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Abstract 
 
The PhD research project is aimed at developing and applying an innovative framework toward 
Risk Assessment of cascading events within the chemical and process industry, addressing 
both domino and security-based events.  
Cascading events are catastrophic accidents, triggered by external hazard factors, including 
safety-based (i.e., domino) and security-based events. In the chemical industry domain, 
barriers provide a crucial role for the prevention, control and mitigation of cascading events. 
Therefore, it is necessary to apply innovative techniques, aimed at the evaluation of barriers 
technical performance and at their optimal economic allocation, to be inserted within 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (i.e., QRA). 
Concerning barriers technical performance, the research activity is aimed at applying Bayesian 
Networks to safety barriers performance assessment, regarding domino events. Starting from 
a conventional approach, preliminary applications have been aimed at implementing a 
Bayesian approach to barriers performance assessment concerning major accidents. 
Therefore, the approach has been extended to domino accident analysis, in purpose to evaluate 
the effect of barriers introduction within modelling. The case studies demonstrated that the 
application of a Bayesian approach provides a very accurate barriers performance assessment 
within QRA, with reference to external hazard factors driven accidents (i.e., domino events), 
offering a realistic risk picture. 
Concerning barriers optimal economic allocation, the research activity is aimed at developing 
and applying an original economic model for the prevention of security-based cascading 
events. The model includes security upgrades performance and costs assessment, evaluation 
of benefits and definition of threat and vulnerability probabilities. The application of economic 
techniques, by means of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, enables barriers optimal 
allocation within budgets constraints. Validation of the model is provided by application to 
relevant case studies. Therefore, the model enables defining rational criteria for barriers 
optimal selection and allocation and its outputs support the inclusion of security hazards 
within QRA, and related decision-making.
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Section 1. 
Premise 
 
Since the past century, the worldwide population growth has caused a relentless increase of 
energy demand and material supply to fulfill its everyday needs. The chemical and process 
industry has seized the challenge by a continuous innovation in its technologies, which leads 
to a relevant increase of chemical production and, in turn, to process intensification, with high 
amounts of hazardous materials to be handled and stored, as well as severe operating 
conditions. Moreover, chemical and process installations tend to form huge and complex 
clusters, often located in proximity of densely populated areas for logistic purposes. Due to 
these reasons, the occurrence of cascading events, which are catastrophic escalations of 
accidental events, triggered by external hazard factors, and characterized by high impact and 
low probability, is a concerning phenomena. These accidental events may be divided based on 
their nature, into two classes. Safety-based events, as domino and natural events are 
unintentional, while security-based events, as terroristic attacks and sabotage, are the results 
of intentional malevolent acts. Indeed, the importance of cascading events is strictly linked to 
their potential consequences in terms of disruption of operations, destruction of property, 
environmental damages, health deterioration or loss of life, both inside and outside facility 
boundaries. 
Nowadays, quantitative risk assessment is a widely applied tool to provide quantitative 
information on risk caused by conventional major accidents in the chemical and process 
industry. Therefore, it plays an established and fundamental role for major accidents 
prevention. Nevertheless, recent major catastrophic events have raised the need to go beyond 
the limits of conventional methods for risk assessment and related techniques to support the 
decision-making process, in purpose to address emerging and increasing risk issues, triggered 
by external hazard factors, as domino, security and natural events. This PhD research project 
was aimed at developing and applying a novel framework toward risk assessment of cascading 
events, addressing both domino and security-based events. State of the art methodologies for 
risk assessment and related decision-making process are presented, with a focus on recent 
techniques and tools for the inclusion of external hazard factors. Novel methodologies are 
presented and applied to case studies. 
In Section 2, the state of the art of quantitative risk assessment background and recent 
developments within the chemical and process industry domain is provided. The 
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improvements of risk assessment techniques in the last thirty years, the limitations that still 
need to be tackled, and the possible way forward offered by dynamic risk assessment 
techniques, capable to deal with emerging and increasing risks, are highlighted.  
In Section 3, an overview on the methods and tools to perform risk assessment and on 
economic techniques to support related decision-making, in the prevention of external hazard 
factors driven accidents, is provided. The description will focus on the role played by safety and 
security measures (or barriers), which are widely employed within chemical and process 
facilities, in purpose to prevent, control or mitigate unwanted events or accidents. Indeed, 
safety measures refers to unintentional (i.e., safety-based) accidents, while security-measures 
refers to intentional malevolent acts (i.e., security-based). Classifications and methodologies 
for their performance assessment are provided, highlighting parallels and differences. The 
analysis of research gaps is conducted to highlight possible needs to apply innovative 
techniques for barriers performance assessment and to develop novel economic models for 
their optimal selection and allocation, to be inserted within the broader risk assessment 
framework. 
With regards to barriers performance, the research activity is aimed at developing and applying 
Bayesian Networks, a graphical-probabilistic technique able to dynamically revise occurrence 
probabilities over time, to safety barriers performance assessment in the context of major 
accidents and domino effects analysis. A description of the Bayesian approach is available in 
Section 3 and the applications thereto related are presented in Section 5. Starting from a 
conventional approach, preliminary applications are focused on the implementation of a 
Bayesian approach to safety barriers performance assessment and on the comparison of the 
obtained results. As the Bayesian approach proves to be able in representing accidental 
scenarios with enhanced flexibility in comparison with conventional methodologies and 
demonstrates its advantages in the revision of safety barriers performance probabilities, top 
event, intermediate and final events probabilities over time, it can be extended to cascading 
events prevention, with particular reference to domino accident analysis, to assess the effect of 
safety barriers application in the modelling step. Two original case studies, the first regarding 
a simplified tank farm and the second regarding a realistic tank farm, are carried out, in 
purpose to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach.  
With regards to economic models for optimal barriers selection and allocation, the research 
activity is aimed at developing and applying an original economic model for the prevention of 
security-based cascading events and for related decision-making support. A description of the 
methodology is available in Section 4. Starting from the baseline performance of the physical 
security system, the model allows proposing site-specific security upgrades and accounting 
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both the performance improvement and the costs of their implementation. The model includes 
also the evaluation of benefits, considering avoided losses for several pertinent hypothetical 
scenarios. Moreover, it allows defining threat and vulnerability probabilities for a chemical 
installation, in relation with possible typologies of malicious acts. The application of economic 
techniques, by means of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, enables the comparison 
among different security upgrades and the choice of economically feasible ones, as well as the 
determination of the combination with the maximum profit, with budgets constraints. The 
model is developed in two-fold versions, in purpose to better represent different typologies and 
specificities of security-based accidents within chemical and process installations. Validation 
of the model is provided by application to relevant case studies, presented in Section 6. 
In this thesis, advanced tools and methodologies are applied, in purpose to address the 
inclusion of cascading events triggered by external hazards factors in quantitative risk 
assessment for the chemical and process industry domain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extension of Quantitative Risk Assessment to the Analysis of External Hazard Factors 
in the Chemical and Process Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2 - State of the art on Risk Assessment background and recent developments 
5 
 
Section 2. 
State of the art on Risk Assessment 
background and recent developments 
 
The objective of this section is to analyse the progress of Risk Assessment during the last 
decades and to offer an overview on its recent advancements and applications for chemical and 
process industries. Despite the general approach of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is 
unchanged since its origin in the early 1980s, QRA has continuously evolved in different forms 
and its fields of application have enlarged significantly beyond process safety, where it has 
always been traditionally developed and used for chemical process industries. Now risk 
assessment techniques play a fundamental role in process design, implementation of safety 
systems, inspection and maintenance planning as well as operation management. Eventually 
risk assessment has become an essential tool for the development, continued operation and 
expansion of process installations. On the other hand, QRA limitations, such as its inability to 
update the risk picture, led to the development of several recent dynamic risk assessment 
approaches, whose methodological and applicative contributions are introduced in this 
section. This demonstrates that risk assessment is in continuous development; nevertheless, it 
still shows many challenges to face: a way forward is improving its range of application, 
preciseness and its capability to be dynamically updated, that it will enhance its support to 
decision-making. 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
During the last three decades, risk assessment has emerged as an essential and systematic tool 
that plays a relevant role in the overall management of many aspects of our life.  
In particular, risk assessment has shown dramatically its importance in technical domains 
dealing with hazardous materials. Pasman affirms that events involving hazardous materials 
represent the most dreadful risk (Pasman, 2015). Such substances may range in nature and 
effect and a high-level definition may be provided by the CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive) acronym, on which the Council of the European Union 
has recently focused its attention. In fact, a CBRNE agenda was defined to develop strategic 
and overarching approach to CBRNE policy fields involving internal and external safety and 
security aspects (Council of the European Union, 2012). 
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Loss of control of such substances has the potential to cause high consequence low probability 
accidents (Pasman, 2015) and specific safety measures are designed to mitigate such risk. For 
this reason, accurately evaluating risk of a system represents the foundation for effective 
prevention. 
The chemical and nuclear sectors commonly store large amounts of CBRNE substances – 
mostly chemical and explosive the former and radiological and nuclear the latter. Presumably 
due to the high social impact of nuclear accidents (e.g. on the 30th anniversary of the 
Chernobyl disaster, access within the 30-km exclusion zone is still restricted (Fountain, 2016)), 
risk assessment has its roots in the nuclear sector and only later spread to the chemical process 
industry (Pasman, 2015).  
Despite the obvious differences between the two sectors, continuous exchange of knowledge 
and methods from one to the other has led to huge improvements in the chemical process 
industry (Charvet et al., 2011) and helped to cope with increasing issues of social acceptability 
(Marshall, 1997).  
Nuclear power risk analysts have a long tradition of quantitative approaches: the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed its first nuclear power plant Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in the 1970s (NUREG - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2016). However, 
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) reached the chemical process industry only at a later stage. 
For instance, before 2003 quantitative probability assessment was used to assess risk in the 
French chemical industry (Charvet et al., 2011). Similarly, the accident occurred in Buncefield 
(United Kingdom) in 2005 called into question the semi-qualitative risk analysis approach 
used for flammable substances in the British chemical industry, whereas the other hazardous 
substances were subject to QRA since the 1980s (Buncefield Major Investigation Board, 2008).  
While the disadvantage of QRA was mainly represented by the computational effort needed to 
perform it, its advantage is that it deals with some of the criticisms made to qualitative analysis 
(Buncefield Major Investigation Board, 2008): 
 vagueness in terminology, for example “a very high degree of protection”, 
“worthwhile (sometimes almost total) protection”, “unlikely but foreseeable”; 
 arbitrariness and lack of transparency in selection of the worst-case event, and 
through this, potential inconsistency in treatment between installations;  
 challenges at comparing the degree of protection achieved with that for other 
everyday risks. 
With the progressive increase in computation power, QRA is nowadays a tool widely applied 
to provide quantitative information on risk caused by conventional accidents in chemical 
process plants.  
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Despite the obvious fact that QRA is not an exact description of reality, it may represent the 
best available, analytic predictive tool data to assess the risks of complex process and storage 
facilities. QRA consists of a set of methodologies for estimating the risk posed by a given system 
in terms of human loss or, in some cases, economic loss (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 2000; Mannan, 2005). Recently, risk assessment methodologies and applications have 
evolved toward a dynamic direction, in order to address risk issues in a continuously evolving 
environment, support operations and overcome limitations of conventional techniques. 
Moreover, this allows for continuous integration with more accurate information and 
refinement of the risk picture (Paltrinieri and Khan, 2016). The Living Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (LPSA), theorized for the nuclear sector in 1999 (IAEA, 1999), might have inspired 
such evolution. 
In the past, several reviews dealt with risk assessment under different perspectives. Due to the 
difference in the review scopes, different techniques have been considered by these studies. 
However, they all address the fundamental phases of risk assessment and may provide useful 
insight.  
Khan and Abbasi have presented a relevant state-of-art review on the techniques and 
methodologies available up to 1998 for risk assessment in the chemical process industry, but 
some steps forward have been made in the meantime (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a). Tixier et al. 
have listed 62 risk analysis methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative ones, for generic 
industrial plants (Tixier et al., 2002). Marhavilas et al. have published a review of risk analysis 
and assessment, but generically referred to different work sites (Marhavilas et al., 2011). More 
recently, Reniers and Cozzani (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013) and Necci et al. (Necci et al., 2015) 
presented reviews on quantitative risk assessment for the chemical process industry, 
specifically concerning domino accidents.  
The present work aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of risk assessment 
methodologies and relevant applications for the chemical process industry, which may be 
missing by reading the mentioned past reviews. This sector is addressed because of its high 
criticality in terms of safety and security. Progresses and drawbacks are identified in order to 
propose an overview on recent advancements and future directions. This allows understanding 
what is the state of the art of QRA in chemical process industry and why specific approaches 
are used today. Achievements and limitations suggest how risk assessment approaches may 
(or may not) be applied for different purposes. Moreover, limitations pave the way for future 
research and development of the current techniques. 
The literature review proposed starts in Section 2.2 with a description of the implications of 
risk definition, whose concept provides sound foundation for risk assessment. Fundamentals 
of Quantitative Risk Assessment are reported in Section 2.3, in order to make clear what has 
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been nowadays accomplished as current industrial practice in risk assessment and what are 
eventually the criticalities. Section 2.4 intends to consider, with a novel classification approach, 
how risk assessment methodologies and applications have recently evolved toward a dynamic 
direction, in order to address risk issues in a continuously evolving environment. A review of 
existing dynamic risk assessment methodologies is followed by their application to different 
aspects inherent of the process industry: accident and consequence modelling, process design, 
implementation of safety systems, control systems, asset integrity and maintenance planning, 
inclusion of external factors. Section 2.5 presents a discussion on the advantages and 
limitations of dynamic approaches and, in Section 2.6, conclusions are drawn on the state of 
art of Risk Assessment and probable future developments for chemical process industries. 
2.2  IMPLICATIONS OF RISK DEFINITION 
Several efforts have been devoted to define the concept of risk in chemical process industry, as 
shown by related literature: Aven and Renn (Aven and Renn, 2010, 2009) proposed 9 general 
risk definitions, which have been later revised within risk assessment (Aven and Zio, 2011) and 
safety domains (Aven and Reniers, 2013) and eventually refined (Aven, 2012). Risk definitions 
provide a sound foundation for risk assessment and management: review of risk definitions is 
reported in Table 2. 1.  
Table 2. 1 Review of risk definitions by Aven (Aven, 2012). 
 Definition of Risk References 
1 Expected value (Loss) Risk equals the expected loss. (Willis, 2007) 
Risk equals the expected disutility. (Campbell, 2005) 
2 Probability of an (undesirable) 
event 
Risk means the likelihood of a specific effect originating from a 
certain hazard occurring within a specified period or in specified 
circumstances. (Kirchsteiger, 2002)  
3 Objective Uncertainty Risk is measurable uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty where the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either 
from calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience). 
(Knight, 1921)  
4 Uncertainty Risk refers to uncertainty of outcome, of actions and events. 
(Cabinet Office, 2002) 
5 Potential/possibility of a loss Risk is the potential for realisation of unwanted, negative 
consequences of an event. (Rowe, 1977)  
6 Event estimated frequency 
(probability) × event 
consequences 
Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects. 
(Lowrance, 1976)  
Risk is defined as a set of scenarios, each of which has a probability/ 
frequency and a consequence - set of triplets. For a given scenario, 
risk is the product of estimated probability/ frequency and event 
consequences. (Kaplan, 1997; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981) 
7 Event or consequence Risk is a situation or event where something of human value 
(including humans themselves) is at stake and where the outcome 
is uncertain. (Rosa, 2003, 1998)  
Risk is an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with 
respect to something that humans value. (IRGC - International Risk 
Governance Council, 2009) 
8 Consequences/damage/severity 
of these + Uncertainty 
Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of 
events/consequences and associated uncertainties (will the events 
occur, what will be the consequences). (Aven, 2007) 
9 Effect of uncertainty on 
objectives 
(ISO, 2009; ISO31000:2009, 2009) 
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As we can appreciate, there is a broad set of existing ways of looking at the concept of risk: 
expected loss (Willis, 2007), likelihood of hazard effect (Kirchsteiger, 2002), uncertainty of 
outcome (Cabinet Office, 2002), potential of negative consequence (Rowe, 1977) or 
combination of probability and consequence (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Lowrance, 1976).  
Reading such definitions and their authors explanation, it can be derived that the terms used 
to express loss (Willis, 2007), disutility (Campbell, 2005), effect (ISO, 2009; ISO31000:2009, 
2009; Lowrance, 1976), outcome (Knight, 1921) and (undesirable) event (Kirchsteiger, 2002) 
may be conceptually associated to Kaplan and Garrick’s "consequence" (Kaplan and Garrick, 
1981). While uncertainty (Aven, 2007; Cabinet Office, 2002; ISO, 2009; ISO31000:2009, 
2009; Knight, 1921), likelihood (Kirchsteiger, 2002), potential or possibility (Rowe, 1977) may 
be conceptually associated to Kaplan and Garrick’s "probability" (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). 
In this way, the definitions of risk reported in Table 2.1 may be plotted on a 
"consequence/probability" diagram in order to show whether they give more importance to 
one or the other aspect (or both) (Figure 2. 1). This may be objected as "over-reduction" to 
basic terms, because each definition conveys specific (and important) shades of the risk 
concept, according to their authors. For this reason, the diagram gives only a high-level 
overview on the priorities addressed by these risk definitions. Figure 2. 1 can be read in a 
twofold manner to highlight the difference between risk definitions and risk itself.  
1. Consequence/probability plot for risk definitions, where definition is intended as “an 
exact statement or description of the nature, scope, or meaning of something” (i.e. risk) 
(Stevenson, 2016). It shows that definition 1 (to a lower extent also definition 7 – Table 
1) focuses mainly on the potential event consequence, while definition 4 focuses mainly 
on the probability. The other definitions address both consequence and probability, 
with varying degrees of accuracy – 5, 2 and 9 in a relatively less specific and detailed 
way than 3, 6 and 8. 
2. Consequence/probability plot to categorize unbiased hypothetical risk into typologies. 
Risk of low-probability and low-consequence events resides in the "normal area" (green 
area) and it is an acceptable risk to sustain. While the probability and the event 
consequence raise, the associated risk is described first by the intermediate area (yellow 
area), for which risk mitigation measures are needed, and then by the intolerable area, 
for which extraordinary measures of risk prevention should be carried out.  
Four priority areas are reported on the diagram, showing the typology of risk considered as 
worst-case scenario by the definitions from Table 2. 1. For instance, the risk definitions 1 and 
7 associate risk mainly with consequence. For this reason, they may lead to identify worst-case 
scenarios in any point of the elongated priority area 1, without distinction on probability. 
Similarly, the priority area 4 shows where worst-case scenarios characterized by high 
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probability can be identified by following the risk description 4. The priority areas 2 and 3 rely 
on both consequence and probability to identify worst-case scenarios. However, while the risk 
definitions 5, 2 and 9 being less detailed may lead to uncalibrated assessment, following the 
risk definitions 3, 6 and 8 may allow defining actual high-consequence and high-probability 
worst-case scenarios. 
 
Figure 2. 1 Diagram of risk definitions and related priority areas. 
Different risk definitions may lead to different ways of risk assessment and management. For 
instance, three out of four priority areas in Figure 2. 1 coincide with the risk classes outlined 
by Renn and Klinke (Renn and Klinke, 2004), for which different strategies for action were 
defined.  
Risk priority area 1. Risk management with focus on reducing the disaster potential, 
improving emergency preparedness and increasing resilience – i.e. the capability to 
cope with the unexpected (Renn and Klinke, 2004).  
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Risk priority area 2. Risk management with focus on implementing precautionary 
principle, improving knowledge and reduction/containment (Renn and Klinke, 2004). 
Risk priority area 3. Risk management with focus on consciousness building and risk 
communication (Renn and Klinke, 2004). 
Risk priority area 4. Due to the high probability of occurrence, risk management with 
focus on lessons learned from past events. Not included in Renn and Klinke's classes. 
This association of different perspectives on the definition of risk and related risk strategies 
suggests that there is not one single approach, but several paths leading to relatively different 
results, which may be all beneficial but intrinsically incomplete. In order to properly cover the 
consequence/probability diagram (Figure 2. 1), integration is needed for continuous 
enrichment with new and important details of the overall risk picture.  
2.3  FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
Distant events in time, such as the tragedies occurred in Bhopal (1984) and Piper Alpha (1988), 
as well as more recent ones, such as Buncefield (2005) and Deepwater Horizon (2010), have 
remarked the essential role of adequate management and control for chemical process 
industry. The European industrial safety regulations aiming to control major-accident hazards 
related to chemical substances are named after the town of Seveso, in Italy, scene of a disaster 
occurred in a chemical process plant in 1976.  
In 2012, the third generation of these regulations (Seveso III directive) (EU, 2012) was issued 
and it applies to more than 10000 industrial establishments in the European Union, mainly 
chemical, petrochemical, logistics and metal refining sectors (European Commission - 
Environment Directorate, 2015). QRA is used to comply with Seveso regulations (Pasman and 
Reniers, 2014), evaluate the overall process safety risk in the chemical process industry and 
identify areas requiring risk reduction (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2000).  
The installations to be considered in the QRA are selected following consultation between the 
operator of an establishment and the competent authority. The operator is responsible for the 
calculations needed to select installations. However, the selection of the installations to 
consider in the QRA is carried out by the competent authority only (TNO, 2005a). 
2.3.1 Quantitative risk assessment for Chemical Process Industries 
QRA is a systematic methodology for identifying and quantifying contributions to overall risk 
of a process facility. As defined by NORSOK Standard Z-013 (NORSOK, 2010) and by ISO/IEC 
standard (ISO31000:2009, 2009) Quantitative Risk Assessment includes: establishment of 
the context, risk identification, performance of the risk analysis, risk evaluation. 
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Communication, consultation, monitoring and review activities should be performed prior to, 
during and after the assessment, in purpose to guarantee the achievement of its goals. The Risk 
Assessment process defined by the NORSOK standard Z-013 (NORSOK, 2010) has been 
reported in Figure 2. 2.  
 
Figure 2. 2 Risk Assessment for Process Industry (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2000; 
NORSOK, 2010); figure adapted from NORSOK Standard Z-013 (NORSOK, 2010). 
A QRA can provide authorities and stakeholders with a sound basis for creating awareness 
about existing hazards and risks. Based on the outcomes from the QRA, potential measures to 
control or reduce the risk can be implemented, and their effect can be assessed. A preliminary 
step (0 – Establishment of the context) defines objectives, responsibilities, methods, as well as 
risk acceptance criteria and deliveries throughout process and execution plan, in order to 
derive full value from the results obtained (Mannan, 2005).  
The first step in the development of a chemical process QRA is the identification of hazards (1 
– Hazard identification), which may have several important aims:  
1. Highlighting possible malfunctions of the systems, that even without causing accident, 
can give raise to a loss of product quality or to the process-plant shutdown. 
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2. Outlining top-events that are undesired situations, often the potentials of release of 
hazardous substances to the environment, to be included in the QRA. 
3. Describing potential scenarios associated with the top-events and their consequences. 
Based on the type of process upset and the performance of control and safety barriers, 
the scenario could involve quality loss, safety loss, or both.  
As reported by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 2000), several approaches to hazard identification may be employed: check lists, 
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree 
analysis (FTA), bow-tie analysis (Figure 2. 3), hazard and operability study (HAZOP), etc. Their 
applicability depends on the project lifecycle, as well as the amount of information required. 
The maximum credible accident scenario analysis method developed by Khan and Abbasi 
(Khan and Abbasi, 2002) can be used as a criterion to identify credible scenarios among a large 
number of possibilities (Hashemi et al., 2014).  
The following phases are central for the whole QRA process and lead to the estimation of 
potential initiating events frequencies and evaluation of event consequences (2 – Frequency 
estimation and 3 – Consequence estimation). As stated by Crowl and Louvar (Crowl and 
Louvar, 2011), risk analysis basically involves the estimation of accident consequences and 
frequencies using engineering and mathematical techniques.  
Generic failure rates can be retrieved from databases and applied in QRA calculations; specific 
plant data should be applied, if available. Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment “Purple 
Book” (TNO, 2005a) reports generic loss of containment events (LOCs) and failure frequencies 
for a number of standard installations like storage tanks, transport units, pipelines and loading 
equipment. LOCs should be included if the failure frequency is higher than 10-8 per year and if 
lethal damage (1% probability) outside the establishment boundary is possible. The failure data 
reported in this source are largely based on the research done in the COVO study (COVO 
Commission, 1981), as reported by Beerens (Beerens et al., 2006). Similarly, Health & Safety 
Executive (HSE) has published a set of generic failure frequency data for process installations 
(HSE - Health and Safety Executive, 2009) and it has recently started a comprehensive project 
“Storybuilder” (HSE - Health and Safety Executive, 2012), in order to update failure 
frequencies for process plants.  
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Figure 2. 3 Bow-Tie Diagram: a valuable standard tool for Risk Assessment. 
Consequence estimation is used to determine the potential for damage or injury from specific 
unwanted events. Quantification of consequences has been usually carried out in terms of 
production loss, human health loss, assets loss, and environmental loss (Khan and Haddara, 
2004). The assessment of consequences can be performed using a huge number of 
mathematical and empirical models; a description of many available approaches has been 
presented by Arunraj and Maiti (Arunraj and Maiti, 2009). Consequences estimation firstly 
includes source models, which allow assessing the loss of containment of hazardous substance 
(e.g., the release rate of hazardous material, the degree of flashing and the evaporation rate) 
and the related physical effects, such as fires, explosions and toxic dispersions (TNO, 2005b). 
Physical-mathematical models for the estimation of impacts, named damage models, can be 
applied to calculate the spatial distribution of damage, usually considered by QRA as 
probability of human death. For instance, a review of available models for damage estimation 
has been carried out by Cozzani and Salzano (Cozzani and Salzano, 2004a), which brought a 
significant contribution to the development of vulnerability models for storage tanks subjected 
to shockwaves.  
The following step of QRA (4 – Establishment of  the risk picture), named risk re-composition 
can be performed in order to estimate the risk, by summing the contribution of all scenarios to 
the risk in each specific position over space (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2000). 
The choice of risk metrics is critical as it directs what kind of information to obtain from the 
risk analysis and whether the results are considered legitimate and informative by decision-
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makers and stakeholders (Johansen and Rausand, 2014). Further discussion on the choice of 
the risk metric is carried out later in this section.  
On the basis of risk estimation results, risk is compared with acceptability criteria (5 – Risk 
evaluation), defined by both regulations and companies. Relevant examples of different 
acceptability criteria are the one developed by National Agencies (Pasman, 2011), as well as the 
Risk Matrix developed in the framework of European ARAMIS Project (Salvi and Debray, 
2006). In case of unacceptable risk, adequate measures for its reduction are applied (Aven and 
Vinnem, 2005) throughout the life cycle of the plant. During the concept and engineering 
phase, risk reduction proposals should be focused on possible alternative process options, 
different layouts, equipment and location (NORSOK, 2010). During the operational phase, risk 
reduction proposals on operational nature and modification projects should be evaluated in 
order to demonstrate that the risk level during operations is the lowest, or provide a 
justification, if it is not (NORSOK, 2010). A summary of QRA steps from 1 to 5 is reported in 
Table 2. 2. 
Table 2. 2 Quantitative risk assessment for Chemical Process Industries (CCPS - Center for Chemical 
Process Safety, 2000; NORSOK, 2010): description of the steps from 1 to 5. 
Step Description 
0 Establishment 
of the context 
Definition of the context for the Risk Assessment; this implies defining 
the objectives, the scope, the responsibilities, the   methods, models and 
tools to be used, the system boundaries and basis, the risk acceptance 
criteria, the deliveries throughout the process and the execution plan.  
 
1 Hazard 
Identification 
Definition of the potential event sequences and potential incidents. 
This may be based on qualitative hazard analysis for simple or 
screening level analysis. Complete or complex analysis is normally 
based on a full range of possible incidents for all sources. 
2 Frequency 
Estimation 
Estimation of the potential incident frequencies. Fault trees or generic 
databases may be used for the initial event sequences. Event trees may 
be used to account for mitigation and post release events. 
3 Consequence 
Estimation 
Evaluation of the potential incident outcomes (consequences). Some 
typical tools include vapour dispersion modelling and fire and 
explosion effect modelling. Then the estimation of incident impacts on 
people, environment and property is carried out. 
4 Establishment 
of the Risk 
Picture 
Estimation of the risk is done by combining the potential consequence 
for each event with the event frequency, and summing over all events. 
 
5 Risk Evaluation Identification of the major sources of risk and determination of cost-
effective process or plant modifications, which can be implemented to 
reduce risk. Risk evaluation may be done against legally required risk 
criteria, internal corporate guidelines, comparison with other 
processes or more subjective criteria. If the risk is considered to be 
excessive, then identification and prioritization of potential risk 
reduction measures is required. After that, QRA should be performed 
iteratively, starting from step 2, up to the acceptability criteria is 
satisfied. If the risk is negligible, then emergency response and Land 
Use Planning should face residual risk. 
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Eventually, it must be underlined that QRA may be considered an iterative procedure that 
provide each time a risk picture of the process facility (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 2000) and should be updated maximum every five years or in case of major plant 
changes, as stated by the Seveso directive (EU, 2012). Communications and consultation 
activities (6), as well as monitoring, review and update activities (7) should be performed 
throughout the process. (NORSOK, 2010) 
Johansen and Rausand (Johansen and Rausand, 2012) provide an explanatory overview of 17 
common risk metrics related to major accidents (Table 2. 3); most of the metrics express harm 
to humans, but environmental and material damage are also covered, even if not considered 
by actual standard. A specific evaluation of the choice of the risk metric should be discusses in 
this work, in order to introduce the applicability of QRA to different scopes. 
In particular, the risk metrics addressing harm to humans (first 10 risk metrics in Table 2. 3) 
were analysed. A score from 1 to 5 was assigned for the following dimensions: 
1. Tangible application (tangible – score 1) against hypothetical application (hypothetical 
– score 5) to the life cycle phases of a chemical process plant. For example, application 
of a risk metric to the phase of "Operation and maintenance" has relatively concrete 
implication and addresses known, consolidated and, somehow, routine activities (score 
1). On the contrary, application of a risk metrics to the phase of "Feasibility" implies a 
prediction of the system behaviour, which is modelled on the basis of hypothesis (score 
5). Between these two extremes, application to the other life cycle phases is ranked as 
it follows (from tangible to hypothetical): "Detailed Design and Engineering 
Installation" (score 2), "Decommissioning/ disposal" (score 3) and "Concept" (score 4). 
An average value is defined for risk metrics applied to more than one phase. 
2. Risk metrics focusing on the harm of the single individual (individual – score 1) against 
risk metrics addressing the societal effect of an unwanted event (societal – score 5). 
Group risk metrics are in an intermediate position (score 3). 
3. Specific risk metrics addressing only one life cycle phase (specific – score 1) against 
general risk metrics addressing all the five risk phases (general – score 5). Scoring for 
this dimension is straightforward and defines the level of specificity of the risk metrics. 
Figure 2. 4 illustrates the results of this qualitative analysis by means of a radar chart. The 
three percentages reported on the diagram are calculated comparing the areas defined by the 
three contours and the total chart area.
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Table 2. 3 Risk metrics. Characterization of risk metrics categories adapted from Johansen and Rausand (Johansen and Rausand, 2012). 
 
Name 
 
Type 
 
Meaning 
Life cycle phase applicability 
 
 
Feasibility 
 
Concept 
 
Detailed Design 
& 
Engineering/ 
Installation 
 
Operation/ 
Maintenance 
 
Decommissioning/ 
disposal 
IRPA - 
Individual Risk 
per annum 
Loss of life; 
individual risk 
The probability that a specific or hypothetical individual will 
be killed due to exposure to the hazards or activities during 
a period of one year. (NORSOK, 2010; Rausand, 2011) 
   
√ 
 
√ 
 
LIRA - 
Localized 
individual risk 
Loss of life; 
individual risk 
The probability that an average unprotected person, 
permanently present at a specified location, is killed during 
a period of one year due to a hazardous event at an 
installation. (Jonkman et al., 2003; Rausand, 2011) 
 
√ 
 
√ 
   
√ 
IRHSE - 
Individual risk 
of dangerous 
dose 
Indirect harm; 
individual risk 
The frequency of receiving a dangerous dose of a toxic 
chemical, which leads to severe distress, injury or fatality, 
per 106 years. (HSE - Health and Safety Executive, 1992) 
   
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
PLL - Potential 
loss of life 
Loss of life; group 
risk 
The expected number of fatalities within a specific 
population per year. (Jonkman et al., 2003; NORSOK, 2010) 
√     
FAR - Fatal 
accident rate 
Loss of life; group 
risk 
The expected number of fatalities within a specific 
population per 100 million hours of exposure. (NORSOK, 
2010; Rausand, 2011) 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
FN - diagram Loss of life; 
societal risk 
Diagram displaying the relationship between severity (i.e. 
number of fatalities) and frequency of single accidents. (Ball 
and Floyd, 1998) 
  
√ 
  
√ 
 
RICOMAH - 
Weighted risk 
integral 
Loss of life; 
societal risk 
Expected number of fatalities corrected for risk aversion 
w.r.t. a high number of fatalities. (Hirst and Carter, 2002) 
 
√ 
 
√ 
   
SRI - Scaled risk 
integral 
Loss of life; group 
risk 
Group risk per area per year. (Ball and Floyd, 1998)  √    
TR - Total Risk Loss of life; 
societal risk 
Expected number of fatalities corrected for risk aversion 
w.r.t. extreme events. (Vrijling et al., 1995) 
√     
PEF - Potential 
equivalent 
fatality 
Loss of life; group 
risk 
Expected harm per year from both fatalities and injuries, 
where injuries are expressed as fractions of a fatality. (EMS, 
2001) 
    
√ 
 
PER - Potential 
environmental 
risk 
Environmental 
damage 
Frequency of a defined consequence category for a certain 
organism, population, habitat or ecosystem within an area. 
(OLF, 2007) 
 
√ 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
 √: yes;       Blank: no 
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Table 2. 3 (Continued) Risk metrics. Characterization of risk metrics categories adapted from Johansen and Rausand (Johansen and Rausand, 2012). 
 
Name 
 
Type 
 
Meaning 
Life cycle phase applicability 
 
Feasibility 
 
Concept 
 
Detailed 
Design & 
Engineering/ 
Installation 
 
Operation/ 
Maintenance 
 
Decommissioning/ 
disposal 
RT - Recovery 
time 
Environmental 
damage 
The probability per year of having an accident that exceeds the 
time needed by the ecosystem to recover from damage. (OLF, 
2007) 
  
√ 
   
√ 
FE - diagram Environmental 
damage or economic 
loss; societal risk 
Diagram displaying the relationship between the frequency 
and environmental/economic loss in a single accident. 
(Jorissen and Stallen, 1998) 
  
√ 
  
√ 
 
EL - Expected 
economic loss 
Economic loss Expected value of economic loss per year. (Jonkman et al., 
2003) 
  
√ 
  
√ 
 
Frequency of 
intermediate 
events 
Indirect loss Frequency of hazardous or intermediate events in an accident 
scenario. (NORSOK, 2010; NUREG - US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2003) 
   
√ 
  
CED - 
Conditional 
expected 
damage  
General loss; 
societal risk 
Conditional expected value given that the consequence 
severity is above a specified level. (Haimes, 2004) 
  
√ 
   
MCR - 
Monetary 
collective risk 
Combined loss; 
societal/group risk 
Expected total loss in terms of monetary units per year, 
aggregated and weighted across different damage categories 
(e.g. fatalities, injuries, disruption of service). (Bohnenblust 
and Slovic, 1998) 
 
√ 
    
√: yes;       Blank: no 
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Figure 2. 4 Analysis of risk metrics expressing harm to humans. 
The blue contour is defined by the tangible/hypothetical scoring of the risk metrics. Its area 
shows that the representative human harm risk metrics collected by Johansen and Rausand 
(Johansen and Rausand, 2012) tend to focus more on tangible/concrete life cycle phases of a 
chemical process plant (as previously defined): resulting area of 39%, where 0% represents 
tangible/concrete life cycle phases and 100% represents hypothetical modelling phases. This 
underlines the fact that there is big care also in terms of safety of the phases of "operation and 
maintenance" and "detailed design and engineering installation", which represent the core of 
the plant life cycle and are key phases in terms of productivity. However, these phases are 
subject to regular tests and inspections and they are supported by operational experience. 
Other phases that are performed only once in the life cycle of a plant and have little chance to 
be corrected ("Feasibility", "Concept" and "Decommissioning / disposal") might hide latent 
risks. 
The green contour is defined by the individual/societal scoring of the risk metrics. Its area 
shows that the risk metrics considered tend to focus more on the individual: resulting area of 
39%, where 0% represents individual risk and 100% represents societal risk. A good 
overlapping between the green and the blue areas shows that individual risk metrics tend to be 
preferred for tangible/concrete plant life cycle phases, such as "operation and maintenance" 
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and "detailed design and engineering installation", while group and societal risk metrics tend 
to be used for more hypothetical phases, such as "Feasibility" and "Concept". 
The red contour is defined by the specific/general scoring of the risk metrics. Its area shows a 
pronounced specificity of these metrics: resulting area of 15%, where 0% represents specific 
metrics and 100% represents general metrics. Thus, in most of the cases, the risk metrics are 
defined for few life cycle phases of a chemical process plant and cannot be effectively used to 
describe the other phases. In the following section, more details on the applicability of QRA to 
these life cycle phases are discussed. 
2.3.2 Application of QRA in the chemical process industry 
At the beginning of its history, QRA was used primarily as a verification activity (Falck et al., 
2000), while now it plays a relevant role in different aspects of process plant life cycle, as shown 
in the previous section. An important application of QRA is risk-based design; as pointed out 
by Fadier and De la Garza (Fadier and De la Garza, 2006) and Hale et al. (Hale et al., 2007), 
risk-based or risk-informed design plays a relevant role in risk-reduction for chemical and 
process installations. A valid quantitative approach to a risk-based engineering design involves 
acquiring and incorporating all of the possible knowledge on the design into the decision 
process (Demichela and Piccinini, 2004). Important QRA results are obtained at the earliest 
possible stage of the design process (Hendershot, 2006), such as the feasibility and the concept 
phases or at least as soon as the cost of plant and potential accidents can be estimated. As 
previously shown, specific risk metrics are applied in these phases and, with the exception of 
the LIRA risk metric, a particular attention is given to group and societal risk (Table 2. 3). In 
this framework Medina et al. have developed and applied a relevant optimization procedure, 
which can be applied to reduce the risk of a given plant or unit by finding an ‘‘optimum’’ design 
(Medina et al., 2009).  
However, as Shariff and Zaini point out, QRA has been often applied in the detailed design and 
engineering installation because, at preliminary design stage, process designers normally lack 
of information on the risk level from process plant (Shariff and Zaini, 2013). Generally, QRA 
is carried out when the main equipment layout has been completed. For instance, safety system 
modelling is nowadays an integral part of risk assessment studies and represents a significant 
application of QRA. In this regard, safety systems aiming to avoid, prevent, limit or control 
accidents are evaluated to examine the extent to which they are effective in reducing the risk 
of the accident to an acceptable level. An important contribution was given by SCAP 
methodology (Khan et al., 2002a, 2002b, 2001), a quantitative methodology for design of 
safety measures based on a feedback system of fault tree and credible accident. Cozzani et al. 
(Cozzani et al., 2009) and Khan and Abunada (Khan and Abunada, 2010) proposed a new 
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methodology: a risk-based approach to measure process safety using a set of safety 
performance indicators.  
Another relevant application of QRA is a risk-based approach to operations and maintenance, 
which at present time is widely recognized, after many researchers and industries have 
addressed this issue (Apeland and Aven, 2000; Hale et al., 1998; Vaurio, 1995). Risk-based 
maintenance is designed to study all the failure modes, determining the risk associated with 
those failure modes, and developing a maintenance strategy that minimizes the occurrence of 
the high-risk failure modes (Arunraj and Maiti, 2007; Okoh and Hauge, 2013). Risk-based 
maintenance and inspection strategies have been developed to provide a basis for not only 
taking the reliability of a system into consideration when making decisions regarding the type 
and the time for maintenance actions, but also to be able to take into consideration the risk 
that would result as a consequence of an unexpected failure (Khan and Haddara, 2004). 
During decommissioning and disposal phases, risk assessment should be aimed at evaluating 
the risk to the health and safety of the personnel directly involved in the decommissioning and 
disposal operations and to the environment, taking into account geographical and social 
specificities (ISO, 2002).  
However, the application of QRA is not only confined in the mentioned phases of a plant life 
cycle. It is applied to entire industrial areas (Egidi et al., 1995) and several subsequent 
developments with Land Use Planning purposes (Spadoni et al., 2003, 2000).  
Moreover, in the last years, much attention has been posed on the possible extension of QRA 
to external hazard factors (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani, 2010; Cozzani et al., 2006), as 
domino, security and natural hazards. A comprehensive approach was obtained to allow the 
inclusion of natural hazards (NaTech), such as flooding (Cozzani et al., 2010) and lightning 
(Necci et al., 2014), and extending its potentialities to the quantitative assessment of the 
contribution to industrial risk due to such scenarios. A summary of the mentioned approaches 
can be found in Cozzani et al. (Cozzani et al., 2014) demonstrates that the topic has almost 
filled its research gaps. Indeed, as stressed by several authors, the integration of QRA with 
domino accidents, still needs improvements in terms of methodologies to be applied and 
insertion of risk reducing measures in the analysis (Janssens et al., 2015; Khakzad, 2015; 
Khakzad et al., 2013d). Moreover, the necessity to include in QRAs security hazards, such as 
possible terrorist attacks and sabotages, in order to define an exhaustive risk-picture that 
represents in a detailed and realistic way the real situation is pointed out by several authors 
(Reniers, 2010; Reniers and Audenaert, 2014; Srivastava and Gupta, 2010). A detailed 
overview on the existing methodologies and applications for the inclusion of external hazard 
factors in QRA, with particular reference to domino and security hazards, is available in Section 
3. 
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2.3.3 Accomplishments and criticisms of QRA 
Greenberg et al. (Greenberg et al., 2012) describe some of the last accomplishments that 
generic risk analysis has had in the last years addressing health, safety, and the environment. 
A list of accomplishments can be also identified for QRA along the same lines of what identified 
by Greenberg et al. (Greenberg et al., 2012). 
1. Risk perception and behaviour are increasingly affected by analytical evaluation. Risk 
managers may be perceived more competent by means of QRA, which leads to less 
concern and more benefits perceived by the public and greater acceptance of a hazard 
(Frewer et al., 1996; Peters et al., 1997; Siegrist, 2000; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; 
Slovic, 2000, 1993). 
2. QRA has laid the foundation for estimating the economic impact of hazard events. 
Several examples show that such impact should not be disregarded and represent an 
important element for critical decision-making (Kyaw and Paltrinieri, 2015; Paltrinieri 
et al., 2014c).  
3. By means of QRA, risk communication is providing reliable and useful information to 
all interested parties, including scientists and managers "who too often think that they 
already know whatever they need to know" (National Research Council, 1989). 
4. Legal decisions may be now supported by the application of QRA for a more risk-
informed outcome, as demonstrated by the outcome of the trials assessing the 
responsibilities of the explosion occurred in the Buncefield oil depot in 2005 (HSE - 
Health and Safety Executive, 2011). 
On the other hand, there are frequent criticisms associated to QRA paving the way to follow 
for further improvements.  
1. Creedy (Creedy, 2011) addresses the estimation of the frequencies included in the QRA 
by stating that “it still appears to be largely based on values from several decades ago”. 
He affirms that the decision-making process and management system for risk control 
is a field where much has been learned in the last two decades, but it is not clear how 
much this learning is taken into account when estimating frequencies. There is need 
for both realistic values of failure probability and event frequency better describing the 
actual conditions of the system.  
2. Classical risk analysis approach is static. It decomposes a system and focuses on failure 
events of components. This approach is not sufficient to explain all what can go wrong, 
because it does not grasp the dynamics of unsafe interactions and fails to capture the 
variation of risks as deviations or changes in the process and plant (Kalantarnia et al., 
2009; Pasman and Reniers, 2014). QRA produces a risk picture in a frozen moment of 
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the plant life cycle that may turn to be a partial and temporary description of the overall 
safety problem. For instance, analysts may tend to initially focus on changes around a 
reference point, such as reference value of risk assessed through a QRA, and relatively 
disregard extreme situations. This is explained by Greenberg et al. (Greenberg et al., 
2012) with the prospect theory and may lead to the choice of an incomplete risk 
strategy, as introduced in Section 2.2. Moreover, as Falck et al. affirms (Falck et al., 
2015), risk assessment performed for a specific life cycle phase of a plant is not always 
suitable for the other phases and needs to be updated. This is also demonstrated by the 
presence of risk metrics that are specific for some life cycle phases of the plant and not 
for others (Section 2.3.1). These criticisms highlight the need of a dynamic approach 
that can be adapted through the lifespan of a plant. 
3. Apostolakis (Apostolakis, 2004) claims that probability cannot be realistically 
calculated, meaning that one cannot use straightforward statistical methods and divide 
the number of failures by the number of trials to calculate “realistic” probabilities. QRA 
analysts make an extensive use of expert judgment and should always look at the 
uncertainties associated with the results. For this reason, a project such as PDS 
(Reliability Prediction Method for Safety Instrumented Systems) (Hauge et al., 2013), 
run by SINTEF to provide an evaluation method for reliability analysis, aims to account 
for the major reliability influencing factors through consultation with oil companies, 
engineering companies, consultants, vendors and researchers. 
4. Hauge et al. mentions the attempts "made to keep the PDS method and associated 
formulas as simple and intuitive as possible without losing accuracy" (Hauge et al., 
2013). In fact, decision-makers and/or their staff may need some background in these 
methods in order to understand that options are clarified and not obfuscated, and 
someone may distrust the method because assuming that values are buried in the 
numbers and that these drive the decisions (Greenberg et al., 2012). The estimation of 
likelihood is typically treated in a cursory way and sometimes even with apparent 
reluctance, as if examining more deeply could call into question the validity of (or faith 
in) the risk assessment process (Creedy, 2011). A specific mind-set based on the trust 
of this quantitative method should be built by involving decision-makers in the creation 
and refinement of the associated tools. 
5. Further methodologies to support the risk evaluation step needs to be developed, in 
purpose to account the economic and technical performances of risk reducing measures 
in the prevention, control and mitigation of major accidents triggered by external 
hazard factors (i.e., domino and security events) (Landucci et al., 2015a; Reniers, 2010; 
Villa et al., 2016). 
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The accomplishments show the maturity of QRA and its systematic steps – described in Section 
2.3.1. QRA solidity is demonstrated by the wide application to the life cycle phases of chemical 
process industry – Section 2.3.2. However, despite its diffusion, the risk metrics produced by 
a QRA study may reveal overall rigidity, because they are suitable for only few life cycle phases 
of the system – as highlighted in Section 2.3.1. Rigidity is also proved by the tendency of basing 
QRA on outdated frequencies data and little capability of progressive improvement and update 
– as previously mentioned. Moreover, the necessity to further refine the extension of 
quantitative risk assessment to the analysis of external hazard factors was underlined. Such 
drawbacks pave the way to follow for further improvements.  
2.4 WAY FORWARD IN RISK ASSESSMENT: DYNAMIC RISK 
ASSESSMENT APPROACHES  
QRA drawback of intrinsic stativity precludes any possible update and integration of the overall 
risk figures, due to the actual real world ever-changing environment or later improvements 
based on new risk notions. To overcome this limit, during the last decade several efforts have 
been devoted to the development of novel approaches to risk assessment and management, 
which can consider the dynamic evolution of conditions, both internal and external to the 
system, affecting risk assessment (Paltrinieri and Scarponi, 2014). Herein it is reported a brief 
description of the most relevant methodologies and applications of dynamic approaches to risk 
analysis in the chemical process industry, underlining their relevant features. This specific way 
forward in risk assessment (Figure 2. 5), and in general, the growing interest toward the topic 
has been derived by:  
 Over 250 references on Scopus database with inputs “dynamic risk assessment” and 
“process industry” in the decade 2006-2016, proving the interest of academic researchers 
toward this topic; 
 Recent application of these techniques within consulting studies and industries (e.g., in the 
framework of Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry (Norway)). 
The inclusion of external hazard factors and the application of economic techniques within risk 
assessment for the chemical and process industry is addressed in Section 3. 
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Figure 2. 5 Dynamic Risk Assessment as possible way forward for the chemical and process industry 
domain. 
2.4.1 Dynamic Risk Assessment Methodology (DRA) with Bayesian 
Analysis 
Some of the first attempts to simulate the dynamic nature of system behaviour were made by 
Swaminathan and Smidts, who proposed a methodology to extend the application of event 
sequence diagram (ESDs) to the modelling of dynamic situations and identification of missing 
accidental scenarios (Swaminathan and Smidts, 1999a, 1999b). Also, Čepin and Mavko 
developed an extension of the well-established fault tree to represent time requirements in 
safety systems (Čepin and Mavko, 2002) and similarly Bucci et al. (Bucci et al., 2008) 
presented a methodology to extend fault trees and event trees in a dynamic perspective. On the 
other hand, the attempt to deal with an ever-changing environment led to the definition and 
application of a new graphic formalism, named discrete-time Bayesian Network (Boudali and 
Dugan, 2005), which represented random variables and their dependencies by means of nodes 
and directed arcs. The above-mentioned methodologies, even if not completely exhaustive by 
themselves, may be considered as an important starting point for a comprehensive risk-
updating approach.  
The first complete Dynamic Risk Assessment methodology for process facilities, termed as 
Dynamic Failure Assessment, was developed by Meel, Seider et al. (Meel et al., 2007; Meel and 
Seider, 2008, 2006). This approach aims at estimating the dynamic probabilities of accident 
sequences, including near misses and incident data (named as Accident Sequence Precursors 
– ASP) as well as real-time data from processes. This method was applied to several case 
studies, such as CSTR reactor safety systems (Meel and Seider, 2006), Ethyl Benzene process 
(Meel and Seider, 2008), and alarm systems for process equipment (Pariyani et al., 2012a, 
2012b). 
Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) was further developed by Kalantarnia et al. (Abimbola et al., 
2014; Kalantarnia et al., 2010, 2009; Khakzad et al., 2013a): this approach integrates Bayesian 
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failure mechanisms with consequence assessment. The novelty of this approach stands in the 
presence of two additional steps if compared with conventional risk assessment (Table 2. 4). 
These steps represent the key to dynamic risk assessment: accident analysis and probability 
updating. Accident analysis step uses the event/ fault tree along with real time process data to 
estimate events’ probabilities. Then these probabilities can be updated using all available 
information and new data in the form of likelihood function, by means of Bayesian inference. 
Subsequently updated probabilities are applied in the re-estimation of the risk profile for a 
process facility following an iterative procedure, which mirrors real-time changes in the 
system. The Dynamic Risk Assessment process may be implemented to a selected system in 
five steps (Kalantarnia et al., 2010, 2009), as reported in Table 2. 4.   
As a valuable alternative in revising prior failure probabilities, also a non-Bayesian updating 
approach, in which new data are supplied by real time monitoring of parameters, inspection of 
process equipment and use of physical reliability models, was proposed (Ferdous et al., 2013; 
Khakzad et al., 2012). Despite the slight difference in the updating process, all the other 
features are similar to the DRA approach above reported.  
DRA was applied to a real-case represented by the BP Texas Refinery accident (Kalantarnia et 
al., 2010) and offshore drilling operations (Abimbola et al., 2014). The integration with 
established Bow-Tie technique proved to be an effective solution, as revealed by the application 
to a sugar refinery explosion (Khakzad et al., 2012). Starting from the foundational 
contribution by Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al., 2010, 2009), several methodologies have 
tried to enlarge the field of application for Dynamic Risk Assessment, by introducing slight 
modifications. For instance, Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) widened the field of 
application for DRA also to rare event, due to a two-stage Bayesian method. The feasibility of 
this approach was witnessed by the application to BP Deepwater Horizon accident (Yang et al., 
2013) and to offshore blowouts (Khakzad et al., 2014). System hazard identification, prediction 
and prevention methodology (SHIPP) is another relevant approach derived from DRA and 
referred specifically to accident modelling, that has been developed by Rathnayaka et al. 
(Rathnayaka et al., 2011) and proved, in the application to a LNG facility (Rathnayaka et al., 
2012), to be able to integrate technical and non-technical barriers. Another mentionable 
contribution, derived from DRA procedure, is Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment (DORA) 
methodology (Yang and Mannan, 2010a, 2010b) that included conceptual framework design, 
mathematical modelling and decision-making based on cost–benefit analysis. 
Dynamic Risk Assessment methodology has demonstrated to be an exhaustive and versatile 
approach for chemical process systems, as witnessed by several recent applications. The 
mathematics that lies behind Dynamic Risk Assessment is explained in detail, in its application 
to safety barriers performance evaulation, in Section 3.4.2.2.
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Table 2. 4 DRA – Dynamic Risk Assessment (Kalantarnia et al., 2009). Description of the steps. 
Step Description 
0 Collect ASP Monitoring and reporting of process accidents, incidents and near misses. These data have been called Accident Sequence 
Precursors (ASP). 
1 Scenario 
identification 
The potential scenarios, their causes, consequences and related safety barriers are identified by means of a bow-tie analysis. 
A bow-tie analysis is performed at this step to provide a visual representation of consequences, causes and related safety 
barriers in place to mitigate or control the hazards. The “knot” of the bow-tie diagram is generally an event of loss of 
containment, often indicated as “critical event” (CE). Consequences in left-hand part of the diagram and causes in the right-
hand part of the diagram have been respectively indicated as “initiating events” (IEs) and “outcome events” (OEs) 
2 Prior function 
calculation 
The prior failure function of each barrier represents our understanding of it prior to the start of operation. A probability 
density function of type Beta can be selected to represent the failure probability of a system (Vose and Rowe, 2000) such as 
a safety barrier. If a bow-tie diagram approach to the calculation of prior OE frequencies is used, the mean value of the Beta 
distribution of barrier failure probability can be obtained and used as a discrete value. In fact, if the CE frequency (obtained 
by gate-by-gate fault tree calculation (Delvosalle et al., 2005)) is multiplied by the conditional probability values encountered 
on the branch connecting the CE to an OE, that particular OE frequency is obtained, as shown in the following equation: 
Freq(OE) = Freq(CE)∙Prob(OE)∙Prob(SBOE) 
where Freq(CE) is the frequency of the CE, Prob(OE) represents the probabilities of transmission from the CE to the 
considered OE (e.g. probability of immediate or delayed ignition and probability of a VCE) and Prob(SBOE) the failure 
probability function mean values of the safety barriers encountered on the branch between the CE and the considered OE. 
3 Formation of the 
likelihood 
function 
This function is formed using real time data from the process as it operates. These data are inferred from the ASPs and are 
specific numbers within a discrete domain, which is best presented by a binomial distribution. Many approaches exist for 
selecting likelihood functions. The most convenient in the present framework is to use the conjugate pair of the prior function 
(Kalantarnia et al., 2010). Beta and binomial distributions are conjugate pairs and so binomial distribution is used to 
represent the likelihood function. 
4 Posterior 
function 
calculation 
The posterior failure function of the safety barriers has been obtained from the prior and likelihood functions using Bayesian 
inference. Bayesian inference is a tool, which uses data to improve an estimate of a parameter. The posterior function is the 
same distribution type as the prior (Beta), but the parameters are updated trough the likelihood function. Thus, the posterior 
function can be derived as follows: 
f (x|Data) ∝ g(Data|x)∙f (x) 
Where x is the failure probability of the barrier, f(x) is the probability distribution function (prior distribution), f(x|Data) is 
the posterior distribution and g(Data|x) is the likelihood function. Posterior frequencies of the OEs may be obtained using 
the bow-tie diagram approach described previously. 
5 Consequence 
Analysis 
Consequence analysis is carried out on the scenario in order to estimate the potential consequences of all possible OEs. 
Consequence assessment is a straightforward approach as the consequence of an event is often constant throughout the 
lifetime of the process. Generally, consequences of an event in process facilities are: asset loss, human fatality, environmental 
loss, and confidence or reputation loss. 
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2.4.2 Coupling of DRA and DyPASI 
The use of conventional hazard identification techniques may present some limitations related 
to completeness, reproducibility, inscrutability, relevance of experience and subjectivity (CCPS 
- Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2008a). To overcome this limit, DRA was coupled with a 
dynamic hazard identification technique named DyPASI (Dynamic Procedure for atypical 
scenario identification) (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b, 2014c, 2013a, 2013b). The DyPASI procedure 
allows the HAZID process to define and take into account atypical accident scenarios, which 
by definition are deviating from normal expectations of unwanted events or the worst-case 
reference scenarios. As a preliminary activity, DyPASI requires the application of a 
conventional bow-tie technique, followed by the retrieval from databases and search-systems 
of relevant information concerning undetected potential hazards and accident scenarios that 
may not have been previously considered (Paltrinieri et al., 2013a, 2013b). A brief description 
of DyPASI steps has been reported in Table 2. 5.  
Table 2. 5 DyPASI (Paltrinieri et al., 2013b). Description of the steps (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c). 
Step Description 
0 Identification of 
relevant accident 
scenarios by 
means of Bow-
Tie analysis 
Preliminary activity in which the application of a conventional bow-
tie technique is required for the identification of relevant accident 
scenarios and relative safety barriers. This technique provides a visual 
representation of the causes of unintended events, likely outcomes 
and the measures in place to mitigate or control the hazards. It is 
centred on a critical event, i.e. a loss of containment. The left part of 
the bow-tie, named fault tree, identifies the possible causes. The right 
part of the Bow-Tie, named Event-Tree, identifies the possible 
consequences. This step should be ignored in case of update of 
previous bow-tie analysis. 
1 Search for risk 
notions on 
undetected 
hazards 
Search for relevant information on undetected potential hazards and 
accident scenarios not considered by conventional bow-tie 
development. Information retrieval techniques are used to reduce 
potential information overload. 
2 Assessment of 
risk notion 
relevance 
Assessment of information to determine whether it is significant 
enough for further action. A register of risk notions to show relevance 
and impact is used as support. 
3 Scenario 
isolation from 
early warnings 
Isolation of potential scenarios from early warnings and development 
of cause-consequence chain to integrate into the bow-tie diagram. 
4 Definition of 
safety measures 
Definition of safety measures for the newly introduced scenarios. 
Safety barriers and related generic safety functions describe the safety 
measures. 
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DyPASI was applied to both systems where atypical scenarios occurred in the past, such as the 
Buncefield oil depot and the Toulouse fertilizer plant (N. Paltrinieri et al., 2012), and to 
emerging technologies, whose relative lack of experience may lead to atypical scenarios, such 
as a Carbon Capture and Sequestration plant (Paltrinieri et al., 2014d) and LNG (Liquefied 
Natural Gas) regasification units (Paltrinieri et al., 2015b, 2011). 
The DyPASI technique, whose nature is iterative, should not be considered “stand-alone”. In 
this case it was coupled with DRA (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c), as illustrated in Figure 2. 6. The 
results obtained by preliminary applications to systems where actual accidents occurred (BP 
Texas City Refinery (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c) and Hoeganaes Metal Dust accident (Paltrinieri 
et al., 2014b)) showed that the related scenarios could be identified and potentially prevented. 
Moreover, the application of DyPASI technique showed a strong complementarity with DRA, 
which is heavily dependent from the hazard identification and early warning collection systems 
(Paltrinieri et al., 2014c). Therefore, the coupling of two advanced methodologies established 
a more exhaustive dynamic risk assessment approach (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b, 2014c), as 
visible from Table 2. 6. 
 
Figure 2. 6 DRA and DyPASI integrated methodology flowchart. Figure adapted from Paltrinieri et al. 
(Paltrinieri et al., 2014c).
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Table 2. 6 Coupling of two Advanced Dynamic techniques: DRA and DyPASI. Description of the steps, adapted from Paltrinieri et al. (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c). 
Step Description 
1 Definition of scope and 
information required 
The framework and the limits of the study are defined. This involves defining the scope of the risk analysis and the 
information that is required from it. 
2 Hazard identification 
by means of bow-tie 
analysis 
Basic hazards are identified. In this step, the HAZID methodology applied for the representation of the basic and well-
recognized process hazards is the bow-tie analysis.  
3 Definition of accident 
scenario frequency 
Accident scenario frequency is identified. The frequency of the identified scenarios is calculated. 
4 Definition of accident 
scenario consequences 
Accident scenario consequences are identified. The physical extent and severity of the identified scenarios are 
calculated. 
5 Risk estimation by 
composition of 
frequency and 
consequence 
Risk is estimated. Risk is estimated by the composition of probability and consequence for the scenarios identified, as 
recommended by (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). 
6 Risk tolerability 
evaluation according to 
criteria 
Risk tolerability is evaluated according to risk criteria. In case risk exceeds certain limits, appropriate actions are to be 
taken in the next step. 
7 Reactive and proactive 
intervention on risk 
Reactive and proactive intervention on risk is taken. This step is the response to the results previously obtained and, 
at the same time, the starting point of a new reiteration of the analysis. In fact, decision-making should address not 
only reactive actions in response to the calculated risk, but also proactive interventions for a more comprehensive risk 
assessment. In general, robustness in decision-making is of particular relevance. In a dynamic system this principle 
earns more importance because it is asked to cope with variations in its operating environment without alteration or 
loss of functionality. 
8 Application of DyPASI DyPASI is applied. DyPASI is used in the reiteration of the analysis in order to identify and integrate basic process 
hazards with new or atypical scenarios when evidence of them is demonstrated by early warnings. The latter are 
identified by a systematic screening process of related risk notions. Every time DyPASI identifies a new scenario, the 
consequence and the frequency analysis must be reiterated in order to assess its risk. 
9 Posterior function 
calculation (DRA) 
Posterior Probability (DRA) is calculated. By means of the DRA technique (only steps 3 and 4 should be applied) the 
probability of the events identified by the HAZID process is updated. The information for this step (ASPs) is provided 
by the screening process of related risk notions per- formed in the previous step. This reiteration represents also a way 
to monitor system performance. 
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2.4.3 Dynamic Risk Assessment with Bayesian Networks  
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are a graphical representation of uncertain quantities and decisions 
that explicitly reveal the probabilistic dependence between the variables and the related 
information flow. BNs are directed acyclic graphs for reasoning under uncertainty in which 
random variables and their dependencies are represented by means of nodes and directed arcs. 
A distinct advantage of using BNs is that they provide a useful tool to deal with uncertainty and 
with information from different sources, such as expert judgment, observable information or 
experience, as well as common causes and influences of human factors (Ale et al., 2014). The 
mathematics that lies behind Bayesian Networks and the tools offered by a specific software 
for BNs application are presented in Section 3 (Section 3.4.2.2).    
However, despite about 200 publications regarding Bayesian Networks are available with 
reference to dependability, maintenance and risk analysis areas, only 26% of them deals with 
risk analysis topics and few ones are related to the chemical industry domain (Weber et al., 
2012).  
For instance Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b, 2011) made clear how to map conventional 
techniques, as fault-tree and Bow-tie diagrams into BNs. They also discussed the enhanced 
flexibility of BN structure in comparison with the bow-tie diagram; the crucial point is that 
each conventional diagram can be mapped to its corresponding BN, while a BN is not 
necessarily equivalent to a Bow-Tie (or a Fault-Tree), due to multi-state variables. The 
mapping procedures are presented in detail in Section 3.4.2.2. As a starting point some hybrid-
models were developed and successfully tested, for example in the framework of the 
operational safety program for offshore companies in Norwegian Sea, called Risk OMT (risk 
modelling - integration of organizational, human and technical factors) (Røed et al., 2009; 
Vinnem et al., 2012).  
In the dynamic risk assessment framework, Bayesian Networks are nowadays considered to 
represent a promising tool, suitable to cope with complex and uncertain situations, with a 
graphical and easy-to-update model, which has recently gained increasing popularity in the 
process industry (Ale et al., 2014; Khakzad et al., 2013d; Pasman and Rogers, 2013). The 
potentiality of BNs approach to Dynamic Risk Assessment has been proved by several 
applications: Pasman and Rogers (Pasman and Rogers, 2012) applied BNs for the evaluation 
of process design alternatives, Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013c) showed the role of BNs in 
Risk-based Design applications. The effectiveness of this approach in operational safety was 
demonstrated with regards to the prevention of major accidental scenarios, as off-shore 
blowouts (Khakzad et al., 2014, 2013a) and dust explosions (Yuan et al., 2015). Recent 
applications are aimed at extending the applicability of Bayesian Networks both to risk 
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management issues (Ale et al., 2014) and to cascading events, with particular reference to 
domino accident modelling (Khakzad, 2015; Khakzad et al., 2013d).  
2.4.4 Risk Barometer 
The Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry has recently developed the 
“Risk Barometer” technique (Hauge et al., 2015; Paltrinieri et al., 2015a, 2014a; Paltrinieri and 
Hokstad, 2015), aiming to continuously monitor risk picture changes and support decision 
makers in daily operations. This proactive approach to risk is based on the contribution by 
Øien (Øien, 2001a) on the definition of risk indicators describing Risk Influencing Factors 
(RIFs), which are aspects of a system or of an activity that affect its risk level (Øien, 2001b).  
The risk barometer needs to be performed on an existing QRA, in order to conduct sensitivity 
analysis and select the RIFs that are mostly affecting the risk picture. Indicators that assess the 
state of RIFs and may be evaluated on a real-time basis are then introduced. The aggregation 
of indicators and RIFs by means of a weighted sums approach allows the assessment of the 
overall risk variation. An example of Risk Barometer is available in Figure 2. 7. 
 
Figure 2. 7 Risk Barometer. It visualizes the average risk level measured in the last period (tp - 
indicated by a dotted line) and the instantaneous risk level (ti - indicated by a solid line and the arrow). 
Figure adapted from Paltrinieri et al. (Paltrinieri et al., 2014a) 
This approach, whose description of steps is reported in Figure 2. 8, is based on the availability 
of a large amount of real-time data, whose collection is made easier by the extensive use of 
Information and Communication Technologies. Real-time Risk assessment can provide a basis 
for dynamic adjustments of inspection and maintenance plans or implementation of risk 
reducing measures while maintaining production (Paltrinieri et al., 2014a).  
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Figure 2. 8 Risk Barometer: methodology flowchart (Okstad et al., 2013). 
The Risk Barometer was tested on a series of different case-studies from the Oil & Gas sector 
(Hauge et al., 2015):  
 Process leak on an oil production platform. 
 Impact between a platform and a visiting vessel.  
 Loss of containment due to sand erosion/corrosion in a Floating Production Storage 
and Offloading unit. 
 Well leak and blowout 
One of the advantages of the Risk Barometer in comparison with other dynamic techniques is 
the fact that the model is built in collaboration with the potential users, decision-makers and 
key organization personnel. The application on the case-studies listed was conducted through 
a series of workshops in order to involve the operators and build trust in the quantitative 
evaluation tool (Hauge et al., 2015). A "drill-down" capability was also implemented to allow 
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the user to keep a track of each element of the model, for instance by checking the trend of the 
single indicators. The philosophy of the "transparent box" (opposite of "black box") was 
followed. The user should not only be able to see inputs and outputs, but also the processes 
occurring in the box and how the indicators (inputs) turn into overall risk variation (output). 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
2.5.1 Advantages and limitations of Dynamic Risk Assessment 
approaches 
Dynamic risk assessment aims to take into account new risks notions and early warnings, and 
to systematically update the related risks, ensuring enhanced flexibility. This may answer the 
need for more realistic values of failure probability and event frequency. Generic values may 
be then refined by the continuous improvement of dynamic assessment (DRA and DRA with 
Bayesian Networks). Morover, the application of dynamic techniques (as DRA and DRA with 
Bayesian Networks) will allow accounting in a more detailed and effective manner risk 
reducing measures performance, therefore avoiding overestimation of the risk picture; this 
topic is developed in Section 3.4.2.2 by a description of specific methodologies. 
Integration of partial initial risk assessment would be also possible if a dynamic approach 
ranging from hazard identification to risk evaluation is employed (coupling of DRA and 
DyPASI). Through the use of techniques such as DRA and the Risk Barometer, analysts may 
relatively increase their awareness of uncertainties associated with the results. Expert 
judgment may be constructively used for the creation and refinement of dynamic tools of risk 
assessment in order to oppose the possible scepticism such techniques may lead to (e.g., Risk 
Barometer). Ultimately, techniques such as the Risk Barometer would represent a support for 
critical decision and allow risk-informed decision-making, i.e. results obtained from Risk 
Assessment process would be weighted with other attributes during the decision process. The 
applicability of these methods within the chemical and process industry domain is enforced by 
many recent applications, described in Section 2. 4 and summarized in Table 2. 7. 
Dynamic risk assessment may be applied not only in the design stage of a process, but also 
throughout its lifetime, allowing safer operations and easier maintenance, as well as 
supporting a more precise, risk-informed and robust decision-making process (Khakzad et al., 
2014).  
As reported in Table 2. 8, Dynamic Approaches may show advantages in design and operation 
on processing facilities, while the main limitations are shared between design and operation 
phases. Dynamic methods may improve design and comparison between different alternatives 
of safety systems, by integrating standard processes of hazard identification with notions on 
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emerging risks or external experience on relevant events. Accounting for human and 
organizational factors since the beginning of the design process would also allow for proactive 
prevention of potential underlying issues. The operation phase of a plant would be the main 
phase to benefit from dynamic risk assessment. In fact, frequent reiteration of risk assessment 
may allow continuous evaluation of safety measures, refinement of their management and 
enhanced management of safety-critical operations and improved maintenance planning. 
Moreover, constant monitoring of human and organizational factors would allow for feedback 
on the organization safety culture and support training sessions focusing on key organizational 
issues.  
In particular, next challenges will be devoted to solving the issues of formalization, 
standardization and creation of completely automated software able to perform Dynamic Risk 
Assessment. Eventually, despite several steps forward have been made from the pioneering 
studies, every dynamic approach showed to be effective only if associated with a proper safety 
culture, which continuously search for learning opportunities by monitoring and recording 
process performance and incidents (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b). Moreover, research on Risk 
Assessment may be further developed in order to futher include by means of innovative 
methods/tools cascading events (e.g. domino events) and management issues. 
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Table 2. 7 Dynamic Risk Assessment applications in the Chemical and Process industry domain. 
 
Name 
 
Main tasks 
Applicative contributions – Main Topics Theoretical/ 
Methodologic
Contributions 
Accident/ 
Consequence 
Modelling 
Design Safety Asset 
integrity 
Other 
Dynamic 
Risk 
Assessment 
(DRA) 
 First applications termed as Dynamic Failure Assessment 
 Two more steps in comparison with conventional QRA: accident 
analysis and probability updating (often Bayesian) 
 Use of real time data, near-misses, ASP to update probabilities 
 Possible integration with Bow-Tie diagrams 
 Application also to rare events (HBA - Hierarchical Bayesian 
Approach modification) 
 Application to Process accident model with predictive capability 
(SHIPP - System hazard identification, prediction and prevention 
methodology) 
 Application to operational Risk Assessment (DORA – Dynamic 
Operational Risk Assessment). 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
DRA  
+ DyPASI 
 Coupling of two advanced dynamic techniques: DyPASI (Dynamic 
Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification) and DRA 
(Dynamic Risk Assessment) 
 Improved Hazard Identification (first step of Risk Assessment) in 
comparison with DRA by itself. 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
Dynamic 
Risk 
Assessment 
with 
Bayesian 
Networks 
 Direct acyclic graphs representation of variables and probabilities, 
with flexible and time-dependent structure 
  Possible conversion from Bow-Tie to BNs 
 Easy integration of technical and non-technical factors (e.g. human 
and organizational ones). 
 Transparency and intuitiveness, due to graphical appearance, may 
be suitable in purpose to involve non-expert people in important 
decisions (e.g. stakeholders). 
 Complex events description, with the ability to incorporate 
multistate variables and common cause failure. 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
Risk 
Barometer 
 Proactive method based on Risk Indicators 
 Requires a QRA to be performed 
 Capture real-time information of critical safety barrier, allowing to 
incorporate human barrier performance indicators 
 Easy visualization of results 
 Still limitations in aggregation of data 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√:  Contributions available         X:  No contributions currently available, but application is possible.   Blank: application is not possible. 
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Table 2. 8 Possibilities and limitations of dynamic approaches application to Risk Assessment in design and operation of chemical and process facilities. 
Plant life 
cycle phase 
Possibilities Limitations 
 
 
 
Design 
Improved development of scenario generation and description, due to application of 
early-warnings and specific data from the process (Al-Shanini et al., 2014).  Dynamic 
Methods for Hazard Identification can tackle Atypical Scenarios, whose detection 
influences the design process and safety systems implementation. 
 No regulations currently available on 
Dynamic Risk Assessment Methodologies 
and Applications (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b). 
 Effectiveness of the methods relies on 
continuous monitoring activity and real-time 
data capturing. It implies the necessity to 
collect early-warnings, near misses, incidents 
and accident data (Khakzad et al., 2014). 
 Most of the methodologies presented herein 
are part of on-going studies. There are still 
some issues to be addressed in each methods 
(e.g. for DRA the use of free-distribution data 
(Paltrinieri et al., 2014c), for Bayesian 
Networks the Net development (Pasman and 
Rogers, 2013), for Risk Barometer the 
Indicators aggregation processes (Paltrinieri 
and Hokstad, 2015)).  
 Lack of knowledge on these methods: no 
completely automated software existing, very 
limited experience in industry (Pasman and 
Rogers, 2013). 
 Need of conventional models as pre-
requirements (e.g. Bow-Tie for DyPASI, 
conventional QRA for Risk Barometer) 
(Paltrinieri and Scarponi, 2014). 
 Necessity to further develop and apply these 
methods, in particular to the inclusion of 
external factors (e.g. domino effect, natural 
hazards) (Pasman and Rogers, 2013). 
Transparent comparison between different design alternatives, determining (dis-)utility 
on the basis of risk costs and benefits (Pasman and Rogers, 2012). 
Uncertainties introduced in the analysis are clearer (Pasman and Rogers, 2013).  
Increased QRA transparency. 
Effective visualization of results (e.g. Risk Barometer, Bayesian Nets, Graphs of Risk vs 
Time)  Improved decision-making process and stakeholders’ involvement during the 
design phase and throughout the plant lifetime (Weber et al., 2012). 
Integration among technical, human and organizational factors from the beginning of 
the design process (Ale et al., 2014).  Improved frequency and consequence 
calculations, that takes into account common causes and human influences.  
 
 
 
Operation 
 
Evaluation of additional safety measures during the operational phase based on updated 
consequences in order to fulfil risk minimization (Yuan et al., 2013). 
Managing operation effectively, determining whether to continue it or stopping it, in 
order to review the existing operating condition to avoid accidents (Abimbola et al., 
2014). 
Possibility to reiterate Risk Assessment more frequently in comparison with static 
methods (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c).  Real-time Risk Picture. 
Effective detection of lacking/defective maintenance (Paltrinieri et al., 2014c).  
Improved inspection and maintenance time intervals.  
Effective detection of organizational issues during operation phase.  Improved 
training, planning for personnel and safety communication (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b). 
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2.5.2 Towards the development of a Dynamic Risk Management 
Framework 
Paltrinieri et al. (Paltrinieri et al., 2014b, 2014c) have recently proposed a dynamic approach 
to Risk Management - Dynamic Risk Management Framework (DRMF), developed from a set 
of well-known risk management and governance frameworks (IRGC - International Risk 
Governance Council, 2009; ISO31000:2009, 2009). The DRMF aims at implementing the 
need of continuous improvement and updating in the risk management process, by applying 
Dynamic Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. The framework, whose 
schematization has been reported in Figure 2. 9 a, is composed by two general stages, four 
sequential phases and two continuous activities involving all the process. The first stage is a 
process of learning and understanding that refers to the process of knowledge and information 
management, and includes the phases of Horizon Screening and Hazard Identification. The 
second stage is the Decision process, which refers to process of elaboration and judgement of 
information subsequent intervention, and includes an assessment phase and a decision and 
action phase. Along with the risk assessment phases, there are two “continuous” activities that 
should be constantly performed: “monitoring, review and continuous improvement” and 
“communication and consultation”; this framework results to be open to external constraints 
and continuously reiterated in order to effectively take into account real-time changes in the 
process. 
The effectiveness in the application of a Dynamic Risk Management framework in collecting 
and considering evidence of emerging risks relies on the continuous development of Dynamic 
Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, joined with a proper safety culture. 
This is also illustrated by the 3D elaboration of the DRMF in Figure 2. 9 b. In fact, initially 
there may be events that are defined by the QRA analysists as "Unknown Unknowns" (analysts 
are not aware they do not know them). Information about these events is gradually collected 
through the continuous activity of "monitoring, review and continuous improvement" once a 
reasonable doubt is raised. This information is represented by early warnings, past events, 
accident precursors, test results or related studies. Due to an increased awareness of the 
potential disregarded related risk, these events turn to be "Known Unknowns" (analysts are 
aware they do not know them). The risk evidence is then integrated in the analysis through the 
dynamic techniques mentioned in this work, the knowledge about these potential accident 
events increases and vice versa, the uncertainties decrease, as shown by Figure 2. 9 b. Once the 
potential scenarios are assessed and metabolized in the process, analysts can define them as 
"Known Knowns" (analysts are aware they know them). The dynamic process of risk 
assessment can be described not only as a circular process (Figure 2.9 a), but as a 3D spiral, 
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where the radial centripetal movement represents the increase of awareness and the vertical 
movement from the top to the bottom represents the decrease of related uncertainties. 
 
Figure 2. 9 Dynamic Risk Management Framework (a) and its 3D perspective (b). 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In the present section, relevant approaches to risk assessment for chemical and process 
facilities have been analysed and classified, applying novel criteria. The classification 
highlighted how the application of Risk Assessment has supported process safety in the last 
thirty years, and showed its usefulness to support the process industry business by enabling 
risk management. Despite the obvious fact that it is not an exact description of reality, QRA 
proved to be the best available, analytic, predictive tool to assess the risks of complex chemical 
process systems. However, the present overview pointed out that more refinements of Risk 
Assessment tools are required to exploit its full potential. Most of the research is oriented to 
improve basic aspects, such as data frequencies. A possible development pathway is given by 
the application of dynamic approaches, as a direct consequence of the nowadays-feasible 
possibility of real-time monitoring for process facilities. In particular dynamic risk assessment 
approach, either coupled with a dynamic procedure for hazard identification, seems to be a 
promising step forward. For instance, a novel method based on indicators, the Risk Barometer, 
has demonstrated valuable features in its first applications. On the other hand, the 
incorporation of Bayesian networks into Risk Assessment may be another interesting focus, 
for both research and industrial purposes, because it allows a systemic approach considering 
human error and management influences. The application of a dynamic approach within 
cascading events (e.g., domino accidents) modelling is outlined as possible research field. In a 
broader perspective, the insertion of dynamic risk assessment approaches within a Dynamic 
Risk Management framework allows effectively taking into account real-time changes in the 
process, which results into increased awareness of the analysts toward potentially disregarded 
risks.  
To conclude, despite the fact that risk assessment application has deeply increased the safety 
of chemical process plants, major accident scenarios are still occurring and in order to 
guarantee a certain level of safety, risk assessment techniques should be constantly improved 
and evolve in parallel with the increasing complexity of the systems where they are applied. 
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Section 3. 
State of the art on external hazard 
factors and economic evaluations 
within Risk Assessment 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the past years, several accidental events raised the attention toward the possible 
escalation of major accidental scenarios into cascading events within chemical and process 
facilities. Cascading events are catastrophic accidents triggered by external hazard factors, as 
domino effects (i.e., triggered by safety-based accidents, as primary fire/explosions), security 
threats (i.e., sabotages or terroristic attacks) and natural events (i.e., lightnings, floodings, 
earthquakes).  
External hazards factors are widely recognized causes of major accidents and cascading events, 
which determined about 30.7% of all these accidental events worldwide (Darbra et al., 2010). 
Therefore, they should be accounted within Quantitative Risk Assessment in the chemical and 
process industry domain. 
Considering risk as the effect of uncertainties on objectives (ISO31000:2009, 2009), the key 
different element between safety and security domains is the risk source that in the safety 
domain can be considered unintentional, while in the security domain it is the result of a 
specific intent. Therefore, many authors (Aven, 2007; Reniers, 2014; Reniers and Audenaert, 
2014) suggested a unified framework the inclusion of external hazard factors within safety and 
security risk assessment.  
Despite their different causes, all these accidents share low probabilities of occurrence and very 
high impacts in terms of human, environmental and assets losses, both inside and outside 
facilities boundaries (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). These catastrophic accidents tend to affect 
particularly chemical and process installations, due to the high inventory of hazardous 
chemicals and possibly severe operating conditions.  
In Section 3. 2, a description of different typologies of cascading events is carried out, together 
with available techniques to model and include external hazard factors driven accidents within 
risk assessment.  
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Indeed the analysis of risk assessment techniques made clear the role of safety and security 
measures within cascading events prevention. Safety barriers (or measures) are widely applied, 
concerning domino accidents, as well as security barriers (or measures), concerning security-
based accidents, in purpose to prevent, control or mitigate their occurrence. Therefore, 
quantitative assessment of barriers performances, from both technical and economic point of 
view, takes on a major role in the risk evaluation step of risk assessment, and in a broader 
context, in accidents modelling and prevention (Janssens et al., 2015).  
Therefore, different typologies of risk reducing measures applied within chemical and process 
installations are described in Section 3. 3, together with methodologies to evaluate their 
performances.  
For what concerns safety barriers, conventional methodology for performance evaluations is 
based on Bow-Tie diagram and/or on its constituents (i.e., Fault-Tree and Event-Tree). 
Dynamic risk assessment techniques have recently emerged within the process industry 
domain, due to their flexibility in mirroring systems changes over time and to their enhanced 
intuitiveness in the presentation of results, as described in Section 2. Among these techniques, 
Bayesian Networks, a graphical probabilistic method, is nowadays a promising and 
increasingly popular tool, suitable to cope with complex and uncertain situations (Ale et al., 
2014), and therefore to model safety barriers behaviour within a chemical installation; the 
mathematics behind Bayesian Networks and a software to construct them will be presented. 
Therefore, the conversion processes from conventional techniques into Bayesian Networks will 
be presented, together with methodologies for safety barriers performance assessment by 
means of Bayesian techniques and Bayesian Networks. A methodology, which combines 
existing ones, to assess safety barriers performance assessment, by means of Bayesian 
Networks, with an eventual extension to domino accident analysis, is outlined. 
For what concerns security barriers, existing methodologies for performance evaluations are 
site-specific and accident-specific; an overview on the most applied techniques is presented.  
Due to the increased attention for safety and security issues, an optimal selection and 
allocation of risk reducing measures, including related cost issues, is becoming progressively 
more important for decision-makers. A description of economic models for supporting risk 
assessment and related decision-making process is presented in Section 3. 4. Indeed, economic 
analyses, such as cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, may offer rational criteria for 
the selection and allocation of safety and security measures. An overview of recent 
contributions regarding theoretical, methodological and applicative aspects of economic 
analyses within the safety and security domain, referred to chemical and process industry 
installations, is presented. The analysis of research gaps highlighted that, despite the potential 
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of economic analyses in establishing competitive business advantage, previous contributions 
and ongoing research within the chemical industry address economic assessment with respect 
to unintentional major and occupational accidents (i.e., safety-based accidents). No specific 
complete economic models and applications are yet available addressing the selection and 
allocation of preventive security measures (e.g., counter terrorism related measures), within 
the chemical and process industry domain. 
3.2 CASCADING EVENTS TRIGGERED BY EXTERNAL 
HAZARD FACTORS 
3.2.1  Safety-based accidents: domino accidents 
3.2.1.1 Definition of domino effect 
A domino effect indicates a catastrophic escalation of accidental events, characterized by very 
low frequency and high consequences that can affect both workers and population in the 
nearby, as well as assets and environment. In a domino effect, a chain of accidents in which a 
primary accident escalates and triggers other secondary or higher-order accidents, occurs. As 
explained in Section 2, many significant progresses have been made in the context of 
Quantitative Risk Assessment for the Chemical and Process industry domain in the last thirty 
years, but the topic of cascading events modelling and inclusion within QRA still needs to be 
further investigated. Nevertheless, in the past decades cascading events, and among them, 
domino accidents, were often neglected by risk analysts because of their very low probability 
and high complexity, but, unfortunately, defining an accidental event a “Black Swan” (Murphy 
and Conner, 2012) does not mean it would be impossible.  
For instance, two surveys on domino effect accidents (Darbra et al., 2010; Planas et al., 2014) 
emphasized an increasing trend of domino events occurrence, between 1961 and 1980-1990, 
within the chemical domain, followed by a more recent decreasing trend, as visible from Table 
3. 1, which may be justified by increasing safety culture and improved risk management. 
According to Darbra et al. (Darbra et al., 2010), domino accidents are nowadays significantly 
more severe in underdeveloped countries, due to safety culture deficits and lack of proper risk 
planning. However, domino events, as demonstrated by BP Texas city refinery accident in 
2005 (CSB, 2007a), where a primary Vapor Cloud Explosion was followed by several fires and 
explosions and Buncefield depot accident (Buncefield Major Investigation Board, 2008) may 
still occur everywhere.  
The awareness of hazards posed by domino events requires efforts to prevent these 
catastrophic accidental scenarios. In the European Union, the legislation on the control of 
major accident hazard (i.e., “Seveso-III” Directive, 2012/18/EU (EU, 2012)) includes measures 
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to assess, control and prevent domino accidents (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991; Khan and Abbasi, 
1999).  
Since there is disagreement on what people define as domino effect, the natural consequence 
is that the most of studies on domino effect are carried out independently and focuses either 
on very particular aspects of accident escalation process like vulnerability models or on the 
definition of methodologies for risk assessment. An overview on available domino events 
definitions is presented in Table 3. 2; among these the most recent is the one by Reniers and 
Cozzani (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013).  
Domino effects modelling requires at its basis the definition of three concepts: primary 
accident, accident propagation and escalation probability (Darbra et al., 2010). 
A primary event is an accidental scenario that occurs in a certain unit (i.e., either a fire or an 
explosion). According, to Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a), domino accident scenarios 
triggered by the escalation of fires were responsible of severe accidents that affected the 
chemical and process industry. Past accident data analysis review carried out by Necci et al. 
(Necci et al., 2015) confirmed that in more than half of the industrial accidents involving a 
domino effect, occurred in the past fifty years, escalation was triggered by a primary fire. 
Indeed, fires act a severe heat load to every structure, both irradiative and convective, capable 
and destroy hazardous substance containers. There are many different kind of fire accidents 
due to hazardous substances, but in the framework of risk assessment four typologies of fires 
are relevant: pool fire, flash fire, fireball and jet fire. 
A description of accident propagation and escalation probabilities concepts is reported in the 
following sections (see Section 3.2.1.2, Section 3.2.1.3 and Section 3.2.1.4). 
Table 3. 1 Historical analysis of domino events occurrence within the chemical industry domain, 
adapted from Darbra et al. (Darbra et al., 2010). 
Period Number of accidents % of domino accident events 
1961-1970 49 22 
1971-1980 70 31 
1981-1990 63 28 
1991-2000 24 11 
2001-2007 19 8 
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Table 3. 2 Domino effects definitions according to the literature, adapted from Necci et al. (Necci et 
al., 2015). 
Source/authors Definition 
Third Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Major 
Hazards (HSE - Health and 
Safety Commission, 1984) 
The effects of major accidents on other plants on the site or nearby sites. 
(Bagster and Pitblado, 1991) A loss of containment of a plant item that results from a major incident on a nearby plant unit. 
An event at one unit that causes a further event at another unit. 
Lees’ Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industry (Mannan, 
2005) 
An event at one unit that causes a further event at another unit. 
A factor to take account of the hazard that can occur if leakage of a hazardous material can lead 
to the escalation of the incident, e.g. a small leak which catches fire and damages by flame 
impingement a larger pipe or vessel with subsequent spillage of a large inventory of hazardous 
material. 
(Khan and Abbasi, 1998b) A chain of accidents or situations when a fire/explosion/missile/toxic load generated by an 
accident in one unit in an industry causes secondary and higher order accidents in other units. 
(Darbra et al., 2010; 
Delvosalle, 1998) 
A cascade of events in which the consequences of a previous accident are increased both 
spatially and temporally by the following ones, thus leading to a major accident. 
(TNO, 2005a) The effect that loss of containment of one installation leads to loss of containment of other 
installations. An accident that starts in one item and may affect nearby items by thermal, blast 
or fragment impact. 
(CCPS - Center for Chemical 
Process Safety, 1995) 
An accident that starts in one item and may affect nearby items by thermal, blast or fragment 
impact. 
(Vallee et al., 2002) An accidental phenomenon affecting one or more installations in an establishment that can 
cause an accidental phenomenon in an adjacent establishment, leading to a general increase 
in consequences. 
(EU, 2012) A loss of containment in a Seveso installation that is the result (directly and indirectly) from a 
loss of containment at a nearby Seveso installation. The two events should happen 
simultaneously or in very fast subsequent order, and the domino hazards should be larger than 
those of the initial event. 
(Post et al., 2003) A major accident in a so-called ‘exposed company’ as a result of a major accident in a so-called 
‘causing company’. A domino effect is a subsequent event happening as a consequence of a 
domino accident. 
(Cozzani et al., 2006) Accidental sequences having at least three common features:  
 A primary accidental scenario, which initiates the domino accidental sequence; 
 The propagation of the primary event, due to “an escalation vector” generated by the 
physical effects of the primary scenario, that results in the damage of at least one 
secondary equipment item; 
 One or more secondary events (i.e., fire, explosion and toxic dispersion), involving 
the damaged equipment items (the number of secondary events is usually the same 
of the damaged plant items). 
(Gorrens et al., 2009) A major accident in a so-called secondary installation that is caused by failure of a so-called 
external hazards source. 
(Antonioni et al., 2009) The propagation of a primary accidental event to nearby units, causing their damages and 
further “secondary” accidental events resulting in an overall scenario more severe than the 
primary event that triggered the escalation. 
(Reniers and Cozzani, 2013) An accident in which a primary unwanted event propagates within an equipment 
(‘temporally’), or/and to nearby equipment (‘spatially’), sequentially or simultaneously, 
triggering one or more secondary unwanted events, in turn possibly triggering further (i.e., 
higher order) unwanted events, resulting in overall consequences more severe than those of 
the primary event. 
3.2.1.2 Accident propagation 
Domino effect takes place when an accident in a unit, known as a “primary event,” triggers 
other accidents in adjacent units by means of escalation vectors (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Therefore, the study of domino accidents requires the analysis of the physical effects that 
trigger the escalation chain, named escalation vectors. The typologies of escalation vectors 
depend on several factors including the primary event and the distance between the accident 
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epicenter and nearby units. Destructive physical effects that may be accounted as escalation 
vectors are fire impingement, fire engulfment, heat radiation, overpressure, or explosion 
caused by the projection of fragments (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). Several models are 
available in literature regarding the calculation of escalation vectors (i.e., often named 
vulnerability models, which may be divided into three main classes: analytical model, integral 
model and averaged model (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2000; TNO, 2005b). 
In purpose to determine which nearby units are impacted, a comparison between the 
escalation vectors derived from the primary event on the nearby units and predefined 
threshold values is carried out; for instance several contributions proposed typical values for 
heat radiation and overpressure (Cozzani et al., 2009; Cozzani and Salzano, 2004b, 2004c); a 
summary is available in Table 3. 3. 
Table 3. 3 Reference values for domino accident analysis (Cozzani et al., 2009). From the left to the 
right, in column order: primary events, escalation vector, secondary unit, threshold value, safety 
distance. (*) 𝑅 indicates Sachs energy-scaled, calculated as 𝑅 =
𝑥
(𝐸/𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑚)
1/3, where 𝑥 is the distance from 
explosion center (𝑚); 𝐸 is released energy of explosion (𝐽), 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑚 is atmospheric pressure (𝑃𝑎). 
Primary event Escalation 
Vector 
Secondary unit Threshold 
value 
Safety distance 
Fireball Heat radiation Atmospheric 15 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  Fireball radius 
Fire engulfment Pressurized 50 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  N/A 
Jet fire Heat radiation Atmospheric 15 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  Flame length + 50 𝑚 
Fire impingement Pressurized 50 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  Flame length + 25 𝑚 
Pool fire Heat radiation Atmospheric 15 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  Flame length + 50 𝑚 
Fire engulfment Pressurized 50 𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  Flame length + 15 𝑚 
Explosion Overpressure Atmospheric 22 𝑘𝑃𝑎 𝑅𝑎 = 1.8 (*) 
Pressurized 16 𝑘𝑃𝑎 𝑅𝑎 = 2.0 (*) 
The escalation vectors whose values is above the relevant thresholds may cause credible 
damage to the nearby units, resulting in loss of containment or loss of physical integrity. Thus, 
based on a comparison between escalation vectors and threshold values, a preliminary 
screening of the nearby units is performed, leading to the specification of potential secondary 
targets. The potential secondary units are the units adjacent to primary unit that may give a 
potential contribution to domino effect. Moreover, the escalation vectors that are generated 
from secondary units, may in turn trigger other accidents in further units (i.e., tertiary units), 
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either by themselves or by means of synergistic effects. By means of synergistic effects, the 
escalation vectors of a unit of order 𝑖 collaborates with those of already engaged units (i.e., 
order i– 1) to impact the units of order i + 1 that had not passed the threshold criteria in 
previous levels (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). Further information on accident propagation 
concept is presented in Section 3.3.2.1.3, together with the advanced methodology that will be 
applied in case studies. Indeed, it should be remarked that the concept of accident propagation 
is particularly significant, because it does not only results in a more realistic and accurate 
calculation, but it avoids possible underestimation of the potential risk. Moreover, it offers a 
sound support to safety analysts in purpose to choose safety barriers, and consequently to 
hinder domino effect in the early stages. 
3.2.1.3 Calculation of escalation probabilities 
The calculation of escalation probabilities (𝑃𝑑), named also damage probabilities, is generally 
carried out by means of Probit methods (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 2005; Cozzani 
and Salzano, 2004b). Probit methods may consider both the type of equipment (e.g., 
atmospheric or pressurized) and the type of escalation vector that affects the equipment (e.g., 
heat radiation or overpressure); for instance, the Probit variable (𝑌) can be calculated as 
follows, in its generic formula (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013): 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∙ ln(𝑉)                                                                                                                                      (3.1) 
Where: 
 𝑎 and 𝑏 are Probit coefficients determined using experimental data or regression 
methods; 
 𝑉 is either the escalation vector (e.g., static overpressure (∆𝑃) in case of explosions) or 
an escalation related parameter (e.g., time to failure (𝑡𝑡𝑓) in case of heat radiation). 
Therefore, in case of domino accident triggered by heat radiation, Probit values can be 
calculated according to the following version of equation (3.1): 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∙ ln 𝑡𝑡𝑓                                                                                                                                               (3.2) 
Where [𝑡𝑡𝑓] = [𝑠] is the time lapse between the fire start and the thermally induced failure. 
In case of domino accident triggered by overpressure, Probit values can be calculated according 
to the following version of equation (3.1): 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∙ ln(∆𝑃)                                                                                                                                               (3.3) 
Where [∆𝑃] = [𝑘𝑃𝑎] is the peak static overpressure.  
In turn, escalation vectors, expressing the physical effects that trigger the escalation chain, can 
be estimated according to specific vulnerability models, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.2. 
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The values of Probit coefficients to be applied are reported in Section 5, in correspondence of 
each case study. Then, the normalized Probit variable (𝑌 − 5) is calculated and the cumulative 
density function of normal standard distribution (𝛷) is applied to get 𝑃𝑑 values, according to 
the following expression: 
𝑃𝑑 = 𝛷(𝑌 − 5)                                                                                                                                          (3.4) 
3.2.1.4 Conventional approach to risk assessment of domino accidents 
The inclusion of domino accidents within QRA requires as crucial point the estimation of 
events likelihood and consequences. Several past contributions that are analysed in a recent 
comprehensive review by Necci et al. (Necci et al., 2015), led to the creation of a conventional 
approach. According to the conventional methodology (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 
2005; Necci et al., 2015) the use of escalation probabilities, domino accident frequencies can 
be calculated as follows (Reniers and Cozzani, 2013):  
𝑓𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑂 = 𝑓𝑃𝐸 ∙ 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑓𝑃𝐸 ∙ 𝑃(𝐸|𝑃𝐸)                                               (3.5) 
Where 𝑓𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑂 is the domino event frequency, 𝑓𝑃𝐸 is the primary event frequency, 𝑃𝑑 is the 
escalation probability of the impacted unit and P(E|PE) is the probability of escalation (E), 
conditioned to the happening of the primary event (PE).  
In addition, a probabilistic version of equation (3.5) can be retrieved from technical literature 
(Khakzad et al., 2013d): 
𝑃𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑂 = 𝑃𝑃𝐸 ∙ 𝑃𝑑                                                                         (3.6) 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑂 is the domino event probability and  𝑃𝑃𝐸 is the primary event probability. 
Once the domino accident propagation and frequencies are identified, and physical effects are 
evaluated, a proper risk profile can be defined. The application of a GIS (i.e., Geographical 
Interface Software) tool (Cozzani et al., 2006) may allow the calculation of individual and 
societal risk contours due to domino accidents, even to entire industrial areas (Antonioni et al., 
2009). However, it should be remarked that the inclusion of domino accidents within QRA 
deeply influences also many other safety-related aspects (e.g., safety management, plant 
design, emergency planning) requiring new solutions to be found (Janssens et al., 2015).  
3.2.2  Security-based accidents 
3.2.2.1 Definitions and characteristics of security-based accidents 
Several recent events raised the attention toward possible major accidents triggered by 
external acts of interference in industrial facilities, named for instance security-based 
accidents. Many categories of critical infrastructures (Moteff, 2005) can be attractive targets 
for deliberate attacks, such as airports, power plants, roads and maritime means of 
transportation. Chemical (and process) fixed installations were recognized several years ago 
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by CCPS (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2008b, 2003) (amongst others) as 
attractive targets for potential intentional malevolent acts, such as terroristic attacks and 
sabotage. Due to the high inventory of hazardous chemicals and possibly severe operating 
conditions, the potential consequences of these events, in terms of disruption of operations, 
destruction of property, health deterioration or loss of life (Bajpai and Gupta, 2007), are severe 
and include the possibility of cascading effects (Landucci et al., 2015b; Nolan, 2008).  
In particular, among possible typologies of security-based accident, a growing concern is 
present with respect to the intentional release of dangerous substances resulting in 
environmental and eco-terroristic attacks. Two environmental security-related phenomena, 
named enviro-terrorism and eco-terrorism, emerged among security threats to tackle in 
chemical and process facilities worldwide. Enviro-terrorism and eco-terrorism are aimed at 
respectively triggering severe environmental damages and demonstrating radical 
environmentalism by means of unlawful set of actions within chemical facilities (Alpas et al., 
2011). Comparison between the two has been reported in Table 3. 4. 
For instance, in 2015, two security-related accidents, possibly terroristic attacks, took place in 
France: an attack to a warehouse of explosive chemicals in a gas production factory on June 
26th, 2015 (BBC News, 2015a) and the sabotage, with consequent explosions, of two storage 
tanks in an oil refinery on July 14th, 2015 (Le Guernigou and Revilla, 2015). Investigations, 
which are still underway, consider the intentional nature of both events and two suspects have 
been arrested, one for each of them; crime and terrorism are thus deemed as possible 
motivations (Associated Press, 2015; BBC News, 2015a; Pardini, 2016).  
These two security-based accidents are just the latest ones of a long series; as reported by the 
ARIA governmental agency, only in France, 850 malicious acts have been perpetrated within 
industrial facilities, mainly chemical industrial sites, in the period 1992-2015 (ARIA, 2015). 
Indeed, the importance of environmental losses in the context of security-related accidents has 
been highlighted by the results of them mentioned ARIA survey (ARIA, 2015). Security-based 
accidents may be classified according to four main possible typologies of consequences: 
environmental, economic, social and human. For instance, the survey results highlight that 
46% of security-based accidents resulted in severe environmental consequences (Figure 3. 1 
A), leading also to economic consequences. For instance, economic consequences include 
internal damages necessitating repair expenses and production losses, as well as damages to 
third parties operations and properties. Environmental damages include soil, air, surface and 
ground water pollution. Moreover, release of hazardous or polluting substances occurred in 
almost half of security-based accidents (Figure 3. 1 B).  
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Table 3. 4 Definitions and comparison of enviro-terrorism and eco-terrorism in industrial facilities, 
adapted from Alpas et al. (Alpas et al., 2011). 
 
DEFINITION 
ENVIRO-TERRORISM ECO-TERRORISM 
Unlawful action or set of actions, committed 
by individuals or groups, leading to short or 
long term disruption of environmental 
resources and properties to deprive others of 
its use.  
Severe damage/disruption to property, 
rare threat and/or harm against people, 
and/or nonviolent activism caused by 
individuals or groups protesting because 
of perceived harm/destruction to the 
environment and/or nature.  
EXAMPLES Sabotage or terroristic action w.r.t. 
industrial facilities containing large 
inventories of hazardous substances (e.g., 
chemical and process plants, nuclear 
installation, infrastructures involved in 
energy production) with the aim to trigger a 
major accident, with the worst 
environmental damages possible. 
Arson actions against housing/industrial 
developments, targeting companies using 
animals for tests, theft and trespassing; 
demonstrative actions (e.g., machinery 
and vehicles sabotage) in industrial 
facilities perceived as pollutant. 
MOTIVATION Political, religious, personal, economic, etc. Ideological (i.e., “very radical 
environmentalism”)  
TARGETS Environment Assets (e.g., equipment), rarely people 
(e.g., managers) 
SCALE OF THE 
ACCIDENT/ 
CONSEQUENCES 
Relevant environmental, health and assets 
losses, sometimes not confined within 
facility boundaries. The accident may cause 
the partial/complete interruption of 
operations for several hours/days and may 
contribute to the facility closedown. Severe 
environmental damages take place, 
generally requiring massive emergency 
intervention, causing health consequences 
to workers and, less often to the resident 
population (including injuries and/or 
casualties). Remediation costs and assets 
losses are relevant. 
Generally, the consequences consist on 
minor assets losses, confined within 
facility boundaries that might cause a 
short and/or partial interruption of 
operations.  
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Figure 3. 1 Overview on security accidents consequences in industrial facilities, based on ARIA survey 
regarding 850 accidents in the period 1992-2015 (ARIA, 2015). (A) General overview on consequences 
percentage composition according to four main consequence categories: environmental, economic, 
social and human. (B) General overview on security-based scenarios according to four main scenario 
categories: explosion, discharge of hazardous/polluting substances, fire and other phenomena. The 
consequences percentages in (A) and (B) are obtained with respect to the total number of accidents 
considered in the mentioned survey (i.e., 850). Consequences and scenario category percentages do not 
sum into 100% as a security-based accident may determine consequences and scenario belonging to 
more than one of the listed categories.  
However, as demonstrated by Figure 3. 1, security-based accidents are complex phenomena, 
not limited only to environmental and economic damages, wherein social consequences (e.g., 
installation of safety perimeters and personnel redundancies) and human consequences (e.g., 
casualties and morbidities) should be considered too. Therefore, an accurate monetary 
quantification of environmental damages within security-based accident losses, including 
intervention and remediation costs, may lead to a more realistic description of all the other 
accidents consequences. Consequently, the monetary quantification should be tailored on the 
typology of security-based accident to be studied (i.e., enviro-terrorism or generic security-
based accident). 
Despite the growing attention towards counter-terrorism issues in the chemical and process 
industry, at a European Union level only a general Directive on how to prevent, prepare and 
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respond to terrorist attacks related to critical infrastructures (Council Directive, 2008) was 
issued. No detailed guidelines for security management of chemical enterprises currently exist. 
Instead, in the United States, following the 9/11 attack, a specific regulation named CFATS 
(i.e., Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards) has become effective since 2007, and 
applied to all the facilities classified by US Department of Homeland Security as “high-risk” 
(DHS - US Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
3.2.2.2 Risk assessment of security-based accidents 
According to Reniers and Audenaert (Reniers and Audenaert, 2014), security can be defined 
as the state of being protected against potential danger or loss that can result from the 
deliberate, malicious, and unlawful acts of others. Security risks assume threats, vulnerabilities 
and consequences as main components. Security risk sources can be several: individuals, 
business competitors, intelligence organization, terrorists, and criminals. All may behave 
according to different motivations, varying from personal to political, religious, economic and 
business advantage. Security risk assessment within chemical plants is a systematic approach 
to collect and organize information regarding (Bajpai and Gupta, 2007; CCPS - Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2003; Reniers et al., 2015):  
 Site-specific assets (i.e., people, properties, infrastructures, reputation and 
information) that need to be protected;  
 Threats that may be posed against those assets; 
 Probabilities and consequences of malevolent attacks against them.  
The result of a security risk assessment is a number of consequent actions planning and 
tracking on the threats tackled by the analysis.  
Reniers et al. (Reniers et al., 2015) have recently proposed a methodology for security risk 
assessment within chemical facilities (Figure 3. 2) that mirrors exactly in its constituents the 
steps of conventional QRA (Figure 2. 2).  
The process start with the facility characterization step that consists on undertaking a 
geographical overview of the company, including the identification of neighboring industrial 
activities (e.g., hazardous chemicals storages) and facility access. The security hazard and risk 
identification process should identify all company security risks, by means of historical data 
analysis and other methods. The process should be performed by including relevant 
stakeholders (e.g., company, government officials, intelligence representatives, etc.). Then, the 
security risk picture is established and the outcomes are compared with acceptability criteria, 
generally defined by security management and including both technical and economic criteria, 
to define possible security risk-reducing measures to be adopted. As in conventional QRA, the 
procedure is iterative and every step in the process has to be rigorous and transparent. 
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However, for security-based events, as terroristic attacks, only qualitative probabilities of 
occurrence may be available (e.g., low, medium, high) (Broder and Tucker, 2012; Garcia, 
2005), while quantitative probabilities and frequencies of safety related events are generally 
available on databases (TNO, 2005a).  
Moreover, for security-based events, also consequences are generally not calculated by means 
of specific damage model, but only a severity ranking is presented. Therefore, qualitative (or 
semi-quantitative) security risk analysis methodologies are largely applied within the chemical 
industry domain, instead of QRA (Garcia, 2005). Nevertheless, qualitative approaches do not 
allow obtaining an accurate risk picture, which is of paramount importance whenever HILP 
(i.e., high impact, low probability) events may occur, as in the chemical and process industry 
domain. 
 
Figure 3. 2 Methodology for Security Risk Assessment, adapted from Reniers et al. (Reniers et al., 
2015). 
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3.2.3 A common framework for the inclusion of external hazard factors 
within risk assessment 
Many authors (Aven, 2007; Reniers, 2014; Reniers and Audenaert, 2014) suggested a unified 
generic framework for safety and security risk assessment. Considering risk as the effect of 
uncertainties on objectives (ISO31000:2009, 2009), the key different element between the two 
domains is the risk source, that in the safety domain can be considered unintentional, while in 
the security domain it is the result of a specific intent. 
The common framework, reported in Figure 3. 3, applies the standard QRA methodological 
steps (see Section 2.3.1 for further details). External hazard factors (e.g., domino, security and 
natural events) are included in the Hazard Identification step. The framework emphasizes the 
importance of the risk evaluation step, which requires the identification, by means of a 
technical performance assessment, and the evaluation of possible risk reducing measures, by 
means of economic analyses techniques. The technical and economic performance criteria 
derived from the risk evaluation step are needed to select the eventual additional risk reducing 
measures to be implemented and to eventually comply with the acceptability criteria. 
3.3 THE ROLE OF RISK REDUCING MEASURES IN 
EXTERNAL HAZARD FACTORS - DRIVEN ACCIDENTS 
3.3.1 Description of risk reducing measures 
3.3.1.1 The concept of risk reducing measure 
The implementation of risk reducing measures (i.e., safety and security measures) may 
prevent, control or mitigate unwanted events or accidents within chemical installations. Risk 
reducing measures may either prevent the occurrence of a chain of events or limiting its 
consequences (Mannan, 2005). Before going into details regarding risk reducing measures 
classification and performance evaluation, it is necessary to briefly explain the definition of 
risk reducing measure. Several synonyms (i.e., barrier, defence, protection layer, 
safety/security critical elements, safety/security function, etc.) are used in the literature to 
describe risk reducing measures (Sevcik and Gudmestad, 2014). From a general point of view, 
the concept of barrier refers to an obstruction towards and emerging threat or accident. 
According to Janssens et al. (Janssens et al., 2015), the most complete definition of barrier is 
provided by Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority: “…technical, operational and 
organizational elements on an offshore or onshore facility, that, individually or collectively, 
reduce the possibility of concrete failures, hazard and accident situations occurring, or that 
limit or prevent harm/inconveniences”.    
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Figure 3. 3 A unified framework for the inclusion of external hazard factors within QRA. 
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3.3.1.2 Safety measures 
Safety measures (or barriers) need to be categorized, before evaluating their performances in 
the prevention of major accidents and cascading events. Three different categories of barriers 
were identified, adapting the classification of protection layers proposed by AIChE (CCPS - 
Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2000) and in the Aramis project (Gowland, 2006): 
 active barriers; 
 passive barriers; 
 procedural and emergency barriers; 
A combination of all categories of safety barriers is generally required to assure the safety of 
humans, environment and assets (Mannan, 2005).  
Active or mitigative safety barriers are activated by a detection system. The mitigation action 
is carried out using hardware, software, and/or human actions. Despite their wired 
application, active protection systems are critically dependent on the availability and correct 
design of the detection system and the software activation loop. The high number of 
components that requires to be activated on demand may limit the overall system 
performance.  
On the other hand, a generic passive protection device is a system or a barrier, which does not 
require either power or external activation to trigger the protection action. Thus, the 
performance is not significantly influenced by physical or psychological conditions of operators 
or by the performance and position of other equipment. However, in the case of passive safety 
barriers such as firewalls, blast walls, dikes, and catch basins, the main limitations are given 
by cost and design constraints, maintenance, and possibility of inspection. 
Procedural and emergency safety measures rely on management methods such as training, 
evacuation, and emergency response. These safety measures depend strongly on human 
factors such as safety training effectiveness and human response time. However, in the case of 
instantaneous accidental events procedural safety measures become ineffective (Khakzad et 
al., 2013e).  
The use of protective systems or barriers in the context of domino effects may restrict the 
propagation of domino effects, mitigate its consequences and reduce the vulnerability of 
possible targets (e.g., by increasing the time to failure).  
Nevertheless, it should be remarked that the application of safety barriers, often termed as 
“add-on safety” is not the solely answer possible to escalation prevention. According to 
Janssens et al. (Janssens et al., 2015), a significant portion of current research is concerned 
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with design-based safety with respect to domino effects, which means applying the concept of 
inherent safety. Inherent safety focuses on material characteristics, process design, and plant 
layout to eliminate the possibility of an escalation scenario, rather than on physical barriers to 
be implemented (Cozzani et al., 2009, 2007). However, the implementation of inherent safety 
principles requires major plants changes that in most of existing installations are not so easy 
to be made, so it becomes very important to optimize safety barriers within an existing 
industrial installation, according to technical and economic performance criteria (Janssens et 
al., 2015). 
The typologies of safety barriers to be implemented may depend also on the typology of critical 
event, possibly triggering escalation. For instance, particular attention is posed to fire 
protection safety barriers, as fire is identified as the most common hazard factor triggering 
domino events; a summary of fire protection safety barriers typologies is adapted from 
Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). 
Active fire protection systems more relevant in escalation prevention can be divided into two 
different categories: 
 Systems for the delivery of fire-fighting agents (such as water or water-based foam) 
which can be further classified into fixed, semi-fixed, mobile and portable systems; 
 Emergency Shutdown Systems (i.e., ESD) and Emergency Depressurization Systems 
(i.e., EDP). 
Active fire protection systems are aimed and designed to: 
 Mitigate fire exposure protection of the target, keeping a water film on exposed surfaces 
to absorb radiant heat and to cool the steelwork, thus preventing loss of strength (water 
delivery systems);  
 Isolate and empty the target vessel, reducing the potential loss and consequent damage 
connected to the large inventory (ESD and EDP systems); 
 Provide effective control of the primary fire and prevention of fire spread in nearby 
units (fire-fighting agents delivery systems). 
In the framework of escalation prevention, the application of passive fire protection measures 
consists on the use of fireproofing material (cementitious or vermiculite sprays, intumescent, 
mineral or ceramic fibers, etc.). Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) are a further widely applied 
passive safety barrier. Fireproofing and PSVs are aimed at combining two possible effects of 
mitigation: 
 Reduction of the vessel wall temperature (heat resistant coating/shielding effect); 
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 Limitation of the vessel internal pressure by the control of the vapor pressure increase 
due to the raise of the liquid temperature (PSV effect). 
Procedural measures include the company operating procedures, which are relevant with 
respect to escalation prevention. Emergency measures represent the coordinated response to 
a major accident scenario, in which different roles and functions are to be performed by 
different actors. They typically involve the mobilization of resources and follow specific 
procedures since all actions are to be carried out in agreement with local authorities, fire 
brigade, emergency teams, etc.  
The selection and allocation of safety barriers, with respect to possible accidental events and 
escalation, should be supported by appropriate methodologies for technical and economic 
performance assessment, which are described in details in the following sections. 
3.3.1.3 Security measures 
Physical Protection Systems (PPS) have a crucial role in providing adequate security 
protection. A physical protection system is an integration of protection components and 
elements that can include people, procedures and equipment for the protection of assets or 
facilities against security threats, as theft, sabotage or other malevolent human attacks (Garcia, 
2007, 2005).  
The selection, design and upgrade of PPS, often indicated as security barriers or security 
measures, require a methodological approach in which the objectives of the PPS are weighted 
against available resources and it eventually turns into a proposed design, that may be 
evaluated and subsequently further optimized in order to improve its performance (Garcia, 
2007).  
Generally, the PPS design and implementation should address the systematic and integrated 
protection of assets in anticipation of adversary attacks rather than in reaction of attack 
occurrence. It should also achieve the protection objectives with respect to operational, safety, 
legal and economic constraints of the facility (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
2003). However, the occurrence of an attack may offer the occasion to tackle the weakness of 
PPS and consequently upgrade the security measures present in the facility.  
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Figure 3. 4 Security measures classification.  
The classification of PPS is generally carried out in three main categories accordingly to the 
function they serve and the elements that compose a security system (Garcia, 2007, 2005): 
detection of an adversary, delay of that adversary and response by security personnel.  
Indeed, for the system to be effective in protecting critical assets from theft or sabotage by a 
malevolent adversary, there must be notification of an attack (i.e., detection), then adversary 
progress must be slowed (i.e., delay), which will allow the response force time to interrupt or 
stop the adversary (i.e., response). The response force time indicates the time it takes for the 
response personnel, including proprietary guards, contractors and/or members of local law 
enforcement, to arrive at a location and establish interruption of the adversaries from 
progressing in their attack.  
A flowchart representing the three main security functions and the most common typologies 
of security measures belonging to each of them is reported in Figure 3. 4. A detailed description 
of each typology of security measures to be applied in chemical facilities is presented from 
Table 3. 5 to Table 3. 11. 
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Table 3. 5 Exterior intrusion sensors as part of detection function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
T 
E 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Exterior Intrusion Sensors 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Sensors posed in outdoor environment for detection of a person or of a vehicle 
attempting to gain unauthorized entry into an area that is being protected by 
someone who is able to authorize or initiate an appropriate response.   
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 Probability of assessed detection (𝑃𝐴𝐷); the likelihood of detecting an 
adversary within the zone covered by an intrusion detection sensor. 
For an ideal sensor, 𝑃𝐴𝐷 = 1. For real sensors 𝑃𝐴𝐷 ≅ 0.9. 
 False Alarm Rate; the expected rate of alarms from an intrusion 
detection sensor that can be attributed to known causes unrelated to 
intrusion attempts. For an ideal sensor, false alarm rate is 0. 
 Vulnerability to defeat; exploitable capability of the sensor to be 
defeated though bypass or spoof by taking advantage of the sensor 
physics, signal processing, installation, degradation and site 
conditions. 
Also: communication system for sending and assessing alarms, lightning and 
assessment systems, balanced system for adequate protection though the 
perimeter. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
 Passive/Active; detector of some type of energy emitted by the target 
of interest/ transmitter of some type of energy and detector of a 
variation in the received energy. 
 Covert/Visible: hidden from view/ in plain view of the intruder. 
 Line-of-Sight/Terrain-Following: requiring a flat ground surface or a 
clean Line-of Sight/ capable of detecting on flat and irregular terrain. 
 Volumetric/Line Detection; detection in a certain volume not 
identified by the intruder/ detection along a line often easy to identify. 
 Application mode: buried line/ fence-associated/freestanding. 
SENSOR TECHNOLOGY (Classification according to application mode) 
Buried- Line 
Sensors 
Pressure or seismic sensors Ported coaxial cables 
Magnetic field sensors Fiber-optic cables 
Fence-Associated 
Sensors 
Fence-disturbance sensors Electric field or capacitance 
Sensor fences 
Freestanding 
Sensors 
Active infrared Bistatic microwave 
Passive infrared Monostatic microwave 
Dual-technology sensors 
Emerging 
Technology 
Video motion detection Ground-based radar 
Passive scanning thermal 
Imagers 
Wireless sensor network 
Active scanning thermal 
imagers 
Red/blue force tracking 
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Table 3. 6 Interior intrusion sensors as part of the detection function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
T 
E 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Interior Intrusion Sensors 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Sensors posed in indoor environment for the detection of unauthorized acts 
or unauthorized presence of insiders, as well as outsiders, into an area that is 
being protected by someone who is able to authorize or initiate an 
appropriate response. The main difference with external detection sensors is 
that internal ones are vulnerable to both insiders and outsiders. 
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 Probability of detection (𝑃𝐴𝐷); the likelihood of detecting an 
adversary within the zone covered by an intrusion detection sensor. 
For an ideal sensor 𝑃𝐴𝐷 = 1. For real sensors 𝑃𝐴𝐷 ≅ 0.9. 
 False Alarm Rate: the expected rate of alarms from an intrusion 
detection sensor that can be attributed to known causes unrelated 
to intrusion attempts. For an ideal sensor false alarm rate is 0. 
 Vulnerability to defeat; exploitable capability of the sensor to be 
defeated though bypass or spoof by taking advantage of the sensor 
physics, signal processing, installation, degradation and site 
conditions. 
Also: choice of sensor placement in relation with its physical operation and 
with other sensors present (i.e., sensor detection areas should overlap). 
Consideration of the interaction among equipment, environment (e.g., 
electromagnetic, nuclear radiation, acoustic, thermal environment) and 
potential intruders in the selection of sensor technology. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
 Passive/Active; detector of some type of energy emitted by the target 
of interest/ transmitter of some type of energy and detector of a 
variation in the received energy. 
 Covert/Visible: hidden from view (e.g., in walls, under floor)/ in 
plain view of the intruder (e.g., attached to a door). 
 Volumetric/Line Detection: detection in a certain volume not 
identified by the intruder, regardless of the point of entry into the 
zone/ detection along a line often easy to identify. 
 Application mode: boundary penetration sensors/Interior motion 
sensors/ Proximity sensors; detection of penetration of the 
boundary to an interior area/ detection of motion of an intruder 
within a confined interior area/ detection of the intruder in the area 
adjacent to the object or when the intruder touch the object. 
SENSOR TECHNOLOGY (Classification according to application mode) 
Boundary- 
Penetration 
Sensors 
Vibration sensors Electromechanical sensors 
Capacitance sensors Infrasonic and passive sonic sensors 
Active infrared sensors Fiber-optic cable sensors 
Interior Motion 
Sensors 
Microwave sensors Ultrasonic sensors 
Active sonic sensors Passive infrared sensors 
Dual-technology sensors Video motion detection 
Proximity Sensors Capacitance proximity 
sensors 
Pressure sensors 
Others Wireless sensors Miscellaneous (e.g., light and electric field) 
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Table 3. 7 Alarm assessment as part of the detection function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
T 
E 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Alarm Assessment 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Process of determining an alarm condition status (i.e., whether the event is an 
attack or a false alarm). Alarm is defined as a warning from a sensor or sensor 
system that a sensor has been triggered or activated, usually signaled by light 
or sound; alarm may indicate a nuisance or a false alarm, or a valid alarm.  
Alarm assessment includes appraisal of the credibility, reliability pertinence, 
pertinence, accuracy, or usefulness of an indicated alarm. Alarm assessment 
may be carried out by installing closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. 
Rarely it has been carried out by dispatching guards to an alarm location. 
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Alarm assessment performance must support system objectives:  
 An immediate on-site response (short time between alarm and 
response) is needed to protect high-consequence targets, the system 
resolution and timing must be sufficient to enable a timely response. 
 A delayed response may be sufficient to protect low-consequences 
targets.  
 Choice of adequate level of resolution depending on the expected 
threats, their tactics, the target asset to protect, the way the video 
information are used. 
It includes also: conscientious approach toward installation and maintenance 
with equipment burn-in tests before final installation and preventive 
maintenance for the light. Minimization of camera vulnerabilities though 
correct placement. Realizing integration between alarm assessment system 
and intrusion detection system, considering interactions between the video 
system, intrusion sensors and display systems. Use of different cameras for 
safety and security monitoring. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
 Primary/secondary assessment: determining whether the alarm is 
due to an adversary or a nuisance alarm/ providing additional 
information about an intrusion that can be relayed to the response 
force. 
 Resolution of the camera (3 levels): detection/classification/ 
identification; ability to detect the presence of an object in the area 
of interest/ ability to determine what is present by class (e.g., animal, 
blowing debris, person)/ ability to uniquely identify an object based 
on details of appearance (e.g., Marco, not Luca). 
COMPONENTS OF A VIDEO ALARM ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
Camera and lens Converting an optical image of the physical scene into an electric signal. 
Lighting system Illuminating the alarm location evenly with enough intensity for camera and 
lens. 
Transmission 
system 
Connecting the remote cameras to the local video monitors. 
Video switching 
equipment 
Connecting video signals from multiple cameras to monitors and video 
recorders. 
Video recording 
system 
Producing record of an event. 
Video monitors Converting electric signal to a visual scene. 
Video controller Interfacing between alarm sensor system and alarm assessment system. 
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Table 3. 8 Alarm communication and display as part of the detection function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
T 
E 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE  
Alarm Communication and Display (AC & D) 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Alarm communication and display plays a fundamental role in the successful and 
timely response to a threat by controlling the flow of information from sensors 
to the operator and displaying it quickly and clearly. The alarm communication 
and display system collects alarm data, presents information to a security 
operator and enables the operator to enter commands to control the system. The 
system may be a simple alarm panel display or a complex multicomputer control 
and communication system, depending on specific needs and resources. 
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
An AC & D should promote the rapid evaluation of alarms, by means of: 
 Fast reporting time (AC & D system speed is often a measure of 
effectiveness); quick information for the operator. 
 Communication of the following information: where an alarm has 
occurred/ what or who caused the alarm/ when the alarm happened. 
 Line supervision of all cables. 
 Easy and quick discovery of single point failure that should be repaired 
(or at least isolated) without affecting the whole system. 
 Isolation and control of sensors by means of a path to check and isolate 
individual sensors. 
 Expansion flexibility by capability to accommodate easily new sensors 
in a computer system. 
It includes also: adequate design for the environment (e.g., wide temperature 
variations), robustness, reliability by availability of individual components, 
redundancy or backup for critical components. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
 Classification into two main subsystems: alarm communication 
subsystem/ alarm control & display subsystem; alarm communication 
subsystem moves data from the collection point (sensors) to a central 
repository (display) and often throughout the repository / alarm control 
and display subsystem presents information to a security operator and 
enables the operator to enter commands affecting the operation of 
AC&D system. 
 Classification based on Open Source Interconnection (OSI) Reference 
Model: Physical Layer/Link Layer/ Network Layer. 
MODEL LAYERS FOR AC & D (Classification according to OSI Model 
Layers) 
Physical Layer The physical layer provides mechanical, electrical, functional, and procedural 
methods used to transmit information from one place to another. It deals with 
the media (wire, fiber, etc.) and network architecture (star, bus, point - to – 
point), low - level protocols or direct current line supervision that are 
characteristics of a communication channel. 
Link Layer The data link layer provides protocol delimiters and framing information. This 
layer also performs basic error - checking, notifying higher layers by means of 
specific protocols. 
Network Layer The network layer provides addressing, sequencing, flow-control, 
receipt/acknowledgement, and error - handling services. The network layer takes 
higher - level data and packages it for transmission. It provides the overall 
redundancy and reliability of the communication system. 
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Table 3. 9 Entry control as part of the detection function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
T 
E 
C 
T 
I 
O 
N 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Entry Control 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Entry control indicates the technology used to verify access (entry/exit) 
authorization to a facility and to detect contraband. Access control includes the 
databases, procedures and rules for access that complement technology.  The 
main objectives of an entry control system are: 
 Permitting only authorized personnel to enter and exit. 
 Detecting and preventing the entry or exit of contraband material 
(weapons, explosives, authorized tools and goods, and critical assets). 
 Providing information to security personnel to facilitate assessment 
and response. 
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 Throughput: measure of the time it takes for an authorized person or 
material to successfully pass an entry or an exit point (e.g., avoiding use 
of long throughput components for entry gates at shift changes in an 
industrial facility) 
 Error rates in personnel identity verification (biometric technologies): 
Type I error (False reject) is the improper rejection of a valid user / Type 
II error (false accept) is the improper acceptance of an unauthorized 
person. Choice of Acceptance precision should take into account these 
two opposite trends of Error Rate VS Acceptance precision. 
Also: eventual presence of CCTV surveillance, eventual integration with AC & D 
system, testing of the system under different (i.e., normal, abnormal and 
malevolent) conditions, entry control system impact on fire codes. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
 Based on classes: something you know/ something you possess/ 
something you are. 
 Based on components’ subsystems: personnel control entry/ 
contraband detection/ Locks/ Procedure/ Administrative Procedures. 
COMPONENTS OF AN ENTRY CONTROL SYSTEM 
Personnel Entry 
Control 
Portion of an entry control 
system used to authorize 
entry and to verify the 
authorization of personnel 
for entrance in a controlled 
area. 
Personal Identification Number – PIN 
Credentials (Photo-identification badge, 
exchange badge, stored image badge, coded 
credentials) 
Personnel Identity Verification – Biometrics 
(Hand/finger geometry, handwriting, 
fingerprints, eye pattern, voice, face, other 
techniques) 
Personnel entry control bypass 
Contraband 
Detection 
Contraband screening is 
aimed at detecting 
unauthorized weapon, 
explosives and tools. 
Manual search Metal detectors 
Package search (bulk and trace explosives 
detection), chemical and biological agent 
detection 
Locks Locks secure the moveable 
portions of barriers in 
conjunction with other 
protection measures. 
Fastening device Strike 
Hasps and Shackles Coded Mechanism 
(Keyless/ key coded) 
Procedures  Procedural and 
administrative tasks 
Employees’ training 
courses 
Development of back-up 
procedures 
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Table 3. 10 Access delay as part of delay function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
E 
L 
A 
Y 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Access Delay 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Access delay follows detection in effective PPS. Delay element prevent 
completion of the malevolent act, provide delay until an adequate response force 
can arrive, or until additional remotely activated delay and response system can 
be activated. The aim of access delay barriers (e.g., reinforced concrete walls, 
fences, gates, guards) is to complicate the adversary’s progress by introducing 
impediments along any possible path the adversary may choose. 
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Time is the key performance measure for access delay barriers; it depends on the 
barrier to be breached and the tools/skills that are necessary for it. Barrier 
penetration time is a function of the attack mode, which is in turn determined by 
the equipment needed. Presence of multiple barriers of different types along 
possible adversary paths. Barriers’ location next to detection alarm to aid 
accurate assessment. If possible, incorporation of barriers into the design of the 
facility (e.g., facility underground or aboveground with massive overburden). 
Use of compensatory measures, as additional guards, during critical operations 
(e.g., fire drills, maintenance by contractors employees). 
Also: assets consolidation into a single room (reduced response time, reduced 
cost of delay upgrades), use of design basis threat to make forecasts about 
adversary’s level of technical skills and appropriate equipment, barriers’ 
upgrading over time. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
Based on barrier types and principles: 
Passive barriers/ guards/ dispensable barriers; 
 
ACCESS DELAY BARRIERS CLASSIFICATION  
Passive Barriers Barriers that do not require any 
activation, they are always in place and 
fail secure. They are commercially 
available, with reduced costs and high 
accessibility, but they are weak against 
explosive attacks and they often impose 
operational and esthetic constraints on 
a facility. 
Perimeter 
barriers 
 Fences 
 Gates 
 Vehicle barriers 
Structural 
barriers 
 Walls 
 Doors 
 Windows and 
utility ports 
 Roofs and floors 
Guards Presence of guards can provide flexible and continuous delay to adversaries using 
stealth or cover tactics to gain entry. Guards may only provide minimal delay to 
adversaries using force, unless in fixed and protected positions. Nevertheless, it 
is an operational expense and guards can be subjected to compromise with 
adversaries. 
Dispensable 
Barriers 
Barriers that are deployed only during 
adversary attack: active barriers can, on 
command (e.g., guard force and/or 
sensor), stop or delay an adversary, 
passive barriers do not require any 
command and control and they are 
activated by the penetration attempt.  
Rigid 
polyurethane 
foam 
Stabilized aqueous 
foam 
Smoke or fog Sticky 
thermoplastic 
foam 
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Table 3. 11 Response force and response force communication as part of the response function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
E 
S 
P 
O 
N 
S 
E 
NAME OF 
SECURITY 
MEASURE 
Response Force & Response Force Communications 
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
It indicates the element of a PPS designed to counteract adversary activities and 
interrupt the threat. Response force includes corporate policies and procedures, 
training, determination of response force tactics, use of force and normal 
operating procedures. The response force includes the proprietary guards and 
external (contractor and/or members of local law enforcement) personnel who 
may be involved in the immediate response to counter the threat of an adversary 
at a particular facility (both on-site and off-site).  
PERFORMANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Two main measures of an immediate response: 
 Time for arrival: time it takes for the response personnel (one or more, 
depending on the threat) to arrive at a location and establish 
interruption that is preventing the adversary from progressing in their 
attack. Interruption is a measure of the detection, delay, communication 
and response function of the PPS and is represented by the probability 
of interruption (𝑃𝐼). Interruption depends on reliable, accurate, and fast 
alarm reporting and assessment, as well as on dependable 
communication and effective deployment to the proper location. 
 Neutralization effectiveness: neutralization measures response force 
numbers, training, tactics, and use of any weapons or equipment and is 
represented by the probability of neutralization (𝑃𝑁). Neutralization 
refers to any confrontation between the adversary and responders and 
is defined as defeat of the adversary; neutralization effectiveness 
depends on training and capability, the techniques used depend on the 
threat. 
AVAILABLE 
CLASSIFICATION 
CRITERIA 
According on different aspects of response function: contingency planning/ 
communication/ interruption/ neutralization/ procedures. 
According to time: immediate/ after-the-fact recovery. 
RESPONSE ASPECTS CLASSIFICATION  
Contingency 
Planning 
 Development of tactical plans to address various threats on relevant targets; 
 Interaction with outside agencies for joint training exercises; 
 Definition of the facility use of force policy; 
 Development of additional procedures describing guard force daily 
operations and assistance during abnormal events (e.g., safety events, bad 
weather). 
Communication Communication network resistant to eavesdropping, deception and jamming: 
 Implementation of voice-private radios make the network more resistant to 
eaves dropping and deception, but more susceptible to jamming; 
 Implementation of digitally encrypted radio transmission can be more 
secure, but often is too expensive; 
 Spread-spectrum radios can provide resistance to jamming. 
Interruption & 
Neutralization 
Careful planning, training and testing of response force capabilities. Periodical 
evaluation of the response force through limited scope performance drills and 
written examination. 
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3.3.2 Performance assessment for risk reducing measures 
In the context of major accidents and cascading events prevention, control and mitigation, risk 
reducing measures (i.e., safety and security barriers) are widely employed. Therefore, 
quantitative assessment of barriers performances takes on a major role. In the current section, 
a selection of available methods, including most advanced ones (i.e., dynamic techniques, 
mostly based on Bayesian Networks), for safety and security barriers technical performance 
assessment are illustrated and compared, with particular mention to cascading events 
prevention within the chemical industry domain.  
3.3.2.1 Performance assessment for safety measures 
3.3.2.1.1 Conventional methodology for safety measures performance 
assessment 
At the present time, conventional quantitative assessment of safety barriers performance with 
respect to major accident prevention is largely based on Event-Tree Analysis, representing the 
right side of Bow-Tie diagram. Event-Tree is a probabilistic model that correlates a top event 
with its outcomes, or consequences. It illustrates, from a qualitative and quantitative 
perspective, the logical relationships present in the system and indeed, it helps understanding 
which safety barriers failures would escalate the top event to a certain consequence (De 
Dianous and Fiévez, 2006).  
The construction of an Event-Tree starts from the identification of credible scenarios, by means 
of past-accident data review (Delvosalle et al., 2006). Then, the identification and detailed 
description of pertinent safety barriers with respect to the specific operational context should 
be carried out. In this phase, the relations among the elements present in the system should be 
investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, the latter aspect aims at 
determining the performance of safety barriers.  
Generally, only the availability is accounted as a measure of safety barriers performance (i.e., 
expressed by the probability of failure on demand – PFD). The values of PDF can be either 
retrieved by technical literature or calculated by means of conventional techniques, as Fault-
Tree analysis (Khakzad et al., 2013b). Eventually, the potential accident sequences and safety 
barriers contributions are outlined by the calculation of final events frequencies (or 
probabilities), according to the following equation: 
𝑓𝐹𝐸_𝑖 = 𝑓𝑇𝑜𝑝_𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ ∏ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑇𝑜𝑝_𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑖                                                                         (3.7)                                                   
Where 𝑓𝐹𝐸_𝑖  is the frequency (or probability) of a final state i, obtained by multiplying the top 
event frequency (or probability) (i.e., 𝑓𝑇𝑜𝑝_𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡) with the n failure probabilities of the safety 
barriers (i.e., 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖) leading to that consequence, whose probability is 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑖. 
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3.3.2.1.2 A recent methodology for quantitative safety measures performance 
assessment in the prevention of domino escalations 
Recent applications stressed the importance of quantitative safety barriers performance 
assessment, by means of Event-Tree based analysis, in the context of cascading effects 
prevention, for instance regarding domino accidents (Janssens et al., 2015; Landucci et al., 
2015a). Recently, the contribution by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a) proposed a novel 
approach to quantitative safety barriers performance assessment in the prevention of domino 
escalations triggered by fires. The approach is based on the conventional Event-Tree tool, but 
it includes specific gates to quantitative evaluate all categories of barriers performance (i.e., 
active, passive and procedural ones), in reducing escalation probability. Therefore, the 
procedure allows defining final events probabilities and eventually domino scenario frequency. 
A flowchart of the methodology is reported in Figure 3. 5. 
 
Figure 3. 5 Methodology for quantitative assessment of safety barriers performance in the prevention 
of domino accidents, triggered by fire. Figure adapted from Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). 
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After the creation of a specific data repository (i.e., according to step 1), the procedure requires 
the identification and classification of safety measures in place (i.e., step 2). Therefore, three 
main categories of Reference installations are identified: 
 Refinery tank farms (RI. 1)  
 LPG storage facilities (RI. 2)]; 
 Offshore Oil&Gas (O&G) rigs for hydrocarbon extraction (RI. 3)  
For each RI identified, possible target equipment (i.e., RTE) for domino escalation and safety 
measures in place are identified and summarized in Table 3. 12. 
Table 3. 12 Summary of safety barriers considered for each Reference Installation, according to 
Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). Symbols: PSV= Pressure safety valve; ESD = Emergency Shut 
Down system; EDP = Emergency Depressurization System; PFP = Passive Fire Protection with 
fireproofing material. * not considered in the quantitative assessment. 
RI 
RTE 
description 
RTE Active Protection Systems 
Passive Protection 
Systems 
Procedural/ 
Emergency 
measures 
RI.1 
Floating roof 
diameter 
> 60 m 
T.1 
Foam-
water 
sprinkler 
system 
Semi-fixed 
Foam System * 
+ Fixed Water 
Spray* 
Rim seal by 
foam 
flooding* 
PSV - 
Emergency 
team 
Floating roof 
diameter 
> 30 m 
Fixed roof  
Diameter 
> 20 m 
T.2 
Foam-
water 
sprinkler 
system or 
Semi-fixed 
Foam System* 
+ Fixed Water 
Spray* 
- PSV - 
Emergency 
team 
Floating roof 
diam. <30 m 
Fixed roof  
diam. < 20 
m 
T.3 
Semi-fixed 
foam 
injection 
system* 
- PSV - 
Emergency 
team 
RI.2 
Abovegroud 
pressurized 
vessel 
V.1 
Water 
Spray 
system 
- PSV 
PFP 
(2h rating) 
Emergency 
team 
Mounded 
pressurized 
vessel 
V.2 - - PSV 
PFP 
(2h rating) 
Emergency 
team 
RI.3 
Horizontal 
separator 
S.1 
Object 
specific 
deluge  
ESD&EDP 
system 
PSV 
PFP 
(2h rating) 
- 
Condensate 
treaters   
S.2 
Area 
deluge 
ESD&EDP 
system 
PSV 
PFP 
(2h rating) 
- 
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Then, the third step of the methodology requires performing quantitative safety barriers 
performance assessment. According to the mentioned approach, the performance of a safety 
barrier is represented by a combination of availability and effectiveness: 
 Availability is defined as the probability of failure on demand (i.e., PFD) of the safety 
barriers; 
 Effectiveness is defined as the probability that the safety barrier, even if successfully 
activated, will be able to prevent the escalation.  
The performance of a safety barrier can be described by the following specific gates, reported 
in Figure 3. 6 (Landucci et al., 2015a); the upper branch of each gate (i.e., OUT 1) indicates the 
failure state. Its probability is the failure probability of the barrier, by combining its 
availability, expressed as probability of failure on demand (i.e., PFDi), and its effectiveness (i.e., 
η). All possible outputs from the same gate are mutually exclusive. The three possible 
typologies of gates are: 
 A simple composite probability (gate type A): availability, expressed as the probability 
of failure on demand, is multiplied by a single probability value expressing the 
probability of barrier success in the prevention of the escalation. OUT 1 indicates the 
failure (i.e., unavailability) of the barrier, OUT 2 indicates the success of the barrier 
(i.e., available and with 𝜂 = 1); 
 A composite probability distribution (gate type B): availability, expressed as the 
probability of failure on demand, is multiplied by a probability distribution expressing 
the probability of barrier success in the prevention of escalation, thus obtaining a 
composite probability of barrier failure on demand. OUT 1 indicates the failure (i.e., 
unavailability) of the barrier, OUT 2 indicates the success of the barrier (i.e., available, 
with 𝜂 ≠ 1); 
 A discrete probability distribution (gate type C): depending on barrier effectiveness, 
three or more events may originate from the gate describing barrier performance: 
barrier success (e.g., OUT 3, no escalation), barrier failure (e.g., OUT 1, unmitigated 
escalation), and one or more partially mitigated scenarios (e.g., OUT 2, partial or 
delayed escalation).  
From a general point of view, gate type A is applied for passive safety measures, gate type B for 
active safety measures and gate type C for procedural safety measures, but there are exceptions. 
For instance, gate type A is applied for Water Deluge System (i.e., WDS), Pressure Safety Valve 
(i.e., PSV), Fireproofing coating (i.e., PFP) and Emergency shutdown system (i.e., EDS). Gate 
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type B is applied for Foam-Water sprinkler system (i.e., Sprinkler), gate type C is applied for 
Emergency intervention (i.e., Em_Team).  
 
Figure 3. 6 Gates for safety barriers performance, accounting both availability and effectiveness 
(Landucci et al., 2015a). 
Then, according to step 4, the Event-Tree based approach is applied. Escalation probability 
values (𝑃𝑑), are calculated depending on safety barriers states, defined by Event-Tree 
branches. Three different procedures are outlined for active, passive and procedural measures 
respectively. 
For active measures, two specific approaches are available for sprinkler and WDS. For a 
sprinkler, a gate type B is applied, with 𝜂 = 0.954. A WDS is represented by a gate type A; in 
case of available WDS system, a reduced heat load (QWDS) should be obtained as follows: 
𝑄𝑊𝐷𝑆 = 𝑄𝐻𝐿 ∙ 𝜑                                                                                                                                       (3.8) 
Where 𝑄𝐻𝐿 is the full heat load value  [𝑄𝐻𝐿] = [
𝑘𝑊
𝑚2
] which can be reduced, according to an 
adimensional intensity reduction factor 𝜑 of 0.5 when the safety barrier is available; else way 
𝜑 is equal to 1. In case of WDS availability, 𝜂 is unitary. 
Passive safety measures are generally represented by a gate type A. Concerning availability, 
passive fire protections (PFP) can be considered as single components, with PFD values can 
be derived from literature. Concerning fireproofing effectiveness, this parameter identifies the 
degree by which the target resistance is enhanced due to PFP presence: the higher the ttf (i.e., 
time to failure) of the target is, the more effective the PFP. In case of failure of PFP system 
(e.g. upper output branch of the gate – OUT 1), the ttf value can be estimated as a function of 
the heat load by the following formula: 
𝑡𝑡𝑓 = 0.0167 ∙ 𝑒(𝑐𝑉
𝑑+ln𝑄𝐻𝐿+𝑓)                                                                                     (3.9) 
Primary fire 
Unmitigated escalation
No escalation
a1
c1
b1
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In which ttf is expressed in minutes, QHL is the heat load, which may be substituted by QWDS in 
presence of effective activation of WDS system, V is the vessel volume (m3) and the coefficients 
(c, d,  f) depend on types of process and storage equipment. 
In case of availability of PFP barrier (e.g., lower output branch of the gate – OUT 2) an 
effectiveness value equal to 1 is considered, adding a further term (namely ttfc) to the ttf 
estimated for the unprotected vessel as follows: 
𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑃 = 𝑡𝑡𝑓 + 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝐶                                                                                                                                 (3.10) 
Where ttfp is the time to failure in presence of thermal protection. A simplified assessment of 
ttfc  is proposed herein; a ttfc value of 70 minutes is considered if PFP is available and effective. 
For what concerns procedural measures, emergency response can be provided by internal 
and/or external emergency teams. These teams can be composed of experts or fire-fighters as 
well as of volunteers or workers who receive a specific training. Three reference times were 
defined and associated to the emergency operations for a given industrial facility: 
 tta (time to alert): maximum time required to start the emergency operations, defined as 
the time needed for the fire to be detected and the alarm to be given;  
 tsm (time to on-site mitigation): maximum time required to start the pre-planned response 
actions to be put in place by personnel and with resources available on site, defined as the 
time needed to start the pre-planned operations to contain the fire hazard or mitigate its 
impact (e.g. start of the emergency water deluges, gathering and deployment in the fire 
area of mobile firefighting equipment, start of water cooling and/or fire control operations 
by using fire-fighting water reservoir or tap water network); 
 tfm (time for final mitigation): characteristic time of an effective intervention of external 
emergency teams, defined as the maximum time required by the external emergency team 
to provide and keep constant, by means of suitable equipment and vehicles, the amount of 
water which is required for primary fire suppression or effective cooling action on the 
target. 
In order to establish the value of barrier effectiveness and to quantify the escalation Event-
Tree, the tfm value (i.e., time for final mitigation) is compared to the ttf of each target. The tfm 
is calculated as the sum of different contributions, according to procedure specific for the 
Reference Installation, provided by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). The gate type C is 
used in the escalation event tree for procedural barriers involving emergency team 
intervention. The following three alternative outputs were identified: 
 OUT1: if the emergency response is not activated or not available, the escalation will 
occur; 
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 OUT2: if the emergency response is activated but tfm results higher than ttf, emergency 
team is not effective since required actions will come too late to prevent escalation 
(η=0), a mitigated escalation scenario will occur;  
 OUT3: if the emergency response is activated and tfm is lower than ttf, the mitigation 
action is successful and the fire escalation will be prevented (η=1). 
It should be noted that availability values can be either retrieved from technical literature, or 
calculated (only in case of active safety barriers) by means of Fault-Tree Analysis.  
At this stage, the values of associated escalation probability (𝑃𝑑,𝑖), corresponding to each final 
state of the Event-Tree can be calculated according to equation (3.2) and equation (3.4). The 
probability of each consequence (𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑖) can be defined by multiplying the performance 
probabilities of all safety barriers leading to that specific consequence, according to Section 
3.3.2.1.1. Final event probability (𝑃𝐹𝐸,𝑖)  for each final state i can be calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝐹𝐸,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑑,𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑖                                                                                                                                (3.11) 
Then, final events frequencies can be calculated (𝑓𝐹𝐸,𝑖) as follows: 
𝑓𝐹𝐸,𝑖 = 𝑓𝑃𝐸 ∙ 𝑃𝐹𝐸,𝑖                                                                                                                                    (3.12) 
Where 𝑓𝑃𝐸 is the frequency of the primary event. 
However, it should be noted that this procedure has been applied only to a first level domino 
and to a simplified case study; moreover, it is based on a conventional static methodology (i.e., 
Event-Tree). 
3.3.2.1.3 Dynamic safety measures performance assessment and domino 
accident analysis methodologies 
Despite the popularity of Event-Tree based approach within the process industry, the 
methodology shows several limitations. For instance, Event-Tree cannot include multi-state 
variables, cannot represent conditional dependencies and cannot apply real-time information 
from a facility to update prior “beliefs”, which are prior probabilities of top events, 
intermediate events and safety barriers (Khakzad et al., 2013b). These limitations hinder from 
obtaining a real-time picture of safety barriers performances and final consequences 
probabilities, therefore offering just a static risk picture, which is not able to account systems 
modifications and information derived from operational experience. Therefore, dynamic risk 
assessment techniques are increasingly developed within the chemical and process industry 
domain; as described in Section 2, Bayesian Networks are promising techniques to be applied 
within major accidents and cascading events prevention. 
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3.3.2.1.3.1 Fundamentals of Bayesian Analysis technique 
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, Bayesian Analysis technique is the first complete dynamic risk 
assessment procedure, developed by Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al., 2010, 2009), which 
is widely applied and established. Therefore, a summary of its 5 key steps is available in Section 
2.4.1. Indeed, the mathematics fundamentals, necessary to apply the procedure to case studies 
in Section 5, are described in the current subsection. The procedure starts in Step 0 from the 
retrieval of existing accident precursors data (i.e., ASP), either from the same installation, the 
same reference sector, or to contiguous ones.  
Then, in Step 1, the potential scenarios, their causes, consequences and related safety barriers 
are identified by means of a conventional Risk Assessment tool (e.g., Bow-Tie analysis or 
Event-Tree analysis). This step provides a visual representation of consequences, causes and 
related safety barriers in place to mitigate or control the hazards.  
Step 2 is aimed at calculating the prior failure probability function for each barrier. The prior 
failure function of each barrier represents our understanding of it prior to the start of 
operation. Different typologies of probability density function can be selected to represent the 
failure probability of a safety barrier (e.g., Beta, Gamma) (Vose and Rowe, 2000), termed as 
𝑓(𝑥), where x is the failure probability of the safety barrier. Each function is characterized by 
two parameters (i.e., 𝛼 and 𝛽) and can be expressed by the following formula: 
𝑓(𝑥) ∝ 𝑥𝛼−1(1 − 𝑥)𝛽−1                                                                                                                       (3.13)                                    
Then, the prior probabilities or frequencies of occurrence of each final state of the Event-Tree 
are calculated according to equation (3.7). Two approaches are available, for instance, 
deterministic and probabilistic one. According to the deterministic approach, the value of each 
end state can simply multiply the probabilities of each branch related to the state, according to 
the second member from the left of equation (3.7). According to the probabilistic approach, 
the median value of the selected probability distribution is accounted as failure probability of 
the safety barrier for the calculation of prior final states probabilities, according to the latter 
member of equation (3.7). 
In step 3, the likelihood function is created (𝑔(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑥)). This function is formed using real 
time data from the process as it operates, according to the following equation: 
𝑔(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑥) ∝ 𝑥𝛾(1 − 𝑥)𝛿                                                                                                                      (3.14) 
Where 𝛾 and 𝛿 are the revised parameter of the likelihood function. These data are inferred 
from the ASPs and are specific numbers within a discrete domain, which is best presented by 
a binomial distribution. Many approaches exist for selecting likelihood functions. The most 
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convenient in the present framework is to use the conjugate pair of the prior function 
(Kalantarnia et al., 2010).  
In step 4, the posterior function (f (x|Data)) is calculated; this probability revising technique 
is often termed as Bayesian adapting. The posterior failure function of the safety barrier has 
been obtained from the prior and likelihood functions using Bayesian inference. Bayesian 
inference is a tool which uses data to improve an estimate of a parameter. The posterior 
function is the same distribution type as the prior (Beta), but the parameters are updated 
trough the likelihood function. Thus, the posterior function can be derived as follows: 
𝑓(𝑥|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) ∝  𝑔(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑥) ∙ 𝑓(𝑥) ∝ 𝑥𝛼−1(1 − 𝑥)𝛽−1𝑥𝛾(1 − 𝑥)𝛿 ∝ 𝑥𝛼+𝛾−1(1 − 𝑥)𝛽+𝛿−1              (3.15)                                                                                                                                                        
Where x is the failure probability of the barrier, f(x) is the probability distribution function 
(prior distribution), f(x|Data) is the posterior distribution and g(Data|x) is the likelihood 
function; (𝛼 + 𝛾) and (𝛽 + 𝛿) are the two parameters of the posterior distribution. 
The last step of the methodology is the consequence analysis, carried out on the scenario in 
order to estimate the revised frequencies (or probabilities) of occurrence of final states, 
according to the equation (3.7), by inserting the posterior failure function in the equation, to 
describe each safety barrier performance. 
In Section 5.2.2, some relevant existing applications of the methodology are proposed in 
purpose to show how it can be put into practice. However, it should be noted that Dynamic 
Risk assessment methodology, especially in case of complex systems, is particularly laborious. 
3.3.2.1.3.2 Fundamentals of Bayesian Networks and Limited Memory Influence Diagrams 
Among several existing approaches, Bayesian Networks (BNs) have emerged. The most 
relevant advantage of BNs is that they provide a useful tool to deal with uncertainties and 
information from different sources, such as expert judgment and observable experience, being 
able to take into account common causes and influences of human factors as well (Ale et al., 
2014). Bayesian Networks are also known as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), Causal 
Probabilistic Networks, Causal Nets, Graphical Probability Networks, Probabilistic Cause-
Effect Models, Directed Acyclic Graphs and Probabilistic Influence Diagrams (Haugom and 
Friis-Hansen, 2011).  
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are a graphical representation of uncertain quantities and decisions 
that explicitly reveal the probabilistic dependence between the variables and the related 
information flow. In BNs, variables and their relations are represented by means of nodes and 
directed arcs; conditional probability tables (CPTs), assigned to the nodes, represent 
conditional dependencies.  
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The arcs denote direct dependencies or cause-effect relationships between linked nodes, 
whereas conditional probabilities assigned to the nodes determine the type and strength of 
such dependencies. In other words, a BN is defined by a qualitative part and a quantitative 
part. The qualitative part consists of a set of nodes which represents the system variables, and 
a set of directed arcs between variables, representing the dependencies or the case-effect 
relations between variables. The quantitative part consists of conditional probability 
distributions for each node, given the states of the influencing nodes, called also parent nodes.  
Together, the quantitative and qualitative parts encode all the relevant information about the 
system variables and their interrelations, which, mathematically, means the joint distribution 
of these variables. 
Therefore, according to Jensen and Nielsen (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007), under the assumption 
of conditional independence, a BN represents the joint probability distribution P(U) of 
variables U = {A1, … , An}, as described by the following equation: 
𝑃(𝑈) = ∏ 𝑃𝑛𝑖=1 (𝐴𝑖|𝑃𝑎(𝐴𝑖))                                                                                                                                 (3.16)  
Where Pa(Ai) is the parent set of Ai. Indeed, a BN expands the joint probability distribution of 
a set of linked nodes. Considering local dependencies, BN factorizes the joint probability 
distribution of a set of random variables as the multiplication of the conditional probabilities 
of the effect nodes given their direct cause nodes. 
To better understand the reasoning, let’s consider the joint probability distribution of the 
random variables A, B, C, and D in the BN of Figure 3. 7, which is exclusively expanded as 
(Khakzad et al., 2013d): 
𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐴) ∙ 𝑃(𝐵 ⎸𝐴) ∙ 𝑃(𝐶𝐴) ∙ 𝑃(𝐷 ⎸𝐵, 𝐶)                                                                        (3.17) 
In this way, instead of working with a large joint probability distribution, one can work with 
smaller pieces of it, but preserving the overall component interaction within the system. 
Accordingly, the marginal probability of each random variable, for example C, can be 
calculated via marginalization as: 
𝑃(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷)𝐴,𝐵,𝐷                                                                                                                   (3.18) 
The main application of BN the use of probability revising techniques. BN applies Bayes 
theorem to revise the prior probabilities of random variables given new information (i.e., called 
evidence) to render posterior or updated probabilities. For example, knowing that the random 
variable D is in state d (i.e., evidence), the revised probability of A being in state a can be 
calculated as (Khakzad et al., 2013e): 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑎 ⎸𝐷 = 𝑑) =
𝑃(𝐴=𝑎 ,𝐷=𝑑)
𝑃(𝐷=𝑑)
= 
∑ 𝑃(𝑎,𝐵,𝐶,𝑑)𝐵,𝐶
∑ 𝑃(𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝑑)𝐴,𝐵,𝐶
                                                                                   (3.19) 
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Indeed, Bayesian Networks allows taking into account new evidences and consequently 
modifying probability distributions, by means of two different probability-revising techniques, 
which are Bayesian Analysis techniques. In fact, Bayesian analysis can be performed through 
probability updating and probability adapting techniques.  
Probability updating consists in the calculation of the Most Probable Explanation (i.e., MPE), 
which is the most probable state of all the variables (i.e., most probable configuration), given 
the accident occurrence (i.e., evidence), according to the following formula (Bobbio et al., 
2001; Khakzad et al., 2011):  
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
                                           (3.20) 
Therefore, probability updating calculates the posterior probability of event xi given a certain 
state of event Q, i.e. P(xi|Q). Probability adapting consists in the calculation of posterior 
probability for a generic event xi, given another event Q has occurred n times, which can be 
expressed in statistical terms as 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑄 = 𝑛). Therefore, probability adapting means applying 
prior experience, in the form of additional information collected during a certain time span, 
named Accident Sequence Precursors (i.e., ASP), to adapt conditional probabilities 
distributions, and therefore, to revise final events probabilities and safety barriers 
performance over time.  
 
Figure 3. 7 Example of Bayesian Network; this modelling technique includes both qualitative and 
quantitative features. A, B, C, D are random variables. 
From a general point of view, the principal steps in application of Bayesian theory include 
(Weber et al., 2012):  
1) Specifying a probability model for unknown parameter values that includes prior 
knowledge about the parameters, if available; 
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2) Updating knowledge about the unknown parameters by conditioning this probability 
model using observed data; 
3) Evaluating the goodness of the conditioned model with respect to the data and the 
sensitivity of the conclusions to the assumptions in the probability model. 
Up to now, three different versions of BBNs have been applied successfully to the description 
of complex real systems, which need to be represented by non-linear non-deterministic 
models. These versions are Discrete Bayesian Belief Nets, Gaussian Bayesian Belief Nets and 
Non-parametric BBNs (NPBBNs); the main differences consist of the mathematical functions 
and input-data; the most applied typology that will be applied in the following case studies, is 
Discrete Bayesian Belief Net  (Weber et al., 2012). 
Eventually, the main advantages of Bayesian methods and applications with respect to major 
accident and cascading events prevention have been summarized in the attached list (Khakzad 
et al., 2013e): 
 Probability updating, using real-time information. 
 Flexible structure, with possibility to develop specific sub-models. 
 Transparency and intuitiveness, due to graphical appearance, may be suitable in purpose 
to involve non-expert people in important decisions (e.g. stakeholders). 
 Quantitative technique, by applying conditional probabilities, with the benefits of a 
qualitative one. 
 Complex events description, with the ability to incorporate multistate variables and 
common cause failure. 
Bayesian Techniques offer the advantage of evaluating various decision alternatives and the 
utilities associated with these.  
To some extent it is possible to construct a model for decision making with a pure BN (as the 
one just described), but the concepts of utility and decisions are not explicitly covered.  
A limited memory influence diagram (LIMID) is simply a Bayesian Network, extended with 
utility nodes and decision nodes, which makes a suitable tool for operational safety decision-
making (e.g., suitable to define selection criteria for a safety barrier). The other nodes are 
renamed in influence diagrams as “chance nodes”.  
Therefore, utilities are associated with the state configurations of the network. These utilities 
are represented by utility nodes. Each utility node can be either represented by direct values 
or by utility values. In the latter case, a utility function that associates to each configuration of 
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states its parents is applied; an example of utility function can be following one (Reniers and 
Van Erp, 2016): 
𝑈𝑖 = 1 −
𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥
                                                                                                                                    (3.21) 
Where 𝑈𝑖 is the utility value, obtained from the direct value (𝑥𝑖), with respect to the constraint 
present (i.e., 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, expressing for instance the maximum budget/cost). 
By making decisions, the analyst influences the probabilities of the configurations of the 
network. Therefore, it is possible to compute the expected utility of each decision alternative 
and the global utility function is the sum of all the local utility functions. The choice will be on 
the alternative with the highest expected utility; this is known as the maximum expected utility 
principle.  
The “Limited Memory” prefix indicates that this kind of diagrams relaxes two fundamental 
assumptions of the traditional influence diagram: the non-forgetting assumption and the total 
order on decisions. Relaxing the non-forgetting assumption and the total order on decisions 
implies a significant change in the semantics of a LIMID compared to a traditional influence 
diagram. In a LIMID it is necessary to specify for each decision the information available to 
the decision maker at that decision. There are no implicit informational links in a LIMID. A 
link into a decision node specify that the value of the parent node is known at the decision. 
Each decision in the LIMID has an initial policy which can be defined by the user either 
manually or using expressions. The initial policy is a table specifying a mapping from 
configurations of the parents of the decision to states of the decision. This initial policy is 
updated in the process of solving the LIMID.  
Therefore, Bayesian Network and Bayesian analysis share the same fundamental mathematics 
concepts, as they both derive from Bayes theorem. The main difference is that dynamic risk 
assessment can be either performed manually, by means of Bayesian Analysis, or with more 
ease, by means of Bayesian Networks, applying specific software, as Hugin Expert software 
version 8.1, which offers dedicated tools (Hugin, 2016). Hugin software has been applied in 
several case studies, regarding Bayesian Networks and LIMID presented in Section 5.  
Hugin software version 8.1 can be run in two modes: the “Edit” mode allows building manually 
the BNs/LIMID, by creating nodes and connecting them with arcs. It is necessary in this step 
to fill the Conditional Probability Tables/Utility Tables manually. Then, according to the “Run” 
mode, the net can be compiled and the results of probability propagation are summarized in a 
probability output panel. Probability revising techniques can be applied by means of specific 
tools.  
With reference to probability updating, an evidence can be inserted of a node being in a specific 
state from the probability panel and the net can be recompiled by means a “max propagate 
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tool”, in purpose to identify the weak links leading to that specific final state. With reference to 
probability adapting, information are inserted manually in a specific adaptation panel and 
then, the net is run according to the “sum propagation tool”. 
For instance, the tutorials available in Section 5.2.2 for BNs and LIMID explain the tools of the 
software that are useful with reference to safety barriers performance assessment.  
3.3.2.1.3.3 Methodologies for conversion of conventional methodologies into Bayesian 
Networks 
3.3.2.1.3.3.1 Mapping a Fault-Tree into a Bayesian Network 
Nowadays Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widely applied methodology in the field of risk 
assessment for process systems and fault diagnosis. FTA aims at determining the potential 
causes of an undesired event (top-event); a downward approach allows linking the top event 
(placed at the top of the tree) to primary events. FTA can be applied also to determine the 
probability of failure on demand of a safety barrier. However, FTA suffers of some relevant 
limitations: 
 Primary events are considered binary (with two states – work/fail) and statistically 
independent. 
 Relations between events are generally represented AND-gates and OR-gates. 
 Redundant failures and common cause failures cannot be accounted. 
 Necessity to determine minimal cut-sets of events. 
Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2011) proposed a mapping algorithm from Fault–Tree to 
Bayesian Network, originally developed by Bobbio et al. (Bobbio et al., 2001), that includes 
graphical and numerical steps, represented in Figure 3. 8.  
In graphical mapping, primary events, intermediate events, and the top event of the FT are 
represented as root nodes, intermediate nodes, and the leaf node in the corresponding BN, 
respectively. The nodes of a BN are connected in the same way as corresponding components 
in the FT.  
In numerical mapping, the occurrence probabilities of the primary events are assigned to the 
corresponding root nodes as prior probabilities. For each intermediate node as well as leaf 
node, a conditional probability table (CPT) needs to be developed (Martins et al., 2014). The 
CPTs should be developed according to the type of gate, as reported in Figure 3. 9. Eventually 
in a BN the equivalent versions of OR and AND - Gates differ only for CPT, while the graphical 
aspect is exactly the same one. 
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Figure 3. 8 Mapping algorithm of Fault-Tree into Bayesian Network, as developed by Khakzad et al 
(Khakzad et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3. 9 Conversion of AND-Gate and OR-Gate into Bayesian Network. 
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3.3.2.1.3.3.2 Mapping a Bow-Tie into a Bayesian Network 
Bow-Tie (i.e., BT) is a probabilistic cause-consequences model that contains on the left side a 
fault tree, and on the right side an event tree. It correlates critical events with outcomes, or 
consequences in general. BT represents a complete accident scenario because, from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective, clearly illustrates the logical relationships here-in 
present and it helps understanding which possible combination of primary events would lead 
to the top event and which safety barriers failure would escalate the top event to a particular 
consequence. Nowadays Bow-Tie diagram is a popular tool in Risk Analysis for many chemical 
companies; however, it suffers limitations that are typical of its constituents (i.e. Fault Tree 
and Event Tree). To mention the most relevant ones, BT cannot include multi-state variables, 
cannot represent conditional dependencies and cannot apply real-time information from a 
facility to update prior “beliefs”, that are prior failure probability of primary events and safety 
barriers. (Khakzad et al., 2013b, 2012) Some studies referred to the chemical process industry 
domain have recently compared and/or integrated Bow-Tie and Bayesian network methods, 
or, at least, Bayesian Updating (Ferdous et al., 2013, 2012, Khakzad et al., 2013b, 2012), 
pointing out the advantages of Bayesian Networks. 
Fault-Tree mapping procedure has already been described in the previous subsection. Event-
Tree mapping procedure is mainly based on the work of Bearfield and Marsh (Bearfield et al., 
2005), a graphical algorithm is presented in Figure 3. 10.  
 
Figure 3. 10 Graphical visualization of the conversion from an Event-Tree into a Bayesian Network 
(Villa and Cozzani, 2016). 
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Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b) proposed a complete mapping algorithm from Bow-Tie 
to Bayesian Network that includes Fault Tree mapping and Event Tree mapping, as 
represented in Figure 3. 11. Each safety barrier of the Event-Tree is represented by a safety 
node having two states, one for the failure and the other for the success of the safety barrier; 
anyway it is possible to consider multi-state variables. Also, a consequence node having as 
many states as the number of the event tree consequences (i.e.,𝐶𝑖) should be added to the 
network. When mapping Event-Tree into BN, a safety node 𝑆𝐵𝑖 should be connected to the 
previous safety node, 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1, only if the failure probability of 𝑆𝐵𝑖 depends on whether 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1 has 
worked or failed. In probabilistic terms, 𝑆𝐵𝑖 must be connected to 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1 only if 𝑃(𝑆𝐵𝑖| 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1) ≠
 𝑃(𝑆𝐵𝑖| 𝑆𝐵̅̅̅̅ 𝑖−1); in the same way 𝑆𝐵𝑖+1 must be connected to 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1 only if 𝑃(𝑆𝐵𝑖+1| 𝑆𝐵𝑖, 𝑆𝐵𝑖−1 ) ≠
 𝑃(𝑆𝐵𝑖| 𝑆𝐵̅̅̅̅ 𝑖−1). In addition, there must be a connection between each safety node and the 
consequence node only if the probabilities of the states of the consequence node are influenced 
by the failure or the success of that safety node. After the BN is constructed, the probabilities 
of safety barriers are considered as the prior probabilities of safety nodes, and a CPT is assigned 
to the consequence node, following a AND – Gate logical model. CPTs for intermediate safety 
nodes are assigned too, as simple causal relations. After the equivalent BNs of the Fault-Tree 
and the Event-Tree are developed, they are connected to each other via the Top Event as a pivot 
node. The Top Event node should be connected also to the consequence node, this implies the 
definition of another state (e.g., “Safe”) to the consequence node; this additional state accounts 
the effect of the non-occurrence of the top event on the consequence node.  
 
Figure 3. 11 Flowchart representing mapping process from Bow-Tie Diagram to Bayesian Network, 
adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b). 
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Two issues raise from the mapping process: 
1) Each BT can be mapped to its corresponding BN, while a BN does not necessarily have 
an equivalent BT, due to multi-state variables, different causal relationships rather 
than simple Boolean functions such as OR-gate and AND-gate, and sequentially 
dependent failures. 
2) Although able to consider the dependency of sequential safety barriers, BT cannot 
capture the conditional dependency of safety barriers on the top event. In other words, 
in a BT the top event is simply an initiating event for the event tree, and cannot 
influence the failure or success probability of safety barriers. On the other hand, BN 
accommodates such dependence by means of causal arcs drawn from the top event to 
those safety barriers whose failure probabilities depend on the occurrence and non-
occurrence of the top event. 
3.3.2.1.3.4 Application of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis 
Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d) applied Bayesian Networks to domino accident 
modelling and prevention, by developing a specific methodology for the propagation pattern, 
whose flowchart is reported in Figure 3. 12; the methodology is described in the current section. 
To model the likely propagation path of domino effect, expressing the core of the BN, the 
following steps are taken: 
1. According to the layout of the plant, a node is assigned to each unit (e.g., storage tank). 
Each unit is either susceptible to the accident or capable of escalating the accident. The 
example of a plant layout with six units (Xi, with i ranging from 1 to 6), reported in Figure 
3. 13, is taken to explain the procedure. 
2. The primary unit where the domino accident is likely to start is determined (e.g., X1 in 
Figure 3. 13), by considering reasonable occurrence probabilities and enough inventory of 
hazardous materials to produce credible escalation vectors should be taken into account 
when choosing the primary unit.  
3. According to the type of possible accident scenarios in the primary unit, the escalation 
vectors transmitted by the primary unit to nearby units are specified and calculated. 
4. 4.1: Based on a comparison between predefined threshold values and escalation vectors, 
those nearby units for which the received escalation vectors exceed the threshold values 
are defined as potential secondary units (e.g., X2, X3, and X4 in Figure 3. 13).  
4.2: In the case of fire or explosion, the probit values (Y) are calculated for the potential 
secondary units, according to equation (3. 1).  
4.3: Using the Probit values, the escalation probability of potential secondary units given 
the primary event, i.e., P(X2|X1), P(X3|X1), and P(X4|X1). 
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4.4: Among the potential secondary units, the one(s) with the highest escalation probability 
is chosen as the secondary unit (for example, X3 in Figure 3. 13). Because the secondary 
events are caused by the primary event, a causal arc must be directed from X1 to X3, 
showing that the occurrence of X3 is conditional on the occurrence of X1.  
5. Given damaged secondary units, potential accident scenarios and their occurrence 
probabilities for the secondary units are specified.  
6. Substituting the secondary units for the primary unit, steps 3 to 5 are repeated to determine 
potential tertiary units (e.g., X2 and X4), potential quaternary units (e.g., X5 and X6), and 
so forth. In this case, it has been assumed because X2 and X4 (X5 and X6) have the same 
escalation probabilities, they both are selected as tertiary units.  
By repeating the same procedure, synergistic effects should be considered. For example, in 
Figure 3. 13, X2 and X3 coooperate with each other (i.e., their escalation vectors are 
superimposed) to trigger an accident in X5. So, causal arcs have to be directed from X2 and X3 
to X5, showing the conditional dependency of the latter on the former units. Accordingly, when 
assigning the CPT of X5, the escalation probability of X5 is P(X5|X2, X3), calculated by 
implementing a noisy OR-gate. 
At that point, the propagation pattern is defined. According to the layout in Figure 3. 13, three 
levels of domino, indicated respectively by 𝐷𝐿1, 𝐷𝐿2 and 𝐷𝐿3 should be added, as three nodes 
to the BN. The probability of first level domino can be expressed by the following: 
𝑃(𝐷𝐿1) = 𝑃(𝑋1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋3|𝑋1)                                                                                                               (3.22) 
So, DL1 is connected to X1 and X3 by AND-gate causal arcs and P(DL1) will be equal to the 
probability of the first-level domino effect. This implies that for the first-level domino effect to 
occur, not only the primary event X1, but also the secondary event X3 is needed. 
Similarly, the domino effect could proceed to the second level only if at least one of the tertiary 
units X2 and X4 is impacted by the first-level domino accident. Therefore, the probability of 
the second-level domino effect can be computed as follows: 
𝑃(𝐷𝐿2) = 𝑃(𝑋1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋3|𝑋1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋2 ∪ 𝑋4|𝑋1, 𝑋3)                                                                             (3.23) 
An auxiliary node, named 𝐿1, is added to the net, such that  𝐿1 = 𝑋2 ∪ 𝑋4; so X2 and X4 are 
connected to 𝐿1 and the CPT is filled with an OR gate. Then, causal arcs are drawn from 𝐿1 and 
𝐷𝐿1 to 𝐷𝐿2; the CPT of 𝐷𝐿2 is filled with an AND gate to obtain 𝑃(𝐷𝐿2). 
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Figure 3. 12 Procedure to develop the propagation pattern to domino effect, adapted from Khakzad et 
al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
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Figure 3. 13 BN to explain the propagation pattern and occurrence probability estimation for domino 
effect, according to Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Then, the domino effect can proceed to the third level. According to the layout considered, 
either X5 or X6 has to be impacted by the second-level domino effect to have a third-level 
domino effect. In this way, the probability of the third-level domino effect is: 
 𝑃(𝐷𝐿3) = 𝑃(𝑋1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋3|𝑋1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋2 ∪ 𝑋4|𝑋1, 𝑋3) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋5 ∪ 𝑋6|𝑋2, 𝑋3, 𝑋4)                             (3.24) 
An auxiliary node, named 𝐿2, is added to the net, such that  𝐿2 = 𝑋5 ∪ 𝑋6; so X5 and X6 are 
connected to 𝐿2 and the CPT is filled with an OR gate. Then, causal arcs are drawn from 𝐿2 and 
𝐷𝐿2 to 𝐷𝐿3; the CPT of 𝐷𝐿3 is filled with an AND gate to obtain 𝑃(𝐷𝐿3). 
The same reasoning can be extended to additional domino levels. The described procedure 
allows a detailed domino accident modelling with the powerful tool of BNs. However, domino 
probabilities might be overestimated, as safety barriers are not included in the methodology 
proposed by Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
3.3.2.2 Performance assessment for security measures 
3.3.2.2.1 Preliminary assumptions regarding security measures performance 
assessment 
The performance of a Physical Protection System (i.e., PPS) is generally expressed by its 
effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆), which expresses the probability of an attacker’s path of actions being 
foiled, deterred or disrupted.  
Effectiveness assessment should take into account the complex configuration of detection, 
delay and response function that compose the PPS; for high-security systems (i.e., as the ones 
Section 3 – State of the art on external hazard factors and economic evaluations within Risk Assessment 
88 
 
considered for counter-terrorism) the response is generally assumed to be immediate on-site, 
so the response force time is part of the PPS effectiveness. The effectiveness of a PPS can be 
evaluated according to a qualitative or quantitative form. Quantitative analysis is required for 
protections of assets with unacceptably high consequences of loss, regardless a low probability 
of adversary attack (Garcia, 2007); Chemical and Process facilities and transportation systems 
should be counted among these ones due to the high consequences of an attack – loss of lives, 
damage to valuable assets and to the environment (Nolan, 2008). This approach is 
“performance-based” in the sense that it evaluates how the elements of the PPS (i.e., detection, 
delay and response) contributes to the system effectiveness (Garcia, 2005).  
On the other hand, a qualitative approach can be applied for either lower threats and lower 
consequences loss assets or whenever the lack of information on the PPS does not allow 
carrying out a quantitative approach.  
Effectiveness assessment should take into account the complex configuration of detection, 
delay and response function that compose the PPS system; for high-security systems (i.e., as 
the ones here in considered) the response is generally assumed to be immediate on-site, so the 
response force time is part of the system PPS effectiveness.  
Effectiveness assessment results are important for two main reasons:  
 They provide a sound basis for the risk evaluation phase within Quantitative Risk 
Assessment, together with economic analysis for security measures selection and 
allocation; 
 They helps to reevaluate and update the design of protection systems over time, in order 
to keep it in the state of art and to accommodate the introduction of new processes, 
functions or assets within the facility.  
The analysis of a protection system requires applying the concept of adversary paths. An 
adversary path is an ordered series of actions against a facility, which if completed, results in 
successful theft, sabotage, or other malevolent outcome, such as a terroristic attack (Garcia, 
2007). The selection of an adversary action sequence should be based on Adversary Sequence 
Diagrams and site-specific data. An Adversary Sequence Diagram is a graphic representation 
of the plant layout that should consider possible adversary starting points, distances up to the 
target(s), locations and typologies of security measures in place, and availability of security 
guards on site. Reasonable assumptions regarding the adversary mode of action (e.g., by foot 
or by car), tactic and attack scope (e.g., triggering an explosion or stealing an asset) should be 
taken. 
In order to achieve his goal the adversary may adopt two opposite tactics: force attack and 
stealth attack. A force attack strategy is based on the minimization of the time required to 
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complete the path, with almost no regard of the probability of being detected; the adversary is 
successful if the path is completed before guard response. A stealth attack is based on the 
minimization of the probability of detection, with little regard to the time required; the 
adversary is successful if the path is completed with no detection. Often the adversary tactics 
may be intermediate between these two extremes. Adversary path depends also on adversary 
objectives: if theft, it implies that the adversary must get in and out the facility to succeed, if 
sabotage, it requires only the adversary to get to the asset and complete the sabotage action. 
Different adversary objectives turn into different times for the response force to interrupt the 
adversary and consequently in different PPS effectiveness.  
Quantitative analysis of PPS effectiveness can be carried out according to either a single 
measure or a systematic model. Three possible measures of PPS effectiveness can be applied 
in chemical and process industries, according to the approach proposed by Garcia (Garcia, 
2007), referred to industrial facilities:  
 Minimum delay time;  
 Cumulative probability of detection; 
 Timely detection.  
Alternatively, a more structured approach (i.e., EASI model) can be applied. 
3.3.2.2.2 Minimum delay time 
Minimum delay time (Figure 3. 14) is the comparison of the minimum cumulative time along 
the path (𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁) and the guard response time (𝑡𝐺). The condition of an effective system is 𝑡𝐺 <
𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁; a system improvement can be achieved either by reducing the guard response time, which 
decreases 𝑡𝐺 , or by adding a protection element with higher delay, increasing 𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁. However, 
this effectiveness measure does not take into account the detection function but only the delay, 
even if a delay without prior detection is not meaningful since the response force must be 
alerted in order to respond and interrupt the adversary.  
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Figure 3. 14 Minimum Delay Time as a Measure of PPS Effectiveness. 
3.3.2.2.3 Cumulative probability of detection 
Cumulative probability of detection (Figure 3. 15) is the cumulative probability of detecting the 
adversary before the goal is achieved (𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁). The condition of an effective system is 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁 <
𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁,𝐴𝐶𝐶, where 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁,𝐴𝐶𝐶 represents the acceptability threshold. It should be noted that no 
consideration on the delay is conveyed by this definition of PPS effectiveness, even if detection 
without sufficient subsequent delay is not effective because the response force may not have 
enough time to interrupt the adversary.  
 
Figure 3. 15 Cumulative Probability of Detection as an Effectiveness Measure. 
 
3.3.2.2.4 Timely detection 
Timely detection measures a system effectiveness by the cumulative probability of detection at 
the point where there is still enough time remaining for the response force to interrupt the 
adversary (Figure 3. 16). It includes 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑁, 𝑡𝑀𝐼𝑁 and 𝑡𝐺; the delay elements along the path 
determine the point in which the adversary must be detected. That point has been named 
“Critical Detection Point” (𝐶𝐷𝑃) and it corresponds to the point where the minimum delay 
Section 3 – State of the art on external hazard factors and economic evaluations within Risk Assessment 
91 
 
along the remaining path (𝑡𝑅) just exceeds the guard response time (𝑡𝐺); in other words 𝐶𝐷𝑃 
is determined by the first point for which the condition 𝑡𝑅 > 𝑡𝐺 is valid.  
Then the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼) can be computed as the cumulative probability of 
detection from the start of the path up to the 𝐶𝐷𝑃; 𝑃𝐼 is the measure of the system effectiveness.  
Quantitative analysis of PPS effectiveness by applying the timely detection measure requires 
to determine the probability of detection, delay times and on-site response time and eventually 
to compute the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼). It should be noted that 𝑃𝐼 is different from the 
total cumulative probability of detection because it considers detection up to the 𝐶𝐷𝑃. Timely 
detection measures however do not account “force engagement” between response force and 
adversaries.  
After having chosen a specific path, under specific conditions of threat and system operation, 
𝑃𝐼 can be quantified by the following equations (Garcia, 2007): 
𝑡𝑅 = ∑ 𝑡𝑖 > 𝑡𝐺
𝑚
𝑖=𝑘                                                                                                                                  (3.25) 
𝑃𝐼 = 1 −∏ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=𝑘                                                                                                                              (3.26) 
Where 𝑡𝑅 is the minimum time delay remaining along the path, 𝑡𝐺 is the guard response time, 
𝑚 is the number of protection elements along the path, 𝑘 is the first point at which  𝑡𝑅 > 𝑡𝐺 , 𝑖 
is a generic protection element, 𝑡𝑖 is the minimum time delay provided by element 𝑖 and 𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑖 
is the non-detection probability provided by element 𝑖. 
 
Figure 3. 16 Timely Detection as the Usual Measure of System Effectiveness. 
The assumptions at the basis of the model are independency of each security element and the 
presence of an adaptive adversary tactic. The latter assumption indicates that the adversary 
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will try to minimize detection before the 𝐶𝐷𝑃 (i.e., by applying a stealth or deceit tactic) and he 
will try to minimize delay after the 𝐶𝐷𝑃 (i.e., by applying a force tactic, moving very fast and 
with almost no concern for detection). This assumption is conservative because the adversary 
may also choose to adopt the same tactic along the whole path; it implies also that the most 
skillful adversary is supposed to defeat or bypass detection along the path up to 𝐶𝐷𝑃 and to 
know the response force time. If adversary tactics does not follow this assumption, it will turn 
into an increase of PPS effectiveness.  
However, it should be highlighted that PPS effectiveness is dependent also on adversary tactics 
and a well-defined design basis threat is important for system effectiveness. 
Clearly, the adversary may follow different paths into a facility, depending on his objective 
(e.g., steal or sabotage), but the one with the lowest 𝑃𝐼 (i.e., 𝑃𝐼
∗) characterizes the effectiveness 
of the overall protection systems and it has been named critical path. A tutorial on timely 
detection model is available in Section 6.2.2. 
3.3.2.2.5 EASI model 
Among the three main measures of PPS effectiveness, timely detection is generally the 
preferred one because it includes detection, delay and guard response time.  
However, in case of a complex system, with many possible adversary paths, with several 
scenarios to consider and several targets as well, the system’s complexity led to the necessity 
of a computer-aided tool that is able to repeat the calculation of PPS effectiveness along each 
possible adversary path, under specific conditions of threat and system operation.  
As reported by Garcia (Garcia, 2007), quantitative computer aided models for the evaluation 
of PPS effectiveness, based on the concept of timely detection, are continually being developed. 
Among these, the EASI model (i.e., Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption), developed 
by Sandia Laboratories (Garcia, 2007) stands for the good combination between easiness to 
use and accuracy in the results.  
This EASI model determines the PPS performance as the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼), 
referred to a sequence of adversary actions aimed at theft or sabotages. Due to the fact that the 
EASI model will be inserted in the original methodology presented in Section 4 for the 
calculation of security measures performances, a detailed description of EASI is provided. 
EASI is a path-level model, meaning that it can analyze PPS performance along one adversary 
path per time; consequently, the preliminary step for its application is the selection of an 
adversary action sequence, based on site-specific data and reasonable assumptions about the 
adversary. An adversary sequence includes a starting point, one or more detection sensors, 
transit and barrier delays and an ending point. This systematic representation of the assets 
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within the facility that allow the analyst to review possible adversary paths, has been named 
Adversary Sequence Diagram (ASD): ASD are site-specific graphical representation of the 
physical layers around a facility, the protection elements between layers and paths to the asset. 
The creation of ASD includes (Garcia, 2005): modeling the facility by separating it into 
adjacent physical areas, defining protection layers and path elements between the adjacent 
areas, recording detection and delay value for each element. In case of multiple paths possible, 
effectiveness analysis should be repeated for each of them.  
EASI model requires as input parameters: detection and communication probabilities (i.e., 
indicated respectively with 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖 and 𝑃𝐶,𝑖), delay and response mean times and standard 
deviations for each protection element 𝑖 (i.e., indicated respectively with 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝐺). EASI model 
(Garcia, 2007, 2005) estimates the cumulative probability of sequence interruption, as follows: 
𝑃𝐼 = 𝑃𝐷1 ∙ 𝑃𝐶1 ∙ 𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴1 + ∑ 𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝐶,𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖 ∙ ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖)
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=2                                                        (3.27) 
Where: 𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴𝑖 is the probability of response force to arrive prior to the end of adversary actions, 
given an alarm for each element 𝑖 present along the path; 𝑃𝐶𝑖 is the probability of 
communication to the response force for each element 𝑖 present along the path; 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖 is the 
probability of assessed detection for a generic element 𝑖. 
In case of single detection sensor, equation (3.27) becomes: 
𝑃𝐼 = 𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝐴                                                                                                                                       (3.28) 
Where 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐷 ∙ 𝑃𝐶 is the probability of notification of the response force, named probability of 
an alarm. 
In order to have adversary interruption, it is necessary that the remaining time for the 
adversary to reach the ending point (𝑡𝑅) exceeds the response force time (𝑡𝐺): 
𝑡𝑅 − 𝑡𝐺 > 0                                                                                                                                             (3.29) 
Assuming the random variables 𝑡𝑅 and 𝑡𝐺 as independent and normally distributed, then the 
random variable 𝑥: 
𝑥 =  𝑡𝑅 − 𝑡𝐺                                                                                                                                              (3.30) 
The variable 𝑥 is normally distributed with mean: 
𝜇𝑥 = 𝐸(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑡𝑅) − 𝐸(𝑡𝐺)                                                                                                                  (3.31) 
and variance: 
𝜎𝑥
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑅) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝐺)                                                                                                      (3.32) 
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Then 𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴 should be computed as: 
𝑃𝑅⃓ 𝐴 = 𝑃(𝑥 > 0) = ∫
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑥
2
∞
0
exp [−
(𝑥−𝜇𝑥)
2
2𝜎𝑥
2 ] dx                                                                                (3.33) 
The method requires the evaluation of 𝐸(𝑡𝑅) and 𝐸(𝑡𝐺) at a point 𝑗 along the path of interest, 
with respect to the terminal point 𝑛, assuming the penetration time through each barriers and 
the transit time between barriers as random variables: 
𝐸(𝑡𝑅) 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑗 = 𝐸(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑗) + ∑ 𝐸(𝑡𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑗+1                                         (3.34) 
Where: 
 𝐸(𝑡𝑖) is the expected time to perform task 𝑖 
 𝐸(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑗) = {
𝐸(𝑡𝑖) ,   𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝐵
𝐸(𝑡𝑖)
2
 ,      𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑀 
0 ,         𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝐸
  ,  
with 𝐵 beginning, 𝑀 mid and 𝐸 end point. 
Under the hypothesis of independency among each task, the variance of the path time 
remaining between point 𝑗 and the terminal point 𝑛 can be expressed: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑗) = {
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑖) ,   𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝐵
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑖)
4
 ,      𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑀 
0 ,         𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝐸
 
with 𝐵 beginning, 𝑀 mid and 𝐸 end. 
Clearly, the adversary may follow different paths into a facility, depending on his objective 
(e.g., steal or sabotage), but the one with the lowest 𝑃𝐼 (i.e., 𝑃𝐼
∗) characterizes the effectiveness 
of the overall protection systems and it has been named critical path:  
𝑃𝐼
∗ = min(𝑃𝐼,𝑝)        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝 = {1,… , 𝑞}, 𝑞 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                     (3.35) 
Where 𝑝 is a generic adversary path, among 𝑞 possible ones. An attempt of security managers 
is to balancing protection among different paths by allocating security upgrades in order to 
have approximately the same 𝑃𝐼 in all the paths leading to critical assets.  
In quantitative analysis for most of industrial facilities, the probability of interruption for the 
critical path is the measure of PPS effectiveness (Garcia, 2007), which varies from 0 to 1: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐼
∗                                                                                                                                                 (3.36) 
Nevertheless, equation (3.36) does not account the neutralization in PPS effectiveness, 
because, as stated by Garcia (Garcia, 2007), it is unlikely that any industrial facility will engage 
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in use of lethal force against an adversary. In case a force-on-force engagement (from verbal 
commands to deadly force) is expected additional modelling is necessary to predict the 
outcome of the conflict, measured by the probability of neutralization (𝑃𝑁). In this case, mostly 
inherent to very high-security applications, PPS effectiveness for the most critical path is 
expressed as follows: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐼
∗ ∙ 𝑃𝑁                                                                                                                                                  (3.37) 
EASI model has been summarized into a single equation (i.e., equation (4.1)) within original 
model application presented in Section 4; EASI can be implemented in an Excel version 2013 
datasheet. A tutorial on EASI model application is provided in Section 6.2.3. 
3.4 ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
SUPPORT 
Due to the increased attention for external hazard factors, an optimal allocation of risk 
reducing measures, including related cost issues, becomes progressively more important. 
Today there are several approaches available to support the decision-making process; among 
these, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis stands as the most common ones. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) compares, through the assignment of monetary value, the 
investment benefits (often seen as the averted costs) with the costs, in order to provide an 
objective evaluation concerning the investment. On the other hand, cost-effectiveness analysis 
is aimed at determining the most profitable investments with reference to a specific scenario, 
under the constraint of the budget (Campbell and Brown, 2003).  
3.4.1 Existing applications of economic evaluations within Safety and 
Security domains 
Table 3. 13 and Table 3. 14 summarize recent contributions regarding theoretical, 
methodological and applicative aspects of economic analyses within the safety and security 
domain, referred to chemical and process industry installations. The analysis of research gaps 
highlighted that, despite the potential of economic analyses in establishing competitive 
business advantage within chemical process safety and security (Reniers, 2014), previous 
contributions are referred mostly to the selection and allocation of safety measures with 
respect to unintentional major and occupational accidents (i.e., safety-based accidents). 
Indeed, the past decades, cost-benefit analyses and the specific features of its application to 
the safety domain were explored (Gavious et al., 2009; Martinez and Lambert, 2012; Nicola 
Paltrinieri et al., 2012). Ongoing research within the chemical industry addresses economic 
assessment for safety decision-making (Janssens et al., 2015; Khakzad and Reniers, 2015; 
Reniers and Brijs, 2014a, 2014b). However, no specific complete economic models and 
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applications are yet available addressing the selection and allocation of preventive security 
measures, within the chemical and process industry domain. 
3.4.2 Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness analysis for risk reducing 
measures selection 
Reniers and Brijs (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b) have developed a tool, named CESMA, for the 
selection of safety measures within the chemical industry domain, with respect to major 
accident scenarios. Following the approach developed by these authors, the general expression 
for the Net Benefit of a single safety countermeasure with reference to a single scenario can be 
computed as (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b): 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ((𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡) − (𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ)) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆                                      (3.38) 
Where: 
 𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡: frequency of an initiating event if the safety measure is not implemented; 
 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡: Loss or consequences, expressed in monetary values, without the 
additional safety measure; 
 𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡: frequency of an initiating event if the additional safety measure is 
implemented; 
 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡: Loss or consequences, expressed in monetary values, with the additional 
safety measure; 
 𝑃𝑟𝑆: performance of the additional safety measure (e.g., expressed by PFD – probability 
of failure on demand ); 
 𝐶𝑆: cost of the safety measure. 
Cost modelling indicates the costs of providing the risk-reducing measure that are required to 
attain the benefit (𝐶𝑆). The cost evaluations (e.g., the CESMA tool (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b)) 
included several classes (Table 3. 15): Initial Costs, Installation Costs, Operating Costs, 
Maintenance Costs, Other Running Costs, Specific Costs.  
Hypothetical benefits modelling consists on the definition of the costs of averted accident that 
are indeed the losses sustained in a successful attack, either with (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ) or without 
(𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡),  the additional safety measure. The losses sustained in a successful attack 
include the fatalities and other damages, both direct and indirect, which will accrue because of 
a major accident, taking into account the value and vulnerability of people and infrastructure. 
Benefit categories for safety measures available in a study referred to safety measures for 
Chemical and Process Industry (e.g., the CESMA tool (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b)) are reported 
in Table 3. 16. 
CBA can be applied either to each safety device separately or to a combination of several ones.  
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It should be noted that in order to compare total benefits and total costs occurring at different 
point in time it is necessary to introduce a discount rate to convert all cash flows to present 
values of annuities (Campbell and Brown, 2003). So the 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡,  accounting the 
conversion of all cash flows to present value of annuities, can be named also 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑁𝑃𝑉). An investment is acceptable if 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑁𝑃𝑉) ≥ 0, else it 
should be rejected. 
Often, safety investments should be compared with budget limitations; in this situation, the 
economic evaluation method turns into a Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA) determines the optimal combination of investments that leads to the maximum 
net benefit, respecting budget constraints. As suggested by Reniers and Sörensen (Reniers and 
Brijs, 2014b; Reniers and Sörensen, 2013a), the optimization problem to be solved, known as 
“Knapsack problem”, has been applied previously in the safety framework: 
{
max𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑥𝑖
𝐶𝑆,𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝜖 {0,1}
                                                                                                                                                    (3.39) 
The first equation expresses the total benefit from the selected investments portfolio, which 
should be maximized, that means obtaining the maximum Net Benefit. The second equation 
expresses the fact that the total cost of the selected measures (𝐶𝑆,𝑖𝑥𝑖) should not exceed the 
budget (𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡). The third constraint implies that a measure/combination of measures (𝑥𝑖) is 
either fully taken or not taken at all. 
A number of assumptions are implicitly taken in this formulation: 
 The safety investments under consideration are either fully taken or not (i.e., they 
cannot be partially taken); 
 The total hypothetical benefit of all measures taken is the sum of the individual 
benefits of the chosen safety countermeasures; 
 The total cost of all safety countermeasures taken is the sum of the costs of the 
individual measures; 
 Safety countermeasures can be implemented independently, without consequences 
for the other investments. 
Therefore, the state of art highlighted that economic analyses methodologies and applications 
have been defined firmly within the chemical and process industry domain and provide 
rational criteria for the risk evaluation phase within QRA, with respect to safety-based 
accidents. 
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Table 3. 13 Previous contributions on economic analysis, regarding safety and security aspects, within the chemical and process industry domain. 
 
                        Keyword 
 
 
 
Contribution 
Reference 
accident/ 
measure typology 
Elements of economic analysis 
Measure 
performance/ risk 
reduction 
assessment 
Cost assessment Losses/consequences 
assessment 
Probability of 
attack/accident 
occurrence  
Economic analysis 
(Ale et al., 2015) Unintentional (safety-
based) accidents/ 
safety measures 
Not considered. Discussion on 
hidden costs; no 
classification 
provided 
Discussion on ethical issues; no 
classification provided 
Not considered Cost-benefit analysis, 
budget limitations 
(Garcia, 2007, 2005) Intentional (security-
based) major 
accidents/ Physical 
security measures 
EASI model; other 
models proposed 
No classification 
provided 
No classification provided Deterministic 
approach 
Qualitative discussion on 
cost-benefit analysis 
(Gavious et al., 2009) Unintentional (safety-
based) accidents/ 
safety measures 
Not considered Not considered Specific classification including 
categories, subcategories and 
formula 
Not considered Qualitative discussion on 
cost-benefit analysis 
(HSE - Health and Safety 
Executive, 2016) 
Unintentional (safety-
based) accidents/ 
safety measures 
Not considered Discussion on costs; 
generic classification 
provided (no 
formula) 
Discussion on benefit; generic 
classification provided (no 
formula) 
Not considered Cost-benefit analysis 
(Janssens et al., 2015) Unintentional (safety-
based) major accidents 
(domino)/ safety 
measures. 
Overall values; no 
classification provided 
Overall values; no 
classification 
provided 
Overall values; no methodology 
provided 
 
Calculation of 
domino probabilities 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis 
(Kyaw and Paltrinieri, 2015) Unintentional (safety-
based) major 
accidents/ safety 
measures 
Not considered Not considered Calculation of reputational losses 
for notorious major accidents 
Not considered Qualitative discussion on 
the possible use within 
cost-benefit analysis 
(Martinez and Lambert, 
2012) 
Unintentional (safety-
based) major 
accidents/ safety 
measures 
Layer of Protection 
Analysis 
Overall values; no 
classification 
provided 
Overall values; no classification 
provided 
Deterministic 
approach 
Cost-benefit analysis 
(Nicola Paltrinieri et al., 
2012) 
Unintentional (safety-
based) major 
accidents/ safety 
measures 
Specific methodology 
for passive safety 
measures 
Overall values; no 
classification 
provided 
Overall values; no classification 
provided. Only human benefits 
considered 
Deterministic 
approach 
Cost-benefit analysis 
(Reniers, 2014) Intentional (security-
based) and 
unintentional (safety-
based) major accidents 
Theoretical discussion 
on performance 
parameters 
Theoretical 
discussion; no 
classification 
provided 
Theoretical discussion; no 
classification provided 
Not considered Theoretical discussion 
on interactions between 
economic analyses and 
risk management 
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Table 3. 14 Previous contributions on economic analysis, regarding safety and security aspects, within the chemical and process industry domain. 
                           
Keyword 
 
 
 
Contribution 
Reference accident/ 
measure typology 
Elements of economic analysis 
Measure 
performance/Risk 
reduction 
assessment 
Cost assessment Losses/consequences 
assessment 
Probability of 
attack/accident 
occurrence  
Economic analysis 
(Reniers and Brijs, 2014b; 
Reniers and Van Erp, 
2016) 
Unintentional (safety-
based) major accidents/ 
safety measures 
Overall values; no 
methodology provided 
Detailed classification 
specific for safety 
measures including 
categories, 
subcategories and 
formula 
Classification for major 
accidents, including 
categories, subcategories 
and formula 
Deterministic 
approach 
Cost-benefit analysis, cost-
effectiveness analysis 
(Reniers and Brijs, 2014a) Occupational accidents/ 
safety measures 
Not considered Not considered Not considered Not considered Presentation of available 
cost-benefit analysis 
software/ methodologies 
(Reniers and Sörensen, 
2013b) 
Occupational accidents/ 
safety measures 
Overall values Overall values; no 
classification provided 
Severity classes; no 
classification provided 
Occurrence classes Cost-effectiveness analysis 
(Tappura et al., 2014) Occupational accidents/ 
safety measures 
Presentation of available 
models  
Discussion on costs; 
no classification 
provided 
Discussion on benefits; no 
classification provided 
Not considered Presentation of available 
cost-benefit analysis 
methodologies 
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Table 3. 15 Cost categories and subcategories for a generic safety measure (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b). 
Cost Classification for Safety measures 
Cost category Cost subcategory 
INITIAL COSTS  Investigation costs 
 Selection and design costs 
 Material costs 
 Training costs  
 Changing of guidelines and informing costs 
INSTALLATION COSTS  Production Loss cost 
 Start-up costs 
 Equipment costs 
 Installing costs 
OPERATING COSTS  Utilities costs 
MAINTENANCE COSTS  Material costs 
 Maintenance team costs  
 Production loss costs 
 Start-up costs 
INSPECTION COSTS  Inspection team costs 
 
Economic analyses, such as cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, may offer rational 
criteria for the selection and allocation of security measures within the decision-making 
process, as demonstrated by the application to other domains, as aviation (Stewart and 
Mueller, 2013, 2011, 2008) and navy facilities (Cox, 2009; Dillon et al., 2009). However, no 
economic model for the allocation security measures to be used within the chemical industry 
has yet been developed.  
Few existing contributions proposed a rather simplified cost-benefit analysis methodology for 
the selection of security measure within another domain (i.e., aviation) (Stewart and Mueller, 
2013, 2012, 2011, 2008). The calculation of the Net Benefit, or Net Present Value, for a security 
countermeasure can be implemented as follows: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝐸(𝐶𝑏) + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝑇) ∙𝐿𝐻𝑇 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∙ ∆𝜂 − 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦             (3.40)        
Where 𝐸(𝐶𝑏) indicates the expected benefit from the security countermeasure not directly 
related to mitigating security threats (e.g., increased personnel confidence, reduction in crime, 
etc.). Often the assumption of 𝐸(𝐶𝑏) ≅ 0 is introduced in order to obtain conservative results. 
𝑃(𝑇) represents the threat probability (e.g., the probability of attack) referred to a critical 
infrastructure. 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) are the vulnerability probabilities. 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 indicates the 
overall losses or consequences, expressed in monetary values, and indicated also as “overall 
benefits”. ∆𝜂 represents the effectiveness improvement achieved by implementing the Security 
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measure (or Physical Protection System, i.e. PPS). 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 indicates the overall costs of the 
specific security measures (or systems) required to attain the benefits. The summation refers 
to the number of possible Threats (𝑇) scenarios, Hazard (𝐻) levels and Losses (𝐿). With the 
assumptions of 𝐸(𝐶𝑏) = 0, equation (3.40) can be rewritten for a single scenario 𝑗 as: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑗 =  𝑃(𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) · 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 ∙ ∆𝜂 − 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦                                         (3.41)                       
The product of threat and vulnerability probability is sometimes indicated as a single term (i.e., 
𝑃𝐴) (Stewart and Mueller, 2012, 2011, 2008), expressing the probability of a “successful” attack. 
Equation (3.41) can be the starting point for the development of an original economic model, 
aimed at the selection and allocation of security measures within the chemical industry 
domain.  
Table 3. 16 Benefit categories and subcategories for a major accidental scenario (Reniers and Brijs, 
2014b). 
Benefit Classification  
Benefit category Benefit subcategory 
SUPPLY CHAIN BENEFITS  Production loss benefits 
 Start-up benefits 
 Schedule benefits 
DAMAGE BENEFITS  Damage to own material/property 
 Damage to other companies’ material/properties 
 Damage to surrounding living areas 
 Damage to public material property 
LEGAL BENEFITS  Fines-related benefits 
 Interim lawyers benefits 
 Specialized lawyer benefits 
 Internal research team benefits 
 Expert at hearings benefits 
 Legislation benefits 
 Permit and license benefits 
INSURANCE BENEFITS  Insurance premium benefits 
HUMAN AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 
 Compensation victims benefits 
 Injured employees benefits 
 Recruit benefits 
 Environmental damage benefits 
INTERVENTION BENEFITS  Intervention benefits 
REPUTATION BENEFITS  Share price benefits 
OTHER BENEFITS 
 
 Manager work-time benefits 
 Cleaning benefits 
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It should be noted that the existing model by Stewart and Mueller (Stewart and Mueller, 2012, 
2011, 2008) has some relevant limitations, paving the way to follow for further improvements: 
 It does not address the specificities of operational security within the chemical industry 
domain; 
 Cost assessment and loss assessment need to be improved, by introducing categories, 
subcategories and expressions allowing quantitative assessment instead of applying 
empirical flat rates for overall costs and benefits. 
 Uncertainties regarding threat and vulnerabilities probabilities need to be addressed 
by specific approaches; 
 An approach to cost-effectiveness analysis needs to be introduced. The application of 
cost-effectiveness analysis is particularly important since it allows the allocation of the 
security budget on the most profitable combination of security measures. An original 
scoring system needs to be developed to provide overall economic indicators. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this section, an overview on the state of the art regarding the inclusion of external hazard 
factors and economic evaluations within risk assessment for the Chemical industry domain is 
presented. A description of two typologies of accidental events triggered by external hazard 
factors (i.e., domino effects and security-based accidents) is carried out, together with available 
techniques to include external hazard factors within risk assessment. Research contributions 
highlighted the necessity to implement unified generic framework for safety and security risk 
assessment. 
Indeed the analysis of risk assessment techniques made clear the paramount important role of 
safety and security measures within cascading events prevention, control and mitigation. For 
instance, safety measures are applied with respect to unintentional accidents (i.e., domino 
effects), while security measures refer to intentional accidents (i.e., security-based accidents). 
Indeed, the identification and evaluation of possible risk reducing measure is a fundamental 
step of QRA, referred to external hazard factors.  
Therefore, different typologies of risk reducing measures applied within chemical and process 
installations were described, together with methodologies to evaluate their performances, from 
economic and technical point of views. A parallelism among the three classes of safety and 
security measures (i.e., active-detection measures; passive-delay measures; procedural-
response measures) has been highlighted, but methodologies needed to address performance 
assessment have demonstrate to be very different between safety and security measures.  
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With regards to the inclusion of safety and security measures performance within risk 
assessment of external hazard factors, two main research gaps have been found and are 
described in the following paragraphs.  
3.5.1 Application of dynamic safety barriers performance assessment by 
means of Bayesian Networks with respect to major accidents and 
cascading events prevention 
The analysis of existing techniques and methodologies for safety measures performance 
assessment pointed out that the applications of advanced techniques (i.e., Bayesian Networks) 
to safety barriers performance assessment with respect to major accidents are still scarce and 
need to be widened and improved. Moreover, with regards to domino effect modelling and 
prevention, no applications of advanced techniques which take into account safety barriers are 
available. Therefore, the original research will be aimed at filling this gaps (see Section 5), 
according to the concepts expounded in the following subsections. 
3.5.1.1 Comparison between quantitative safety barriers performance 
assessment by means of Bayesian Networks and Event-Tree analysis 
The conventional methodology for safety barriers performance assessment is based on Event-
tree Analysis, a probabilistic model that correlates a top event with its consequences. A recent 
Event-Tree based methodology, provided by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a) and 
presented in Section 3.3.2.1.3, allows an accurate evaluation of safety barriers performance by 
means of novel gates and can be applied both to major accident and to domino events. 
Nevertheless, the limitations of Event-tree analysis hinder from obtaining a real-time picture 
of safety barriers performances and consequences probabilities, offering just a static risk 
picture, which is not able to account systems modifications and additional information. These 
drawbacks promise to be solved by Bayesian Networks. 
Therefore, according to the mapping procedure from Event-Tree to Bayesian Network, 
provided by Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b), the procedure for safety barriers 
performance assessment provided by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a) can be converted 
into Bayesian Networks, keeping the same main steps ad constituents.  
Safety barriers performance assessment by means of Bayesian Networks, presented in Figure 
3. 17, takes advantage over the Event-Tree based approach, as it allows performing Bayesian 
Analysis by means of the discussed probability revising techniques (i.e., probability updating 
and probability adapting). Indeed, the Bayesian networks based approach is capable to revise 
safety barriers performance and final events probabilities over time, providing a more-updated 
risk picture. Moreover, the conversion of specific gates (type A, B, C) into BNs represent an 
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additional element of novelty, as they have never been implemented before within BNs. The 
procedure can be applied both to major accident prevention, in particular fire prevention, and 
to the prevention of fire escalation into domino effect. In the latter case, escalation probabilities 
corresponding to each final state are calculated exacting the same way, both in the Bayesian 
approach and in the conventional one. 
The comparison between the procedure by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a) and safety 
barriers performance assessment by means of Bayesian Network will be developed in several 
case studies in Section 5. 3, in purpose to validate the application of Bayesian Networks within 
this specific context. 
 
Figure 3. 17 Comparison between quantitative safety barriers performance assessment by means of 
Event-Tree analysis and Bayesian Networks. 
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3.5.1.2 Inclusion of safety barriers performance assessment by means of 
Bayesian Networks within domino accident modelling and prevention 
With respect to domino accident modelling and prevention, Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 
2013d) have recently developed an advanced methodology to be implemented by means of 
Bayesian Networks, which allows considering synergistic effects and several domino levels. 
However, in the methodology, safety barriers are not included, resulting in an unrealistic 
representation of the system. Therefore, original contributions that compare the introduction 
of safety barriers within domino accident modelling and prevention are required, in a Bayesian 
Network environment. A flowchart representing this reasoning is reported below (Figure 3. 
18). 
 
Figure 3. 18 Flowchart representing the need to include safety barriers performance within domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks. 
3.5.2 Development and application of an economic model for the 
allocation of preventive security measures against terroristic attacks 
in chemical facilities 
The state of the art highlighted that, despite the existence of economic models for supporting 
decision-making processes in general, for instance cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analyses, no specific economic models (and applications) are available in the domain of 
operational security (including counter-terrorism decision-making) to be applied within the 
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chemical and process industry. As suggested by Stewart and Muller (Stewart and Mueller, 
2013, 2012) that have recently developed and applied Cost-Benefit Analysis for aviation 
security, the task is particularly challenging because it involves defining the threat probability, 
the losses sustained in the successful attack, the performance and the costs determined by the 
implementation of a security countermeasure (accordingly to its specific features).  
Therefore, an original model for economic analysis and selection of physical security measures, 
with respect to different typologies of terroristic attacks in chemical facilities needs to be 
developed and validated by application to several case studies. The model, described in Section 
4 and applied in Section 6, allows performing site-specific analysis of the baseline physical 
security system performance and comparing the costs of different security upgrades with the 
benefits related to either prospective or retrospective losses, meanwhile accounting the 
uncertainties related to the threat probability. Selection of the most profitable security 
measures within budget constraints and definition of economic indicators will be the main 
outputs of the model, in order to support decision-making processes for allocation of security 
barriers within the chemical industry domain; a graphical abstract addressing this research 
topic is reported in Figure 3. 19. 
 
Figure 3. 19 Graphical representation of the possible constituents of an original model for the selection 
and allocation of security measures within the chemical industry domain. 
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Section 4. 
Development of an economic model for 
the allocation of preventive security 
measures against terroristic attacks in 
chemical facilities 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Several recent events raised the attention toward possible major accidents triggered by 
external acts of interference in industrial facilities. In particular, among possible security-
based accidents, a growing concern is present with respect to the intentional release of 
dangerous substances resulting in environmental and eco-terroristic attacks. Therefore, 
optimal selection and allocation of preventive security measures is becoming more important 
for decision-makers. Despite the existence of economic models for supporting decision-making 
processes in general, for instance cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, no specific 
economic models are available in the context of operational security (including counter-
terrorism decision-making) to be applied within the chemical and process industry domain, as 
pointed out in Section 3. 6. This section describes a novel model for economic analysis and 
allocation of preventive physical security measures (or barriers) specifically for use in the 
chemically and process industry domain. The model, starting from the analysis of the baseline 
physical security system, allows proposing security upgrades and accounting both the 
performance improvement and the costs derived from their implementation. The model also 
includes the evaluation of benefits related to either prospective or retrospective losses, 
meanwhile accounting threat and vulnerability probabilities for a chemical installation, in 
relation with possible malicious acts.  
The model, presented in Section 4. 2, can be depicted in a two-fold version, referred to different 
typologies of applications. The first version, EM-PICTURES (i.e., Economic Model for Process-
Industry related Counter Terrorism measURES) allows performing cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis of preventive security measures, against generic security-based accidents 
and terroristic attacks in chemical facilities. The evaluation of uncertainties related to the 
definition of threat and vulnerability probabilities is provided by the analysis. Thus, EM-
PICTURES enables the comparison among different security upgrades and the choice of 
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economically feasible ones, as well as the determination of the combination with the maximum 
profit, within budget constraints.   
The latter version, ECO-SECURE (i.e., ECOnomic model for the selection of SECurity 
measUREs) is specifically aimed at preventing potential environmental terroristic attacks in 
chemical facilities by means of a rational allocation of security resources. Indeed, a specific 
classification for environmental losses is elaborated. A coupled approach toward the 
estimation of the threat probability (i.e., deterministic and break-even) allows defining a broad 
set of economic indicators, made clearer by the development of a specific scoring system. 
Indeed, the coupled approach allows including the sensitivity analysis within ECO-SECURE 
application. Selection of the most profitable security measures within budget constraints and 
definition of economic indicators are the main outputs of ECO-SECURE.  
The ultimate aim of the model is allowing a more rational allocation of preventive security 
measures and supporting risk assessment and related decision-making process, within the 
context of chemical and process industries. The model is specifically tailored for security 
measures aimed at the prevention of security-related events, even if also the adoption of safety 
measures may offer sound support in the prevention, control and mitigation of security-based 
accidents (Aven, 2007; Reniers, 2010). 
4.2 MODEL DESCRIPTION: EM-PICTURES AND ECO-
SECURE VERSIONS 
4.2.1 General layout of the model 
The model layout is shown in Figure 4.1. Definition of the site-specific adversary sequence of 
actions and assessment of baseline physical protection system (PPS) performance need to be 
carried out before the model application. This preliminary step was defined as module 0. Six 
steps are then required to complete the assessment: 
 In Module 1, the effectiveness improvement (∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖) achieved by implementing an 
additional security measure 𝑖 to the baseline Physical Protection System (i.e., PPS) is 
evaluated. It provides the degree to which the security measure foils, deters, disrupts 
or protects against a threat. Guidance on the equations and data necessary to apply this 
methodology step and on the possible security upgrades to adopt is provided to users.  
 In Module 2, the overall costs of a specific security measure, 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖, are assessed, by 
means of 22 cost subcategories and formula to calculate each cost category. This 
includes direct and indirect economic costs derived from the application and use of a 
security device. 
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 Module 3 defines the overall losses or consequences of either perspective or 
retrospective accidental scenarios (i.e., 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗), expressed in monetary values, and 
indicated in the following section also as “overall benefits”. Guidance on the scenarios 
to adopt in case of prospective/retrospective accidents is provided to users. 
 Module 4 is aimed at defining the threat probability (i.e., the likelihood of the attack) 
within a chemical facility. In this module also the vulnerability probabilities, expressing 
the conditional hazard and loss probabilities, are defined. 
 Module 5 allows defining the single security measures that are economically justified 
(by means of a cost-benefit analysis, indicated with the acronym CBA throughout the 
manuscript) with reference to a set of scenarios.  
 Module 6 provides the most profitable combination of security measures (by means of 
a cost-effectiveness analysis, indicated with acronym CEA throughout the manuscript) 
with reference to a set of scenarios.  
The outputs of the model are cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness indicators aimed at supporting 
the security decision-making process from an economic perspective. The two-fold versions of 
the model (i.e., EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE) share the mentioned six methodological 
steps. However, they present a relevant number of differences, in particular: 
 Concerning effectiveness assessment, EM-PICTURES allows considering in the 
calculations different adversary mode of actions (e.g., sequential, simultaneous 
actions) in case of multi-targets terroristic attacks within a chemical facility.  
 Concerning losses assessment, the categories are different depending on the focus of 
the analysis. In EM-PICTURES, the damages derived from a generic security-based 
major accident are accounted, while ECO-SECURE focuses on environmental 
consequences.  
 Concerning the definition of the threat probability, as wella as cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analyses, a coupled approach (i.e., deterministic and break-even) is 
provided in ECO-SECURE, instead of the solely deterministic approach presented in 
EM-PICTURES. The coupled approach allows including the sensitivity analysis on the 
threat probability within model application. An original scoring system is developed in 
ECO-SECURE to provide overall economic indicators. 
The model can be implemented in Excel® version 2013 modelling environment. The authors 
suggest using 7 different datasheets, defined according to the modules (i.e., from Module 0 up 
to Module 6). The content and procedures applied in the single modules are explained in detail 
in the following. 
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Figure 4. 1 General layout of the model, with a two-fold version, named EM-PICTURES and ECO-
SECURE. 
4.2.2 Module 0: data gathering and assessment of baseline physical 
security system performance 
Module 0 is the preliminary step for the application of the model: it provides the definition of 
the site-specific adversary sequence of actions and the assessment of baseline physical 
protection system performance. The selection of an adversary action sequence should be based 
on Adversary Sequence Diagrams and site-specific data. An Adversary Sequence Diagram is a 
graphic representation of the plant layout that should consider possible adversary starting 
points, distances up to the target(s), locations and typologies of security measures in place, and 
availability of security guards on site. Reasonable assumptions regarding the adversary mode 
of action (e.g., by foot or by car), tactic (e.g., stealth or deceit) and attack scope (e.g., triggering 
an explosion or stealing an asset) should be taken.  
Several models may be used to determine the baseline physical protection system performance, 
whose principal indicator is its effectiveness (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆) (Hester et al., 2010). A description of 
available methodologies for the evaluation of physical security measures performance is 
available in Section 3.4.3. Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (i.e., EASI) model, 
developed by Sandia Laboratories (Garcia, 2007, 2005), was applied to determine physical 
protection system performance. Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (i.e., EASI) 
model, calculates the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼,𝑝), referred to a single sequence of 
adversary actions aimed at theft or sabotage. The probability of interruption expresses the 
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conditional probability of an attacker’s path of actions (i.e., indicated with 𝑝) being foiled, 
deterred or disrupted. EASI model requires the following input parameters: assessed detection 
and communication probabilities (i.e., indicated respectively with 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖 and 𝑃𝐶), delay mean 
times of each protection element 𝑖 (i.e., indicated with 𝑡𝐷,𝑖 and expressing the mean duration 
time of a task), response force mean time (𝑡𝐺) and standard deviations for the mentioned 
parameters (i.e., indicated respectively with 𝜎𝐷,𝑖 and 𝜎𝐺). Standard deviation input values are 
required because the EASI model, applied for the calculation of the effectiveness, takes into 
account uncertainties regarding each task (e.g., presence of a lag time) by applying probability 
distribution. According to the conservative assumption on data dispersion of the model 
(Garcia, 2007), standard deviation values referred to the delay parameter for each security 
element and to the response parameter have been assumed as 3 10⁄  of the mean value.  
According to EASI model, 𝑃𝐼,𝑝 can be computed as follows, with reference to a path 𝑝 with 𝑙 
tasks: 
{
 
 
 
 𝑃𝐼,𝑝 = (1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖)
𝑗
𝑖=1 ) ∙ 𝑃𝐶 ∙ (∫ (1 √2𝜋(𝜎𝐷
2 + 𝜎𝐺
2)⁄ )
𝑇
0
exp(−𝑇2 (𝜎𝐷
2 + 𝜎𝐺
2)⁄ )𝑑𝑇)
𝑇 = 𝑡𝐷 − 𝑡𝐺
𝑡𝐷 = ∑ 𝑡𝐷,𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=𝑗+1
𝜎𝐷 = ∑ 𝜎𝐷,𝑖
𝑙
𝑖=𝑗+1
            (4.1)                     
Details on the EASI model can be found elsewhere (Garcia, 2007, 2005) and in Section 3.4.3; 
the suggested modeling environment is an Excel® datasheet. A sample Excel® datasheet of 
EASI model can be retrieved from the mentioned source (Garcia, 2007). In the evaluation of 
effectiveness, the neutralization probability is not accounted for, following the stated 
assumption that in industrial facilities the use of lethal force against an adversary is unlikely 
(Garcia, 2007).  
Module 0 differs between EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE in the calculation of the baseline 
PPS effectiveness regarding multi-targets sequence of actions, as visible from Figure 4.2.  
According to EM-PICTURES, in case of multiple targets, the path should be divided into 𝑘 
segments, with 𝑡 number of the targets, and effectiveness calculations should be repeated for 
each of them. In case of multiple paths possible between contiguous targets, effectiveness 
analysis should be repeated for each of them. Therefore, the baseline system effectiveness for 
a segment 𝑘 (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘) can be assessed, as follows: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘 = 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗ = min(𝑃𝐼,𝑝)        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝 = {1,… , 𝑞}        (4.2) 
∀𝑘 ∈ {1,… , 𝑡}, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑍 
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Where the path 𝑝∗ with the lowest 𝑃𝐼 (i.e., 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗) among 𝑞 possible ones, characterizes the 
baseline effectiveness of the protection system along the segment 𝑘. 𝑘 indicates a generic 
segments that connects either the starting point to the first target or two contiguous targets; 𝑘 
is multiple of the number of possible targets (𝑡). The calculation should be repeated for each 
of the 𝑡 segments. The calculation of baseline PPS effectiveness for each path segment provided 
by EM-PICTURES may allow a detailed site-specific description of adversary mode of action 
in case of multi-target attacks.  
According to ECO-SECURE, the baseline PPS effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑) can be assessed as 
follows, according to: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗ = min(𝑃𝐼,𝑝)        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝 = {1,… , 𝑞}       (4.3) 
Where the path 𝑝∗, with the lowest 𝑃𝐼,𝑝 (i.e., 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗) among 𝑞 possible ones has been named 
critical path. 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗ characterizes the baseline effectiveness of the physical protection system, 
according to the principles of EASI model (Garcia, 2007). Therefore, ECO-SECURE provides 
an overall value of baseline PPS effectiveness, regardless the number of targets involved. 
 
Figure 4. 2 Main contents of Module 0, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
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4.2.3 Module 1: preventive security measures performance assessment 
This module is aimed at proposing security upgrades and determining the overall effectiveness 
improvement ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 due to each security measure 𝑖. Module 1 differs between EM-PICTURES and 
ECO-SECURE in the calculation of the upgraded PPS effectiveness regarding multi-targets 
sequence of actions, as visible from Figure 4.3.  
According to EM-PICTURES, following the assumption of adding one security device at time, 
effectiveness improvement due to the introduction of a generic security measure 𝑖 in the 
existing Physical Protection System along a generic segment 𝑘 can be computed as: 
∆𝜂𝑖𝑘 = 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖𝑘 − 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘         
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                                (4.4) 
∀𝑘 ∈ {1,… , 𝑡}, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                               
Where 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖𝑘  expresses the probability of attacker’s path of actions being foiled, deterred 
or disrupted in presence of each additional (i.e., “new”) security measure 𝑖 among the possible 
𝑛 security measures. It expresses the upgraded PPS effectiveness. In order to determine the 
upgraded effectiveness, the EASI model was reapplied to the critical path 𝑝∗ for each of the 
security upgrades 𝑖, obtaining 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖𝑘 , ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍, and therefore the correspondent 
effectiveness improvement (∆𝜂𝑖𝑘), referred to each segment 𝑘. 
On the other hand, 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘 represents the probability of attacker’s path of actions being 
foiled, deterred or disrupted before the addition of a security measure along a segment 𝑘; it 
has been indicated as baseline PPS effectiveness and it is the output of module 0. Therefore, 
the determination of the effectiveness improvement along a segment 𝑘 (∆𝜂𝑖𝑘) requires the 
evaluation of PPS effectiveness before and after the addition of a security measure 𝑖. ∆𝜂𝑖𝑘 is 
sometimes named “risk reduction” (Stewart and Mueller, 2013, 2011, 2008); an explanation 
regarding the nomenclature is available in Section 4.2.7. The calculation should be reapplied 
to each of the 𝑘 segments, in purpose to obtain the overall effectiveness improvement (∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖), as 
follows: 
∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝑓(∑ ∆𝜂𝑖𝑘
𝑡
𝑘=1 )                                                                                                                                               (4.5) 
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍 
Where 𝑓 is a function of adversary’s mode of action. 
In case of a sequential action (e.g., one attacker that sabotage a target and just after a second 
one), the overall effectiveness improvement for each security upgrade 𝑖 can be expressed 
according to a “series model”: 
∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 = ∑ ∆𝜂𝑖𝑘
𝑡
𝑘=1                                                                                                                                                     (4.6) 
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍 
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In case of a simultaneous action (e.g., two or more attackers that sabotage one target each in 
the same time), the overall effectiveness improvement for each security upgrade 𝑖 can be 
expressed according to a “parallel model”: 
∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 = 1 (∑ 1 ∆𝜂𝑖𝑘⁄
𝑡
𝑘=1 )⁄                                                                                                                                         (4.7) 
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍 
The application of the described EM-PICTURES approach toward effectiveness assessment 
allows taking into account different adversary’s mode of action in case of multi-target attacks; 
nevertheless, it requires a relevant amount of inputs. 
On the other hand, ECO-SECURE provides a global approach toward effectiveness assessment, 
also in case of multi-target attacks. Within model application, in case of no information 
available regarding adversary’s mode of action, it is suggested to apply the generic approach 
toward effectiveness assessment presented in ECO-SECURE version of the model. According 
to ECO-SECURE, following the assumption of adding one security device at a time, overall 
effectiveness improvement due to the introduction of a generic security measure 𝑖 in the 
existing Physical Protection System can be computed as: 
∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖 − 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑                       (4.8) 
∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                                
Where 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖 expresses the probability of attacker’s path of actions being foiled, deterred or 
disrupted in presence of each additional (i.e., “new”) security measure 𝑖 among the possible 𝑛 
security measures. It expresses the upgraded PPS effectiveness. On the other hand, 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 
represents the probability of attacker’s path of actions being foiled, deterred or disrupted 
before the addition of a security measure, calculated in module 0, according to ECO-SECURE 
version of the model. In order to define the effectiveness of upgrades, the EASI model is applied 
to the critical path for each of the security upgrades 𝑖, obtaining 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖,  ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍. 
Further details on effectiveness assessment by means of EASI model are provided by Garcia 
(Garcia, 2007, 2005); a description of EASI model is available in Section 3.4.3.  
It should be noted that EASI model, applied in both EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE for the 
calculation of the baseline and upgraded system effectiveness, specifically refers to physical 
security measures and cannot be generalized (i.e., it cannot be applied for safety measures 
performance evaluations). The choice of an appropriate pool of security upgrade should be 
based on the Organizational-Physical-Electronics-Reporting principle (i.e., OPER) (Reniers et 
al., 2015), which considers a complete PPS as a combination of the three security functions of 
detection, delay and response. Therefore, the range of choices should include at least one 
security measure belonging to each security function. Further details on security measures 
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classification (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2003; Garcia, 2007), based on 
security functions, are available in Section 3.4.1.2. A detailed guideline on the possible security 
upgrades to be adopted is presented in Section 3.4.1.2; therefore, it is not necessary to use a 
specific software for the selection of appropriate security upgrades within EM-PICTURES and 
ECO-SECURE versions. 
Figure 4. 3 Main contents of Module 1, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
4.2.4 Module 2: cost assessment 
This module, which is completely analogous for EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions, 
as visible from Figure 4.4, provides the evaluation of costs for each preventive security measure 
(𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖). The cost assessment for a security device includes the direct economic costs of 
applying the device and the indirect costs associated with its use. Therefore, it may include 
general terms as purchase costs, personnel costs and running costs. On the other hand, also 
cost terms either specific for each category of PPS or site-specific might be determined. Six 
main cost categories have been considered. Among these, five are in close analogy with a cost 
evaluation referred to safety measures for the chemical and process industry (Reniers and 
Brijs, 2014b), described in Section 3.5: i) initial costs; ii) installation costs; iii) operating costs; 
iv) maintenance, inspection and sustainability cost; v) other running costs; vi) specific costs. 
Despite the similarities with the cost classification applied to safety measures (Reniers and 
Brijs, 2014b), Module 2 contains cost items specifically tailored for physical security measures, 
as described below.  
Initial costs are the costs incurred during the investigation, selection and design phases of the 
project, involving furthermore the costs of materials, training and eventual guidelines changes 
(Campbell and Brown, 2003). Installation costs refer to the expenses sustained to put the 
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security measure in place and ready for use (Campbell and Brown, 2003). The main difference 
with similar cost evaluations referred to safety measures (e.g. see (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b)) 
is the absence of a “Production loss cost” term and the different composition of the linked 
“Start-up cost”. Installation of security measures usually does not interfere with the production 
rate of chemical plants, determining the necessity to neglect this term from the analysis. 
However, in some situations an integration of safety and security measures has been realized, 
allowing to extend the term “production loss cost” also to security measures. 
 
Figure 4. 4 Main contents of Module 2, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
Operating costs are the expenses derived from the operation of the security measure, in terms 
of utilities consumption and labor (Campbell and Brown, 2003). The maintenance costs should 
incorporate also inspection and sustainability costs (e.g., renewing license and rental costs). 
Also, “other running costs” (e.g., cost of providing office furniture, transport, insurance, and 
stationery items) should be added as a separate category, due to its limited influence on the 
Overall costs (Campbell and Brown, 2003). The last category (“specific costs”) includes all the 
cost features that are peculiar of a specific category of security measure or a site. 
The Overall annual costs due to the implementation of one generic security measure 
(𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖) can be calculated as the sum of the six mentioned contributions for each security 
measure 𝑖 considered in the analysis: 
𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖 = (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐿,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐶 𝑀𝐼𝑆,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐶𝑂𝑅,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉)𝑖  
∀ 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                                    (4.9) 
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Where: 𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿,𝑂𝑉 is Overall initial costs, 𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐿,𝑂𝑉  is Overall installation costs, 
𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁,𝑂𝑉  is Overall operating costs, 𝐶 𝑀𝐼𝑆,𝑂𝑉 is Maintenance, inspection and sustainability 
costs, 𝐶𝑂𝑅,𝑂𝑉  is Other running costs and 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 is Overall specific costs. 
The expressions applicable to the calculation of each cost category in equation (4.9) were 
developed according to the fundamentals of CBA (Campbell and Brown, 2003) and reported 
in Table 4. 1.  
In order to calculate each cost category, the costs pertaining to each subcategory identified in 
Table 4. 1 need to be added: 
𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐶,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                        (4.10) 
Where 𝐶𝐶 is the cost category of interest, and 𝐶𝑆𝐶,𝑖 is the i-th cost subcategory identified in 
Table 4. 1. 
The expressions reported in Table 4. 1 allow the calculation of the single cost terms for a generic 
security device. Grouping them into the six mentioned cost categories, the total annual cost 
due to the implementation a security measure can be computed. The cost estimation can be 
extended to more than one security device. All the cost terms should be expressed in coherent 
monetary value. 
For the determination of Overall specific costs (𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 ), specific cost subcategories were 
outlined for each class of security measures, according to their functions and features. As stated 
by Lee et al. (Lee et al., 2002) cost metrics are often site-specific because each organization has 
its own security policies and risk factors. Despite the fact that this cost category is open to 
eventual additional contributions, Overall specific costs were determined as:  
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 = 𝐶𝐹𝑃 + 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃                                                                                                                           (4.11) 
Where 𝐶𝐹𝑃 indicates Overall cost of a false-positive case and 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃 site-specific costs. The 
false-positive rate refers to a situation in which the detection device identifies an object (person 
or thing) as a potential hazard, when it is not (Lin and Van Gulijk, 2015). This error turns into 
additional security procedures that cause inconvenience to employees, but it may also delay 
systems operation (i.e., due to re-inspection) and it may eventually turn into a money and 
person-hours waste and reduced employees confidence toward security systems. The formula 
proposed by Lin and Van Gulijk (Lin and Van Gulijk, 2015, 2014) was applied to calculate the 
cost of such events: 
𝐶𝐹𝑃 = 𝐶𝐹𝐴 ∙ 𝑃(𝐹𝐴) =  𝐶𝐹𝐴 ∙ 𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 ⃓ 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) ∙ (1 − 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗)                                                           (4.12)                                  
Where: 𝐶𝐹𝑃 is the Overall cost of a false-positive case, 𝐶𝐹𝐴 is the cost of a single false-positive 
case, 𝑃(𝐹𝐴) is the false-positive probability or false-alarm probability, 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 is the likelihood 
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of the attack. 𝑃(𝐹𝐴) is a function of the security device and it expresses the probability of having 
the alarm without an actual threat (𝑃(𝐹𝐴) = 𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚, 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘)).  
Table 4. 1 Overview on Overall annual cost estimation for a generic security measure.  Symbols are 
listed in the key according to appearance order.     
Cost modelling for a generic security measure  
Cost category Symbol Cost subcategory Symbol Formula 
INITIAL COSTS 𝑪 𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳,𝑶𝑽 Investigation costs 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Selection and 
design costs 
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Material costs 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 ∑ 𝐶𝑀,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑀,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
Training costs 
(start-up/in 
service) 
𝑪𝑻 (∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
)
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑢𝑝
+ (∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
)
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
  
Changing of 
guidelines and 
informing costs 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 ∑ 𝐶𝐺&𝐼,𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
INSTALLATION 
COSTS 
𝑪 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳,𝑶𝑽 Start-up costs 𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Equipment costs 
(including P - 
purchase & R - 
rental costs, space 
requirement costs) 
𝑪𝑬 
 
(∑ 𝐶𝐸,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐸,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
)
𝑃
+ (∑ 𝐶𝐸,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐸,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
)
𝑅
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒,𝑖 ∙ 𝑉𝐸,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐸,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
Installing costs 𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
OPERATING 
COSTS 
𝑪𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵,𝑶𝑽 Utilities costs 𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 ∑ 𝐶𝑀,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑀,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
Human resources 
operating costs 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
MAINTENANCE, 
INSPECTION & 
SUSTAINABILITY  
COSTS 
𝑪𝑴𝑰𝑺,𝑶𝑽 Material costs 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 ∑ 𝐶𝑀,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑀,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
Maintenance team 
costs (A- scheduled 
m. /B- unscheduled 
m.) 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 (∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
)
𝐴
+ (∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
)
𝐵
  
Inspection team 
costs 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
License and rental 
renewal 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
OTHER RUNNING 
COSTS 
𝑪𝑶𝑹,𝑶𝑽 Office furniture 
costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 𝐶𝑈,𝑂𝐹 ∙ 𝐴𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒 
Transport costs 𝑪𝑻 - 
Additional 
communication 
costs 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 - 
Insurance costs 𝑪𝑰 - 
Office utilities costs 𝑪𝑶𝑼 𝐶𝑈,𝑂𝑈 ∙ 𝐴𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒 
Office supplies 
costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 - 
SPECIFIC COSTS 𝑪𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽  False-positive case 
costs 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 𝐶𝐹𝐴 ∙ 𝑃(𝐹𝐴) 
Site-specific costs 𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 - 
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Table 4. 1 (continued) Overview on Overall annual cost estimation for a generic security measure. 
Symbols are listed in the key according to appearance order. 
Key 
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition 
𝒘𝒊 Hourly wage of category i (
€
ℎ∙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝒏𝒊 Number of employees of category i (n° 
people) 
𝒉𝒊 Number of hours of category i (ℎ) 𝒕 Number of employee categories 
𝑪𝑴,𝒊 Price for unit of material i (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 𝑵𝑴,𝒊 Amount of units for material i (n° units) 
𝒔 Number of different materials (or 
equipment) 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰,𝒊 Unit cost for changing of guidelines and 
informing (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
𝑪𝑬,𝒊 Price for unit of equipment i (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 𝑵𝑬,𝒊 Amount of units for equipment i (n° units) 
𝑪𝑺𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒆,𝒊 Space requirement cost for unit of equipment 
i (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡∙𝑚3
) 
𝑽𝑬,𝒊 Volume of equipment i (𝑚
3) 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑭 Cost of office furniture per unit area (
€
𝑚2
) 𝑨𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆 Total office area (𝑚
2) 
𝑪𝑻 Cost of transport (€) 𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Cost of communication (e.g., post, phones, 
mails, etc.) (€) 
𝑪𝑰 Cost of insurance (€) 𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑼 Cost of office utilities per unit area (
€
𝑚2
) 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Cost of office supplies (€) 𝑪𝑭𝑨 Cost of a single false-positive case (€) 
𝑷(𝑭𝑨) False-alarm probability (adimensional) 
The right member of equation (4.12) has been determined by applying the probability chain 
rule to 𝑃(𝐹𝐴), with 𝑃(𝐹𝐴) = 𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 ⃓ 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) ∙ (1 − 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗). Further details on the 
formula might be retrieved from a deliverable of SURVEILLE European Project on surveillance 
devices (Lin and Van Gulijk, 2014). Therefore, false-positive costs depend on the assumption 
regarding the likelihood of the attack. Assuming the likelihood of the attack equal to 1 (i.e., a 
possible value according to the deterministic approach) turns false-positive costs to zero. 
Indeed, it leads to the minimum specific costs value, and consequently to the minimum Overall 
costs for a generic security measure. Setting 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 0 leads to the maximum value of specific 
costs and consequently to the maximum value of Overall costs for a generic security measure. 
Therefore, the overall costs for a generic security measure, corresponding to intermediate 
values of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗, fall within these extremes. Further information on the definition of the 
likelihood of the attack is reported in Section 4.2.6.  
Site-specific costs (𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃) can be eventually added when available. An example of typical 
site-specific costs might be the cost related to modification of safety measures/procedures 
necessary to accomplish the company safety standards after the implementation of the security 
measure. Therefore, specific costs are represented by a range of values (i.e., solely for detection 
elements), determining consequently a range of values for Overall costs of a generic security 
measure. Nevertheless, in case of a narrow range of values for overall costs, meaning very low 
values of specific costs with respect to overall costs, this dependence may be neglected. 
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4.2.5 Module 3: benefit assessment 
Benefit assessment consists on the definition of the costs of an either prospective or 
retrospective accident scenario 𝑗 among 𝑚 possible ones. 
Therefore, benefit assessment requires the quantification of the losses (i.e., named also 
damages) derived from a successful terroristic attack or, generally, from a security-based 
accident (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗). Benefit modelling was indicated as module 3 in the general model layout 
(Figure 4. 1). As reported by CCPS (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2003), a 
security risk assessment, as well as the related selection and implementation of security 
measures, requires a definition either of reference assets or of reference scenarios, leading 
respectively to an “asset-based approach” and to a “scenario-based approach”. Despite the 
accidental or intentional nature of the event, a scenario-based approach is aimed at quantifying 
the probability of occurrence of a given outcome, as well as its causal chain and its 
consequences in terms of production loss, human health loss, assets loss, and environmental 
loss (CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2003).  
As stated by Reniers (Reniers, 2010), in the case of security risk assessment within the 
chemical and process industry, a scenario-based approach might be more familiar to experts 
of safety risk assessment, wherein scenario-thinking is widely applied to picture possible 
unwanted situations. Considering that the effects of accidental or intentional events are often 
comparable (Nolan, 2008), in the tentative selection of security scenarios those considered for 
safety thinking can be considered. Le Sage (Le Sage, 2013) stressed the importance of 
considering in the security field a wide range of fictional scenarios to identify to which extent 
the proposed security measures can mitigate the identified risks (or threats) and fit within their 
operational context.  
If available, information should be gathered on previous accidents triggered by terroristic 
attacks on similar reference installations. In case of a retrospective analysis (i.e., posterior 
application based on a real security-based accident), the actual losses sustained in the attack, 
named realistic benefits, may be accounted. In case of a prospective analysis, if available, 
information should be gathered on previous accidents triggered by terroristic attacks on 
similar reference installations. An expected scenario, which considers the average hypothetical 
benefits, weighted by probabilities of occurrence, of different possible outcomes, can be indeed 
considered in the scenario selection phase with reference to prospective analysis (US 
Department of Defense, 2000). In this model, a rating for consequence severity composed by 
four categories; for instance T1 (i.e., catastrophic accident), T2 (i.e., critical accident), T3 (i.e., 
marginal accident) and T4 (i.e., negligible accident), has been adapted from a previous study 
(US Department of Defense, 2000). The mentioned approach has been already applied to the 
Section 4 - Development of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures against terroristic attacks 
in chemical facilities 
 
121 
 
economic analysis of safety prevention investments within the chemical industry (Reniers and 
Sörensen, 2013b). 
Otherwise, in case of no information available regarding scenario selection and prospective 
analysis, a “worst-case scenario” should be taken into account. In fact, adversaries (e.g., in case 
of environmental-terrorism, eco-terrorism or generic malicious acts) deliberately search for 
the best manner to execute their plans. This means that they are aiming to cause as much 
damage as possible, and therefore, certain scenarios that would be labelled as extremely 
unlikely in case of safety thinking, might actually be considered in case of security thinking 
(Reniers and Audenaert, 2014). Therefore, also a “worst-case scenario”, should be taken into 
account in the security domain. For instance, the application of both expected and worst-case 
scenarios is considered common practice within economic analyses for safety purposes in the 
chemical industry domain (Reniers and Van Erp, 2016). For what concerns the definition of 
probability for each scenario, the model framework allows considering different values of 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 for different scenarios, if the security analyst deems it necessary. 
The losses derived from a successful attack include the damages, both direct and indirect, 
which will accrue because of a successful attack, taking into account the value and vulnerability 
of people, environment and infrastructure.  
Generally, in CBA approach, a monetary quantification of both direct and indirect losses is 
carried out, but also non-quantifiable damages (i.e., psychological and political effects) should 
be at least mentioned (Stewart and Mueller, 2011), as described in Section 3. 5. Quantification 
of direct tangible costs (e.g., replacement costs due to property damage) is quite 
straightforward. The quantification of indirect losses has been carried out within the model, 
provided that they are often comparable or even superior to direct losses (Reniers and Brijs, 
2014b). The indirect losses derived from a major accident include reputational losses, legal 
expenses, costs due to accident investigation, involving both internal and external personnel, 
costs related to supply-chain delays and bottlenecks at the start-up phase (Gavious et al., 
2009). On the other hand monetizing intangible terms related to a terroristic attack (e.g., value 
of human lives loss after an attack, long-term environmental consequences, fear or social 
issues emerging after the attack, sufferance and victimization costs) is a very difficult task that 
has always arisen ethical dilemma since its introduction (Hansson, 2007; Kelman, 1981). 
Among these terms, the most controversial issue is the assignment of a monetary figure on a 
person’s life (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2002; Ale et al., 2015). Although the monetization of 
the value of human lives loss after an attack is a common practice in CBA (Cropper and Sahin, 
2009; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), it has arisen ethical concerns since its introduction (Kelman, 
1981). Indeed, the definition of the “Value of a Statistical Life” (VSL) has been defined a 
“complicated situation” (Tappura et al., 2014) and a “philosophical problem” (Hansson, 2007) 
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within the cost-benefit analysis domain. As reported by Viscusi and Aldy (Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003), the variability of VSL all over the world may give raise to ethical issue and criticism. 
Despite detailed descriptions, which can be found elsewhere (Nicola Paltrinieri et al., 2012; 
Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), it should be clear that the monetary value is referred to as “Value of a 
Statistical Life” (i.e., VSL), avoiding any personal involvement. Indeed, also the monetary 
estimation of environmental damages may raise ethical bias, as it reflects the subjective 
environmental attitude of the analyst (Spash, 1997). Furthermore, environmental and health 
consequences of a hazardous substance release, as demonstrated by the notorious Seveso 
accident in Italy (1976), may last over 40 years. Indeed, as stressed by Lin and Van Gulijk (Lin 
and Van Gulijk, 2015) the alternative of not recognizing these damages is probably even more 
arguable. For instance, an alternative approach to economic analysis with respect to the model 
here-in presented, may require different studies for tangible assets and intangible damages 
(i.e., human losses) to solve the mentioned issue (Hansson, 2007).   
The main steps of module 3 are analogous between EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE, as 
visible from Figure 4. 5. The aim of the module is the calculation of the Overall benefits that 
indicates, within risk assessment domain (Reniers, 2010), the damages derived from an 
accidental scenario (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗). However, benefit classification is different, depending of the focus 
of the application, even if benefit categories within the security domain, for both EM-
PICTURES and ECO-SECURE, have been developed in analogy with a similar study referred 
to the safety domain for the chemical and process industry (e.g., the CESMA tool described in 
Section 3.5 (Reniers and Brijs, 2014b)). The details concerning the loss categories of the 
present study, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions, have been reported 
below.  
Regarding EM-PICTURES version, the Overall annual benefits (i.e., avoided losses) derived 
from a generic accidental scenario (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗) can be computed as the sum of nine benefit 
categories, for each scenario 𝑗 considered in the analysis: 
𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 = (𝐵 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐶,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐻&𝐸,𝑂𝑉 +  𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑉,𝑂𝑉 +  𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑇,𝑂𝑉
+ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 )𝑗 
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                         (4.13) 
Where: 𝐵 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐶,𝑂𝑉 is Overall supply chain benefits, 𝐵𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸,𝑂𝑉 is Overall damage benefits, 
𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿,𝑂𝑉 is Overall legal benefits, 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑂𝑉 is Overall insurance benefits, 𝐵𝐻&𝐸,𝑂𝑉 is Overall 
human and environmental benefits, 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑉,𝑂𝑉 is Overall intervention benefits, 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑇,𝑂𝑉 is 
Overall reputation benefits, 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻,𝑂𝑉 is Overall other benefits and 𝐵𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 is Overall specific 
benefits.  
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Figure 4. 5 Main contents of Module 3, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
Regarding ECO-SECURE version, the categories and subcategories referred to the costs of each 
scenario were adapted to enhance the focus on short-term and long-term environmental 
damages. Within ECO-SECURE, Overall benefits can be computed as the sum of seven 
contributions, for each scenario 𝑗 considered in the analysis: 
𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 = (𝐵 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐶,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐷𝑀𝐺,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐿𝐺𝐿&𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝐻,𝑂𝑉 +  𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉,𝑂𝑉 +  𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑇,𝑂𝑉 + 𝐵𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉  )𝑗                    
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍                                                                                                                         (4.14) 
Where: 𝐵 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐶,𝑂𝑉 is Overall supply chain benefits, 𝐵𝐷𝑀𝐺,𝑂𝑉 is Overall damage benefits, 
𝐵𝐿𝐺𝐿&𝐼𝑁𝑆,𝑂𝑉 is Overall legal and insurance benefits, 𝐵𝐻,𝑂𝑉 is Overall human benefits, 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉,𝑂𝑉 is 
Overall environmental benefits, 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑇,𝑂𝑉 is Overall reputation benefits and 𝐵𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 is Overall 
specific benefits. 
The expressions applicable to the calculation of each benefit category were developed 
accordingly to the fundamentals of CBA (Campbell and Brown, 2003) and are reported in 
Table 4. 2 and Table 4. 3, for EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions respectively.  
In order to calculate each benefit category, for both EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE 
versions, the benefits pertaining to each subcategory identified in the mentioned table need to 
be added: 
𝐶𝐵 = ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐵,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                                                                      (4.15) 
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Where 𝐶𝐵 is the benefit category of interest, and 𝐶𝑆𝐵,𝑖 is the i-th benefit subcategory identified 
in Table 4. 2 for EM-PICTURES and in Table 4. 3 for ECO-SECURE respectively. 
The expressions reported in Table 4. 2 and Table 4. 3 allow the calculation of the single benefit 
terms for either a prospective or a retrospective accidental scenario, according to EM-
PICTURES and ECO-SECURE. Grouping them in the pertinent benefits categories (i.e., nine 
in EM-PICTURES, seven in ECO-SECURE), the total losses due to a generic accidental 
scenario can be computed. All the benefits terms should be expressed in coherent monetary 
value (e.g., all of them should be expressed in € 2016⁄ ). Although this category is open to 
eventual additional contributions, Overall specific benefits have been determined, both in EM-
PICTURES and in ECO-SECURE as:  
𝐵𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶,𝑂𝑉 = 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃 + 𝐵𝐼𝑀𝑀                     (4.16) 
Specific benefits are mostly site-specific (𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃) and should be considered in case of 
additional information available. If additional information is available, also other immaterial 
terms (𝐵𝐼𝑀𝑀), such as the “cost of fear”, psychological damages, social and political tensions 
might be added to the analysis. 
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Table 4. 2 Overview on Overall annual benefits estimation for a generic accidental scenario, according 
to EM-PICTURES version. The table key is available in Table 4. 4. 
Benefit modelling for a generic scenario 
Benefit category Symbol Benefit subcategory Symbol Expression 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑺𝑼𝑷𝑪,𝑶𝑽 Production loss 
benefits 
𝑩𝑷𝑳 𝑄 ∙ 𝑡𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑈 
Start-up benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 (𝑄 − 𝑄
∗) ∙ 𝑡𝐷 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑈 
Schedule benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑪𝑯 (𝐹𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐 ∙ 𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐) + (𝐹𝑑 ∙ 𝑛𝑑 ∙ 𝑑)
+ (𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛
∙ (𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛_ℎ)) 
DAMAGE BENEFITS 𝑩𝑫𝑨𝑴𝑨𝑮𝑬,𝑶𝑽 Damage to own 
material/property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑶𝑴&𝑷 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 
Damage to other 
companies’  
material/property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑶𝑪𝑴&𝑷 𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝐹 
Damage to 
surrounding living 
area 
𝑩𝑫,𝑺𝑨 𝐺 
Damage to public 
material property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑷𝑴&𝑷 𝐻 + 𝐼 + 𝐽 
LEGAL BENEFITS 𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑮𝑨𝑳,𝑶𝑽 Fines-related benefits 𝑩𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑺 𝐾 + 𝐿 +𝑀 
Interim lawyers 
benefits 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑨𝑾 𝑤𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑑𝑆𝐿 + 𝑤𝐽𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝐽𝐿 ∙ 𝑑𝐽𝐿 
Specialized lawyer 
benefits 
𝑩𝑺𝑳𝑨𝑾 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Internal research 
team benefits 
𝑩𝑰𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑻 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Expert at hearings 
benefits 
𝑩𝑬𝑯 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Legislation benefits 𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑮 𝑆𝐵 ∙ 𝐼𝑆𝐵  
Permit and license 
benefits 
𝑩𝑷&𝑳𝑰𝑪 𝐶𝐶𝐷 ∙ 𝐿𝑃 
INSURANCE 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑺,𝑶𝑽 Insurance premium 
benefits 
𝑩𝑷,𝑰𝑵𝑺 𝑃𝐹 ∙ 𝐼𝑃𝐹 
HUMAN AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑯&𝑬,𝑶𝑽 
 
 
Compensation 
victims benefits 
𝑩𝑯,𝑪𝑭 𝑉𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝐹 
Injured employees 
benefits 
𝑩𝑯,𝑰𝑬 𝐶𝐿𝐼 ∙ 𝑛𝐿𝐼 + 𝐶𝑆𝐼 ∙ 𝑛𝑆𝐼  
Recruit benefits 𝑩𝑯,𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑹 ∑ (𝐶𝐻,𝑖 + 𝐶𝑇,𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑛𝑖  
Environmental 
damage benefits 
𝑩𝑬 (∑ 𝑚𝑆𝑃,𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑆𝑃,𝑖
𝑦
𝑖=1
) 
INTERVENTION 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑽,𝑶𝑽 Intervention benefits - 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑇 
REPUTATION 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑻,𝑶𝑽 Share price benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑷 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑃 
OTHER BENEFITS 𝑩𝑶𝑻𝑯,𝑶𝑽 Manager work-time 
benefits 
𝑩𝑴𝑾𝑻 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Cleaning benefits 𝑩𝑪𝑳𝑵 𝑤𝑐 ∙ ℎ𝑐 ∙ 𝑛𝑐 
SPECIFIC 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽 Site-specific benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 - 
Immaterial benefits 𝑩𝑰𝑴𝑴 - 
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Table 4. 3 Overview on Overall annual benefits estimation for an accidental scenario, with focus on 
environmental benefits, according to ECO-SECURE version. The table key is available in Table 4. 4. 
Benefit modelling for an environmental scenario  
Benefit category Symbol Benefit subcategory Symbol Expression 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑺𝑼𝑷𝑪,𝑶𝑽 Production loss 
benefits 
𝑩𝑷𝑳 𝑄 ∙ 𝑡𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑈 
Start-up benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 (𝑄 − 𝑄
∗) ∙ 𝑡𝐷 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑈 
Schedule benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑪𝑯 (𝐹𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐 ∙ 𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐) + (𝐹𝑑 ∙ 𝑛𝑑 ∙ 𝑑)
+ (𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛
∙ (𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛_ℎ)) 
DAMAGE BENEFITS 𝑩𝑫𝑴𝑮,𝑶𝑽 Damage to own 
material/property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑶𝑴&𝑷 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 
Damage to other 
companies  
material/property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑶𝑪𝑴&𝑷 𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝐹 
Damage to 
surrounding living 
area 
𝑩𝑫,𝑺𝑨 𝐺 
Damage to public 
material/property 
𝑩𝑫,𝑷𝑴&𝑷 𝐻 + 𝐼 + 𝐽 
LEGAL & 
INSURANCE 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑳𝑮𝑳&𝑰𝑵𝑺,𝑶𝑽 Fines-related benefits 𝑩𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑺 𝐾 + 𝐿 +𝑀 
Interim lawyers 
benefits 
𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑨𝑾 𝑤𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑑𝑆𝐿 +𝑤𝐽𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝐽𝐿 ∙ 𝑑𝐽𝐿 
Specialized lawyer 
benefits 
𝑩𝑺𝑳𝑨𝑾 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Internal research team 
benefits 
𝑩𝑰𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑻 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Expert at hearings 
benefits 
𝑩𝑬𝑯 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
Legislation benefits 𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑮 𝑆𝐵 ∙ 𝐼𝑆𝐵  
Permit and license 
benefits 
𝑩𝑷&𝑳𝑰𝑪 𝐶𝐶𝐷 ∙ 𝐿𝑃 
Insurance premium 
benefits 
𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑺 𝑃𝐹 ∙ 𝐼𝑃𝐹 
HUMAN BENEFITS 𝑩𝑯,𝑶𝑽 
 
 
Compensation victims 
benefits 
𝑩𝑯,𝑪𝑭 𝑉𝑆𝐿 ∙ 𝑛𝐹 
Injured employees 
benefits 
𝑩𝑯,𝑰𝑬 𝐶𝐿𝐼 ∙ 𝑛𝐿𝐼 + 𝐶𝑆𝐼 ∙ 𝑛𝑆𝐼  
Recruit benefits 𝑩𝑯,𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑹 ∑ (𝐶𝐻,𝑖 + 𝐶𝑇,𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑛𝑖  
ENVIRONMENTAL 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑬𝑵𝑽,𝑶𝑽 
 
External intervention 
benefits (salaries 
related to emergency 
interventions / 
materials / post-
accident monitoring / 
others) 
𝑩𝑬,𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑽 ∑ 𝐶𝑆,𝑖
𝑧
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑀𝐸,𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑀𝐸,𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑇,𝑖
𝑣
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑁𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑇,𝑖
+ 𝐶𝑂𝑇𝐻,𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑉 
Internal intervention 
benefits (manager 
work-time benefits/ 
cleaning benefits) 
𝑩𝑰,𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑽 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
+ (𝑤𝑐 ∙ ℎ𝑐 ∙ 𝑛𝑐) 
Environmental 
remediation benefits 
(short-term / long-
term) 
𝑩𝑹𝑬𝑴 (∑ 𝑚𝑆𝑃,𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑆𝑃,𝑖
𝑦
𝑖=1
) + 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝐿𝑇 
Other environmental 
benefits 
𝑩𝑶𝑻𝑯,𝑬𝑵𝑽 - 
REPUTATION 
BENEFITS 
𝑩𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑻,𝑶𝑽 Share price benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑷 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑃 
SPECIFIC BENEFITS 𝑩𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽 Site-specific benefits 𝑩𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 - 
Immaterial benefits 𝑩𝑰𝑴𝑴 - 
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Table 4. 4 Table key referred to Overall annual benefits estimation for an accidental scenario, according 
to both EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions of the model. Symbols are listed according to the 
order of appearance in Table 4. 2 and Table 4. 3. 
Key 
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition 
𝑸 Production rate of the factory (
𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
ℎ
) 𝒕𝑷𝑺 Duration of the stop in production (ℎ) 
𝑷𝒓𝑼 Profit per unit sold (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 𝑸
∗ Production rate of the factory at the start of 
line reactivation  (
𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
ℎ
) 
𝒕𝑫 Duration of reduced production during 
reactivation (ℎ) 
𝑭𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄 Fine for a cancelled order/contract 
(
€
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
) 
𝒏𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄 N° of orders/contracts cancelled (𝑛°𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠) 𝑭𝒅 Fine for delays in deliveries per day  
(
€
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦∙𝑑𝑎𝑦
) 
𝒏𝒅 N° of orders with a delay (𝑛°𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦)) 𝒅 N° days of tardiness in the orders (𝑛°𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒏 N° of units given by the contractor (𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠) 𝑪𝒄𝒐𝒏 Cost per unit asked by the contractor (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
𝑪𝒊𝒏_𝒉 In-house cost per unit (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 𝑨 Damage to the company equipment and 
machines (€) 
𝑩 Damage to the company buildings and other 
infrastructures (€) 
𝑪 Damage to the company raw materials and 
finished goods (€) 
𝑫 Damage to other companies equipment and 
machines (€) 
𝑬 Damage to other companies buildings and 
other infrastructures (€) 
𝑭 Damage to other companies raw materials and 
finished goods (€) 
𝑮 Damage to surrounding living area (€) 
𝑯 Damage to public equipment and public 
machines (€) 
𝑰 Damage to public buildings and other 
public infrastructure (€)  
𝑱 Damage to public materials and public goods 
(€) 
𝑲 Civil liability fines (€) 
𝑳 Criminal liability fines (€) 𝑴 Administrative liability fines (€) 
𝒘𝑱𝑳 Hourly wage of junior lawyers (
€
𝑑𝑎𝑦∙𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟
) 𝒘𝑺𝑳 Hourly wage of senior lawyers (
€
𝑑𝑎𝑦∙𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟
) 
𝒏𝑺𝑳 Number of senior lawyers (𝑛° 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠) 𝒏𝑱𝑳 Number of junior lawyers (𝑛° 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠) 
𝒅𝑺𝑳 Number of work days per senior lawyers 
(𝑛° 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝒅𝑱𝑳 Number of work days per junior lawyers 
(𝑛° 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝒘𝒊 Hourly wage of category i (
€
ℎ∙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝒉𝒊 Number of hours of category i (ℎ) 
𝒏𝒊 Number of employees of category i (n° people) 𝒕 Number of employees categories 
𝑺𝑩 Total security budget of the facility (€) 𝑰𝑺𝑩 Increase of the security budget for the 
facility after major accident occurrence (%) 
𝑪𝑪𝑫 Cost due to facility close-down (€) 𝑳𝑷 Likelihood of losing operating permit (%) 
𝑷𝑭 Current total premium cost of the facility (€)  𝑰𝑷𝑭 Expected increase of the premium (%)  
𝑽𝑺𝑳 Value of a statistical life (
€
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝒏𝑭 Number of fatalities (𝑛° 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒) 
𝑪𝑺𝑰 Cost of one serious injured worker (
€
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝒏𝑺𝑰 Number of serious injured workers 
(𝑛° 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒) 
𝑪𝑳𝑰 Cost of one light  injured worker (
€
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝒏𝑳𝑰 Number of light injured workers 
(𝑛° 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒) 
𝑪𝑯,𝒊 Hiring cost per employee of category i (
€
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 𝑪𝑻,𝒊 Training cost per employee of category i 
(
€
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 
𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑻 Fire department costs charged to the company 
(€) 
𝑷𝑰𝑵𝑻 Police department costs charged to the 
company (€) 
𝑨𝑰𝑵𝑻 Ambulance service costs charged to the 
company (€) 
𝑺𝑰𝑵𝑻 Special units costs charged to the company 
(€) 
𝑪𝑴𝑬,𝒊 Unit cost for material i applied during 
emergency intervention (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
𝑵𝑴𝑬,𝒊 Amount of units of material i applied 
during emergency intervention (n° units) 
𝒔 Number of emergency materials applied during 
emergency intervention 
𝑪𝑴𝑶𝑵𝑰𝑻,𝒊 Unit cost of monitoring action type i (
€
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
𝑵𝑴𝑶𝑵𝑰𝑻,𝒊 Number of monitoring actions type i (n° units) 𝒗 Number of monitoring actions categories 
𝑪𝑶𝑻𝑯,𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑽 Other environmental costs (€) 𝒘𝒄 Hourly wage of a cleaning employee 
(
€
ℎ∙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
) 
𝒏𝒄 Number of cleaning employees (n° cleaning 
employees) 
𝒉𝒄 Number of hours worked by a cleaning 
employee (ℎ) 
𝒎𝑺𝑷,𝒊 Amount of product i spilled (𝑘𝑔) or (𝑚
3) 𝑪𝑺𝑷,𝒊 Cost per unit of product i spilled (
€
𝑘𝑔
) or (
€
𝑚3
) 
𝒚 Number of products spilled 𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑴,𝑳𝑻 Long-term remediation costs (€) 
𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑷 Current total market value of the company (€) 𝑫𝑹𝑬𝑷 Expected drop in the share price (%) 
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4.2.6 Module 4: definition of threat and vulnerabilities 
In module 4, the threat likelihood and the vulnerability probabilities to be considered in the 
economic analysis are determined, according to the steps reported in Figure 4. 6. The threat 
likelihood (𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗), named also “likelihood of the attack” and “probability of the attack”, 
expresses the probability of an individual or a group with adequate motivation and capability 
to attack a chemical and process facility, committing theft, sabotage or other malevolent acts 
that would result in loss of assets.  
 
Figure 4. 6 Main contents of Module 4, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
Threat assessment is aimed at quantifying the actual or potential threat on a facility by means 
of statistical data treatment, based on expert elicitation, as well as on available intelligence, law 
enforcement and open source information.  
However, the probability of terroristic attacks on chemical installation is context-sensitive and 
therefore it may vary significantly over time, depending on social and political phenomena 
(European Commission, 2008). As stated by Stewart and Mueller (Stewart and Mueller, 2013), 
assessing the probability of terrorist acts is a challenging task, because terrorism is a 
phenomenon of multi-causal factors and terrorists deliberate effort to defy prediction. The 
complexity of terrorism combined with the unique attributes of individual groups makes it 
nearly impossible to capture the explanatory characteristics of the phenomenon in a single 
variable (i.e., the probability of the attack) (European Commission, 2008). Indeed, several 
authors (Garcia, 2007; Stewart and Mueller, 2013; Villa et al., 2016) stressed the difficulty to 
get a significant estimate of this term. 
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Therefore, in the presence of uncertainties and lack of information on this term, two 
approaches can be applied: 
Module 4.1 Deterministic approach. In this case, a defined value of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 within the range 
[0,1] is assumed, and is considered an input of the economic analysis. A possible guidance 
in the choice of the threat probability, adapted from Stewart and Mueller (Stewart and 
Mueller, 2012) has been reported in Table 4. 5. As suggested by Garcia (Garcia, 2005), in 
case of unacceptably high consequences (i.e., major accidents with possibility of cascading 
effects, national security at stake), for both prospective and retrospective accidents, a 
conditional threat approach may be applied: it implies to consider 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1. This 
assumption means that the consequences of a possible attack are so severe that the 
estimation of the threat probability is not required; therefore, it allows focusing on the role 
of security measures management.  
Module 4.2 Break-even approach. According to this approach 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗, renamed 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗
 and 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗
, respectively for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, is the output of the 
economic analyses and it represents the minimum threat probability required for the 
benefits of a specific scenario 𝑗 to equal the costs of a security measure 𝑖 (or a combination 
of security measures 𝑣); the threat probability is calculated in modules 5 and 6. 
According to EM-PICTURES version, just a deterministic approach to the threat probability is 
carried out (i.e., Module 4.1); this requires performing an additional sensitivity analysis. 
According to ECO-SECURE version, a coupled approach toward the threat likelihood, 
including deterministic (i.e., Module 4.1) and break-even (i.e., Module 4.2) approaches is 
applied. The application of a break-even approach offers a sensitivity analysis on the likelihood 
of the attack, directly included in the model. 
For both EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE typologies of applications, module 4 is aimed at 
defining also the vulnerability probabilities, which are 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻). 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) is the 
conditional probability of a hazard that indicates an initiating event leading to damage and loss 
of life, which can be expressed as follows (Stewart and Mueller, 2012):        
𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) =  𝑃𝑆𝐹 ∙ 𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷                                                                                                                                          (4.17) 
Where 𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷 expresses the reliability of the device, which is often an improvised explosive 
device (i.e., IED) (Landucci et al., 2015b); the Performance Shaping Factors (i.e., 𝑃𝑆𝐹) 
represents the performance of adversaries in the use of the device, depending on its complexity, 
on adversary skills and location. 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) guidance global data referred to terroristic 
organizations and other typologies of adversaries (e.g., insurgent organization, criminals) have 
been reported in Table 4. 5; more detailed information regarding specific geographical areas 
can be found elsewhere (Stewart and Mueller, 2012).  
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𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) is the conditional probability of loss or consequences (e.g., having at least asset 
damages), given the occurrence of a hazard; guidance values have been reported in Table 4. 5. 
The product of threat and vulnerability probability is sometimes indicated as a single term (i.e., 
𝑃𝐴) (Stewart and Mueller, 2012, 2011, 2008), expressing the probability of a “successful” 
attack: 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃(𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻)                                                                                                                          (4.18) 
However, in the present model, it was preferred to maintain threat and vulnerabilities as 
separate terms, in purpose to evaluate clearly their contributions to the final results. 
Table 4. 5 Guidance values for the estimation of threat and vulnerability probabilities, retrieved from 
(Garcia, 2005; Stewart and Mueller, 2012). 
Threat severity Example of adversaries and malicious act 𝑷(𝑻)𝒊𝒋 𝑷(𝑳 ⎸𝑯) 
Low Individual stealing asset/ vandals 0.6 0.25 
Medium Organized criminals/ terrorists stealing assets/ weak sabotage action 0.3 0.80 
High Terrorists aimed at causing a major accident  0.1 1 
Conditional threat Terrorists aimed at causing cascading effects  1 1 
𝑷(𝑯 ⎸𝑻) 
Reliability of Improvised Explosives Devices 
Device complexity Representative IED design 𝑹𝑰𝑬𝑫 
Simple Pipe bomb 0.931 
Medium Mobile phone initiated VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) 0.920 
Complex Improvised mortar 0.910 
Conservative assumption No information available 1 
Global Performance Shaping Factors 
Device complexity   𝑷𝑺𝑭  for organizational culture 
Terrorist 
organization 
Individual Criminal Insurgent 
organization 
Simple 0.981 0.588 1 1 
Medium 0.980 0.695 0.972 1 
Complex 0.905 - 0.550 1 
No information available 1 1 1 1 
4.2.7 Module 5: Cost-Benefit analysis for preventive security measures 
selection 
In module 5, the single security measures 𝑖 that are economically feasible with reference to all 
the 𝑚 scenarios are identified. According to EM-PICTURES version, only a deterministic 
approach is applied, according to the description provided in subsection 4.2.7.1. According to 
ECO-SECURE version, deterministic and break-even approaches, indicated as module 5.1 and 
5.2 in the model flowchart (Figure 4. 1), are coupled, following the procedure explained in 
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subsections 4.2.7.1 and 4.2.7.2. The content of module 5 is summarized in Figure 4. 7, for both 
EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE typologies of applications. 
Before starting an economic analysis, it should be noted that the total benefits and the total 
costs occur at different points in time. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a discount rate to 
convert all cash flows in the future to present values of annuities. This conversion process, 
named “actualization”, is shown by the following formula (Campbell and Brown, 2003): 
{
𝐶̅ = 𝐶 ∙
((1+𝑟)𝑧−1)
((1+𝑟)𝑧∙𝑟)
 , 𝑟 ≠ 0
𝐶̅ = 𝐶, 𝑟 = 0 
                                                                      (4.19) 
Where 𝐶̅ is the actualized value of overall cost or benefit, 𝐶 is the yearly overall cost or benefit, 
𝑧 is the number of years the security measure will be operating and 𝑟 represents the discount 
rate, intended here as the real rate of interest.            
4.2.7.1 Module 5.1: Cost-Benefit analysis with deterministic approach 
When deterministic approach is applied, the Net Benefit for every security measure 𝑖 and each 
scenario 𝑗 is determined according to the following equation: 
{
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 ∙ ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 − 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
              (4.20)            
Where 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 indicates the Net benefit obtained by applying a security measure 𝑖, 
among 𝑛 possibilities, with reference to a specific scenario 𝑗, among 𝑚 scenarios considered in 
the analysis.  
Following the standard CBA terminology, the term 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 ∙ ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 
indicates the overall risk variation obtained by the application of security measure 𝑖 for 
scenario 𝑗, while 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖 indicates the costs of providing the risk-reducing security measure 
𝑖 that is necessary to obtain the benefits. Equation (4.20) allows considering different values 
of the threat and vulnerability probabilities for different scenarios, if the security analyst deems 
it necessary. 
According to a deterministic approach, the implementation of a single security measure 𝑖 is 
acceptable, with reference to all the 𝑚 scenarios if: 
{
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
                                                                                                                        (4.21) 
Else, it should be rejected. The calculation of 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 represents the output of cost-
benefit analysis submodule 5.1. The analysis should be repeated for each security measure 𝑖 
and for each scenario 𝑗, obtaining therefore 𝑛 x 𝑚 values of Net benefits. A single security 
measure should be accepted or rejected over all the 𝑚 scenarios.  
Section 4 - Development of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures against terroristic attacks 
in chemical facilities 
 
132 
 
Since the purpose of cost-benefit analysis is to support the security risk management and 
decision-making, often the security risk is made explicit: 
𝑅 = 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 ∙ 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆                                                                                                     (4.22) 
According to equation (4.21), the risk variation (∆𝑅𝑖) achieved by implementing an additional 
security measure 𝑖 with reference to the same scenario, depends only on the effectiveness 
improvement (i.e., ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖), as follows: 
∆𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) ∙ 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗 ∙  ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖                                                                                        (4.23)                                                
Indeed, it explains how sometimes the nomenclature for the two terms overlaps (Stewart and 
Mueller, 2013, 2011, 2008; Villa et al., 2016).  
Therefore, Cost-benefit analysis results, according to the deterministic approach, can be 
presented also in a column graph reporting ∆𝑅𝑖 versus 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖. According to this alternative 
presentation the acceptability threshold for the implementation of a single security measure 𝑖, 
with reference to all the 𝑚 scenarios can be expressed as follows: 
{
∆𝑅𝑖 ≥ 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
                                                                                                                                   (4.24) 
4.2.7.2 Module 5.2: Cost-Benefit analysis with break-even approach 
This submodule, which belong to ECO-SECURE version, calculates the break-even point, 
which is the probability of the attack 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗
,  corresponding to 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 0 for every 
security measure 𝑖 and each scenario 𝑗, according to the following equation: 
{
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗ =
𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖
𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗∙∆𝜂𝑖
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
                                                                                                                                 (4.25) 
According to a break-even approach, the implementation of a single security measure 𝑖 is 
acceptable, with reference to all the 𝑚 scenarios, if: 
{
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗ ≤ 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
′
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
                                             (4.26) 
Where 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
′
 is a threshold value for the likelihood of the attack, which can be derived from 
different sources, as intelligence data or generic accident data gathering, as well as expert 
elicitation. Else, the security measure should be rejected. The calculation of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗
 represents 
the output of cost-benefit analysis submodule 5.2. The analysis should be repeated for each 
security measure 𝑖 and for each scenario 𝑗, obtaining therefore 𝑛 x 𝑚 values of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗
. A single 
security measure should be accepted or rejected over all the 𝑚 scenarios. The application of a 
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break-even approach offers a sensitivity analysis on the likelihood of the attack, directly 
included in the model. 
Figure 4. 7 Main contents of Module 5, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
4.2.8 Module 6: Cost-Effectiveness analysis for preventive security measures 
allocation 
This module calculates the most profitable combination of security measures with reference to 
the scenarios. Often, security investments should be compared with budget limitations. In this 
situation, the economic evaluation method turns into a cost-effectiveness analysis.  
Within EM-PICTURES version, cost-effectiveness analysis is performed according to the 
deterministic approach described in subsection 4.2.8.1. Within ECO-SECURE version, cost-
effectiveness analysis is performed according to both deterministic and break-even 
approaches, described in subsections 4.2.8.1 and 4.2.8.2 respectively. Then, ECO-SECURE 
results derived from the two approaches are coupled by means of a specific scoring system, 
described in subsection 4.2.8.3. The content of module 6 is summarized in Figure 4. 8, for both 
EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE typologies of applications. 
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4.2.8.1 Module 6.1: Cost-Effectiveness analysis with deterministic approach 
According to the deterministic approach, the optimization problem to be solved, known as the 
“Knapsack problem” in the field of Operations Research, consists on finding the solution of the 
following system: 
{
 
 
 
 max (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 ∙ 𝑥𝑣)
𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣 ≤ 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}, 𝑥𝑣 ∈ 𝑍 
𝑣 𝜖 {1, . . . , 𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍
                   (4.27) 
The formulation of the problem is analogous for security measures to the one already applied 
in the safety domain.  
The first equation of the system expresses the total Net benefit from the selected investments 
portfolio, which should be maximized, hence obtaining the max (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 ∙ 𝑥𝑣), among 
all the possible 𝑤 combinations of security measures, indicated by 𝑣 𝜖 {1,… ,𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍. The 
values of 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 can be calculated according to equation (4.20), by replacing a single 
measure 𝑖 with a combination 𝑣. Therefore the calculation should be applied for each 
combination of security measures 𝑣 and for each scenario 𝑗, obtaining 𝑤 x 𝑚 values of Net 
benefits.  
The second equation expresses the fact that the total cost of the selected measures, composing 
combination 𝑣, (𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣) should not exceed the security budget (𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗). The same constraint 
allows discarding directly also single security measures not respecting the budget. The security 
budget (𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗) is the total annual monetary amount defined by security managers that can 
be allocated on a combination of measures. The security budget is often scenario-dependent, 
as it can vary based on scenario severity. However, in case of unacceptably high losses (e.g., 
cascading events, national security at stake) security budget might have a lower threshold fixed 
value, which cannot be reduced. The third constraint (𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}) implies that a measures 
combination is either fully taken or not taken at all.  
A number of assumptions are implicitly embedded in this formulation:  
 Security investments cannot be partial: a measure is either adopted or not; 
 The overall hypothetical benefits of all measures considered is the sum of the individual 
benefits;  
 The overall cost of all security measures adopted (𝐶𝑣) is the sum of the costs of the 
individual measures, composing a combination 𝑣, as expressed by the second equation;  
 Each security measure can be implemented independently, without consequences for 
the other investments. This simplifying assumption was kept in the present 
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formulation. However, it might be overcome in future studies by considering reduction 
cost factors due to the combined implementation of security measures. 
The output of submodule 6.1 is the most profitable combination of security measures (𝑣∗), 
within the constraint of the security budget, for each scenario 𝑗, according to deterministic 
approach. A ranking of all the combinations, in order of decreasing profitability, is provided. 
However, the top-three most profitable combinations are identified, as they might be the 
probable final security investments. Therefore, the combinations that are outlined are the most 
profitable ones, under the deterministic assumption of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 as a defined value within the 
range [0,1]. According to EM-PICTURES version, the output of submodule 6.1, which is a set 
of indicators derived from economic analyses that can support the security decision-making 
process within the chemical and process industry domain, overlaps with the entire model 
output.  
Therefore, within EM-PICTURES version an additional sensitivity analysis, at least regarding 
the threat probability, needs to be performed.  
Figure 4. 8 Main contents of module 6, according to EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE versions. 
It should be noted that the results of cost-effectiveness analysis, according to the deterministic 
approach, might differ significantly among scenarios. According to ECO-SECURE, the outputs 
of submodule 6.1 flow into the application of an original scoring system, described in 
subsection 4.2.8.3, that allows defining an economic indicator expressing overall cost-
effectiveness analysis results, derived from multiple scenarios, according to the deterministic 
approach.  
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4.2.8.2 Module 6.2: Cost-Effectiveness analysis with break-even approach 
ECO-SECURE version of the model include submodule 6.2, which allows performing cost-
effectiveness following a break-even approach. In this situation, the optimization problem 
consists on finding the solution of the following system: 
{
 
 
 
 min (𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑣)
𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣 ≤ 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}, 𝑥𝑣 ∈ 𝑍 
𝑣 𝜖 {1, . . . , 𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍
                  (4.28) 
The first equation of the system (4.28) expresses the probability of the attack with the 
application of a selected investments portfolio, which should be minimized, hence obtaining 
min (𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑣), among all the possible 𝑤 combinations of security measures, indicated by 
𝑣 𝜖 {1, … ,𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍. Therefore, the calculation should be applied for each combination of 
security measures 𝑣 and for each scenario 𝑗, obtaining 𝑤 x 𝑚 values of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗
. The values of 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗
 can be calculated according to equation (4.25), by replacing a single measure 𝑖 with a 
combination 𝑣. The constraint expressed by equation (4.25), regarding 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 = 0 is 
embedded in the formulation of system (4.28). 
The second equation expresses the fact that the total cost of the selected measures (𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣), 
composing combination 𝑣, should not exceed the security budget (𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗), which in turn is 
often scenario-dependent. The third constraint (𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}) implies that a measure is either 
fully taken or not taken at all. The assumptions embedded in the formulation, the constraints 
and the notations are the same ones as those expressed with a deterministic cost-effectiveness 
analysis.  
The output of submodule 6.2 is the combination of security measures, 𝑣∗, with the lowest 
probability of the attack, within the constraint of the security budget, for each scenario 𝑗, 
according to a break-even approach. A ranking of all the combinations, in order of increasing 
break-even probability (i.e., decreasing profitability), is provided. However, the top-three most 
profitable combinations are identified, as they might be the probable final security 
investments. The combinations that are outlined are the most profitable ones with the 
assumption of 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 = 0. 
The application of a break-even approach to cost-effectiveness analysis offers a sensitivity 
evaluation on the likelihood of the attack, directly included in the model, according to ECO-
SECURE version. The results of cost-effectiveness analysis, according to the break-even 
approach, may differ significantly among scenarios. The application of an original scoring 
system, described in submodule 6.3, allows defining an economic indicator expressing overall 
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cost-effectiveness analysis results, derived from multiple scenarios according to the break-even 
approach.  
4.2.8.3 Module 6.3: Overall Economic indicator 
The outputs of submodule 6.1 and submodule 6.2 may offer significant support to security 
decision-making. However, the indications provided by deterministic and break-even cost-
effectiveness analyses, within ECO-SECURE version, might be different and sometimes 
conflicting with respect to the same scenario (e.g., a combination might have a high 𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗
 
and a high 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗), as visible from Figure 4. 9. For this reason, it is not possible to 
compare directly cost-effectiveness analyses results obtained from the two approaches, 
because Net Benefits are monetary values, within the range (−∞,+∞) whereas 𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗
∗
 are 
adimensional values, ranging within [0,1]. Moreover, within the same approach to cost-
effectiveness analysis, results might be very different among scenarios, as discussed in Sections 
4.2.8.1 and 4.2.8.2 and visible from Figure 4. 9. Consequently, security investments that are 
not profitable with respect to a marginal scenario, might become economically feasible with 
respect to a catastrophic scenario. 
The introduction of specific scoring systems is a common approach to provide more 
understandable information to stakeholders (Argenti et al., 2015; Srivastava and Gupta, 2010). 
As visible from Figure 4. 9, 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗) is a linear function increasing 
monotonically in the range [0,1] (i.e., under the assumptions expressed in the two economic 
analyses modules) for each combination of security measures and each scenario, considering 
the same assumptions regarding vulnerabilities.  
Therefore, it is possible to define, within ECO-SECURE version, two original economic 
indicators, named 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 and 𝐾𝑃𝐼2, expressing respectively the results of deterministic and 
break-even cost-effectiveness analysis, and eventually to combine them linearly. The combined 
application of the two approaches, and then of the two indicators, allows defining the function 
univocally. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis regarding the threat probability is included in the 
model. The use of multi-scenario criteria allows defining average economic performance of 
security measures combinations, weighted on all the scenarios 𝑚. 
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Figure 4. 9 Representation of cost-effectiveness analysis results under break-even and deterministic 
approaches for a combination of security measures 𝑣 and a scenario 𝑗, according to model application. 
Two crosses represent the break-even point and the deterministic point. 
The first economic indicator (𝐾𝑃𝐼1) expresses the results of deterministic cost-effectiveness 
analysis. 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 is defined according to equation (4.29), for each possible combination of security 
measures 𝑣 and for all the scenarios 𝑚: 
{
  
 
  
 
If 𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣 ≤ 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
𝐾𝑃𝐼1 = (∑ (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗 ∙ 𝑥𝑣 (max (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣∗𝑗))⁄ )
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑚⁄ ) · 10
𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}, 𝑥𝑣 ∈ 𝑍 
𝑣 𝜖 {1,… ,𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍
𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
Else 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 = 0 
                                               (4.29) 
Therefore, 𝐾𝑃𝐼1, ranging between [0,10], expresses the combined economic and technical 
performance of each combination of security measures, according to the deterministic 
approach. The value of the indicator is normalized with respect to the most cost-effective 
options 𝑣∗ obtained from a deterministic approach for each scenario, which scores 10 and 
weighted on all the scenarios 𝑚. The higher the value of 𝐾𝑃𝐼1, the better the overall 
performance of the combination. If the combination does not comply with the budget 
constraint for all the scenarios, the value of the indicator is 0. 
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The second economic indicator (𝐾𝑃𝐼2) expresses the results of break-even cost-effectiveness 
analysis. 𝐾𝑃𝐼2 is defined according to equation (4.30), for each possible combination of 
security measures 𝑣 and for all the scenarios 𝑚: 
{
  
 
  
 
If 𝐶𝑣 ∙ 𝑥𝑣 ≤ 𝐶𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡,𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
𝐾𝑃𝐼2 = (∑ (1 − (𝑃(𝑇)𝑣𝑗 
∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑣) (1 − min (𝑃(𝑇)𝑣∗𝑗 
∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑣))⁄ )
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑚⁄ ) · 10
𝑥𝑣  𝜖 {0,1}, 𝑥𝑣 ∈ 𝑍 
𝑣 𝜖 {1, … ,𝑤},𝑤 ∈ 𝑍
𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑚},𝑚 ∈ 𝑍
Else 𝐾𝑃𝐼2 = 0 
                                           (4.30) 
Therefore, 𝐾𝑃𝐼2, ranging between [0,10], expresses again the combined economic and technical 
performance of a combination of security measures, according to the break-even approach. 
However, 𝐾𝑃𝐼2 is normalized with respect to the most cost-effective option 𝑣
∗obtained from a 
break-even approach for each scenario 𝑗, which scores 10 and weighted on all the scenarios 𝑚. 
Also in this case, if the combination does not respect the budget constraints for all the 
scenarios, the indicator value is zero. 
An overall performance indicator is calculated from the combination of 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 and 𝐾𝑃𝐼2: 
{
If 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 ≥ 𝛼 and 𝐾𝑃𝐼2 ≥ 𝛽
𝐸𝐶𝑆 = (𝐾𝑃𝐼1 + 𝐾𝑃𝐼2) ∙ 0.5
Else 𝐸𝐶𝑆 = 0
                                                                                                                          (4.31) 
Where 𝐸𝐶𝑆 is an overall cost-effectiveness indicator, again ranging between [0, 10]. Constants 
𝛼 and 𝛽 are acceptability thresholds, having a value ranging between [0, 10], which may be 
introduced by the security analyst and discussed with management, to warrant that 
combinations considered in decision-making perform above some minimum threshold values, 
under both the deterministic and break-even approaches.  
A possible guideline for the selection of 𝛼 and 𝛽 values has been proposed in Table 4. 6. From 
a general perspective, in case of security managers that tend to put the focus of the economic 
analysis on the profitability of measures regardless the likelihood of the attack (i.e., high values 
of Net Benefit under deterministic approach and consequently high values of 𝐾𝑃𝐼1), it is 
suggested to adopt high or very high 𝛼 values. On the contrary, in case of security managers 
that tend to put the focus of the economic analysis on having an acceptable measure even with 
very low likelihood of the attack (i.e., low break-even probability and consequently high 𝐾𝑃𝐼2), 
it is suggested to adopt high or very high 𝛽 values. Other 𝛼 and 𝛽 values fall within the two 
discussed extremes.  
Therefore, the submodule 6.3 provides a scoring system based on three indicators, all ranging 
within [0,10]: two intermediate economic indicators, expressing respectively deterministic and 
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break-even cost-effectiveness approaches, and an overall cost-effectiveness indicator. The 
scoring system provides the basis for a sound comparison of all possible security alternatives.  
Table 4. 6 Guideline on 𝛼 and 𝛽 acceptability thresholds for security analysts. 
Qualitative 
description of 
acceptability 
thresholds 
𝜶 𝜷 
Values 
ranges 
for 𝜶  
Requirements for 𝜶 
selection 
Values 
ranges for 
𝜷 
Requirements for 
𝜷 selection 
Very high (8, 10] Very high Net benefit accepted 
under deterministic approach 
by security management 
(8, 10] Very low break-even 
probability accepted 
by security 
management  
High (6, 8] High Net benefit accepted 
under deterministic approach 
by security management 
(6, 8] Low break-even 
probability accepted 
by security 
management 
Medium (4, 6] Medium Net benefit accepted 
under deterministic approach 
by security management 
(4, 6] Medium break-even 
probability accepted 
by security 
management 
Low (2, 4] Low Net benefit accepted under 
deterministic approach by 
security management 
(2, 4] High break-even 
probability accepted 
by security 
management 
Very low [0, 2] Very low Net benefit accepted 
under deterministic approach 
by security management 
[0, 2] Very high  break-
even probability 
accepted by security 
management 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
The orginal model presented in Section 4 offers a complete framework for economic analysis, 
aimed at the selection and allocation of preventive security measures against terroristic 
attacks, within the specific chemical and process industry context. Two possible versions, 
depending on the focus for the application of the model, are depicted: EM-PICURES refers to 
generic security-based accidents and terroristic attacks, while ECO-SECURE refers to 
environmental and eco-terroristic attacks and related consequences. 
The main advantage of the model is its completeness with respect to cost and performance of 
security measures, as well as to losses, and the consequent accuracy of results. Moreover, the 
model is relatively straightforward, enhancing its possibility to be applied in industrial 
practice. The model provides site-specific answers to security analysts, because it allows 
evaluating the performance of physical security measures present on-site and comparing 
several security upgrades according to technical and economic criteria, as well as possible 
adversary paths dependent on the layout of the facility.  
The model may be applied both in predictive and in posterior analysis, as well as to different 
accident scenarios, in order to obtain scenario-specific economic indicators to be compared. 
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The precise checklist provided for costs and benefits evaluation may prevent omissions and 
inaccuracies. The cost assessment allows a precise definition of the most relevant cost terms 
due to the implementation of security measures, leaving at the same time enough space for the 
analyst to add specific costs. Indeed, the benefit assessment allows a detailed description of 
the losses derived from either perspective or retrospective accidental scenarios. The benefit 
assessment includes different damage categories between EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE 
versions, depending on the focus of the application (i.e., generic major accident and 
environmental damages respectively, both triggered by security threats). In particular, the 
retrospective application of the model may offer an additional tool to retrieve and validate 
quantitative information on security-based scenarios. 
However, as all economic analyses, the results may reflect the subjectivity of the analyst, 
concerning the monetization of intangible costs and benefits and the choice of discount rates, 
whose inaccuracies may lead to misleading results. For instance, assigning monetary values to 
mortality and morbidity is a common practice in economic analyses, but it is still defined “a 
complicated situation” (Tappura et al., 2014), which might arise ethical concerns (Ale et al., 
2015). Also the effectiveness assessment present several uncertainties: the analysis is site-
specific and accident-specific, as it depends on the possible adversary path of actions. 
Therefore, the results obtained from effectiveness assessment cannot be generalized beyond a 
specific application. Moreover, although the model is able to take into account uncertainties 
that may decrease the overall performance of the PPS (e.g., possible lag-time in detection by 
security guards), it offers just a simplified description of a possible real accident.  
Another possible limitation of the model is the choice of an appropriate pool of security 
upgrades and accidental scenarios that is up to the security analysis, in particular whenever a 
prospective analysis should be performed. Indeed, also the definition of vulnerability 
probabilities requires carefulness of the security analyst, as they depend on many variables. 
For this reason, whenever the model is applied, it is important to present the analysis in a fully 
transparent manner, specifying the assumptions made and discussing the uncertainties arisen. 
The distinctive feature of the model is the flexibility, given by its capability to perform both 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, offering as outputs a broad spectrum of economic 
analyses results, which can eventually support the security decision-making process.  
The application of solely cost-benefit analysis might not provide significant screening criteria, 
in particular with reference to very severe security-based accidents (e.g., cascading events). In 
this situation, the costs of security measures are several orders of magnitude inferior to overall 
losses, resulting therefore in the feasibility of almost all the single security measures. According 
to the same reasoning, security measures that are not feasible with reference to a marginal 
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scenario might be appropriate with reference to a catastrophic scenario. This issue makes the 
selection of an appropriate pool of credible scenarios even more important. 
Instead, cost-effectiveness analysis may offer sound indications for the stakeholders to 
rationally select and allocate security measures, providing a range of economically profitable 
options that consider also security measures combinations within the budget constraints. A 
specific feature of ECO-SECURE version is the presence of two complementary approaches to 
the likelihood of the attack, named deterministic and break-even, leading to two different 
economic analysis approaches. On the other hand, in EM-PICTURES version, solely a 
deterministic approach is provided. The deterministic approach offers to the security manager 
insight on the optimal revision of the physical protection system, within the constraint of the 
annual security budget, after a variation regarding the likelihood of the attack (e.g., due to 
socio-political changes, increased visibility of the target, etc.). Therefore, it defines the optimal 
allocation of security upgrades, as a trade-off of two relevant parameters: cost and effectiveness 
improvement. The break-even approach, starting from a range of security options, allows 
defining the minimum likelihood of the attack that makes each option economically profitable, 
within the constraint of the annual security budget. The combined application of deterministic 
and break-even approaches to cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, provided solely by 
ECO-SECURE, allows inserting directly the uncertainties related to the estimation of the 
likelihood of the attack in the model, avoiding the necessity to perform an additional sensitivity 
analysis on the results. Therefore, ECO-SECURE version is more complete than EM-
PICTURES one. For both versions, cost-effectiveness analyses results may vary depending also 
on the threshold of the security budget that is generally defined yearly by security 
management.  
Another original feature of the model is the use of a specific scoring system, provided solely by 
ECO-SECURE version. The use of a scoring system was made necessary to compare the cost-
effectiveness results obtained from the two approaches and to eventually combine them into 
an overall cost-effectiveness indicator (i.e., 𝐸𝐶𝑆). Eventual company-specific acceptance 
criteria and additional information should be considered, depending on the type of risk to be 
quantified (such as safety, economic, environmental, social), the focus of the stakeholders and 
decision-makers and the quality of information available. For instance, the application of the 
scoring system makes the model more understandable to decision-makers with non-technical 
backgrounds, because the final output of ECO-SECURE version of the model is constituted by 
solely one typology of indicator (i.e., 𝐸𝐶𝑆). Therefore, the application of an original scoring 
system allows to compare a limited pool of final combinations, and consequently to allocate 
the dedicated budget on security upgrades according to a rational criteria. 
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The application field of the model here in presented is limited to the selection and allocation 
of preventive security measures against security-based accidents, with different specific focus 
within EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE typologies of applications. This limitation is 
imposed by the specific features of security devices, and by the different intent of preventive 
measures with respect to mitigation measures (i.e., safety measures). Mitigation may consider 
both intentional and unintentional accidents and, as such, needs to incorporate a different 
analysis, including unintentional failure scenarios. Indeed, the tools required to carry out such 
analysis are different and address a specific legislation context. Moreover, as discussed in 
section 3. 5, recent applications of economic analyses are mainly focused on safety aspects. 
Nevertheless, the methodology may be extended to post-accident mitigation, in purpose to 
compare the possible role of safety and security measures with respect to major accidents. The 
extended methodology will allow decision-maker to have an integrated view of safety and 
security deficits in a chemical installation and to allocate the budget on the most critical aspect 
(i.e., either on preventive or on mitigation measures). Moreover, the current modelling 
environment is Excel® version 2013; possible further developments of the research might deal 
with the implementation of the model in a more user-friendly interface, including an 
automated tool for the selection of upgrades and accidental scenarios. 
The outputs of the model might be applied in risk-informed security decision-making both at 
company and at regulatory level with different purposes: to increase the awareness of 
management towards security issues by means of non-technical and rather user-friendly 
outputs, to tackle security vulnerability in chemical facilities and to allocate the budget on 
profitable physical protection alternatives w.r.t. security-based major accidents. At company 
level, possible solutions for the optimal selection and allocation of security prevention 
investments provided by the model may be discussed by the management and eventually 
weighted with respect to company specific acceptance criteria, site-specific issues and 
additional qualitative information available. At regulatory level, the model might be applied to 
tackle security vulnerable chemical facilities and to propose economically feasible physical 
protection alternatives, which allow meeting eventual legal requirements. However, the 
application of the model at company level seems to be more feasible in a short-term 
perspective, due to the actual lack of regulation at European Union level regarding security risk 
assessment and related decision-making within chemical and process facilities.  
Indeed, even if the framework is not over-complicated, its application requires an effort that 
should be avoided whenever the results are obvious from the outset, because in these situations 
it does not provide additional support to security decision-making. Moreover, the general 
concepts of this economic model are applicable beyond the industrial security domain; for 
instance, to support security decision-making at social level against environmental damages 
(e.g., selection of security measures to prevent vandalism).  
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Eventually, the model may be a systematic useful tool to cope with security-based accidents in 
chemical and process facilities; however, it requires to be validated by several applications to 
case studies that are available in Section 6. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In the present section, a novel model for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses of 
chemical and process-industry related preventive security measures was developed, with two 
specific versions, depending on the focus of the application, named EM-PICTURES and ECO-
SECURE. The model, starting from the baseline physical protection system effectiveness of a 
process facility, allows evaluating and comparing the costs derived from the introduction of a 
security upgrade with the losses derived from either perspective or retrospective accidental 
events, named benefits, accounting also effectiveness improvement. The model developed 
provides to security managers indications on the most profitable single security upgrades and 
combinations of them needed to prevent security-based accident scenarios. Two approaches 
toward the estimation of the threat probability and therefore to economic analyses, named 
deterministic and break-even, are considered. 
Results of deterministic analysis allow upgrading the physical protection system, according to 
possible variations in the likelihood of the attack. Break-even analysis provides the optimal 
allocation of the security budget, defined yearly by security management. The application of a 
specific scoring system allows comparing the two set of results, obtaining overall indicators. 
Thus, the method enables to define a more rational selection and allocation of physical security 
measures (or barriers) and its outputs provide a sound support to managers within the security 
decision-making process. Therefore, the model may support the inclusion of security hazards 
within quantitative risk assessment and related delated decision-making and its application 
may eventually contribute to the reduction of chemical and process plants vulnerability 
towards intentional malevolent acts.  
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Section 5. 
Dynamic safety measures performance 
assessment in the prevention of major 
accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present section is aimed at filling the research gap identified in Section 3.5.1, by applying 
dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and 
cascading events (i.e., domino effects). Several case studies and tutorials are presented.  
In Section 5.2, existing applications of dynamic techniques, as Bayesian analysis and Bayesian 
Networks, to major accidents prevention within the chemical industry domain are presented, 
in purpose to explain in practice the potentialities of these methods. The mentioned Section is 
aimed at reproducing existing case studies regarding Bayesian analysis and Bayesian 
Networks, in purpose to derive lessons on the possible research gaps to be filled.  
For instance, in Section 5.2.2, Bayesian analysis is applied to safety measures performance 
assessment by considering two case studies: case study A deals with the application of Bayesian 
failure assessment for a process tank equipped with safety systems, case study B applies 
Bayesian analysis to an oil spill accident.  
Then, safety barriers performance assessment has been applied by means of Bayesian 
Networks in Section 5.2.3: tutorials illustrating the features and tools of a specific software to 
construct Bayesian Networks, named Hugin version 8.1, are presented. Two case studies, 
named case study C and D, aimed respectively at converting conventional risk assessment 
techniques (i.e., Fault-Tree and Bow-Tie) into Bayesian Networks, are presented. The 
possibility of Bayesian Networks to account safety barriers performance, including also 
economic elements have been explored by an additional case study (i.e., case study E).  
The lesson learnt from existing contributions gives a precise direction for the original 
applications to be carried out, which are aimed at filling a significant research gap, by applying 
dynamic risk assessment method, for instance Bayesian Networks, to major accidents and 
cascading events prevention (i.e., domino effects), including safety barriers within the 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
146 
 
modelling phase. Therefore, in Section 5.3, four original applications are presented, and in 
Section 5. 4, conclusions are drawn on their possible contributions in the broader risk 
assessment perpective. 
5.2 LESSONS LEARNT FROM EXISTING APPLICATIONS 
5.2.1 Applications of Bayesian analysis to safety measures performance 
assessment 
5.2.1.1 Case study A: application of Bayesian failure assessment for a process 
tank equipped with safety system 
5.2.1.1.1 Description of the case study 
The current application is aimed at reproducing the relevant case study by Kalantarnia et al.  
(Kalantarnia et al., 2009), which is the first complete application of Dynamic Risk assessment 
(i.e., DRA), by means of Bayesian Analysis, within the process industry domain. The aim of the 
application is to put in practice the fundamental steps of DRA presented in Section 3.3.2.1.3.1 
and to highlight the advantages of Bayesian analysis, as well as the possible limitations.  
The case study considers a process tank containing a hazardous chemical liquid, according to 
the layout is reported in Figure 5. 1.  
In Step 1 of DRA, the potential scenarios, their causes, consequences and related safety barriers 
are identified by means of Event-Tree analysis. Within the case study, the top event to be 
accounted is high flow. The occurrence of the top event may lead, according to Event-Tree 
analysis, to 11 final accidental states, which are grouped into three severity classes:  
 A – Safe;  
 B – fluid release; 
 C – high pressure.  
The safety systems (i.e., barriers) are: BPC (Basic Process Control), Bypass (Bypass Line), HLA 
(High Level Alarm), Manual (Manual Valve), PSV (Pressure safety valve). The Event-Tree for 
the case study is reported in Figure 5. 2.  
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Figure 5. 1 Layout of the process tank for the case study, adapted from Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia 
et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 5. 2 Step 1 of DRA: Event-Tree for the failure assessment of a process tank equipped with 
safety systems, adapted from Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al., 2009). 
Step 2 of DRA is aimed at calculating the prior failure probability function for each barrier. 
Two approaches for the calculation of failure probabilities of each safety system are used:  
 Deterministic approach, which applies deterministic values for failure probabilities; 
 Probabilistic approach, which applies the median value of the failure probability 
distribution (i.e., type Beta in the case study). The median value is calculated by 
inserting in the inverse of Beta distribution function the value 0.5.  
The values of prior failure probabilities for each safety system, according to both approaches, 
are reported in Table 5. 1. 
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Table 5. 1 Step 2 of DRA: prior values of failure probabilities for deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches. Inputs adapted from Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al., 2009). 
Deterministic approach 
Safety systems Failure Probability Symbol 
BPC  0.025 x1 
Bypass 0.015 x2 
HLA 0.15 x3,1 x3,2 
Manual  0.2 x4,1 x4,2 
PSV 0.045 x5,1 x5,2 x5,3 x5,4 
Probabilistic approach 
Safety systems Alpha Beta Median values of 
distribution 
Symbol 
BPC  0.25 2.1 2.47 E-02 x1 
Bypass 0.15 0.76 1.51 E-02 x2 
HLA 1.5 7 1.51 E-02 x3,1 x3,2 
Manual 1 3 2.06 E-02 x4,1 x4,2 
PSV 0.4 3.4 4.55 E-02 x5,1 x5,2 x5,3 x5,4 
Then, the prior probabilities of occurrence of each final state (i.e., end-state) of the Event-Tree 
are calculated according to equation (3.7) and reported in Table 5. 2. 
Table 5. 2 Prior probabilities of final states according to deterministic and probabilistic approaches. 
  
End-state 
Occurence probability (priors) 
Deterministic a. Probabilistic a. 
1 - A 9.60E-01 9.61E-01 
2 - A 9.95E-03 9.90E-03 
3 - B 2.37E-03 2.46E-03 
4 - C 1.12E-04 1.17E-04 
5 - B 2.10E-03 2.11E-03 
6 - C 9.87E-05 1.01E-04 
7 - A 1.70E-02 1.66E-02 
8 - B 4.06E-03 4.13E-03 
9 - C 1.91E-04 1.97E-04 
10 - B 3.58E-03 3.55E-03 
11 - C 1.69E-04 1.69E-04 
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5.2.1.1.2 Application of Bayesian analysis 
In Step 3 od DRA, the likelihood function is created (𝑔(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑥)), according to equation (3.14), 
by the introduction of Accident Sequence Precursors (i.e., ASP) over 10 years of operational 
experience, to revise probability distributions, as reported in Table 5. 3. 
Table 5. 3 Accident Sequence Precursors in cumulative form, derived from plant specific data and 
safety experts feedback, adapted from Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al., 2009). 
Years 1 - A 2 - A 3 - B 4 - C 5 - B 6 - C 7 - A 8 - B 9 - C 10 - B 11 - C 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 
3 1 2 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 
4 2 2 2 6 2 4 3 2 3 2 4 
5 2 3 3 7 2 4 3 2 5 2 4 
6 3 3 3 8 4 6 5 3 7 3 4 
7 5 4 5 10 6 8 6 4 7 4 4 
8 8 6 10 11 7 9 7 5 7 5 4 
9 9 8 12 12 8 10 8 6 8 6 5 
10 11 10 14 13 9 11 9 7 9 6 6 
 
5.2.1.1.3 Results and discussion 
In step 4 of DRA, the posterior failure function of each safety system (f (x|Data)) is calculated 
from the prior and likelihood functions using Bayesian inference, according to equation (3.15). 
Indeed, for each safety barriers, the parameters of the Beta distribution are changed according 
to ASPs, as well as safety barriers median values of failure probabilities. Posterior values of 
failure probabilities, dynamically revised over 10 years of operational experience, are reported 
in Table 5. 4. 
The last step of DRA application (step 5) is the consequence analysis, carried out on the 
scenario in order to estimate the revised probabilities of occurrence of final states, according 
to the equation (3.7), by inserting the posterior failure function in the equation, to describe 
each safety barrier performance. Therefore, the values of posterior end-state probabilities and 
end-state classes are dynamically revised over 10 years of operational experience; results are 
available in Table 5. 5. 
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Table 5. 4 Step 4 of DRA: safety measures posterior failure probabilities. 
Years BPC Bypass HLA 
n. 
failures 
n. 
success 
Alpha 
  
Beta 
  
Median 
value 
  
n. 
failures 
n. 
success 
Alpha 
  
Beta 
  
Median 
value 
  
n. 
failures 
n. 
success 
Alpha 
  
Beta 
  
Median 
value 
  
1 3 4 3.25 6.1 3.36E-01 3 1 3.15 1.76 6.62E-01 2 4 3.5 11 2.29E-01 
2 8 8 8.25 10.1 4.48E-01 7 1 7.15 1.76 8.26E-01 6 9 7.5 16 3.14E-01 
3 13 11 13.25 13.1 5.03E-01 10 1 10.15 1.76 8.72E-01 9 14 10.5 21 3.30E-01 
4 14 18 14.25 20.1 4.13E-01 16 2 16.15 2.76 8.67E-01 12 18 13.5 25 3.48E-01 
5 16 21 16.25 23.1 4.11E-01 19 2 19.15 2.76 8.85E-01 12 23 13.5 30 3.07E-01 
6 22 27 22.25 29.1 4.32E-01 24 3 24.15 3.76 8.74E-01 17 29 18.5 36 3.37E-01 
7 25 38 25.25 40.1 3.85E-01 33 5 33.15 5.76 8.58E-01 22 36 23.5 43 3.52E-01 
8 28 51 28.25 53.1 3.46E-01 43 8 43.15 8.76 8.36E-01 25 46 26.5 53 3.32E-01 
9 33 59 33.25 61.1 3.51E-01 50 9 50.15 9.76 8.41E-01 29 54 30.5 61 3.32E-01 
10 37 68 37.25 70.1 3.46E-01 57 11 57.15 11.76 8.33E-01 32 62 33.5 69 3.26E-01 
Years  Manual PSV 
 
n. failures n. success Alpha Beta Median value n. failures n. success Alpha Beta Median value 
1 2 2 3 5 3.64E-01 4 0 4.4 3.4 5.70E-01 
2 5 4 6 7 4.60E-01 8 3 8.4 6.4 5.71E-01 
3 9 5 10 8 5.58E-01 12 6 12.4 9.4 5.71E-01 
4 13 5 14 8 6.41E-01 17 8 17.4 11.4 6.07E-01 
5 17 6 18 9 6.71E-01 20 9 20.4 12.4 6.24E-01 
6 21 8 22 11 6.70E-01 25 13 25.4 16.4 6.09E-01 
7 26 10 27 13 6.78E-01 29 19 29.4 22.4 5.68E-01 
8 33 13 34 16 6.82E-01 31 27 31.4 30.4 5.08E-01 
9 38 16 39 19 6.74E-01 35 32 35.4 35.4 5.00E-01 
10 43 19 44 22 6.68E-01 39 36 39.4 39.4 5.00E-01 
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Table 5. 5 Step 5 of DRA: posterior probabilities over 10 years of operational experience: 1) final states 
probabilities; 2) category probabilities results. 
1) Final state probabilities 
Years 1 - A 2 - A 3 - B 4 - C 5 - B 6 - C 7 - A 8 - B 9 - C 10 - B 11 - C 
1 2.24E-
01 
2.15E-
01 
5.30E-
02 
7.03E-
02 
4.33E-
02 
5.74E-
02 
1.65E-
01 
4.06E-
02 
5.38E-
02 
3.32E-
02 
4.39E-
02 
2 9.63E-
02 
1.69E-
01 
6.17E-
02 
8.20E-
02 
6.14E-
02 
8.17E-
02 
1.66E-
01 
6.06E-
02 
8.05E-
02 
6.03E-
02 
8.02E-
02 
3 6.36E-
02 
1.29E-
01 
6.95E-
02 
9.25E-
02 
6.13E-
02 
8.16E-
02 
1.49E-
01 
8.06E-
02 
1.07E-
01 
7.12E-
02 
9.47E-
02 
4 7.83E-
02 
1.19E-
01 
8.35E-
02 
1.29E-
01 
6.96E-
02 
1.07E-
01 
9.68E-
02 
6.79E-
02 
1.05E-
01 
5.66E-
02 
8.72E-
02 
5 6.74E-
02 
1.19E-
01 
9.09E-
02 
1.51E-
01 
6.02E-
02 
1.00E-
01 
9.38E-
02 
7.18E-
02 
1.19E-
01 
4.75E-
02 
7.90E-
02 
6 7.15E-
02 
1.08E-
01 
8.60E-
02 
1.34E-
01 
6.54E-
02 
1.02E-
01 
9.45E-
02 
7.50E-
02 
1.17E-
01 
5.70E-
02 
8.89E-
02 
7 8.73E-
02 
1.10E-
01 
1.00E-
01 
1.32E-
01 
8.01E-
02 
1.06E-
01 
8.04E-
02 
7.30E-
02 
9.62E-
02 
5.85E-
02 
7.71E-
02 
8 1.08E-
01 
1.16E-
01 
1.23E-
01 
1.27E-
01 
8.92E-
02 
9.22E-
02 
7.34E-
02 
7.76E-
02 
8.02E-
02 
5.65E-
02 
5.84E-
02 
9 1.03E-
01 
1.19E-
01 
1.23E-
01 
1.23E-
01 
9.06E-
02 
9.06E-
02 
7.64E-
02 
7.91E-
02 
7.91E-
02 
5.83E-
02 
5.83E-
02 
10 1.10E-
01 
1.22E-
01 
1.23E-
01 
1.23E-
01 
8.87E-
02 
8.87E-
02 
7.74E-
02 
7.80E-
02 
7.80E-
02 
5.64E-
02 
5.64E-
02 
2) Final categories probabilities 
 Posterior probabilities (over 10 years) Prior 
probabilities 
Categories 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 
A 6.04E-
01 
4.31E
-01 
3.41E-
01 
2.94E-
01 
2.80E-
01 
2.74E-
01 
2.78E-
01 
2.97E-
01 
2.98E-
01 
3.09E-
01 
9.87 E-01 
B 1.70E-
01 
2.44E
-01 
2.83E-
01 
2.78E-
01 
2.70E-
01 
2.83E-
01 
3.12E-
01 
3.46E-
01 
3.51E-
01 
3.46E-
01 
1.23 E-02 
C 2.25E-
01 
3.24E
-01 
3.76E-
01 
4.28E-
01 
4.50E-
01 
4.42E-
01 
4.11E-
01 
3.57E-
01 
3.51E-
01 
3.46E-
01 
5.85 E-04 
Results from this study show that safety systems, final state probabilities, as well as final states 
category probabilities, vary significantly over the time span considered, due to the introduction 
of ASP and the application of Bayesian analysis within DRA.  
For instance, without additional information, the probability of system being Safe (i.e., Prior 
probability of final state category A) is largely prevailing. Nevethless, after probabilities 
revisions, at the end of the observation period, all three categories of final events have the same 
probability of occurrence.  
Indeed, DRA with Bayesian analysis helps obtaining revised probabilities over time, providing 
safety managers an updated risk picture. However, it should be noted that Bayesian analysis 
should be performed by revising manually probability distribution for each safety system, so it 
may become an unsuitable techinque for complex case studies. Moreover, it is based on 
conventional Risk assessment tool (e.g., the Event-Tree), so it still suffers from some of its 
limitations (e.g., difficulty to account common causes).    
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5.2.1.2 Case study B: application of Bayesian analysis to an oil spill accident 
5.2.1.2.1 Description of the case study  
The current application is aimed at reproducing the relevant case study by Yang et al. (Yang et 
al., 2013), which is the first complete application of Dynamic Risk assessment (i.e., DRA), by 
means of Bayesian Analysis, to a major accidental scenario, within the process industry 
domain. The aim of the application is to put in practice the fundamental steps of DRA 
presented in Section 3.3.2.1.3.1 and to highlight the advantages of Bayesian analysis, as well as 
the possible limitations with respect to a complex accidental event, with several safety barriers, 
intermediate events and final states to be considered.  
The case considers an explosion that occurred aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform 
in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20th, 2010. Eleven people were killed, about 8.0 ∙ 105 𝑚3of oil 
spilled into the Gulf unabated until mid July when the wellhead was capped. Severe 
consequences affected people living in the nearby coastal region, as well as environment and 
assets. 
In Step 1 of DRA, the potential scenario, the intermediate event and the consequences 
identified by means of Event-Tree analysis; the Event-Tree for the case study is reported in 
Figure 5. 3; the description of intermediate events reported in Table 5. 6 (Yang et al., 2013). 
Table 5. 6 Description of events to be considered in the case study, adapted from Yang et al. (Yang et 
al., 2013). 
Description of events 
0 High pressure gas in rock formation 
1 Anular cement and shoe track barrier fail to isolate gas 
2 Hydrostatic pressure does not hold and entered the well 
3 Failure of inner pipe 
4 Gas leak is not detected by the system 
5 Gas leak is not detected by rig crew 
6 Mud gas separator fails to control the release 
7 HVAC fails to shut down, trasfers more gas-rich mixture 
8 Ignition source, e.g., over-speed engine 
9 Blowout preventer fails to be activated 
The 27 final accidental states defined by the Event-Tree are grouped into three main categories: 
 A - safe;  
 B - unsafe;  
 C - fire and major accident.
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Figure 5. 3 Event-Tree for the case study, adapted from Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2013).
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Step 2 of DRA is aimed at calculating the prior failure probability function for each event, by 
means of a probabilistic approach, using a distribution type Gamma. Prior mean values for 
each event are obtained (Table 5. 7), as the product of the two parameters, according to the 
typology of distribution (Vose and Rowe, 2000). 
Table 5. 7 Step 2 of DRA: calculation of prior failure probabilities for each event; inputs adapted from 
Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2013). 
Event Alpha Beta Distribution Prior mean 
0 0.500 0.200 Gamma 1.00E-01 
1 0.500 0.200 Gamma 1.00E-01 
2 0.071 0.700 Gamma 4.97E-02 
3 0.063 0.800 Gamma 5.04E-02 
4 0.100 0.500 Gamma 5.00E-02 
5 0.800 0.400 Gamma 3.20E-01 
6 0.761 0.080 Gamma 6.09E-02 
7 0.300 0.500 Gamma 1.50E-01 
8 0.300 0.600 Gamma 1.80E-01 
9 0.120 0.200 Gamma 2.40E-02 
 
Then, the prior probabilities of occurrence of each final state (i.e., end-state) of the Event-Tree 
are calculated according to equation (3.7) and reported in Table 5. 8. 
Table 5. 8 Step 2 of DRA: Prior probabilities for final states. 
Final state ID Probability 
11 - A 9.00E-02 
12 - A 9.50E-03 
13 - A 4.72E-04 
14 - A 2.23E-05 
15 - B 1.23E-06 
16 - B 1.78E-07 
17 - C 3.82E-08 
18 - C 9.39E-10 
19 - A 8.00E-07 
20 - B 4.41E-08 
21 - B 6.38E-09 
22 - C 1.37E-09 
23 - C 3.36E-11 
24 - B 3.41E-07 
25 - B 4.93E-08 
26 - C 1.06E-08 
27 - C 2.60E-10 
Total A 1.000E-01 
Total B 1.85E-06 
Total C 3.94E-08 
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5.2.1.2.2 Application of Bayesian analysis 
In Step 3 of DRA, the likelihood function is created (𝑔(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑥)), according to equation (3.14), 
by the introduction of Accident Sequence Precursors (i.e., ASP) over 30 years of operational 
experience, to revise probability distributions. Accident precursor data, obtained from plants 
specific data and safety expert feedback, are reported in Table 5. 9. However, no specific 
precursors are available for the accidental scenario that actually happened (27 – C), due to the 
fact that it is an HILP (i.e., High Impact, Low Probability accident). Therefore, additional 
sequence precursors data from contiguous process sectors, in which the same components are 
applied, reported in Table 5. 10, are inserted, as sensitivity analysis to DRA.  
Table 5. 9 Accident sequence precursors referred to the chemical sector, in cumulative form and 
gathered over 30 years of operational experience (Yang et al., 2013). 
End-State Operational experience (years) 
10 20 30 
11 - A 1 1 2 
12 - A 0 1 1 
13 - A 0 1 1 
14 - A 0 1 1 
15 - B 0 0 1 
16 - B 0 1 1 
17 - C 0 1 1 
18 - C  -  -  - 
19 - A 1 1 1 
20 - B 0 0 0 
21 - B 0 0 0 
22 - C 0 0 0 
23 - C  -  -  - 
24 - B 1 1 1 
25 - B 1 1 1 
26 - C 0 0 0 
27 - C  -  -  - 
Table 5. 10 Additional accident sequence precursors from contiguous sectors (Yang et al., 2013). 
  
Event 
Operational experience (years) 
30 30 30 
Nuclear Mining Process 
0 8 9 10 
1 6 7 6 
2 7 7 8 
3 5 6 7 
4 4 2 4 
5 2 2 1 
6 3 4 5 
7 1 1 3 
8 0 1 1 
9 0 1 2 
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5.2.1.2.3 Results and discussion 
In step 4 of DRA, the posterior failure function of each safety system (f (x|Data)) is calculated 
from the prior and likelihood functions using Bayesian inference, according to equation (3.15). 
Indeed, for each event, the parameters of the Gamma distribution are changed according to 
ASPs, and posterior median values of failure probabilities are obtained. Posterior values of 
failure probabilities, dynamically revised over 30 years of operational experience, according to 
the ASPs of Table 5. 9, referred to the chemical sector, are reported in Table 5. 11. 
Then, Bayesian analysis is carried out by including also the additional ASPs data of contiguous 
sectors reported in Table 5. 10; the posterior median values of failure probabilities for each 
event is available in Table 5. 12.  
The last step of DRA application (step 5) is the consequence analysis, carried out on the 
scenario in order to estimate the revised probabilities of occurrence of final states, according 
to the equation (3.7), by inserting the posterior failure function in the equation, to describe 
each safety barrier performance. Therefore, the values of posterior end-state probabilities and 
end-state classes are dynamically revised, according to ASPs from the chemical sector (Table 
5. 9) and additional data from contiguous sectors (Table 5. 10). The results are available in 
Table 5. 13. Then, final states probabilities have been summed, according to the three severity 
classes (i.e., A, B and C). 
Results from this study show that events, final state probabilities, as well as final states 
category probabilities, vary significantly over the time span considered, due to the introduction 
of ASP and the application of Bayesian analysis within DRA.  
For instance, without additional information, the probability of system being Safe (i.e., Prior 
probability of final state category A) is largely prevailing. Neverthless, after probabilities 
revisions, at the end of the observation period, the likelihood of occurrence of categories B and 
C of final events is at least two orders of magnitude higher in comparison with initial data.  
This demonstrates the effectiveness of Bayesian analysis in major accidents modelling. 
Morover, the application of a sensitivity analysis, due to the introduction of additional ASPs, 
demonstrates the usefulness of applying precursors of major accidents. 
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Table 5. 11 Step 4 of DRA: Posterior mean for events after introduction of ASP for the chemical sector. 
  
  
Event 
10 years 20 years 
 
30 years 
 
 
n. 
failures 
n.success Alpha* 
(new) 
Beta* 
(new) 
Posterior 
mean 
n. 
failures 
n.success Alpha* 
(new) 
Beta* 
(new) 
Posterior 
mean 
n. 
failures 
n.success Alpha* 
(new) 
Beta* 
(new) 
Posterior 
mean 
0 4 0 4.500 0.067 3.00E-01 9 0 9.500 0.040 3.80E-01 11 0 11.500 0.029 3.29E-01 
1 3 1 3.500 0.067 2.33E-01 8 1 8.500 0.040 3.40E-01 9 2 9.500 0.029 2.71E-01 
2 3 0 3.071 0.088 2.69E-01 7 1 7.071 0.047 3.30E-01 8 1 8.071 0.032 2.57E-01 
3 3 0 3.063 0.089 2.72E-01 6 1 6.063 0.047 2.85E-01 7 1 7.063 0.032 2.26E-01 
4 3 0 3.100 0.083 2.58E-01 3 3 3.100 0.045 1.41E-01 3 4 3.100 0.031 9.69E-02 
5 2 1 2.800 0.080 2.24E-01 2 1 2.800 0.044 1.24E-01 2 1 2.800 0.031 8.62E-02 
6 0 1 0.761 0.044 3.38E-02 2 2 2.761 0.031 8.50E-02 3 2 3.761 0.024 8.85E-02 
7 1 1 1.300 0.083 1.08E-01 3 1 3.300 0.045 1.50E-01 3 2 3.300 0.031 1.03E-01 
8 0 1 0.300 0.086 2.57E-02 1 2 1.300 0.046 6.00E-02 1 2 1.300 0.032 4.11E-02 
9 0 0 0.120 0.067 8.00E-03 0 1 0.120 0.040 4.80E-03 0 1 0.120 0.029 3.43E-03 
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Table 5. 12 Comparison of Bayesian analysis results regarding posterior failure probabilities after 30 
years of operational experience (step 4 of DRA) with ASP from the chemical sector and with additional 
ASPs from contiguous sectors. 
Event n. failures Alpha* 
(new) 
Beta* 
(new) 
Conventional 
Bayesian method 
(with additional 
data) 
Conventional 
Bayesian 
method 
(only specific 
plant data) 
Difference % 
Posterior mean Posterior mean   
0 10.000 10.500 0.029 3.00E-01 3.29E-01 9.52% 
1 7.667 8.167 0.029 2.33E-01 2.71E-01 16.33% 
2 7.667 7.738 0.032 2.46E-01 2.57E-01 4.31% 
3 6.500 6.563 0.032 2.10E-01 2.26E-01 7.62% 
4 3.167 3.267 0.031 1.02E-01 9.69E-02 5.38% 
5 1.83 2.633 0.031 8.10E-02 8.62E-02 6.33% 
6 3.500 4.261 0.024 1.00E-01 8.85E-02 13.29% 
7 2.333 2.633 0.031 8.23E-02 1.03E-01 25.32% 
8 0.8333 1.133 0.032 3.58E-02 4.11E-02 14.71% 
9 0.5000 0.620 0.029 1.77E-02 3.43E-03 416.67% 
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Table 5. 13 Step 5 of DRA: Event-Tree final states results after application of Bayesian adapting. 
 
Years 
  
  
End-state 
10 20 30 30 Difference % 
  Conventional 
Bayesian 
method 
  
Conventional 
Bayesian 
method 
  
Conventional 
Bayesian method 
(only specific plant 
data) 
Conventional 
Bayesian method 
(with additional 
data) 
Posterior mean Posterior mean Posterior mean Posterior mean 
11 - A 2.30E-01 2.51E-01 2.39E-01 2.30E-01 4.08% 
12 - A 5.12E-02 8.66E-02 6.63E-02 5.28E-02 25.61% 
13 - A 1.37E-02 3.05E-02 1.77E-02 1.36E-02 30.20% 
14 - A 3.67E-03 9.56E-03 4.26E-03 2.92E-03 45.73% 
15 - B 1.15E-04 7.55E-04 3.71E-04 2.99E-04 24.09% 
16 - B 1.36E-05 1.25E-04 4.09E-05 2.59E-05 58.24% 
17 - C 3.55E-07 7.95E-06 1.75E-06 9.43E-07 85.17% 
18 - C 2.86E-09 3.84E-08 6.00E-09 1.70E-08 183.09% 
19 - A 9.92E-04 1.37E-03 4.18E-04 3.06E-04 36.73% 
20 - B 3.10E-05 1.08E-04 3.64E-05 3.12E-05 16.42% 
21 - B 3.66E-06 1.80E-05 4.01E-06 2.70E-06 48.47% 
22 - C 9.60E-08 1.14E-06 1.71E-07 9.85E-08 73.73% 
23 - C 7.74E-10 5.51E-09 5.89E-10 1.78E-09 201.72% 
24 - B 2.64E-04 1.81E-04 3.87E-05 2.75E-05 41.04% 
25 - B 3.13E-05 3.01E-05 4.27E-06 2.38E-06 79.86% 
26 - C 8.19E-07 1.91E-06 1.82E-07 8.66E-08 110.46% 
27 - C 6.60E-09 9.21E-09 6.27E-10 1.56E-09 149.07% 
Total (A- safe) 3.00E-01 3.79E-01 3.28E-01 3.00E-01 9.50% 
Total (B- unsafe) 4.58E-04 1.22E-03 4.95E-04 3.89E-04 27.45% 
Total (C- fire and 
major accident ) 
1.28E-06 1.11E-05 2.11E-06 1.15E-06 83.44% 
Indeed, DRA with Bayesian analysis helps obtaining revised probabilities over time, providing 
safety managers an updated risk picture. However, it should be noted that Bayesian analysis 
should be performed by revising manually probability distribution for each event, so it 
becomes excessively laborious for complex applications, as the one here in considered. 
Moreover, it is based on conventional Risk assessment tool (e.g., the Event-Tree), so it still 
suffers from some of its limitations (e.g., difficulty to account common causes).  
Therefore, it is preferable in these situations, to apply DRA by means of Bayesian Networks, 
using a specific software.   
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5.2.2 Applications of Bayesian Networks to safety measures performance 
assessment 
5.2.2.1 Tutorials on the use of a dedicated software for the application of 
Bayesian Networks 
The present tutorials have been aimed at applying Bayesian Statistic Methods, in the form of 
Directed Acyclic Graphs, named also Bayesian Networks (BNs), by using a specific software, 
Hugin version 8.1, which provides decision support for reasoning under uncertainty. The 
formalization of BNs model appeared to be necessary in order to integrate various dimensions 
correlated with process system behavior within risk assessment.  
5.2.2.1.1 Tutorial: how to build a basic New Bayesian Network 
This tutorial is aimed at implementing a simple Bayesian Network (BN), named also as 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), in Hugin software, version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). The tutorial is 
aimed at exploring the main functions, tools and potentialies of Bayesian Networks, applying 
in practice the concepts described in Section 3.3.2.1.3.2  
The illustrative tutorial considers two safety barriers, one technical (e.g., a sprinkler system), 
the other human/organizational (e.g. emergency fire-brigade intervention), whose failure may 
cause a fire in a chemical installation. The situation can be modelled by the Bayesian Network 
displayed in Figure 5. 4. 
 
Figure 5. 4 Bayesian Network for the illustrative tutorial. 
The BN consists of three nodes: “Human_barrier”, “Technical_barrier” and “Fire” which can 
all be in one of two states: “Human_barrier” can be either in the state "Human_barrier 
(failure)" or "not"; “Technical_barrier” can be either "Technical_barrier (failure)" or "not" - 
and “Fire” can be either "yes" or "not".  
The node “Human_barrier” tells us that the system can undergo a fire by being in state 
"Human_barrier (failure)". Otherwise, it will be in state "not". The nodes “Technical_barrier” 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
161 
 
and “Fire” tell us in the same way if the system shows a technical barrier failure and if a fire is 
taking place, respectively. The focus of the example is on safety barriers failure, so the 
automatic “yes” state provided by the software has been renamed respectively by 
“Human_barrier (failure)” and “Technical_barrier (failure)" for the two nodes  
“Human_barrier” and “Technical_barrier” of the tutorial, with the purpose to avoid 
misunderstandings. The Bayesian Network in Figure 5. 4 models the causal dependence from 
“Human_barrier” to “Fire” and from “Technical_barrier” to “Fire”. The representation in 
Figure 5. 4 should be considered as a qualitative representation of BN, while the quantitative 
representation is given by the set of Conditional Probabilities Tables (i.e., CPTs) of the nodes. 
In Figure 5. 5 the CPTs of the three nodes represented in Figure 5. 4 are reported. The 
probabilities reported in the present tutorial have been chosen arbitrarily, in purpose to 
demonstrate the applicability of Bayesian Network technique. 
 
Figure 5. 5 CPTs of the nodes; screenshot of Hugin software. 
All the three tables show the probability of a node being in a specific state depending on the 
states of its parent nodes but since “Human_barrier” and “Technical_barrier” do not have 
any parent nodes, the distributions referred to them are not conditioned on anything. This step 
finish the construction of the networks with tools provided by Hugin development 
environment. In Figure 5. 6 the network window has been shown in “Run Mode”, with the 
probabilities of each node being in a certain state. With these inputs, the probability of the 
system being on fire is 18.32%; in a more formal way: 𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒 = "𝑦𝑒𝑠") = 0.1832. 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
162 
 
 
Figure 5. 6 The network window for the tutorial in run mode, with overlapped node list pane. 
Then, the network can be applied by entering evidence in some of the nodes where the state is 
known and retrieve the new probabilities calculated in other nodes corresponding to this 
evidence. The use of additional information is probably the most distinctive advantage of 
Bayesian-based techniques. In this example, let’s suppose it is known that the fire is taking 
place. This evidence can be entered by selecting the state "yes" in the “Fire” node. Then, the 
probability of the fire taking place can be read as the probability of the node “Human_barrier” 
being in state “Human_barrier (failure)” and the probability of the node “Technical_barrier” 
being in state “Technical_barrier (failure)”. In Figure 5. 7, the BN after the entrance of the 
evidence that the system is on fire and the “sum propagation tool” has been reported.  
 
Figure 5. 7 BN after entrance of the evidence that a fire is taking place and sum propagation. 
Another interesting feature, especially with the final goal of modelling domino-effect scenarios 
for chemical process plants, can be the identification of the most likely combination of state 
and the related probability (i.e., MPE). In this case the most likely combination of states, 
obtained by using the “maximum propagation tool”, is given by “Human_barrier” being in the 
failure state and “Technical_barrier” being the “not” state. The monitor window has been 
displayed in Figure 5. 8. 
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Figure 5. 8 Most likely combination of events that cause a fire in the system. 
The software reports the probability of the entered evidence: 
𝑃(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = "ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒)", 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = "𝑛𝑜𝑡",
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒 = "𝑦𝑒𝑠") = 0.081 = 𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑙) 
Eventually the final probability of the most likely combination of states, giving the evidence 
that a fire is taking place, can be calculated, according to equation (3.20): 
𝑃(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = ”𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) ”,
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = ”𝑛𝑜𝑡” |  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒 = ”𝑦𝑒𝑠”) 
=
𝑃(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = "ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒)", 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 = "𝑛𝑜𝑡", 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒 = "𝑦𝑒𝑠")
𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒 = "𝑦𝑒𝑠")
=  
0.081
0.1832
= 0.442 
Similarly, the final probability of other combinations of states can be computed. 
The tutorial herein reported makes clear what are the main advantages of BNs application: 
flexibility and easy-to-update information. On the other side, when modelling causal 
dependence in BNs it is not always so clear in which direction a link should point, especially 
when nets are bigger than this one; this is a relevant drawback still affecting BN technique. In 
further applications, more realistic inputs probabilities coming from databases will be applied 
and more complex chemical process systems will be analyzed. 
5.2.2.1.2 Tutorial: How to build a basic Limited Memory Influence Diagram 
The tutorial conceived considers the extension of the BN, previously constructed and 
described, into a Limited Memory Influence Diagram (i.e., LIMID), by application of Hugin 
software version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). For further information on the previous example, please 
go again to Section 5.2.2.1.2). The aim of the tutorial is to explain how to implement a rather 
simple LIMID with the software. 
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Figure 5. 9 The complete influence diagram (i.e., LIMID) for the tutorial. 
The management of a small process plant wants to decide whether or not invest resources on 
additional training courses for employees, after an accidental event, recently happened, has 
raised the attention toward safety issues of the site. Since this involves a decision through time, 
it implies a modification of the previous BN. The complete influence diagram has been 
reported in Figure 5. 9. 
In this case, the construction (or edit phase) of the Directed Acyclic Graph consists of different 
steps: 
1. Editing the BN just constructed, composed by three nodes: Human_barrier, 
Technical_barrier and Fire. 
2. Adding three nodes, very similar to those already present in the network. The new nodes 
Human_barrier', Technical_barrier’ and Fire' represent the same as the old nodes, except 
that they represent the situation at the time of normal production. The new nodes can be 
in the same states as the old nodes: Human_barrier' can be either "Human_barrier 
(failure)" or "not" - Technical_barrier’ can be either "Technical_barrier (failure)" or "not" 
- and Fire' can be either "yes" or "no". In the new model, a causal dependence from both 
the old Human_barrier node to the new Human_barrier' node and the old 
Technical_barrier node to the new Technical_barrier’ node is expected. This is because if, 
for example, the failure of a technical barrier is expected at the present time, then this is 
also very likely to be the case in the future. Of course, the strength of the dependence 
depends on how far out in the future the net refers. It could be possible also to have a 
dependence from Fire to Fire'. 
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3. Adding a utility node, named Production, which represent the utility gained from the 
production process. Diamonds represents utility nodes; each contributes with one part of 
the total utility. It depends on the state of Human_barrier' indicating that the production 
of the plant depends on the human barrier integrity. 
4. Adding a decision node, named Training, which represents the decision to give the workers 
an additional training on safety issues. Action nodes are represented by rectangles. The 
Training node has the states "training" and "not". As it appears also a link from Training 
to Human_barrier' has been added. This is because we expect the training to have an 
impact on future events involving the process plant. 
5. Linking a Cost – utility node to Training node. The utility node Cost gathers information 
about the cost of the training. The action of giving the employees a training course make 
the representation an influence diagram. 
6. Filling the Conditional Probabilities Tables (CPTs). The CPTs referred to the nodes 
Human_barrier, Technical_barrier and Fire have already been showed in Figure 5. 10. 
The CPTs of Human_barrier’ and Technical_barrier’ are different from the previous 
tutorial and they are specified in the following table (Figure 5. 11). 
Utility functions should be specified with the purpose to compute the expected utility of a 
decision. The Production utility node shows that if the human barrier doesn’t fail 
(Human_barrier’ is the state “not”), an income of 20000€ will be obtained, while if the barrier 
fails (Human_barrier’ is state “yes”) the income will decrease suddenly to 3000 €. The 
decision node Training and the utility node Cost show that if the choice is to implement an 
additional training course, the management should spend 8000 €. 
 
Figure 5. 10 Screenshot of the utility nodes (Production and Cost) and the decision nodes (Training), 
which are present in the LIMID.  
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Figure 5. 11 Screenshot of the CPTs for the nodes Human_barrier’ and Technical_barrier’. 
The quantitative representation of the influence diagram is given by adding conditional 
probability table (CPT) for each chance node and a utility table for each utility node. The utility 
tables are simply cost functions. A decision node does not have any table. At that point, the 
construction of the influence diagram has been completed and the net can be compiled.  
The solution to a LIMID is determined using Single Policy Updating, as explained in Section 
3.3.2.1.3.2. This is a theoretical explanation, but how to put it into practice? In the present case 
the “Single Policy Updating” has been applied by inserting the evidence that Fire is “yes”. This 
means that the management of the small process plant has to decide whether or not invest 
resources on additional training courses for employees, after a recent accident (e.g. a fire a 
couple of weeks before). The net has been propagated using the “sum propagation tool” and in 
the Training decision node the expected utility of “training” or “not” can be eventually read; a 
screenshot has been reported in Figure 5. 12. 
 
Figure 5. 12 The influence diagram propagated with the evidence that Fire = ”yes”. 
With this evidence, the expected utility of not doing anything is 11514 €. This suggests that, 
under the specific inputs and assumptions considered, it will be best for the management not 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
167 
 
to implement another training course. Obviously, the final outcome, as well as consequent 
choices, are strongly affected by the inserted CPTs and Utility functions. Figure 5. 13 reports 
the probabilities and the utilities referred to each node of the net. 
 
Figure 5. 13 The influence diagram (LIMID) propagated with the evidence that Fire = ”yes”, with the 
probabilities and utilities for each node. 
5.2.2.2 Case study C: conversion of a Fault-Tree into a Bayesian Network for 
the analysis of a feeding control system  
5.2.2.2.1 Description of the case study 
The implementation of a Bayesian Network (i.e., BN), starting from a Fault-Tree (i.e., FT), has 
been carried out by reproducing the case study proposed by Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 
2011). The aim of the case study is to show the practical application of the mapping procedure 
described in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.1. 
The case study deals with the performance of a feeding control system that transfers propane 
from a propane evaporator to a scrubbing column, so the top event considered in the case study 
is feed system improper control. In purpose to maintain a specified and constant pressure 
inside the scrubbing column, the feed pipeline is equipped with an automatic valve operated 
by an actuator. A manual valve has also been considered in order to avoid pressure increase in 
case of malfunction of the automatic valve. The automatic valve immediate and effective 
control depends on the mechanical failure of the actuator and the valve as well as on signals. 
The latter ones depend on a pressure relay and a pressure controller that received signals from 
a pressure transmitter. On the other side, the manual valve improper control can be due to a 
mechanical failure or to a human failure during the operation. All components have been 
assumed binary (i.e. work/fail components), at least in the first modelling step. The occurrence 
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probability data of primary events that would contribute to the occurrence of this accident 
scenario have been reported in Table 5. 14, while intermediate events, as well as the top event, 
have been identified by their type of gate. 
Table 5. 14 Input data for Fault-Tree development regarding an accidental scenario for a feeding 
control system. Occurrence probabilities and type of gates applied in the case study are adapted from a 
previous study (Khakzad et al., 2011). 
Number Component Symbol Probability 
1 Pressure transmitter failure PT 1.647 E-01 
2 Pressure controller failure PC 2.818 E-01 
3 No signal received by pressure controller PC_signal OR-gate 
4 Pressure relay failure PY 1.538 E-01 
5 No signal received by actuator Act_signal OR-gate 
6 Automatic valve mechanical failure A_valve 3.403 E-01 
7 Actuator mechanical failure Actuator 2.015 E-01 
8 Automatic valve improper control A_valve_ctrl OR-gate 
9 Human failure in operating manual valve Hum_error 2.696 E-01 
10 Manual valve mechanical failure M_valve 1.393 E-01 
11 Manual valve improper control M_valve_ctrl OR-gate 
12 Feed system improper control Feed_ctrl AND-gate 
The starting Fault-Tree has been reported in Figure 5. 14; the mapping algorithm reported in 
Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.1 allows constructing the correspondent Bayesian Network (i.e., reported in 
Figure 5. 15), by applying the dedicated software Hugin version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). 
Bayesian Network analysis of the so-obtained net, as well as the subsequent implementation 
of other relevant modelling aspects allows demonstrating the ability of this technique to handle 
multi-state variables, sequentially dependent failure and uncertainties. 
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Figure 5. 14 Fault-Tree for the malfunction of a feed system for propane transfer, adapted from 
Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2011). 
5.2.2.2.2 Conversion of Fault-Tree into a Bayesian Network and application of Bayesian 
analysis 
The Bayesian Network reported in Figure 5. 15 represents the translation of FT in Figure 5. 14, 
according to the mapping process described in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.1. The prior probability of 
the leaf node in the BN is calculated to be 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 2.720 ∙ 10
−1, which is the same as that 
of the FT. The application makes clear that, during predictive analysis to calculate the scenario 
occurrence probability (i.e., 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙)), with no additional information/evidence added to 
the network, the BN provides the same results to those of the traditional FT, as long as primary 
events are independent of each other, as in the present example. In other words, the results 
reported in Table 5. 15 prove that, whenever a translation of a Fault Tree is performed, the 
expected results in terms of prior probabilities are the same ones of the corresponding BN. 
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Figure 5. 15 Bayesian Network based on the fault tree reported in Figure 5. 14,  
named “First modelling”. 
However, BNs take advantage on FTs in reducing parameter uncertainty through two 
probability revising techniques: probability adapting and probability updating. In BN analysis, 
the posterior probabilities reflect the characteristics of the accident more specifically than prior 
probabilities, due to new observations.  
A common feature is the calculation of the posterior marginal probabilities of root nodes given 
the scenario occurrence (as an inserted evidence); this probability revising technique is called 
probability adapting or abductive reasoning. The posterior probability of each root node 𝐶𝑖 can 
be calculated as  𝑃(𝐶𝑖|𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙), indicating the probability of 𝐶𝑖 conditioned to the feed system 
control (𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 1) malfunction/failure. Prior and posterior probabilities, calculated 
according to the “sum propagation tool” have been reported in Table 5. 15.   
It may be observed from Table 5. 15 that the occurrence probability of the events 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,
𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 and 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 have the highest increase. 
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Table 5. 15 Bayesian Analysis results referred to “First modelling” network (reported in Figure 5. 15): 
comparison between prior and posterior probabilities and % relative increases. 
Number Component Fault-Tree 
analysis 
Bayesian Network analysis: first modelling 
Prior Posterior Δ rel % 
1 PT 1.647E-01 1.647E-01 2.248 E-01 36.5% 
2 PC 2.818 E-01 2.818 E-01 3.847 E-01 36.5% 
3 PC_signal 4.001 E-01 4.001 E-01 5.461 E-01 36.5% 
4 PY 1.538 E-01 1.538 E-01 2.099 E-01 36.5% 
5 Act_signal 4.924 E-01 4.924 E-01 6.721 E-01 36.5% 
6 A_valve 3.403 E-01 3.403 E-01 4.645 E-01 36.5% 
7 Actuator 2.015 E-01 2.015 E-01 2.751 E-01 36.5% 
8 A_valve_ctrl 7.326 E-01 7.326 E-01 1 36.5% 
9 Hum_error 2.696 E-01 2.696 E-01 7.260 E-01 145.3% 
10 M_valve 1.393 E-01 1.393 E-01 3.751 E-01 169.3% 
11 M_valve_ctrl 3.713 E-01 3.713 E-01 1 169.3% 
12 Feed_ctrl 2.720 E-01 2.720 E-01 1 Evidence  
Another relevant feature is the determination of the most probable state of all the variables 
given the accident occurrence (i.e., the most probable configuration), named in statistics as 
posterior joint probability of all primary event, according to probability updating technique. 
The accident occurrence, which is expressed by 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 1, is inserted as evidence in the 
net. In this case, the BN searches over each variable to identify weak links by applying the “max 
propagate” tool. As visible from Figure 5. 16, the most probable sequence of events given the 
accident occurrence is the one corresponding to the occurrence of the failure of the following 
components: 𝐻𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟, 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙, 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 and 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙. The probability of the system 
being in the most probable configuration has been computed, according to equation (3.20) and 
reported in Figure 5. 16. 
 
Figure 5. 16 Bayesian Updating results for the case study, aimed at calculating the most probable 
sequence of events leading to the top event (i.e., malfunction in feed control), according to “First 
modelling” Bayesian Network. 
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The importance of this feature for safety analysis is due to its ability in identifying critical 
sequence of events and allocating safety barriers not only to the primary events directly leading 
to the top event but also to weak links that are combination of non-critical events. 
5.2.2.2.3 Extension of Bayesian Network application to multi-state variables and 
dependent failures 
Two assumptions in the application of Fault-Tree analysis consist of considering components 
binary and events independent. A Bayesian Network can overcome these limitations, as shown 
by the following application to the case study.   
Starting from the system considered in Figure 5. 15, it is assumed that the manual valve is 
closed by the operator only if an alarm system sounds due to the automatic valve failure (that 
means 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 occurrence). All components are assumed binary, except for the alarm 
system, named 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚. The alarm system is considered ternary; its three states are: No-sound 
(i.e., alarm fails to sound), Wrong-sound (i.e., alarm sounds although automatic valve works), 
and Right-sound (i.e., alarm sounds when automatic valve fails). It has also been assumed that 
human failure probabilities referred to closing the manual valve (named, 𝐻𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟) differ for 
wrong and right alarm sounds.  
The occurrence probability of the BN components, expressed as inputs in the Conditional 
Probability Tables (i.e., CPTs), are the same considered in “First modelling” net and reported 
in Table 5. 14, except for 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 and 𝐻𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟 which are assigned new CPTs, available in Figure 
5. 16. For ease of comparison in subsequent calculations, CPT values have been identified such 
that the prior probability of 𝐻𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟 would be 2.696 ∙ 10−1 (as in “First modelling” step). The 
BN obtained by applying the software Hugin version 8.1. has been reported in Figure 5. 17, with 
the modified or newly inserted CPTs. The net has been indicated as “Alarm modelling”. As 
before, the aim of BN is to predict the probability of improper operation of the control system 
(i.e., 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙)) . Prior probabilities for each node have been reported in Table 5. 16. It 
should be noticed that 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 can have two different failure modes: no-sound and wrong-
sound. The prior probability of the leaf node in the BN is calculated to be 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 1.146 ∙
10−1, inferior to the one calculated in First modelling step and reported in Section 5.2.2.2.2.  
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Figure 5. 17 BN structure for feed control system with alarm systems (Alarm modelling step). The 
fraction of the net modified in comparison with the previous one has been highlighted and its CPTs for 
nodes “Human error” (modified CPT - top) and “Alarm system” (added CPT - bottom) have been 
reported. 
Prior and posterior probabilities have been reported in Table 5. 16.  It may be observed from 
Table 5. 16 that, adding the evidence 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 1, the occurrence probability of the 
events  𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 and 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 has the highest increase. 𝐻𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟 prior probability is the 
same compared with the basic study case, but it decreases suddenly adding the evidence. This 
value highlights that adding the alarm system helps the operator to prevent accident 
occurrence, resulting in a decrease of 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙). 
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Table 5. 16 Bayesian Analysis results, referred to “Alarm modelling step”, whose BN is is reported in 
Figure 5. 17: comparison between prior and posterior probabilities and % relative variations. 
Number Component Alarm modelling 
Prior Posterior Δ rel % 
1 PT 1.647 E-01 2.248 E-01 36.5% 
2 PC 2.818 E-01 3.847 E-01 36.5% 
3 PC_signal 4.001 E-01 5.461 E-01 36.5% 
4 PY 1.538 E-01 2.099 E-01 36.5% 
5 Act_signal 4.924 E-01 6.721 E-01 36.5% 
6 A_valve 3.403 E-01 4.645 E-01 36.5% 
7 Actuator 2.015 E-01 2.751 E-01 36.5% 
8 A_valve_ctrl 7.326 E-01 1 36.5% 
9 Hum_error 2.696 E-01 1.272 E-01 -52.8% 
10 M_valve 1.393 E-01 8.905 E-01 539.3% 
11 M_valve_ctrl 3.713 E-01 1 169.3% 
12 Feed_ctrl 1.146 E-01 1 evidence 
13 
 
Alarm (no-sound) 2.614 E-01 6.39 E-02 -75.6% 
Alarm (wrong-sound) 1.340 E-01 0 -100.0% 
The determination of the most probable state of all the variables given the accident occurrence 
(the most probable configuration) has been carried out also for the system including alarm 
(Figure 5. 17). The most probable state, given the accident occurrence, is the one corresponding 
to the occurrence of the events 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒, 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙,  𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 and 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙. The 
probability of the system being in the most probable configuration has been computed, 
according to equation (3.20): 
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
=
0.018833
0.114597
= 1.643 ∙ 10−1 
It should be noted that human error is not included anymore in this configuration, as suggested 
by previous observations. According to the new most probable explanation, mechanical failure 
of the automatic valve is to blame for 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 occurrence, triggering the alarm system. 
Despite alarm system proper functioning, the manual valve cannot be closed because of 
mechanical failure (𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) , not the operator failure. So mechanical failure of the automatic 
and manual valve eventually caused the feed system not to work properly.  
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5.2.2.2.4 Application of functional uncertainties & Expert Opinion  
Another interesting feature of BN is the ability to capture some types of uncertainties that are 
relevant for accident analysis, as functional uncertainty and uncertainty due to expert opinion. 
Functional uncertainty is due to the lack of certitude in accurate determination of a causal 
function among nodes. In order to handle this kind of uncertainty, alternative functions and 
their relative frequencies should be known. In BNs the most common functions used to link a 
child node to its parents are intersection and union of variables (corresponding respectively to 
OR-gate and AND-gate in FTs), but sometimes it is not clear which is the correct relation, 
whose choice turns into different probabilities. As an example, it is assumed that in the BN 
shown in Figure 5. 17 , it is not clear whether 𝑃𝐶_𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 =  𝑃𝐶 ∪ 𝑃𝑇 or 𝑃𝐶_𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 =  𝑃𝐶 ∩ 𝑃𝑇, 
but it is known that the likelihood of the former is three times that of the latter, that means 
𝑃𝑟(𝑈) = 3 ∙ 𝑃𝑟(∩). This uncertainty can be modeled by adding another parent node to 
𝑃𝐶_𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙, named 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 has two states: 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 and the CPT for 
node 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 has been filled by using the information available: 𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑃𝑟(∪,∩) =
(0.75 , 0.25).  
This turns into a modification of the CPT for node 𝑃𝐶_𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙, as reported in Figure 5. 18. In 
BNs most prior beliefs used to construct the model are based on domain experts’ opinions. So, 
it is common to have different beliefs about probability parameters due to different experts 
assessing the model values.  
BN allows considering different judgments in the network structure by adding a node to the 
parent set of the node of interest. The newly added node has one state for each expert and its 
prior probability represents the reliability degree of each expert. For instance, it is assumed 
that two experts (e.g., 𝐸𝑥𝑝1 and 𝐸𝑥𝑝2) have been asked to assess the causal effect of 
𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 on 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚. So, node 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 with two states 𝐸𝑥𝑝1  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝2  has been added to 
parent set of 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚. The reliability of the first expert is 60% and that of the second is 40%, so 
the CPT of the node has been filled consequently (i.e., 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑝1, 𝐸𝑥𝑝2) =
 (0.6 , 0.4). The different opinions of experts about the conditional dependence of 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 on 
𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙 have been included in the corresponding CPT (Figure 5. 18). Prior and posterior 
probabilities of the BN expressing functional uncertainty and expert opinion (Figure 5. 18) 
have been listed in Table 5. 17. Posterior probabilities have been obtained by probability 
revision (given the accident occurrence), as explained in the previous paragraph. 
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Figure 5. 18 Modified BN structure to capture functional uncertainty and expert opinion (Uncertainty 
modelling step). The fraction of the net modified in comparison with the previous one (feed system with 
alarm) has been highlighted and its CPTs, for nodes PC_signal and Alarm have been reported. The 
newly added nodes are Function and Expert. 
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Table 5. 17 Bayesian Analysis results (referred to Uncertainty modelling step): comparison between 
prior and posterior probabilities and % relative variations. Bayesian Analysis results (referred to 
Uncertainty modelling step): comparison between prior and posterior probabilities and % relative 
variations. 
Number Component Uncertainty modelling 
Prior Posterior Δ rel % 
1 PT 1.647 E-01 2.186 E-01 32.7% 
2 PC 2.818 E-01 3.687 E-01 30.8% 
3 PC_signal 3.117 E-01 4.496 E-01 44.2% 
4 PY 1.538 E-01 2.219 E-01 44.3% 
5 Act_signal 4.175 E-01 6.024 E-01 44.3% 
6 A_valve 3.403 E-01 4.909 E-01 44.3% 
7 Actuator 2.015 E-01 2.907 E-01 44.3% 
8 A_valve_ctrl 6.932 E-01 1 44.3% 
9 Hum_error 3.112 E-01 1.907 E-01 -38.7% 
10 M_valve 1.393 E-01 8.359 E-01 500.1% 
11 M_valve_ctrl 4.071 E-01 1 145.6% 
12 Feed_ctrl 1.155 E-01 1 evidence 
13 
  
Alarm (no-sound) 3.031 E-01 1.320 E-01 -56.5% 
Alarm (wrong-sound) 1.900 E-02 0 -100.0% 
14 
  
Expert (Exp 1) 6.000 E-01 5.632 E-01 -6.1% 
Expert (Exp 2) 4.000 E-01 4.368 E-01 9.2% 
15 
  
Function (Union) 7.500 E-01 7.926 E-01 5.7% 
Function (Intersection) 2.500 E-01 2.074 E-01 -17.0% 
 
The results show a slight increase in the likelihood of union relationship between 𝑃𝑇 and 𝑃𝐶: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑃𝑟(∪,∩) = (0.7926 , 0.2074). Regarding experts opinions. an increase in the 
reliability of 𝐸𝑥𝑝2 has been reported: 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑥𝑝1, 𝐸𝑥𝑝2) =  (0.5632 , 0.4368).  The 
prior probability of the leaf node, indicating the failure of feed system, is: 𝑃(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙) = 1.155 ∙
10−1; its increase in comparison with the value previously calculated, i.e. 1.146 ∙ 10−1 (see 
Section 5.2.2.2.3), denotes the effect of uncertainty consideration in the model. The most 
probable configuration of events, given the accident occurrence, is the one corresponding to 
the occurrence of the events 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒, 𝑀_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙,  𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒 and 𝐴_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙, that is the same 
as before. The probability of the system being in the most probable configuration has been 
computed, according to equation (3.20): 
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
=
0.008475
0.115520
= 7.34 ∙ 10−2 
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The new most probable configuration determines that the states of 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 have 
to be 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐴𝑁𝐷) and 𝐸𝑥𝑝1, respectively. 
5.2.2.2.5 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The present benchmark application has been aimed at implementing a Bayesian Network, 
starting from a Fault-Tree and subsequently at exploring the features of BN technique. The 
case study here-in considered has been adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2011), in 
order to have a direct comparison of the results for each modelling step. Despite this 
application should be considered an intermediate step in the development of a full-Bayesian 
approach to safety barriers performance assessment, it has been relevant in illustrating the use 
of BNs in both accident occurrence probability estimation and updating in the light of new 
information or uncertainties.  
A FT was used to construct a corresponding BN by following a specific conversion algorithm. 
Both methods proved effective in the estimation of accident occurrence probability, but BN 
took advantage of probability updating. By propagating new observations through the network, 
BN updates the prior probabilities, yielding posterior probabilities that are more specific to 
case considered. 
Then, the application was focused on implementing those aspects and modelling issues of BN, 
which FT is incapable of handling, such as multi-state variables, dependent failures and 
uncertainties.  
The overall results, obtained from the three modelling steps, have been summarized in Table 
5. 18, Figure 5. 19 and Figure 5. 20. The application made clear that each FT can be mapped to 
its corresponding BN, while a BN does not necessarily have an equivalent FT, due to its much 
more flexible structure.  
Eventually the application of the conversion process from a Fault Tree to a Bayesian Network 
made clear the advantages of the latter one. In general, BN proved a significant ability for 
abductive reasoning and uncertainty handling, which may turn into real-time accident analysis 
and more effective design and evaluation of safety measures. 
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Table 5. 18 Comparison between prior and posterior probabilities in different modelling steps. 
Number 
  
Component 
  
First modelling Alarm modelling Uncertainty 
modelling 
Prior Posterior Prior Posterior Prior Posterior 
1 PT 1.647 E-01 2.248 E-01 1.647 E-01 2.248 E-01 1.647 E-01 2.186 E-01 
2 PC 2.818 E-01 3.847 E-01 2.818 E-01 3.847 E-01 2.818 E-01 3.687 E-01 
3 PC_signal 4.001 E-01  5.461 E-01 4.001 E-01 5.461 E-01 3.117 E-01 4.496 E-01 
4 PY 1.538 E-01 2.099 E-01 1.538 E-01 2.099 E-01 1.538 E-01 2.219 E-01 
5 Act_signal 4.924 E-01 6.721 E-01 4.924 E-01 6.721 E-01 4.175 E-01 6.024 E-01 
6 A_valve 3.403 E-01 4.645 E-01 3.403 E-01 4.645 E-01 3.403 E-01 4.909 E-01 
7 Actuator 2.015 E-01 2.751 E-01 2.015 E-01 2.751 E-01 2.015 E-01 2.907 E-01 
8 A_valve_ctrl 7.326 E-01 1 7.326 E-01 1 6.932 E-01 1 
9 Hum_error 2.696 E-01 7.260 E-01 2.696 E-01 1.272 E-01 3.112 E-01 1.907 E-01 
10 M_valve 1.393 E-01 3.751 E-01 1.393 E-01 8.905 E-01 1.393 E-01 8.359 E-01 
11 M_valve_ctrl 3.713 E-01 1 3.713 E-01 1 4.071 E-01 1 
12 Feed_ctrl 2.720 E-01 1 1.146 E-01 1 1.155 E-01 1 
13 
  
Alarm  
(no-sound) 
not present not 
present 
2.614 E-01 6.390 E-
02 
3.031 E-01 1.320 E-01 
Alarm 
(wrong-
sound) 
not present not 
present 
1.34 E-02 0 1.900 E-02 0 
14 
  
Expert  
(Exp 1) 
not present not 
present 
not 
present 
not 
present 
6.000 E-
01 
5.632 E-01 
Expert  
(Exp 2) 
not present not 
present 
not 
present 
not 
present 
4.000 E-
01 
4.368 E-01 
15 
  
Function 
(Union) 
not present not 
present 
not 
present 
not 
present 
7.500 E-01 7.926 E-01 
Function 
(Intersection) 
not present not 
present 
not 
present 
not 
present 
2.500 E-01 2.074 E-01 
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Figure 5. 19 Comparison among prior and posterior probabilities: A) First modelling (i.e. basic 
system), B) alarm modelling (effect of multi-state variables) and C) uncertainty modelling and expert 
opinion. 
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Figure 5. 20 Comparison among components probabilities before and after updating, accounting three 
different modelling steps. 
5.2.2.3 Case study D: conversion of a Bow-Tie into a Bayesian Network for the 
analysis of a Vapor Cloud Explosion accident scenario  
5.2.2.3.1 Definition of the case study 
The implementation of a Bayesian Network, starting from a Bow-Tie diagram, has been carried 
out by reproducing the case study proposed by Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b). The aim 
of the case study is to put in practice the mapping procedure from a Bow-Tie into a Bayesian 
Network, explained in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.2. The case study was implemented in Hugin 
software, version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). 
The case study deals with an accident scenario really happened at Universal Form Clamp, Inc., 
Bellwood, Illinois, U.S. on June 14th, 2006. The reference report, issued by the U.S. Chemical 
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Safety Board (CSB, 2007b), described the accident scenario as a flammable vapor cloud 
consisting of heptane and mineral spirits overflowed from an open top mixing and heating 
tank. The vapour cloud ignited as it met unknown ignition sources, leading to one death, two 
injuries and significant business interruption. The tank was equipped with steam coils 
supplying it with heat needed for the mixing process. A temperature controller composed of a 
temperature sensor and a pneumatic control unit was installed to operate the steam valves 
based on the mixture temperature. In addition to these control system, an operator was 
supposed to check the temperature using an infrared thermometer and to take any necessary 
actions. The tank was also equipped with local exhaust ventilation at the top to control vapors. 
As reported by CSB (CSB, 2007b) and later by (Khakzad et al., 2013b), a malfunction of the 
temperature control system allowed the steam valves to remain open long enough to heat the 
mixture to its boiling point, generating a high volume of vapour. Consequently, the failure of 
the local ventilation system due to a broken fan belt caused the vapour cloud to spill from the 
tank and finally ignited when exposed to an ignition source. It was also found that even if the 
ventilation system had been working, it would not have had enough capacity to collect such a 
high volume of vapour. 
 
Figure 5. 21 Bow-Tie diagram for the case study (CSB, 2007b; Khakzad et al., 2013b). 
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Following the accident description, Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b) developed a Bow-
Tie diagram to investigate the envisaged accident scenarios and the effectiveness of the various 
safety measures (Figure 5. 21). The accident components, their symbols and failure 
probabilities have been reported in Table 5. 19.  
Because the vapour cloud is non-toxic, Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b) assumed that any 
fatalities or injuries are due to vapour ignition, not the vapour itself. It should be noted that 
the failure probabilities of safety barriers Sprinkler and Alarm are influenced by either safety 
barrier 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 or top event 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟, showing the conditional dependency of the former on the 
latter. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 and 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 are activated if vapor is ignited, i.e. when 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 = 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 
𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘, but with failure probabilities equal to 4.00 ∙ 10−2 and 1.30 ∙ 10−3, 
respectively. 
Table 5. 19 Components of the system and their probabilities. (Khakzad et al., 2013b). 
Number Events Symbol Probability 
1 Sensor Sensor 4.00 E-02 
2 Pneumatic Unit P_unit 2.015 E-01 
3 Temperature control system T_ctrl_sys OR-gate 
4 Operator Operator 2.00 E-02 
5 Infrared Thermometer Thermo 4.68 E-02 
6 Temperature measurement system T_sys OR-gate 
7 Manual steam valve M_valve 2.43 E-02 
8 Automatic steam valve A_valve 2.76 E-02 
9 Automatic temperature control system ATCS OR-gate 
10 Manual temperature control system MTCS OR-gate 
11 High temperature protection system HTPS AND-gate 
12 Inadequate ventilation Vent 1.50 E-02 
13 Fan failure Fan 100 E-02 
14 Belt failure Belt 5.00 E-02 
15 Duct plugging Duct 1.00 E-03 
16 Ventilation system Vent_sys OR-gate 
17 Vapor overflow Vapor AND-gate 
18 Ignition barrier Ignition 1.00 E-01 
19 Water sprinkler system (spark) Sprinkler 4.00 E-02 
Water sprinkler system ( no spark) 1 
20 Alarm system (spark) Alarm 1.30 E-03 
Alarm system (no spark) 2.250 E-01 
Alarm can also be activated by a particular amount of vapor concentration in the air even if it 
is not ignited, i.e. when 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 = 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑁𝑜 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘, but with a failure 
probability equal to 2.25 ∙ 10−1 (Table 5. 19). Table 5. 20 shows eight consequences that can be 
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envisaged for the accident scenario depending on the success or failure of the sequential safety 
barriers. It has been assumed that even if there is no fire (i.e.,𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑁𝑜 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘), the 
operation of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 will lead to a safer mode compared to its failure, due to fact that the 
operation of 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 can possibly reduce the probability of delayed ignitions. Consequences 
have been reported in order of increasing severity, from 𝐶1 to 𝐶8.  
Table 5. 20 Consequence of the vapor overflow accident scenario, reported in order of increasing 
severity. 
Consequences of the vapor overflow accident scenario 
Event Symbol 
Safe evacuation C1 
Wet vapour cloud near the ground C2 
Safe evacuation with possibility of delayed ignition C3 
Vapour cloud with possibility of delayed ignition C4 
Fire, moderate property damage, low death toll C5 
Fire, moderate property damage, high death toll C6 
Fire, high property damage, low death toll C7 
Fire, high property damage, high death toll C8 
Assigning the probabilities listed in Table 5. 19 to the primary events and the safety barriers of 
the BT, the probabilities of top event, and accident consequences are calculated and presented 
in Table 5. 21. 
5.2.2.3.2 Conversion of Bow-Tie into a Bayesian Network 
The Bayesian Network correspondent to BT (Figure 5. 21) has been implemented by applying 
the mapping algorithm reported in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.2 and the dedicated software Hugin 
version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). The BN has been reported in Figure 5. 22.  
Attention should be posed to the consequence node that is a multi-state node, accounting all 
the possible outcomes (state set from 𝐶1 to 𝐶8); indeed, by connecting node 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 (indicating 
the top event) to 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠, another state, namely 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 state (i.e., 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑) is 
added to the state set. To show the dependency among the safety barriers and the top event, 
causal arcs are also drawn from 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 to 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 and 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚, as suggested by 
the mapping algorithm. All the safety nodes of the BN are connected to node 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 
because the failure/success of each safety barrier results in different consequences (i.e., 
different states of the 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 node). 
Then, Bayesian analysis has been performed by assigning the probabilities listed in Table 5. 19 
as the prior, and the so obtained results have been compared with the results of Bow-Tie 
analysis, in order to assure the translation algorithm has been applied correctly. The 
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comparison among probabilities obtained applying BT approach and the ones obtained by BN 
analysis have been reported in Table 5. 21.  
 
Figure 5. 22 Bayesian Net correspondent to the BT reported in Figure 5. 21. 
Table 5. 21 Comparison among the results of BT analysis and BN analysis (without any additional 
information). The same results denote a successful mapping process.  
Top Event & Consequences BT analysis BN analysis 
C8 8.739E-09 8.739E-09 
C7 6.714E-06 6.714E-06 
C6 2.097E-07 2.097E-07 
C5 1.611E-04 1.611E-04 
C4 3.403E-04 3.403E-04 
C3 1.172E-03 1.172E-03 
C2 0 0 
C1 0 0 
Vapour (Top Event) 9.983E-01 9.983E-01 
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Once it is confirmed that the BT and BN are equally able to analyse the accident scenario, the 
BN superiority can be evidenced by the ability to update the probabilities, taking into account 
new evidences. In the current case, probability updating has been performed by inserting 𝐶5 
consequence (accident occurrence) and propagating it through the network.  This evidence 
(i.e., (𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠) = 𝐶5 , with 𝑥𝑖 generic event) denotes that it is known a fire with 
moderate property damage and low number of fatality is observed in the process plant. 
Posterior probabilities obtained by Bayesian Updating have been reported in Figure 5. 23.  
 
Figure 5. 23 Bayesian Updating results, after having inserted 𝐶5 as an evidence.  
The most probable state given the accident (𝐶5) occurrence, also known as MPE – Most 
probable Explanation, is the one corresponding to the failure of 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜, 𝑃_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑡 and 
consequently of 𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑠𝑦𝑠, 𝑇_𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠, 𝑇_𝑠𝑦𝑠, 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑆, 𝐻𝑇𝑃𝑆, 𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑆 and eventually 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟 
overflow. It results in 𝐶5 (evidence), provided that 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 and 
𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘. The probability of the system being in the most probable configuration has 
been computed, according to equation (3.20): 
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
=
0.000161
3.93 ∙ 10−5
= 2.441 ∙ 10−1 
The importance of this feature, often named as “Probability Updating” for safety analysis is 
due to its ability in identifying critical events (i.e., the failures here-in reported) and allocating 
preventive safety barriers not only to the primary events directly leading to the top event but 
also to weak links that are combination of non-critical events. 
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5.2.2.3.3 Bayesian Network analysis & Probability adapting (Accident Sequence 
Precursors) 
Bayesian probability revision can be performed through “Probability updating” that is the 
calculation of Most Probable Explanation, as shown in the previous paragraph, or through 
“Probability adapting” that calculates the posterior probability of a generic event 𝑥𝑖 given 
another event 𝑄 has occurred 𝑛 times; that can be expressed in statistical terms as 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑄 = 𝑛). 
This means applying prior experience (in the form of cumulative information collected during 
a certain time span – ASP, i.e. Accident Sequence Precursors) to adapt conditional probability 
distributions. Probability adapting technique has been applied by several studies (Kalantarnia 
et al., 2010, 2009; Meel et al., 2007; Meel and Seider, 2006; Rathnayaka et al., 2011) to develop 
likelihood functions for probability updating using Bayes theorem, coupled with standard tools 
for safety assessment (i.e. Bow-Tie diagram).  
In the current case study, adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b), an hypothetical 
prior experience referred to four years of operation has been applied (Table 5. 22). 
Table 5. 22 Experience used in Probability adapting, in the form of ASP, referred to four years of 
operation. 
ASP (accident sequence precursors) – Non cumulative form 
Consequence Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
C3 3 1 2 1 
C5 0 1 0 0 
C6 0 0 0 1 
For example, at the end of the third year, 𝐶3 has cumulatively occurred 6 times, 𝐶5  has occurred 
only once; probability adapting can be performed by inserting 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 = 4𝐶3) and 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 = 𝐶5), with 𝑥𝑖 generic event. Bayesian adapting has been performed by 
applying “adaptation panel” from software Hugin version 8.1, as visible in Figure 5. 24. 
The results of Bayesian Probability Adapting for four sequential years have been reported in 
Table 5. 23 (for safety barriers - both preventive and protective ones - and Top Event) and 
Table 5. 24 (for consequences). The results referred to as “Year 0” are the prior probabilities 
that have been already presented in the previous section.  
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Figure 5. 24 Screenshot of BN Probability Adapting, performed through adaptation function. 
The results highlights that the failure probabilities of the primary events and top event are 
increasing during the time interval (Figure 5. 25). This is due to fact that the top event (i.e. 
vapour overflow) has always occurred a number of times greater than or equal to the maximum 
failure numbers of each safety barrier and all the consequences applied as ASP denotes an 
occurrence of vapour overflow. Indeed, the occurrence probability of Top Event increases 
rapidly over the time span of the analysis. Moreover, the information about the occurrence 
probability of the top event propagates backwards through the network, increasing the 
probability of the primary events, with a similar trend. 
The results highlights that failure probabilities for safety barriers can remain constant or 
decrease during the time interval (Figure 5. 26), with a trend opposite to the one of Primary 
Events. The explanation can be found in ASP (Table 5. 22): there are observations suggesting 
that each safety barrier has been equally observed working or failing during the fourth year. As 
emerged from Figure 5. 26, 𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 has the lowest failure probability among the safety 
barriers shown, and its failure probability illustrates an approximately constant trend, showing 
it has gained the lowest attention compared to the other two safety barriers, on which 
corrective actions should be focused on. 
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Table 5. 23 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of operations for Safety Barriers and Top 
Event.  
Safety Barriers and Top event -  Bayesian Probability adapting over four years 
                   Year 
Probability 
0 1 2 3 4 
Sensor 4.000E-02 1.255E-01 1.442E-01 1.592E-01 1.719E-01 
P_unit 2.015E-01 5.445E-01 5.518E-01 5.534E-01 5.534E-01 
T_ctrl_sys 2.334E-01 6.017E-01 6.164E-01 6.245E-01 6.302E-01 
Operator 2.000E-02 1.837E-01 2.258E-01 2.613E-01 2.922E-01 
Thermo 4.680E-02 3.795E-01 4.090E-01 4.216E-01 4.272E-01 
T_sys 6.586E-02 4.935E-01 5.425E-01 5.728E-01 5.946E-01 
M_valve 2.430E-02 2.192E-01 2.637E-01 2.985E-01 3.268E-01 
A_valve 2.760E-02 8.730E-02 1.012E-01 1.128E-01 1.230E-01 
ATCS 2.546E-01 6.365E-01 6.552E-01 6.669E-01 6.757E-01 
MTCS 8.856E-02 6.046E-01 6.632E-01 7.003E-01 7.271E-01 
HTPS 2.255E-02 3.848E-01 4.345E-01 4.670E-01 4.913E-01 
Vent 1.500E-02 1.651E-01 2.140E-01 2.604E-01 3.030E-01 
Fan 1.000E-02 1.127E-01 1.511E-01 1.912E-01 2.320E-01 
Belt 5.000E-02 4.445E-01 4.618E-01 4.641E-01 4.605E-01 
Duct 1.000E-03 1.174E-02 1.668E-02 2.271E-02 3.005E-02 
Vent_sys 7.453E-02 5.933E-01 6.469E-01 6.867E-01 7.199E-01 
Vapor 1.681E-03 2.283E-01 2.811E-01 3.207E-01 3.537E-01 
Ignition 1.000E-01 5.000E-02 1.500E-01 1.214E-01 1.611E-01 
Sprinkler 9.984E-01 9.890E-01 9.592E-01 9.624E-01 9.449E-01 
Alarm  9.987E-01 7.961E-01 7.488E-01 7.135E-01 6.891E-01 
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Figure 5. 25 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of experience, referred to Primary Events and 
Top Event. From the top to the bottom: (a) Primary events and Top Event (b) Selected primary events 
and Top Events (i.e., only the ones determining MPE). 
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Figure 5. 26 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of experience, referred to Safety Barriers. 
 
Table 5. 24 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of operations, referred to Consequences.  
Consequences -  Bayesian Probability adapting over four years 
                   Year 
Probability 
0 1 2 3 4 
C8 8.739E-09 5.935E-07 1.523E-06 1.550E-06 1.715E-04 
C7 6.714E-06 4.560E-04 1.404E-03 1.361E-03 1.693E-03 
C6 2.097E-07 1.425E-05 4.416E-05 4.275E-05 5.069E-03 
C5 1.611E-04 1.094E-02 4.072E-02 3.754E-02 5.004E-02 
C4 3.403E-04 2.440E-02 2.987E-02 3.414E-02 3.755E-02 
C3 1.172E-03 1.925E-01 2.091E-01 2.476E-01 2.591E-01 
C2 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 
C1 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 
Safe 9.983E-01 7.717E-01 7.189E-01 6.793E-01 6.463E-01 
Using the revised probabilities for Top Event and safety barriers, it is possible to dynamically 
update the probability of all consequences that tends to increase over time, as highlighted by 
Figure 5. 27. This reasoning can be applied also to those consequences for which no 
information is available, that often are the most severe ones. For example, Figure 5. 28 
represents the updated probability of consequence 𝐶8 (the most damaging one) even though it 
has not been observed until the end of observation time (Table 5. 22). Its probability has 
increased by four orders of magnitude during the observation time, so without an appropriate 
improvement of safety barriers the occurrence of a major accident can be expected in the near 
future.  
In this framework Bayesian probability adapting can be applied as a predictive tool in purpose 
to assess the effectiveness and adequacy of safety measures. Moreover, though the adaptation 
process the generality arisen from the application of reliability data can be reduced by observed 
accident precursors.  
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 1 2 3 4
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
Time (Year)
Bayesian Adaptation - Safety Barriers
Ignition
Sprinkler
Alarm
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
192 
 
 
Figure 5. 27 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of operations, referred to Consequences and 
reported in logarithmic scale. Graph representing probability vs time for all possible outcomes: C1 and 
C2 have been neglected because their probabilities were equal to zero. 
 
Figure 5. 28 Results of Bayesian adapting over four years of operations, referred to the worst-case 
consequence 𝐶8 ; graph reported in logarithmic scale. 
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5.2.2.3.4 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The present benchmark application has been aimed at implementing a Bayesian Network, 
starting from a Bow-Tie and subsequently at exploring the features of BN technique in 
evaluating the performance of Safety Barriers. The system here-in considered has been 
adapted from a previous contribution by Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b) in order to have 
a direct comparison of the results for each modelling step of the mapping process, whose 
results highlighted the superior flexibility of BN over Bow-Tie.  
This application should be considered a significant step in the development of a full-Bayesian 
approach in safety barriers performance assessment, and it has been relevant in illustrating 
the flexible use of BNs in probability estimation for primary events, top event, safety barriers 
and consequences.  
Two different approaches to Bayesian Analysis have been applied, in order to dynamically 
update probabilities, by means of Bayesian Networks: probability updating and probability 
adapting. In probability updating, the information about a node instantiated to one of its states 
(i.e., a certain event that had happened) is used as evidence; its main application is the 
determination of the most probable explanation (MPE) leading to that particular state, in order 
to apply consequent actions. On the other hand, in probability adapting the information about 
the cumulative occurrence number of an accident during a time interval is used as evidence, in 
order to dynamically revise probabilities over a certain time span. This feature helps in 
gradually replace generic priors (i.e., generic reliability data) with more case-specific 
posteriors, resulting in a dynamic assessment of systems safety and a reliable prediction of 
occurrence likelihood for each consequence. 
5.2.2.4 Case study E: application of Bayesian Networks tutorials to account for 
the role of safety measures performance on bugdet and risk 
5.2.2.4.1 Definition of tutorials 
The current section is aimed at including safety barriers performance and economic 
evaluations within Bayesian Networks, by reproducing some tutorials by Reniers and Van Erp 
(Reniers and Van Erp, 2016) that illustrate the role of Bayesian Networks (BNs) and Limited 
Memory Influence Diagrams (LIMIDs) in relation to safety decision-making in the context of 
major accidents prevention. The case studies have been carried out by Hugin software version 
8.1 (Hugin, 2016).  
The first example is an extended BN to account the effect of safety barriers on budget and risk, 
with a further modification to consider uncertainties in budget availability. The second 
example is a similar problem, approached with LIMID, which allows considering decision 
alternatives and utilities in a more structured way.  
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5.2.2.4.2 Extended BN to account for the effect of safety barriers on the bugdet and risk 
considering uncertainties in budget availability 
The tutorial considers an initiating event (i.e., IE), which could result in four consequences 
(i.e., C1, C2, C3, C4) based on the work/failure state of two safety barriers (i.e., SB1 and SB2). 
Therefore, the consequence node is composed by 5 states including Safe State - depending on 
the state of SB1, SB2 and IE. Input data for IE, safety barriers nodes, consequence and budget 
nodes are reported in Table 5. 25 and Table 5. 26. A screenshot of the CPT for the risk node is 
reported in Figure 5. 29, considering a consequence monetary value increasing of one order of 
magnitude with the increasing severity of the accidental consequence, starting with a monetary 
value for C1 of 1000 €. The BN is reported in Figure 5. 30.  
Table 5. 25 Input for BN regarding initiating event node, safety barriers node and budget node. 
IE  Initiating event 
P(IE=Yes) 0.01 
P(IE=No) 0.99 
Install SB_1/Install SB_2 
2 states - Yes/No 4 different nets for 4 combinations 
Safety barriers (binary: work/fail state) 
SB_1 Safety barrier 1 
P(SB_1 = work) 0.8 
P(SB_1 = fail) 0.2 
SB_2 Safety barrier 2 
P(SB_2 = work) 0.9 
P(SB_2 = fail) 0.1 
Budget 
Cost of Safety Barriers 
Cost SB_1 (€) 1000 
Cost SB_2 (€) 4000 
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Table 5. 26 Input for BN regarding the consequence node. 
CPT for consequence node 
IE SB 1 SB 2 Consequence 
Yes Work Work C1 
Yes Work Fail C2 
Yes Fail Work C3 
Yes Fail Fail C4 
No Work Work Safe 
No Work Fail Safe 
No Fail Work Safe 
No Fail Fail Safe 
 
 
Figure 5. 29 A screenshot of theCPT for the node Risk. 
Then, the BN is compiled; the results are reported in Table 5. 30, according to the four possible 
barriers configurations (i.e., both working, none working, only SB1 working, only SB2 
working). 
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Figure 5. 30 BN to account the role of safety barriers on the budget and risk. 
Table 5. 27 Results of Bayesian Network for the four possible configurations, according to safety 
barriers state. 
Risk (cost category- €) Both SB working None of SB 
working 
SB 1 SB 2 
Risk (probability) Risk 
(probability) 
Risk 
(probability) 
Risk 
(probability) 
1000 7.20 E-03 0 0 0 
10000 8.00 E-04 0 8.00 E-03 0 
100000 1.80 E-03 0 0 9.00 E-03 
1000000 2.00 E-04  1.00 E-02 2.00 E-03 1.00 E-03 
0 9.90 E-01 9.90 E-01 0.99 9.99 E-01 
Risk (€) 395.2 10000 2080 1900 
Cost (€) 5000 0 1000 4000 
Then, a modification to the previous net to incorporate uncertainty in the amount of available 
budget for purchasing safety barriers. The following CPTs have not been modified: Initiating 
event, Safety Barriers, Consequence, Risk. On the other hand, the CPT for the node Budget 
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has been modified, introducing the same costs for SB1 and SB2, but adding a probability 
distribution for the budget, according to the values reported in Table 5. 28. 
Table 5. 28 Input for the node Budget in the modified version to account uncertainty on safety barriers 
budget. 
Budget (€) Budget 
(probability 
distribution 1) 
Budget 
(probability 
distribution 2) 
5000 0.3 0.1 
4000 0.5 0.3 
1000 0.2 0.4 
0 0 0.2 
The following assumptions have been taken: 
 In case of budget deficiency, priority will be given to SB 1; 
 In comparison with previous example, the arc that connects Budget and Install SB_1 
nodes (as well as the one between Budget and Install SB_2) has been reverted. Budget 
node here becomes the parent node, whose information influence child nodes Install 
SB_1 and Install SB_2; 
 Due to budget constraints and SB1 priority over SB2, an additional arc has been added 
from the node Install SB_1 to Install SB_2. 
The BN obtained according to these assumptions is available in Figure 5. 31; the results are 
available in Table 5. 29. 
 
Figure 5. 31 Bayesian Network to account the role of uncertainty on budget. 
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Table 5. 29 Results of BN to account the effect of uncertainty on budget. Cost indicates the expected 
value of the budget, according to the probability distribution inserted.  
Risk (cost category- €) Probability distribution 1 Probability distribution 2 
Risk (probability) Risk (probability) 
1000 2.16 E-03 7.20 E-04 
10000 4.64 E-03 4.96 E-03 
100000 1.89 E-03 9.90 E-04 
1000000 1.31 E-03 3.33 E-04 
0 9.90 E-03 9.90 E-01 
Risk (€) 1547.56  3479.32 
Cost (€) (*) 3700 2100 
5.2.2.4.3 Application of Limited Memory Influence Diagrams to support safety related 
decision-making 
The present tutorial, adapted from Reniers and Van Erp (Reniers and Van Erp, 2016) is aimed 
at applying Limited Memory Influence Diagrams to support safety related decision-making. 
Limited Memories influences diagrams are extension of Bayesian Networks with decision 
nodes (i.e., rectangles) and utility nodes (i.e., diamonds). Nodes for random variables in this 
case are recalled "chance nodes"; further information is available in Section 3.3.2.1.3.2. The 
general structure of the net is available in Figure 5. 32.  
 
Figure 5. 32 LIMID for the case study. 
Input data for LIMID are reported in Table 5. 30; the nomenclature is the same one of the 
previous tutorial. Safety barriers (i.e., SB1 and SB2 nodes) are assumed to be binary (i.e., 
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work/fail states). The consequence node accounts 5 states including Safe state, depending on 
the state of SB1, SB2 and IE (i.e., initiating event). Risk and cost are utility nodes, expressed in 
€. 
Table 5. 30 Inputs for the case study. 
IE  Initiating event 
P(IE=Yes) 0.01 
P(IE=No) 0.99 
Install which SB? (Decision node) 
Safety barriers (binary: work/fail state) 
SB_1 Safety barrier 1 
P(SB_1 = work) 0.8 
P(SB_1 = fail) 0.2 
SB_2 Safety barrier 2 
P(SB_2 = work) 0.9 
P(SB_2 = fail) 0.1 
Inputs for Consequence node 
IE SB 1 SB 2 Consequence 
Yes Work Work C1 
Yes Work Fail C2 
Yes Fail Work C3 
Yes Fail Fail C4 
No Work Work Safe 
No Work Fail Safe 
No Fail Work Safe 
No Fail Fail Safe 
Cost 
Cost of Safety Barriers 
Cost SB_1 (€) - Utility 1000 
Cost SB_2 (€) - Utility 4000 
Risk 
C1 (€) – Utility -1000 
C2 (€) – Utility -10000 
C3 (€) – Utility -100000 
C4 (€) – Utility -1000000 
Safe (€) - Utility 0 
 
It shoulde be noted that direct values of Cost and Risk have been applied as utility values in the 
utility tables of Cost and Risk (Table 5. 30).  
In case of constraints, as maximum (cost) available budget for safety barriers and maximum 
tolerable risk of consequences, an appropriate utility function can be selected and applied to 
convert direct values into utility values; according to equation (3. 21). Often the approach based 
on utility function is preferred because it allows a better incorporation the satisfaction of the 
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decision making for each decision alternative. Therefore, the application of utility function is 
carried out, according to the values reported in Table 5. 31, in purpose to apply also this feature 
of LIMID. 
Table 5. 31 Utility values for the case study. 
Utility values corrisponding to the 
values of Cost 
Utility values corrisponding to 
the values of Risk 
Cost (€) Risk (€) Utility 
5000 1000 2.00 
4000 10000 1.95 
1000 100000 1.50 
0 1000000 -3.00 
 0 2.00 
Maximum available budget 
Max Cost (€) 4500 
Maximum tolerable Risk 
Max Risk (€) 200000 
Then, the net has been compiled, with sum propagation – normal tool. In order to evaluate the 
expected utility values for 8 decision alternatives, which are all the alternatives possible in this 
case, the node IE and the node "Install which Safety Barrier?" have be instantiated to a certain 
state, to obtain all possible 8 combinations. The summary of the results has been reported in 
Table 5. 32. 
Table 5. 32 Results of the case study, reporting expected utility values for each decision alternative. 
                                              IE 
 
Install which SB?                                        
Yes No 
Both 2.69 2.89 
SB1 2.74 3.78 
SB2 2.16 3.11 
None -1.00 4.00 
The following comments are outlined from the results of the LIMID case study: 
 In case of occurrence of IE, the decision alternative SB1 has the highest expected utility. 
The optimal decision may be to install SB1 and not SB2. 
 In case of non-occurrence of IE, the decision alternative None has the highest expected 
utility. The optimal decision may be to install none of the safety barriers. 
 The results of the case study depend on the definition of cost and risk constraints, as 
well as on the difinition of the utility function. Therefore, an appropriate choice of 
utility function, available budget and tolerable risk is required. 
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Several advantages of applying Bayesian Networks/LIMID within operational safety emerge: 
 BNs/LIMID are useful tools for describing past situations, even better for predicting 
the future, as they are able to revise probability distribution (both for cause and effect 
nodes), after entering new a observation or evidence. If no evidence is inserted, the 
prior distribution is the obtained result. 
 BNs/LIMID allow the integration of different types of evidencies: both objective data 
and subjective opionions can be inserted.  
 They give the possibility to carry out a sensitivity analysis to quantify uncertainties. 
 They provide an effective visualization and communication of the results. 
5.2.3 Discussion on the lessons learnt from existing applications 
Existing applications make clear the adavantages of Bayesian techniques in safety barriers 
performance assessment within major accident prevention in the chemical and process 
industry.  
The application of a relevant dynamic technique, DRA by Bayesian analysis, to risk assessment, 
with particular reference to two significant existing case studies, inherent to process systems, 
was carried out. The first application (i.e., case study A) was a study-case regarding a process 
tank equipped with safety systems, while the second one, more complex, represented real-
happened major accident. The mentioned applications proved the effectiveness of Bayesian 
analysis method, both in everyday plant operation and in the prevention of major accidents. 
However, the second application (i.e., case study B), which is indeed more complex, made clear 
the necessity to perform Bayesian analysis by means of Bayesian Networks, using a specific 
software. 
Tutorials and applications of Bayesian Networks, carried out by a specific software (i.e., Hugin 
version 8. 1) proved that BNs are able to give a flexible an updated risk picture. Two case studies 
investigated how to map conventional risk assessment techniques into Bayesian Networks (i.e., 
case study C and D). An additional application highlights the possible usefulness of BNs within 
safety decision-making, to support prevention investments. 
However, original applications should deal, in a BN environment, with the inclusion of safety 
barriers performance within cascading events prevention, with particular mention to domino 
accident analysis, as no applications currently exist.  
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5.3 ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS OF BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
TO DYNAMIC SAFETY MEASURES PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT IN THE PREVENTION OF MAJOR 
ACCIDENTS AND CASCADING EVENTS 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This Section illustrates several original case studies, aimed at applying Bayesian Networks to 
quantitative assessment of safety measures performance in the context of major accidents and 
cascading events prevention, within the chemical and process industry domain.  
In Section 5.3.2, a preliminary application has been focused on the implementation of Bayesian 
Networks to safety measures performance assessment, starting from an Event-Tree based 
approach. The illustrative case study considers a major accident (i.e., fire triggered by an 
external hazard factor), whose occurrence can be prevented by the action of pertinent technical 
active safety measures.  
In Section 5.3.3, the Bayesian Network application is extended to a realistic case study 
regarding the prevention of fire escalation, including active, passive and procedural safety 
measures performance. In both the applications, the Bayesian approach is compared with a 
conventional Event-Tree based one. The conversion of the Event-Tree, key element of the 
conventional approach to safety barriers performance assessment, into a Bayesian Network 
has been performed, with the aim to test the ability of Bayesian Networks in representing 
possible events sequences, according to the mapping procedure described in Section 
3.3.2.1.3.3. In the Bayesian approach, safety measures performance has been assessed by 
means of specific gates, depending on barriers states and classification, described in Section 
3.3.2.1.2. An adequate number of final states has been considered. Indeed, the potentialities of 
the Bayesian approach in revising probabilities have been explored by means of two different 
techniques: probability updating and probability adapting. The results of the case study will 
highlight the advantages of Bayesian Networks application to safety measures performance 
assessment, proving that its application may eventually will turn into a more flexible and 
realistic analysis of major accidental scenarios, in comparison with conventional techniques. 
Therefore, Bayesian Networks have been applied to the prevention of cascading events, for 
instance to domino accident analysis, in purpose to assess the effect of safety measures 
inclusion in the modelling phase. Two case studies, the first regarding a simplified tank farm 
and the second regarding a realistic tank farm, have been carried out, in Section 5.3.4 and 
Section 5.3.5 respectively.  
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The case study presented in Section 5.3.4 deals with a simplified tank farm, composed by three 
atmospheric storage tanks, with heat radiation as escalation vector. The application is 
developed in three consequential steps: in modelling step (1), safety measures are not 
accounted, in modelling steps (2) and (3) safety measures on each tank, pertinent for the 
reference typology of installation, are considered. In step (2), only availability is considered, 
while in the latter step, specific gates, accounting both availability and effectiveness, are 
applied to describe safety barriers performance, according to the description of Section 
3.3.2.1.2.  
The case study presented in Section 5.3.5 deals with a realistic tank farm, composed by eight 
tanks, with two initiating events, synergistic effects and three domino levels to be inserted in 
the analysis. The application is developed in two steps: in the first step, safety measures on 
each tank are not considered; in the second step, safety measures are introduced in Bayesian 
Networks modelling, by means of specific gates. The effect of safety measures introduction in 
Bayesian Networks modelling is evaluated and discussed in both the case studies, in terms of 
domino escalation probabilities.  
The general aim of the original case studies presented in this section is to demonstrate the 
feasibility and eventual advantages of Dynamic Risk Assessment application, by means of 
Bayesian Networks, to cascading events modelling and prevention, for instance domino 
accidents, including safety measures performance. 
5.3.2 Application of Bayesian Networks to dynamic safety measures 
performance assessment for fire prevention in a major accident 
The present illustrative case study is aimed at applying Bayesian Networks to quantitative 
assessment of safety measures performance in the context of major accidents triggered by an 
external hazard factor, within the process industry domain.  
5.3.2.1 Definition of the case study 
The illustrative case study considers a major accident (i.e., fire) on a storage tank, belonging to 
a tank farm, whose occurrence can be prevented or mitigated by the action of two pertinent 
technical active safety barriers. The inputs for the case study are adapted from a previous 
Event-Tree based application (Necci et al., 2014), in purpose to compare the results obtained 
from the conventional and Bayesian Network approaches. The software applied for case study 
development is Hugin Expert software, version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016).  According to the procedure 
illustrated in Section 3.5.1.1, the application of quantitative safety barriers performance 
assessment by means of Bayesian Networks starts with the identification of the accidental 
scenario; the top event is a lightning strike on an atmospheric storage tank, containing 
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flammable liquid. The top event can determine either direct perforation or not, leading in the 
latter case to the action of the two active safety barriers; this intermediate event is indicated as 
direct damage throughout the case study. Then, the two technical active safety barriers, 
pertinent for the reference installation, which are a rim seal fire extinguisher and a fixed foam 
system, are identified.  
5.3.2.2 Conversion of the Event-Tree for the case study into a Bayesian 
Network 
The Event-Tree, which is the starting point for the application, adapted from Necci et al. (Necci 
et al., 2014) has been reported in Figure 5. 33, Part A. The conversion of the Event-tree has 
been performed, according to the mapping procedure reported in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.2 and 
maintaining the same inputs, which are reported in Table 5. 33. The assessment of safety 
barriers performance by means of Bayesian Networks is carried out in two sequential steps: 
1) Only availability, expressed by the probability of failure on demand (i.e., PFD), is 
accounted to represent safety barriers performance. Two Fault-Trees developed in the 
application by Necci et al. (Necci et al., 2014), reported in Figure 5. 33, Part B and C, to 
calculate the probability of failure on demand for both the barriers are directly 
converted and inserted into the Bayesian Network, according to the mapping 
procedure, reported in Section 3.3.2.1.3.3.2. Indeed, the availability (i.e., probability of 
failure on demand) has been calculated for each barrier as the output of several 
pertinent subsystems. This simplified approach to safety barriers performance 
assessment allows comparing directly the results obtained from Event-Tree and 
Bayesian Networks applications. 
2) The performance of safety barriers has been accounted by means of a specific gate (i.e., 
type B), suitable for active safety measures and described in Section 3.3.2.1.2, which 
combines availability and effectiveness. The inputs regarding availability values are the 
same ones applied in the previous modelling step. Indeed, for effectiveness a reference 
value of 0.95  (Landucci et al., 2015a) has been considered for both the barriers. This 
approach allows avoiding over conservative assumptions regarding safety barriers 
performance, according to the concepts discussed in Section 3.3.2.1.2. 
In the conversion process from Event-Tree to Bayesian Network attention should be posed to 
the consequence node, that is a multi-state node, accounting all the possible outcomes, 
according to an AND-gate. According to this configuration, there are six possible consequences 
states; consequences state set of the node range from 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1, to 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_5, plus state Safe, which 
should be added in the conversion process. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1 indicates release and pool fire, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_2 
indicates rim seal fire extinguishment, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_3 corresponds to full surface fire extinguishment, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_4 represents full surface fire, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_5 indicates no consequences. However, the most 
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severe consequences are 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_4. Therefore, their sum, which a useful indicator of 
major accidents occurrence probability, has been considered as the final output of the BN, 
named for instance 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠. Indeed, by connecting node 𝑇𝑜𝑝_𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 (i.e., indicating the top 
event) to 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, another state, namely 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 state is added to the state set; the 
mentioned node is connected also to the 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 node, indicating the possible direct 
perforation of the tank, which in turn is connected, according to the mapping procedure, to the 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 node. 
 
 
Figure 5. 33 Starting point for the conversion of a conventional application, adapted from Necci et al. 
(Necci et al., 2014), into a Bayesian Network. A) Event-Tree to be converted. The Top Event is the 
occurrence of a lightning strike on a storage tank, which can be prevented by two technical barriers: a 
fixed foam system and a rim seal fire extinguisher. Their performance is calculated in the conventional 
application by means of Fault-Trees represented in B) for a rim seal fire extinguisher and in C) for a 
fixed foam system. 
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To show the dependency among the safety barriers and the top event, causal arcs are also 
drawn from 𝑅𝑖𝑚_𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒_𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟 and 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑜𝑎𝑚_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 to the node 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 
because the failure/success of each safety barrier results in different consequences (i.e., 
different states of the 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 node). 
The Bayesian Networks obtained from the conversion of the corresponding Event-Tree, 
according to modelling steps 1) and 2) are reported in Figure 5. 34 and Figure 5. 35. 
 
Figure 5. 34 Bayesian Network obtained from Event-Tree conversion according to modelling step 1), 
regarding the prevention of a major accident (i.e., fire) by means of two pertinent safety barriers: rim 
seal fire extinguisher and fixed foam system. The performance of safety barriers is represented only by 
their availabilities. 
 
Figure 5. 35 Bayesian Network obtained from Event-Tree conversion, according to modelling step 2), 
regarding the prevention of a major accident (i.e., fire) by means of two pertinent safety barriers: rim 
seal fire extinguisher and fixed foam system. The performance of active safety barriers is represented by 
a specific gate accounting both availability and effectiveness. 
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An overview on the data applied in the case study, according to modelling steps 1) and 2) has 
been reported in Table 5. 33. 
Table 5. 33 Data for the application of Bayesian Networks to the case study, from Event-Tree 
conversion. 
Symbol  Description Probability Type 
Data for modelling steps 1) and 2) 
Top_Event Top event occurrence; lightning on storage 
tank 
4.85E-02 Input 
Damage Intermediate event occurrence; probability of  
direct perforation 
3.38E-04 Input 
Safety barrier: Rim seal fire extinguisher 
Av_Rim_seal_extinguis
her (in step 2)/ 
Rim_seal_extinguisher 
(in step 1) 
Probability of failure on demand (PFD) 
for  
rim seal fire extinguisher  
2.38E-02 Output; OR-gate of 4 
subsystems listed 
below 
Actuation Actuation system (both automatic and 
manual) fails on demand 
2.21E-02 Input 
Detection Detection system fails on demand 8.96E-04 Input 
Foam_module Foam module failure/leak 5.84E-04 Input 
Distribution Distribution system fails on demand 2.81E-04 Input 
Safety barrier: Fixed foam system 
Water_supply Water supply fails on demand 8.83E-04 Input 
Foam_supply Foam supply system fails on demand 1.00E-04 Input 
Foam_formation Foam formation devices fail on demand 5.14E-03 Intermediate output; OR-
gate of two subsystems 
(i.e., proportioning system 
and foam maker) 
Av_Fixed_foam_system 
(in step 2)/ 
Fixed_foam_system (in 
step 1) 
Probability of failure on demand (PFD) 
for  
fixed foam system 
7.01E-03 Intermediate output; 
OR-gate of 8 
subsystems listed 
below 
Proportioning_system Proportioning system fails on demand 1.16E-03 Input 
Foam_maker Foam maker fails on demand 3.98E-03 Input 
Valves_actuation Actuation system (valves on foam and water 
lines) fails on demand 
6.24E-04 Input 
Undetected_leak Undetected major leak 1.37E-07 Input 
DetectionFF Fixed foam detection system fails on demand 8.96E-06 Input 
Logic_solver Logic solver fails on demand 1.76E-04 Input 
Pump_actuation Pumps actuation system fails on demand 9.57E-05 Input 
Data for modelling step 2) 
Eff_rim_seal Effectiveness of rim seal fire extinguisher 0.95 Input 
Eff_fixed foam_system Effectiveness of fixed foam system 0.95 Input 
Rim_seal_extinguisher Performance of rim seal fire extinguisher by 
combined availability and effectiveness 
7.26E-02 Intermediate output; gate 
type B  
Fixed_foam_system Performance of fixed foam system by 
combined availability and effectiveness 
5.67E-02 Intermediate output; gate 
type B 
Bayesian analysis has been performed by assigning in modelling step 1) the same probabilities 
of the conventional Event-Tree based application as the prior probabilities. The comparison 
among probabilities obtained applying Event-Tree based approach and the ones obtained by 
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Bayesian Network analysis have been reported in Table 5. 34. Indeed, the application of 
modelling step 1) to safety barriers performance assessment confirmed the equal ability of 
Bayesian Networks in the analysis of the specific accidental scenario, in comparison with the 
conventional Event-Tree based approach, as the results completely overlap. The results of 
Bayesian Network analysis after the application of a logic gate (type B) specific for active safety 
barriers, used in modelling step 2), are reported in Table 5. 34. This approach allows avoiding 
over conservative assumptions regarding safety barriers performance, according to the 
concepts discussed in Section 3.3.2.1.2. Indeed, introducing a more detailed approach to safety 
barriers performance in Bayesian Network analysis turns into an increase of fire probability of 
one order of magnitude. From a general perspective, the conversion process proved that the 
Event-Tree and Bayesian Network are equally able to analyse the accident scenario. Moreover, 
BN superiority can be evidenced by the ability to incorporate also the converted fault trees in 
the same net, to calculate PFD of the safety barriers. 
Table 5. 34 Results of Bayesian Network application to the case study, according to modelling steps 1) 
and 2). The results of Bayesian Network analysis according to modelling step 1) completely overlap with 
Event-Tree analysis. 
Symbol  Description Probability 
Event-Tree/  
BN Modelling 
step 1) 
BN Modelling 
step 2) 
Fixed_foam_system Probability of fixed foam system failure  7.01E-03 5.67E-02 
Rim_seal_fire_extinguisher Probability of rim seal fire extinguisher 
failure 
2.38E-02 7.26E-02 
Consequence  
Cons_1  
Cons_2  
Cons_3  
Cons_4 
Cons_5 
Safe 
Consequence multistate node 
Release and pool fire 
Rim seal fire extinguishment 
Full surface fire extinguishment 
Full surface fire  
No consequences 
Safe 
 
1.64E-05 
3.32E-04 
1.14E-03 
8.08E-06 
4.70E-02 
9.52E-01 
 
1.64E-05 
2.55E-03 
3.32E-03 
1.99E-04 
4.24E-02 
9.52E-01 
Results Fire probability  2.45E-05 2.16E-04 
5.3.2.3 Results of dynamic safety measures performance assessment with 
Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Network analysis has been performed by applying two probability-revising 
techniques (i.e., probability adapting and probability updating – see Section 3.3.2.1.3.2) with 
Hugin software version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016), to the net obtained in modelling step 2).  
The sequences of events leading to the two most critical final states (i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1  and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_4), 
named also Most Probable Explanations, have been determined by applying probability 
updating, according to equation (3.20); the calculations are reported in Figure 5. 36, which 
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illustrates also the sequences. For instance, the most probable sequence leading to 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1, 
with 84.4% probability, consists in the direct perforation of the tank, leading to release and 
pool fire. On the other hand, the most probable sequence leading to 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_4, with 58.8% 
probability, is given by the availability and ineffectiveness of both safety barriers, leading to 
their failure and to full surface fire. Therefore, the importance of probability updating for safety 
barriers performance assessment lies in its ability to identify critical sequence of events and 
allocate safety barriers consequently.  
 
Figure 5. 36 Bayesian Updating results for the case study, aimed at calculating the most probable 
sequence of events leading to the most severe consequences (i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1  and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_4). 
Then, Bayesian adapting, which calculates the posterior probability of a generic event 𝑥𝑖 given 
another event 𝑄 has occurred 𝑛 times, is applied. It can be expressed in statistical terms as 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑄 = 𝑛). Probability adapting requires as inputs prior experience data (in the form of past 
accident data collected during a certain time span – ASP, i.e. Accident Sequence Precursors) 
to adapt conditional probability distributions. In probability adapting application to the 
illustrative case study, fictional operational data over five years of experience, reported in Table 
5. 35, have been applied to revise top event, intermediate event, safety barriers and 
consequences probabilities over time. Year 0 represents the baseline Bayesian Network 
analysis, with no additional information added to revise probabilities. For example, at the end 
of the third year, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_3 has cumulatively occurred 3 times, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_5 has occurred 5 times; 
probability adapting can be performed by inserting 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_5 ) and 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_3), with 𝑥𝑖 generic event. Bayesian adapting has been performed 
by applying “adaptation panel” from software Hugin software, version 8.1. 
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Table 5. 35 Accident Sequence Precursors (ASP) over five years of operational experience for 
probability adapting application. 
Consequence Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Cons_1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Cons_2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Cons_3 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Cons_4 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Cons_5 0 2 2 1 1 1 
The results of Bayesian adapting regarding Top event occurrence probability highlight an 
increasing trend during the time interval (Figure 5. 37). The trend regarding Top event can be 
explained considering that the accidents top event has always occurred a number of times 
greater than or equal to the maximum failure numbers of each safety barrier and all the 
consequences applied as ASP denotes an occurrence of the top event. Indeed, the occurrence 
probability of Top event increases rapidly over the time span of the analysis. With respect to 
damage probability, the trend is different, as a consequence of ASP applied in the analysis: its 
occurrence probability does not vary significantly, with the exception of Year 5, in which a 
significant increase is recorded, due to a precursor data regarding 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1, which propagates 
backwards thorough the network. Therefore, the insertion of ASP led to an increase after 5 
years of the top event and intermediate event probabilities of one and two order of magnitude 
respectively. 
Concerning both the safety barriers, their PFDs, as well as the failure probabilities of their 
subsystems, have been revised over time by means of Bayesian adapting technique, showing a 
general increasing trend, which is visible in Figure 5. 38. Furthermore, their effectiveness 
values have changed consequently over time, with a general decreasing trend. Indeed, the 
application of a specific gate for the assessment of safety barriers performances hindered from 
performances overestimation, in comparison with the standard approach based solely on 
PFDs. The results regarding the failure probabilities for both safety barriers, obtained by 
combining PFDs and effectiveness, have been reported in Figure 5. 38. They show a global 
increase of the failure probability over time, which corresponds to a performance decrease over 
time, for both the rim seal fire extinguisher and the fixed foam system. 
Consequences probabilities show a general increasing trend over time, with the obvious 
exception of “Safe” state, which tend to decrease over time, due to ASPs application. The results 
of probability adapting referred to all consequences, with a focus on the most critical ones (i.e., 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_1   and _4 ), have been reported in Figure 5. 39. The results show that the major accident 
probability (i.e., Results probability), either by release and pool fire or by full surface fire, 
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increases after five years of more than two order of magnitude, as displayed by Figure 5. 39 
revealing indeed a significant change in the relative percentages of the two critical final states.  
 
Figure 5. 37 Bayesian adapting results regarding A) Top event occurrence probability B) Direct damage 
occurrence probability, over five years of operational experience. 
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Figure 5. 38 Results of safety barriers performance assessment by means of Bayesian Networks, with 
Bayesian adapting application. For both the safety barriers: A) PFDs; B) Effectiveness; C) Overall 
performance combining PFD and effectiveness with a specific gate for active safety measures.
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Figure 5. 39 Consequences probabilities over time, after the application of Bayesian adapting, over five years of operational experience:  
A) All accidental states for the case study; B) Major accident.
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5.3.2.4 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The current contribution has been aimed at comparing the application of a conventional Event-
Tree based approach with a Bayesian Network based approach to safety barriers performance 
assessment in the context of major accidents prevention and mitigation.  
The illustrative case study considered a major accident (i.e., a fire triggered by lightning as 
representative external hazard factor) that can be prevented by pertinent technical safety 
barriers. The advantages of Bayesian Networks application, in terms of enhanced flexibility 
and dynamic system representation, have been highlighted by the application. The case study 
highlighted Bayesian Networks ability to represent an accidental scenario, by the conversion 
of a previous Event-Tree based application. Indeed, the application of a specific gate for the 
assessment of active safety barriers performance, accounting both availability and 
effectiveness, proved to be useful in purpose to avoid performance overestimation and to 
provide a more accurate risk picture.  
The case study is the first application of this specific gate, named gate type B, in a Bayesian 
framework, and indeed it provides a benchmark for further implementations. Nevertheless, 
two specific gates (type A and C) stills need to be tested on a more complete case study 
performed with Bayesian Networks, including also passive and procedural safety barriers, 
besides active ones.  
Within the current case study, Bayesian analysis, by means of probability updating and 
probability adapting, was performed, leading to the revision of probabilities over time. In 
probability updating, the information about a node instantiated to one of its states (i.e., a 
certain event that had happened) is used as evidence; its main application is the determination 
of the most critical sequence of events, in order to revise the safety system consequently. The 
results demonstrate that Bayesian probability adapting can be applied as a predictive tool in 
purpose to assess the adequacy of a safety system. Therefore, probability adapting is a useful 
technique to replace generic prior probabilities (i.e., generic reliability data) with more case-
specific posterior probabilities, resulting in a dynamic assessment of safety barriers 
performance and a more reliable prediction of occurrence likelihood for each final event. 
Eventually, the results of the case study proved the applicability of Bayesian Networks in the 
context of quantitative safety barriers performance assessment with respect to major accidents 
triggered by external hazard factors in chemical facilities. However, the present case study 
provides just a preliminary illustrative application; further applications should deal with 
cascading events triggered by external hazard factors, considering realistic plant layouts and 
the integration of different technical and organizational safety barriers. 
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5.3.3 Application of Bayesian Networks to dynamic safety measures 
performance assessment in the prevention of a domino accident 
triggered by fire 
The present case study is aimed at applying a Bayesian Networks based approach to safety 
barriers performance assessment in the prevention of fire escalation, starting from a 
conventional Event-tree based one, adapted from Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a), and 
at applying both of them to the same case study, in purpose to compare the so-obtained results. 
5.3.3.1 Definition of the case study 
The case study deals with the dynamic assessment of safety barriers performance by means of 
Bayesian Networks with respect to the prevention of a possible domino accident triggered by 
fire in a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (i.e., LPG) storage facility. 
The inputs for the case study are adapted from a previous Event-Tree based application 
(Landucci et al., 2015a), in purpose to compare the results obtained from the conventional and 
Bayesian approaches. The software applied for case study development is Hugin Expert 
software, version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). According to the procedure illustrated in Section 3.3.2.1.2 
and in Section 3.5.1.1, the application of quantitative safety barriers performance assessment 
starts with the identification of the accidental scenario: the case study considers a pool fire of 
ethanol (from T1 tank) causing the top event, which is fire impingement on a second tank, 
named for instance T2, containing LPG. Fire escalation can be prevented by the action of four 
technical and organizational safety barriers, pertinent for the reference installation, which is, 
according to the criteria presented in Section 3.3.2.1.2, RI Type 2 with above ground 
pressurized vessel. The layout of the installation to be applied in the case study is available in 
Figure 5. 40. The barriers to be considered in the application are indeed a water deluge system 
(i.e., WDS), which is an active barrier, a pressure safety valve (i.e., PSV) and a passive fire 
protection coating (i.e., PFP), belonging both to the class of passive barriers, and emergency 
team intervention (i.e., Em_Team), which is a procedural/organizational barrier.  
 
Figure 5. 40 Layout of the reference installation to be applied in the case study (Landucci et al., 2015a). 
Both in the starting application and its Bayesian conversion, safety barriers performance is 
carried out by means of specific gates, depending on barriers states and classification, and 
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accounting both availability and effectiveness. In detail, for water deluge system, pressure 
safety valve and passive fire protection performance is described by a gate Type A; emergency 
tem intervention is represented by a gate Type C. 
The final accidental states to be considered in the case study are 16 (i.e., indicated as FE1.1, 
FE1.2, FE.2.1, etc.), grouped into three main severity classes: no domino, mitigated domino 
(partial/delayed fire escalation) and unmitigated domino.  
5.3.3.2 Application of an Event-Tree based approach to the case study 
The starting point for the case study is the Event-Tree reported in Figure 5. 41. The Event-Tree 
based application, provided by Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a), was reproduced, in 
purpose to provide a starting point for the implementation of the corresponding Bayesian 
Network and to compare the results. 
 
Figure 5. 41 Event-Tree for escalation assessment (Landucci et al., 2015a), which is the starting point 
for the application a Bayesian Network. The case study considers the probabilistic assessment of a 
domino accident resulting from pool fire impingement on a storage tank, considering the action of 
relevant safety barriers. The upper branch always indicates the failure state. 
Both the approaches require the calculation of associated escalation probability values (𝑃𝑑), 
according to the procedure described in Section 3.3.2.1.2, depending on safety barriers states. 
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Concerning the two branches defined by water deluge system in Figure 5. 41 (i.e., the first 
branch on the left, starting from the top event), the heat load (𝑄𝑊𝐷𝑆) is calculated according to 
equation (3.8), considering a full heat load value (𝑄𝐻𝐿) of 50
kW
m2
 which can be reduced, 
according to an intensity reduction factor 𝜑 of 0.5 when the safety barrier is available; else way 
𝜑 is equal to 1. Indeed, WDS is charaterized by a gate type A (Figure 3. 6).  
For all barriers represented by a gate type A, OUT 1 represents failure state, with barrier 
unavailability expressed by PFD; OUT 2 represent barrier success, corresponding to 
availability of the barrier, but its effectiveness η should be considered. The PFD of WDS was 
assumed 4.33 ∙ 10−2, according to the Fault-Tree analysis provided by Landucci et al. (Landucci 
et al., 2015a); the effectiveness value was assumed unitary. The values of heat loads for each 
accidental final states are reported in Table 5. 38 (i.e., third column from the left).  
Concerning the four branches defined by pressure safety valve in Figure 5. 41, a gate type A has 
been considered: the availability value is 1.00 ∙ 10−2, according to literature data (Landucci et 
al., 2015a) and the effectiveness value was assumed unitary. 
Concerning the eight branches defined by fireproofing coating in Figure 5. 41, a gate type A 
was applied with a PFD value of 1.00 ∙ 10−3 and 𝜂 = 1. The calculation of the time to failure 
(𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑃) was carried out according to equation (3.10), according to the following inputs:  
 𝑡𝑡𝑓 is calculated according to equation (3.9), using the coefficients listed in Table 5. 36; 
 𝑄𝐻𝐿 is substituted by 𝑄𝑊𝐷𝑆 if WDS available; 
 In equation (3.10), if PFP is available and effective, with 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝐶 = 70 𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Table 5. 36 Coefficients for time to failure calculation to be applied in the case study. 
V (m
3
) Vessel description 
T1 (first tank) 229 Ethanol, atmospheric tank 
T2 (second tank) 25 LPG (propane), pressurized vessel 
Coefficients for ttf calculation 
Item f e d c 
Atmospheric vessel 9.877 -1.13 1 -2.667E-05 
Pressurized vessel 0 -0.95 0.032 8.845 
Indeed, according to the Event-Tree presented in Figure 5. 41, branches FE1.1, FE1.2, FE3.1, 
FE3.2, FE5.1., FE5.2, FE7.1., FE7.2 indicate fireproofing failure; time to failure values for each 
final state have been reported in Table 5. 38 (i.e., fourth column from the left). 
Concerning the sixteen branches defined by emergency team intervention in Figure 5. 41, a 
gate type C has been applied; in the present application the gate has two states. OUT 1 
represents the upper branch of the gate, corresponding to unavailability of the emergency 
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teeam, expressed by PFD, whose value is 1.00 ∙ 10−1. The lower branch of the gate is either in 
state OUT 2 or in state OUT 3; OUT 2 and OUT 3 are mutually exclusive states. According to 
OUT 2, emergency response is activated but uneffective (𝜂 = 0), as the time for final mitigation 
(i.e., maximum time required by the external emergency team to provide and keep constant 
the amount of water for fire suppression and cooling action, indicated with 𝑡𝑓𝑚) overcomes 
the time to failure. According to OUT 3, the emergency response is activated, mitigation action 
is successful and therefore fire escalation is prevented (𝜂 = 1).  
The calculation of 𝑡𝑓𝑚 is carried according to the data reported in Table 5. 37, applying the 
concepts described in Section 3.3.2.1.2. The values of the difference between time to failure 
and 𝑡𝑓𝑚 for each final accidental state are reported in Table 5. 38 (i.e., fifth column from the 
left). 
Table 5. 37 Calculation of the time for final mitigation. 
Calculation of time for final mitigation (tfm) 
Description Value Unit 
Time to alert external emergency team 5 minutes 
Overall response time 12 minutes 
Time for equipment deployement 7 minutes 
Other set up operations 8 minutes 
tfm 32 minutes 
1920 s 
Then, the calculation of associated escalation probability (𝑃𝑑) is carried out for each final 
accidental state, according to the following steps: 
1) Calculation of Probit variable (𝑌), according to equation (3.2), using coefficients 𝑎 =
9.261 and 𝑏 = −1.85; 
2) Calculation of normalized Probit variable (𝑌 − 5); 
3) Application of standard cumulative distribution to get 𝑃𝑑 values, according to equation 
(3.4). 
Probit values and associated escalation probability values are reported in Table 5. 38 (i.e., sixth 
and seventh column from the left respectively). Indeed, consequences probabilities for each 
final state are calculated and reported in Table 5. 38 (i.e, second to last column).  
Then, the root frequency of the top event, indicating fire impingement on T2, 𝑓𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1.0 ∙
10−5 𝑒𝑣 𝑦⁄  is introduced to calculate final events frequencies, according to the conventional 
Event-Tree approach, by applying equation (3. 12); the results are reported in the last column 
of Table 5. 38. Then, final events consequences probabilities and frequencies are grouped into 
the three mentioned severity categories: no domino, mitigated domino and unmitigated 
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domino, whose values are calculated by summing all the contribution to each category and 
reported in Table 5. 39. 
It should be noted that without considering safety barriers, the probability of escalation for the 
case study is 0.715, therefore unmitigated domino escalation frequency value is 7.15 ∙ 10−6𝑦−1, 
significantly higher than the value reported by Purple Book (TNO, 2005a) for a catastrophic 
loss of containment (i.e., 5.00 ∙ 10−7𝑦−1).  
Therefore, the introduction of safety barriers in the modelling phase of fire escalation avoid 
unrealistic over estimation of  a possible domino event occurrence. This observation makes the 
use of accurate tools for the evaluation of safety barriers performances even more important 
within risk assessment.
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Table 5. 38 Results of Event-Tree application for the case study, which is the starting point for the conversion into a Bayesian Network approach. 
Final 
event 
ID 
Type of 
resulting 
scenario 
Heat Load 
(kW/m
2
) 
ttf (s) 
- total 
ttf-tsm 
(s) 
Escalation 
Probit (Y) 
Associated 
Escalation 
Probability 
(Pd) 
Barriers states 
Consequence 
probability 
Event-Tree 
results 
 
Final event 
probabilities 
 
WDS PSV 
 
PFP 
EM- 
TEAM 
FE1.1 Unmitigated 
domino 
50 442 
-1478 
5.568 7.15E-01 
OUT1 OUT1 OUT1 OUT1 4.33E-08 3.10E-08 
FE1.2 Mitigated domino 50 442 
-1478 
5.568 7.15E-01 
OUT1 OUT1 OUT1 OUT2 3.90E-07 2.79E-07 
FE2.1 No domino 50 4642 
2722 
1.216 7.72E-05 
OUT1 OUT1 OUT2 OUT1 4.33E-05 3.34E-09 
FE2.2 No domino 50 4642 
2722 
1.216 7.72E-05 
OUT1 OUT1 OUT2 OUT3 3.89E-04 3.01E-08 
FE3.1 Mitigated domino 50 442 
-1478 
5.568 7.15E-01 
OUT1 OUT2 OUT1 OUT1 4.29E-06 3.07E-06 
FE3.2 Mitigated domino 50 442 
-1478 
5.568 7.15E-01 
OUT1 OUT2 OUT1 OUT2 3.86E-05 2.76E-05 
FE4.1 No domino 50 4642 
2722 
1.216 7.72E-05 
OUT1 OUT2 OUT2 OUT1 4.28E-03 3.31E-07 
FE4.2 No domino 50 4642 
2722 
1.216 7.72E-05 
OUT1 OUT2 OUT2 OUT3 3.85E-02 2.98E-06 
FE5.1 Mitigated domino 25 853 
-1067 
4.350 2.58E-01 
OUT2 OUT1 OUT1 OUT1 9.57E-07 2.47E-07 
FE5.2 Mitigated domino 25 853 
-1067 
4.350 2.58E-01 
OUT2 OUT1 OUT1 OUT2 8.61E-06 2.22E-06 
FE6.1 No domino 25 5053 
3133 
1.059 4.06E-05 
OUT2 OUT1 OUT2 OUT1 9.56E-04 3.88E-08 
FE6.2 No domino 25 5053 
3133 
1.059 4.06E-05 
OUT2 OUT1 OUT2 OUT3 8.60E-03 3.49E-07 
FE7.1 Mitigated domino 25 853 
-1067 
4.350 2.58E-01 
OUT2 OUT2 OUT1 OUT1 9.47E-05 2.44E-05 
FE7.2 Mitigated domino 25 853 
-1067 
4.350 2.58E-01 
OUT2 OUT2 OUT1 OUT2 8.52E-04 2.20E-04 
FE8.1 No domino 25 5053 
3133 
1.059 4.06E-05 
OUT2 OUT2 OUT2 OUT1 9.46E-02 3.84E-06 
FE8.2 No domino 25 5053 
3133 
1.059 4.06E-05 
OUT2 OUT2 OUT2 OUT3 8.52E-01 3.46E-05 
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Table 5. 39 Final events probabilities and frequencies, according to the Event-Tree methodology and 
grouped into three main classes, depending on scenario severity. 
Type of resulting scenario Final event evaluated 
probability 
Final event frequency (y
-1
) 
Unmitigated domino 3.10E-08 3.10E-13 
Mitigated domino 2.78E-04 2.78E-09 
No domino 4.21E-05 4.21E-10 
5.3.3.3 Conversion of the Event-Tree into a Bayesian Network for the case study 
The application of an Event-Tree based approach to safety barriers performance assessment 
proved its limitations in terms of flexibility and ability to insert additional information. 
Therefore, the conversion of the Event-Tree for escalation assessment into a Bayesian Network 
was carried out for the case study, using Hugin software version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016). The 
mapping procedure to be applied is described in Section 3.3.2.1.2; the same inputs listed in 
Section 5.3.3.2 were maintained in BN application.  
Regarding the four technical and organizational safety barriers in place (i.e., water deluge 
system, pressure safety valve, fireproofing coating and emergency team intervention) they are 
represented by four safety nodes, whose performances have been evaluated by means of the 
same specific gates, accounting both availability and effectiveness that have been applied in 
the Event-Tree based approach. The nomenclature has been kept coherent with the Event-Tree 
application. The implementation of the logic gates Type A and Type C in a Bayesian Network 
environment has been realized, implementing the equations reported in Figure 3. 6. The inputs 
for the safety nodes, regarding availability and effectiveness values, are the same ones applied 
in the previous modelling step and reported in Section 5.3.3.2; these are called prior 
probabilities throughout the development of the Bayesian approach to the case study.  
The Top Event node (𝑇𝐸_𝑃𝐹𝑇2), indicating fire impingement on LPG tank T2, was defined, 
considering a probability unitary, in purpose to keep the focus of Bayesian analysis on safety 
barriers and consequences. 
In the conversion process from Event-Tree to Bayesian Network attention should be posed to 
the consequence node, named 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏, which is a multi-state node, accounting all the 
possible outcomes, according to an AND-gate, implemented manually, whose screenshot is 
reported in Figure 5. 42. According to this configuration, the consequence node include sixteen 
possible accidental consequences states, corresponding to the Event-Tree application. Indeed, 
by connecting the top event to the consequence node, another state, namely Safe state is added 
to the consequence state set. As in the Event-Tree based approach, final states have been 
grouped analogously into three classes: unmitigated domino, delayed/mitigated domino and 
no domino.  
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Figure 5. 42 Conditional Probability Table for the consequence node of BN, including 16 final 
accidental states plus state Safe. 
An overview on the inputs and nomenclature applied in the development of Bayesian approach 
to the case study is available in Table 5. 40. The Bayesian Network application, derived from 
the conversion of the corresponding Event-Tree, is displayed in Figure 5. 43. The results 
obtained by running the net with the sum propagation tool of Hugin software, completely 
overlaps with the results previously obtained with the Event-Tree based approach, as visible 
from Table 5. 41, as inputs data and assumptions are the same ones and no application of 
Bayesian inference has been carried out at this stage of the case study.  
This confirms that Event-Tree and Bayesian Network are equally able to perform escalation 
assessment referred to a possible cascading event. 
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Table 5. 40 Data for the application of Bayesian Networks to the case study, from Event-Tree 
conversion. 
Symbol  Description Probability Type 
TE_PFT2 Top event occurrence; fire impingement on LPG 
tank T2 
1 Input. In the BN 
𝑃(𝑇𝐸_𝑃𝐹𝑇2 ) = 1 to focus 
on safety barriers. 
Safety barrier node: water deluge system (WDS) 
Av_WDS Probability of failure on demand (PFD) for water 
deluge system 
4.33E-02 Input 
Eff_WDS Effectiveness of water deluge system 1 Input 
WDS Performance of water deluge system by 
combined availability and effectiveness 
4.33 E-02 Intermediate output; gate 
type A 
Safety barrier node: pressure safety valve (PSV) 
Av_PSV Probability of failure on demand (PFD) for 
pressure safety valve 
1.00E-02 Input 
Eff_PSV Effectiveness of pressure safety valve 1 Input 
PSV Performance of pressure safety valve by 
combined availability and effectiveness 
1.00E-02 Intermediate output; gate 
type A 
Safety barrier node: fireproofing coating (PFP) 
Av_PFP Probability of failure on demand (PFD) for 
fireproofing coating 
1.00E-03 Input 
Eff_PFP Effectiveness of fireproofing coating 1 Input 
Fireproofing Performance of fireproofing coating by 
combined availability and effectiveness 
1.00E-03 Intermediate output; gate 
type A 
Safety barrier node: emergency team intervention (Em_team) 
Av_Emt Probability of failure on demand (PFD) for 
emergency team intervention 
1.00E-01 Input 
Eff_Emt Effectiveness of emergency team 1 Input 
Em_team Performance of emergency team by combined 
availability and effectiveness 
1.00E-01 Intermediate output; gate 
type C 
Consequence node 
Cons_prob Consequence multistate node with 16 final 
accidental states + state Safe 
- Outputs of AND-gate; 
results available in Table 5. 
41 
𝑷𝒅 Escalation probability for each final accidental 
state 
- Inputs added externally 
from Bayesian Network; 
values available in Table 5. 
38 
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Figure 5. 43 Bayesian Network for fire escalation resulting from pool fire impingement on an LPG 
tank, considering the action of four relevant safety barriers. The net has been obtained from the 
conversion of the corresponding Event-Tree. 
Table 5. 41 Comparison of results obtained from Event-Tree analysis and Bayesian Network analysis. 
Final event 
ID 
Type of 
resulting 
scenario 
Event-Tree analysis Bayesian Network analysis 
Consequence 
probability 
Final event 
probability 
Consequence 
probability 
Final event 
probability 
FE 1.1 Unmitigated 
domino 
4.33E-08 3.10E-08 4.33E-08 3.10E-08 
FE 1.2 Mitigated domino 3.90E-07 2.79E-07 3.90E-07 2.79E-07 
FE 2.1 No domino 4.33E-05 3.34E-09 4.33E-05 3.34E-09 
FE 2.2 No domino 3.89E-04 3.01E-08 3.89E-04 3.01E-08 
FE 3.1 Mitigated domino 4.29E-06 3.07E-06 4,29E-06 3.07E-06 
FE 3.2 Mitigated domino 3.86E-05 2.76E-05 3.86E-05 2.76E-05 
FE 4.1 No domino 4.28E-03 3.31E-07 4.28E-03 3.31E-07 
FE 4.2 No domino 3.85E-02 2.98E-06 3.85E-02 2.98E-06 
FE 5.1 Mitigated domino 9.57E-07 2.47E-07 9.57E-07 2.47E-07 
FE 5.2 Mitigated domino 8.61E-06 2.22E-06 8.61E-06 2.22E-06 
FE 6.1 No domino 9.56E-04 3.88E-08 9.56E-04 3.88E-08 
FE 6.2 No domino 8.60E-03 3.49E-07 8.60E-03 3.49E-07 
FE 7.1 Mitigated domino 9.47E-05 2.44E-05 9.47E-05 2.44E-05 
FE 7.2 Mitigated domino 8.52E-04 2.20E-04 8.52E-04 2.20E-04 
FE 8.1 No domino 9.46E-02 3.84E-06 9.46E-02 3.84E-06 
FE 8.2 No domino 8.52E-01 3.46E-05 8.52E-01 3.46E-05 
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5.3.3.4 Results of dynamic safety measures performance assessment with 
Bayesian Networks 
Once it is confirmed that the Event-Tree based approach and Bayesian Networks are equally 
able to perform escalation assessment, the BN superiority can be evidenced by the ability to 
update the probabilities, taking into account new evidences. Bayesian Analysis has been 
applied in order to demonstrate the superior flexibility of this technique in comparison with 
Event-Tree and exploring its features in safety barriers performance evaluation. Two different 
approaches to Bayesian Analysis have been applied, in order to dynamically update 
probabilities: probability updating and probability adapting (see Section 3.3.2.1.3.2).  
Probability updating is the determination of the most probable state of all the variables given 
the accident occurrence (i.e., the most probable configuration or explanation - MPE), named 
in statistics as posterior joint probability of all events. The information about a node is used as 
evidence, determining the most probable explanation (MPE) leading to that state.  
In the case study, final state FE 7.2, which is the most probable final state according to Table 
5. 41, is added as an evidence, and by means of the “max propagate tool”, the BN searches over 
each variable to identify weak links. The probability of the system being in the most probable 
configuration leading to final state FE 7.2 is 85.2%; the most critical sequence, which is 
reported in Figure 5. 44, corresponds to Passive Fire Protection failure state (i.e., OUT 1) and 
working state for all the other safety barriers in place (i.e., WDS, PSV and Emergency Team). 
Bayesian updating results suggests revising and upgrading fireproofing coating, as it 
represents the weak point of the critical sequence of events leading to the most probable final 
state. Therefore, the importance of probability updating for safety barriers performance 
assessment lies in its ability to identify critical sequence of events and allocate safety barriers 
consequently to prevent fire escalation. 
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Figure 5. 44 Bayesian Updating results for the case study, aimed at calculating the most probable 
sequence of events leading to the most probable consequence (i.e., 𝐹𝐸 7.2). 
Then, Bayesian probability adapting is applied. In probability adapting, the additional 
information during a time interval is used as evidence (e.g, in the form of Accident Sequence 
Precursors), in order to dynamically revise probabilities for safety barriers, final events and 
domino probabilities. In statistical terms, this can be expressed as 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑄 = 𝑛).  
Indeed, probability adapting requires as inputs prior experience data (in the form of past 
accident data collected during a certain time span – ASP, i.e. Accident Sequence Precursors) 
to adapt conditional probability distributions. In probability adapting application to the case 
study, fictional operational data over five years of experience, reported in Table 5. 42, have 
been applied to dynamically revise safety barriers, final events and domino probabilities over 
time; ASP are referred to top-4 most probable final events. Year 0 represents the baseline 
Bayesian Network analysis, with no additional information added to revise probabilities, 
whose results have already been presented in Table 5. 41. For example, according to the data 
reported in Table 5. 42 at the end of the second year, FE 8.2 has cumulatively occurred 4 times, 
FE 7.2 has occurred only once; probability adapting can be performed by inserting 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖| 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠) = 4𝑃(𝐹𝐸 8.2) and 𝑃(𝑥𝑖| 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠) = 𝑃(𝐹𝐸 7.2), with 𝑥𝑖 generic 
event. Bayesian adapting has been performed by applying “adaptation panel” from software 
Hugin software, version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016), inserting manually the values of ASP reported in 
Table 5. 42 and developing a specific net corresponding to each year of operational experience. 
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Table 5. 42 Accident Sequence Precursors (ASP) over five years of operational experience for 
probability adapting application. 
Consequence Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
FE 3.2 0 0 0 1 0 
FE 7.1 0 0 0 0 2 
FE 7.2 0 1 0 0 1 
FE 8.2 3 1 2 1 0 
The information about the occurrence probability of selected final events propagates 
backwards through the network, varying the performance of the safety barriers over time, as 
well as the values of final events probabilities and final events categories probabilities.  
The results of Bayesian adapting over 5 years of operational experience concerning the 
performance of the four safety barriers in place, evaluated by means of specific gates combining 
availability and effectiveness are reported in Figure 5. 45 and Figure 5. 46 with reference to 
failure (i.e., OUT1) and work (i.e., OUT 2-3) states respectively.  
Indeed, the application of a specific gate for the assessment of safety barriers performances 
hindered from performances overestimation, in comparison with the standard approach based 
solely on PFDs. As visible from both the figures, it is possible to have either decreasing trend, 
increasing trend or constant values of safety barriers performance depending on the ASP 
introduced. As highlighted by Figure 5. 45, the barriers show slightly different behaviors: WDS, 
PSV and Emergency team failure probabilities tend to increase moderately over time, while 
PFP gains more attention compared to the other three barriers, due to a significant increase of 
the failure probability of two orders of magnitude after the application of 5 years long 
operational experience.   
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Figure 5. 45 Results of safety barriers performance assessment by means of Bayesian Networks, with 
Bayesian adapting application over five years of operational experience. The results refers to failure state 
(i.e., OUT 1) and are obtained by means of specific gates for four safety barriers in place in the reference 
installation: water deluge system (i.e., WDS), pressure safety valve (i.e., PSV), fireproofing coating (i.e, 
PFP) and emergency team intervention (i.e., Em. Team). 
 
Figure 5. 46 Results of safety barriers performance assessment by means of Bayesian Networks, with 
Bayesian adapting application over five years of operational experience. The results refers to work state 
(i.e., OUT 2-3) and are obtained by means of specific gates for four safety barriers in place in the 
reference installation: water deluge system (i.e., WDS), pressure safety valve (i.e., PSV), fireproofing 
coating (i.e, PFP) and emergency team intervention (i.e., Em. Team). 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
229 
 
Table 5. 43 Final events probabilities for sixteen final accidental states obtained by means of Bayesian 
Networks, with Bayesian adapting application over five years of operational experience. 
Final event ID -
consequences 
Type of 
resulting 
scenario Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
FE 1.1 
Unmitigated 
domino 3.10E-08 1.94E-09 3.89E-07 2.78E-07 1.54E-06 6.30E-06 
FE 1.2 
Mitigated 
domino 2.79E-07 3.68E-08 7.39E-06 5.29E-06 2.93E-05 4.10E-05 
FE 2.1 No domino 3.34E-09 4.18E-10 3.76E-10 3.88E-10 1.32E-09 2.58E-09 
FE 2.2 No domino 3.01E-08 7.94E-09 7.14E-09 7.37E-09 2.52E-08 1.68E-08 
FE 3.1 
Mitigated 
domino 3.07E-06 3.85E-07 7.74E-05 5.54E-05 3.07E-04 1.25E-03 
FE 3.2 
Mitigated 
domino 2.76E-05 7.32E-06 1.47E-03 1.05E-03 5.83E-03 8.15E-03 
FE 4.1 No domino 3.31E-07 8.31E-08 7.48E-08 7.72E-08 2.64E-07 5.13E-07 
FE 4.2 No domino 2.98E-06 1.58E-06 1.42E-06 1.47E-06 5.01E-06 3.34E-06 
FE 5.1 
Mitigated 
domino 2.47E-07 3.15E-08 6.34E-06 4.54E-06 6.64E-06 3.36E-05 
FE 5.2 
Mitigated 
domino 2.22E-06 5.99E-07 1.20E-04 8.62E-05 1.26E-04 2.19E-04 
FE 6.1 No domino 3.88E-08 9.92E-09 8.93E-09 9.21E-09 8.32E-09 2.01E-08 
FE 6.2 No domino 3.49E-07 1.89E-07 1.70E-07 1.75E-07 1.58E-07 1.30E-07 
FE 7.1 
Mitigated 
domino 2.44E-05 6.28E-06 1.26E-03 9.03E-04 1.32E-03 6.69E-03 
FE 7.2 
Mitigated 
domino 2.20E-04 1.19E-04 2.40E-02 1.72E-02 2.51E-02 4.35E-02 
FE 8.1 No domino 3.84E-06 1.97E-06 1.78E-06 1.83E-06 1.66E-06 3.99E-06 
FE 8.2 No domino 3.46E-05 3.75E-05 3.38E-05 3.48E-05 3.15E-05 2.59E-05 
The results of probability adapting referred to all final states, with have been reported in Table 
5. 43. The final events consequences have been obtained by keeping the top event probability 
equal to one and by inserting escalation probabilities values externally from the network, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.3.3.  
Final events (i.e., consequences) probabilities show a general increasing trend over time, due 
to ASP application, with few exceptions. Most of final states (i.e., FE 1.1, FE 1.2, FE 3.2, FE 5.1, 
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FE 5.2, FE 7.1, FE 7.2) show an increase, either around two orders of magnitude or three (i.e., 
FE 3.1) ones in their occurrence probabilities.  
Other accidental states reveal just a slight increase in their occurrence probabilities, inferior to 
one order of magnitude (i.e., FE 4.1, FE 4.2, FE 8.1). Few final accidental states (i.e., FE 2.1, FE 
2.2, FE 6.1, FE 6.2, FE 8.2) show a slight decrease of their probabilities, inferior to one order 
of magnitude. It should be noted that, despite ASP refer only to 4 possible final states, all the 
consequences are dynamically revised over time, even those for whom no information is 
available, that are often the most severe ones (e.g., FE 1.1 - unmitigated domino in the case 
study).  
The results of Bayesian adapting for selected final states, which includes the top four most 
probable ones in the initial Bayesian Network configuration at Year 0 (i.e., the final states to 
whom ASPs are referred – FE 3.2, FE 7.1, FE 7.2, FE 8.2) and the most severe final state (i.e., 
FE 1.1) are reported in Figure 5. 47. For instance, even though FE 1.1 has not been observed 
until the end of observation time, which equals 5 years in the case study, its probability has 
increased by two orders of magnitude at the end of the fifth year.  
The probability of the consequence node being in the 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 state is equal to zero throughout 
the time interval considered in the case study, due to the assumption of unitary top event 
probability of occurrence. 
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Figure 5. 47 Final events probabilities for selected final accidental states obtained by means of 
Bayesian Networks, with Bayesian adapting application over five years of operational experience. From 
the top to the bottom: A) FE 1.1 regarding unmitigated domino; B) FE 3.2; C) FE 7.1; D) FE 7.2 and E) 
FE 8.2. The latter four final events are the ones associated with ASPs. 
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Then, final events probabilities referred to the same year are grouped into the three mentioned 
final events categories: no domino, mitigated domino and unmitigated domino. The dynamic 
evolution over time of the occurrence probability for each final event category is available in 
Figure 5. 48. The results reveal that mitigated domino and unmitigated domino categories have 
a significant increase of two orders of magnitude. On the other hand, no domino category 
shows a slight decrease of occurrence probability over time.  
 
Figure 5. 48 Final events categories probabilities results, referred to fire escalation, obtained by means 
of Bayesian Network, applying Bayesian adapting over five years of operational experience. From the 
top to the bottom: A) Unmitigated domino probabilities; B) Mitigated domino probabilities and C) No 
domino probabilities. 
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In Figure 5. 49 the percentage relative compositions of final events categories for each year 
considered in the Bayesian adapting application (i.e., from Year 0 to Year 5) are reported.  
The results confirm that final events categories compositions vary over time after the 
introduction of ASPs.  
For instance, no domino probability is significant at Year o (i.e., with no additional 
information), but it turns into a very low value starting from Year 2; this trend confirms the 
decrease of the absolute values displayed in Figure 5. 48. Consequently, the relative percentage 
of mitigated domino category tend to increase over time and from Year 2 it overcomes 99%, 
becoming very predominant, according to the absolute value increase displayed in Figure 5. 
48.  
Indeed, it should be remarked that, even if unmitigated domino category assumes an irrelevant 
percentage value throughout the operational time considered (Figure 5. 49), the increase of its 
absolute value of almost two orders of magnitude, displayed in Figure 5. 48, joined with its 
severity, makes the consideration of this final event category significant.  
 
Figure 5. 49 Percentage relative compositions of final events categories obtained from Bayesian 
adapting over five years of experience. From each year, the categories are: A) Unmitigated domino; B) 
Mitigated domino and C) No domino. 
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5.3.3.5 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The present application has been aimed at implementing a Bayesian approach to safety 
barriers performance assessment, by means of Bayesian Networks, starting from a 
conventional Event-Tree based approach and applying them to the same case study in purpose 
to compare the results. The case study refers to the prevention of fire escalation into a 
cascading event (i.e., domino accident), which can be prevented by the action of four active, 
passive and procedural safety barriers, pertinent for the reference installation.  
The conversion of an Event-Tree for escalation assessment into a Bayesian Network has been 
performed, highlighting equal ability to consider the escalation pathway. Indeed, the mapping 
process has highlighted the advantages of Bayesian Networks application, in terms of 
enhanced flexibility and dynamic system representation. Safety barriers performance have 
been assessed by means of specific gates (i.e., type A and C), depending on barriers states and 
classification, combining availability and effectiveness. Indeed, the present case study provides 
validation for the application of these specific gates within a Bayesian framework, as it 
represents their first application within a Bayesian Network. The application of specific gates 
for the assessment of safety barriers performance proved definitively to be useful in purpose 
to avoid performance overestimation and to provide a more accurate risk picture.  
Escalation probabilities as well as sixteen final accidental states have been considered in the 
case study and grouped into three severity categories related to the possible final states (i.e., 
no domino, mitigated/delayed domino and unmitigated domino); this allows a more effective 
visualization of domino probabilities over time than the application of final accidental states.  
Bayesian Analysis has been applied in order to demonstrate the superior flexibility of this 
technique in comparison with Event-Tree and to explore its features in safety barriers 
performance evaluation with respect to the prevention and mitigation of domino escalation. 
Two different approaches to Bayesian Analysis have been applied, in order to dynamically 
revise probabilities: probability updating and probability adapting. In probability updating to 
the case study, the information about the occurrence of a final accidental state is used as 
evidence; its main application is the determination of the most critical sequence of events, in 
order to revise safety barriers consequently.  
However, as highlighted by the results, the most significant feature of Bayesian Network is the 
application of probability adapting technique that allows revising dynamically safety barriers 
performance and final events probability over time, as a function of additional information in 
the form of Accident Sequence Precursors added to the net. The results of the case study 
demonstrates that probability adapting is a useful technique to replace generic prior 
probabilities (i.e., generic reliability data) with more case-specific posterior probabilities, 
resulting in a dynamic assessment of safety barriers performance and a more reliable 
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prediction of final events, with reference to the prevention and mitigation of fire escalation into 
a cascading event. Indeed final events categories probabilities have been dynamically revised 
over time, demonstrating that additional information revise significantly both their absolute 
values and their relative percentage compositions, giving a more realistic and exhaustive 
picture of the possible escalation of the accident into a cascading event, and allowing to 
perform consequently custom-made revision of safety barriers. 
Therefore, the case study proved the feasibility of Bayesian Networks application to safety 
barriers performance assessment with respect to accident escalation into a cascading event. 
This advanced application allows obtaining detailed and updated information regarding safety 
barriers technical performance, to be inserted within the risk evaluation step of QRA, in the 
extended version that includes external hazard factors (i.e., domino accidents).  
However, the present application considers just a simplified two-tank process plant layout and 
one top event, whose probability was assumed unitary, in purpose to focus on safety barriers 
and final events. Further applications should extend safety barriers performance assessment 
to domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks, considering process tank farms, 
occurrence probabilities of the top event(s), eventual synergistic effects and several domino 
levels.  
5.3.4 Application of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis 
including safety measures performance for a simplified tank farm 
5.3.4.1 Definition of the case study 
The present case study applies domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks for a 
simplified tank farm. The original application is aimed at extending safety barriers 
performance assessment by means of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis, filling 
the research gap identified in Section 3.5.1.2.  
The case study has been developed in three sequential steps. 
The starting point for the case study (i.e., named step 1 thoughout Section 5.3.4) is an existing 
application of domino accident analysis by means of BNs (Khakzad et al., 2013d), which 
applied an innovative methodology for domino accident propagation (see Section 3.3.2.1.3.4), 
with no safety barriers included in the modelling phase. The existing application is reproduced 
as the starting point for further implementations. 
In step 2, which is an original application, safety barriers are introduced in domino accident 
analysis by means of BNs. Domino accident analysis is performed according to the same 
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methodology of the previous step. The safety barriers to be accounted are pertinent for the 
reference installation, according to the classification presented in Section 3.3.2.1.2, but their 
performance is evaluated with a standard approach based solely on availability.  
In the step 3, safety barriers are included in domino accident analysis by means of BNs. 
Domino accident analysis is performed according to the same methodology of step 1) and 2). 
The safety barriers to be accounted are pertinent for the reference installation (i.e., the same 
ones applied in the previous step), but safety barriers performance is improved by applying 
specific gates accounting availability and effectiveness and depending on barriers classification 
(see Section 3.3.2.1.2 for further information on logic gates). 
The inputs data applied for the case study are adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 
2013d), in purpose to provide a sound comparison between the original application (with 
safety barriers included) and the starting point (where safety barriers are neglected). The 
installation to be considered is a simplified tank farm, where the possible cascading event is a 
domino accident triggered by fire. The following inputs regarding the tank farm, shared among 
all modelling steps of the case study, are reported: 
 The tank farm includes 3 atmospheric storage tanks (T1, T2 and T3); 
 T1 is selected as primary unit; 𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒) = 1.00 ∙ 10−5; 
 One Top-event (Fire) is included; heat radiation is the solely escalation vector; 
 DL1, DL2 indicates respectively the probability of first and second level domino 
obtained with AND gates, according to the procedure of Section 3.3.2.1.3.4; 
 Escalation probabilities are embedded in the Conditional Probability Table (CPTs) of 
each tank (T1,T2 and T3), according to the procedure of Section 3.3.2.1.3.4; 
Further explanations on these assumptions are available below. The layout of the simplified 
tank farm is reported in Figure 5. 50; a description of tanks characteristics is available in Table 
5. 44. 
 
Figure 5. 50 Layout of the simplified tank farm, adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
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Table 5. 44 Vessels characteristics for the simplified tank farm case study, adapted from Khakzad et al. 
(Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Vessel Type Substance Content 
(t) 
Accident 
scenario 
Primary 
probability 
Escalation 
vector 
T1 Atmospheric Gasoline 500 Pool fire 1.00E-05 Heat 
radiation 
T2 Atmospheric Xylene 200 Pool fire 1.00E-05 Heat 
radiation 
T3 Atmospheric Gasoline 200 Pool fire 1.00E-05 Heat 
radiation 
To determine the possible secondary units, the intensity of heat radiation received by T2 and 
T3 in the case of a PF in T1 is calculated (Table 5.45). As can be seen, T2 is more likely to be 
the secondary unit impacted by T1. Accordingly, in the corresponding BN, a causal arc should 
directed from node T1 to node T2 (Figure 5. 51). T3 did not exceed the threshold criteria; but, 
considering the synergistic effect of T1 and T2, it can be seen that the total heat radiation 
received by T3 because of both T1 and T2 would be sufficiently above the threshold value to 
damage T3. Therefore, in BN configuration T3 should receive two arcs, both from T2 and T1. 
DL0 overlaps with the primary event. Nodes DL1 and DL2, representing first level and second 
level domino should be added to the network. To account for the first level domino effect, DL1 
is connected to the primary unit T1 and the secondary unit T2 and the CPT is filled with an 
AND gate. Similarly, to consider the second level domino effect, DL2 is connected to the first-
level domino effect node DL1 and the tertiary unit T3 with an AND gate. 
Table 5. 45 Data for escalation probabilities (𝑃𝑑) calculations for the simplified tank farm, adapted 
from (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Data for calculation of escalation probabilities  
Ref. Heat Load 
(kW/m2) 
ttf (s) Probit (Y) Escalation 
Probability (Pd) 
 
 
19.3 686.37 0.4764 3.041E-06 
 
 
17.6 762.15 0.2830 1.197E-06 
Data for time to failure calculation (ttf) 
Volume of T2 (m3) 247 Volume of T3 (m3) 220 
c -2.667·10-5 
d 1 
e -1.13 
f 9.877 
Probit coefficients for probit calculation (Y) 
a 12.54 
b -1.847 
𝑃(𝑇2⃓ 𝑇1) 
𝑃(𝑇3⃓ 𝑇1,  𝑇2) 
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Preliminary calculations allows defining escalation probabilities, according to the procedure 
reported in Section 3.3.2.1.3.4; the data are reported in Table 5. 45. Time to failure calculation 
is carried out according to equation (3.9); escalation Probit calculation for heat radiation is 
carried out according to equation (3.2) with the Probit coefficients presented in Table 5. 45; 
the calculation of associated escalation probability is obtained by the application of normal 
standard distribution (equation (3.4)).  
5.3.4.2 Application of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis without 
safety measures 
In modelling step 1), which is adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d), safety 
barriers are not included in domino accident analysis, which is performed according to the 
methodology of Section 3.3.2.1.3.4. Bayesian Network is constructed using Hugin Software 
version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016); a qualitative representation of the net is available in Figure 5.51, the 
inputs and reasoning that lead to the accident propagation modelling are listed in the previous 
subsection.  
 
Figure 5. 51 Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with no safety 
barriers included in the analysis (modelling Step 1), adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b). 
Table 5. 46 Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with 
no safety barriers included in the analysis (modelling Step 1). 
Results (probabilities) 
Modelling 
step 1 
No safety 
barriers 
T1 1.00E-05 
T2 3.041E-11 
T3 3.640E-17 
DL0 1.00E-05 
DL1 3.041E-11 
DL2 3.640E-17 
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The outputs of the net obtained from modelling step 1), which consist on tank accident 
probabilities (i.e., T1, T2, T3) and domino level probabilities (i.e., DL0, DL1 and DL2) are 
available in Table 5.46. It should be noted that modelling step 1) demonstrate the usefuleness 
and ease of application of Bayesian Network aplication to domino accident modelling, at least 
with reference to a simplified plant layout. Neverthless, step 1) provide only a baseline situation 
for further implementations, as cascading events realistic representation demands for 
introduction of safety barriers in the modelling phase. 
5.3.4.3 Application of safety measures performance assessment to domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks 
According to modelling step 2) and 3) an extension of the previous case study with introduction 
of pertinent safety barriers on each tank is provided, obtaining therefore two original 
applications of domino accident analysis with Bayesian Networks, filling the research gaps 
identified in Section 5.1.1.2. The accident propagation and the input data are the same ones 
applied in the previous section. 
Safety barriers pertinent for the reference installation are defined, based on the approach 
presented in Section 3.3.2.1.2. As the installation is considered RI Type 1, the presence of 3 
safety barriers on each tank is accounted. They are respectively: sprinkler (Sprinkler_TX), PSV 
(PSV_TX) and emergency team intervention (Em_Team_TX), represented by three nodes in 
BNs modelling, which are connected as child node of TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,3}; each safety barrier 
has a binary behavior (i.e., fail/work). A consequence node is defined for each tank (Cons_TX), 
according to an AND - gate, as displayed in previous safety barriers performance assessment 
by means of BNs (e.g., see Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3). According to the configuration of the case 
study (i.e., one top event, three safety barriers on each tank), the consequence node on each 
tank accounts for 8 accidental states plus state Safe, as displayed in Table 5. 47. 
Table 5. 47 Safety barriers states for each resulting final accidental state, for a generic tank X of the 
simplified tank farm. 
Consequence ID - Tank X Safety barrier ID_TX 
Sprinkler_TX PSV_TX Em_team_TX 
CTX_1 fail fail fail 
CTX_2 fail fail work 
CTX_3 fail work fail 
CTX_4 fail work work 
CTX_5 work fail fail 
CTX_6 work fail work 
CTX_7 work work fail 
CTX_8 work work work 
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The escalation occurs only when all the barriers on a tank are not working, according to the 
approximation taken from Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). In this situation, the 
consequence node is in state CTX1 (Table 5. 47)); this is represented in the net by an additional 
node (WCons_TX) on each tank, which is a child node of the respective consequence node. 
Therefore, WCons_TX node represents the “reduced” accident probability on each tank, due 
to the introduction of safety barriers. Indeed, WCons_TX , which has a binary behavior (i.e., 
accident/safe), should concour to the determination of domino level probabilities in modelling 
steps 2) and 3). The methodology for domino accident modelling displayed in Section 
3.3.2.1.3.4, and previously applied in modelling step 1) has been applied also in these modelling 
steps; the introduction of safety barriers did not modified the accident propagation pattern. 
Therefore, WCons_TX is linked to the following tanks considering the same propagation 
pattern as in modelling step 1).With reference to the specific case plant layout, for example 
WCons_T1 is connected to T2, WCons_T2 is connected to T3 and WCons_T1 is connected to 
T3. Instead of considering the unprotected tank accident probability TX, WCons_TX is 
considered to define domino level probabilities. For example, the probability of a first level 
domino (𝐷𝐿1) is obtained from an AND gate of WCons_T1 and WCons_T2; the probability of 
a second level domino (𝐷𝐿2) is obtained from an AND gate of WCons_T3 and 𝐷𝐿1. DL0 
overlaps with WCons_T1. 
Table 5. 48 Input data for the inclusion of safety barriers performance assessment within domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks. Data retrieved from a data repository (Landucci et al., 
2015a). 
Safety 
barrier ID 
Safety barrier 
description 
Input data for modelling step 2  Input data for modelling step 3  
Sprinkler Foam water 
sprinkler system 
with electric 
actuation 
Availability 2.00E-03 Gate Type B 
Availability 5.39E-03 
Effectiveness (η) 0.954 
PSV Pressure safety 
valve 
Availability 1.00E-02 Gate Type A 
Availability 1.00E-02 
Effectiveness (η) 1 
Em.Team Emergency 
team 
intervention 
Availability 1.00E-01 Gate Type C 
Availability 1.00E-01 
Effectiveness (η) 1 
With regards to Bayesian Network modelling, in modelling steps 2) and 3), two approaches to 
safety barriers performance assessement are considered: 
2) Only availability, expressed by the probability of failure on demand (i.e., PFD), is 
accounted to represent safety barriers performance. Availability values for safety 
barriers on each tank are taken from a standard reference and reported in Table 5. 48. 
3) The performance of safety barriers has been accounted by means of the three typologies 
of specific gates described in Section 3.3.2.1.2, which combine availability and 
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effectiveness. Therefore, the performance of safety barriers on each tank (i.e., 
Sprinkler_TX, PSV_TX, Em_Team_TX) is the output of a logic gate, whose inputs are 
the nodes regarding the availability of each barrier (Av_Spr_TX, Av_PSV_TX, 
Av_Emt_TX) and the respective effectiveness (Eff_Spr_TX, Eff_PSV_TX, 
Eff_Emt_TX). Input data are reported in Table 5. 48. This approach allows avoiding 
over conservative assumptions regarding safety barriers performance, according to the 
concepts discussed in Section 3.3.2.1.2. 
5.3.4.4 Results of the case study 
The results obtained from modelling step 2) are reported below; the qualitative part of BN, 
obtained with Hugin software 8.1 (Hugin, 2016) is reported in Figure 5. 52; the outputs of the 
net, obtained from Bayesian Network analysis, are available in Table 5. 49. 
According to modelling step 2), for each tank of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,3});, the following 
results have been reported in Table 5. 49: 
 Safety barriers performance probabilities, referred to failure state (i.e., Sprinkler_TX, 
PSV_TX, Em_Team_TX); 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Consequence node probabilities (Cons_TX), specifying the one possibly leading to further 
escalation (WCons_TX); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2). 
 
Figure 5. 52 Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with safety 
barriers included in the analysis. Their performance is evaluated with a standard approach, based solely 
on availability (modelling Step 2). 
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Table 5. 49 Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with 
safety barriers included in the analysis. Their performance is evaluated with a standard approach, based 
solely on availability (modelling Step 2). All the results are referred to accidental/failure state. 
  
 Symbol 
Tank X (X=1,2,3) 
X=1 X=2 X=3 
TX 1.000E-05 6.082E-17 1.456E-28 
Sprinkler_TX 2.000E-08 1.216E-19 2.912E-31 
PSV_TX 1.000E-07 6.082E-19 1.456E-30 
Em_team_TX 1.000E-06 6.082E-18 1.456E-29 
Cons_TX X=1 X=2 X=3 
CTX_1 2.000E-11 1.216E-22 2.912E-34 
CTX_2 1.800E-10 1.095E-21 2.621E-33 
CTX_3 1.980E-09 1.204E-20 2.883E-32 
CTX_4 1.782E-08 1.084E-19 2.595E-31 
CTX_5 9.980E-09 6.070E-20 1.453E-31 
CTX_6 8.982E-08 5.463E-19 1.308E-30 
CTX_7 9.880E-07 6.009E-18 1.439E-29 
CTX_8 8.892E-06 5.408E-17 1.295E-28 
WCons_TX 2.000E-11 1.216E-22 2.912E-34 
Domino probability 
DL0 2.000E-11 
DL1 1.216E-22 
DL2 2.912E-34 
The results obtained from modelling step 3) are reported below; the qualitative part of BN, 
obtained with Hugin software 8.1 (Hugin, 2016) is reported in Figure 5. 53; the outputs of the 
net, obtained from Bayesian Network analysis, are available in Table 5. 50. 
According to modelling step 2), for each tank of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,3});, the following 
results have been reported in Table 5. 50: 
 Safety barriers nodes performance probabilities, referred to failure state – OUT 1 (i.e., 
Sprinkler_TX, PSV_TX, Em_Team_TX); 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Consequence node probabilities (Cons_TX), specifying the one possibly leading to further 
escalation (Cons_TX); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2).
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Figure 5. 53 Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with safety barriers included in the analysis. Their performances are 
evaluated with specific gates, based on availability and effectiveness (modelling Step 3). 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
244 
 
Table 5. 50 Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank farm with 
safety barriers included in the analysis. Their performances are evaluated with specific gates, based on 
availability and effectiveness (modelling Step 3). All the results refer to accident/failure state (i.e., 
OUT1). 
Symbol Tank X (X=1,2,3) 
X=1 X=2 X=3 
TX 1.000E-05 1.555E-15 9.521E-26 
Sprinkler_TX 5.114E-07 7.954E-17 4.869E-27 
PSV_TX 1.000E-07 1.555E-17 9.521E-28 
Em_team_TX 1.000E-06 1.555E-16 9.521E-27 
Cons_TX X=1 X=2 X=3 
CTX_1 5.114E-10 7.954E-20 4.869E-30 
CTX_2 4.603E-09 7.158E-19 4.382E-29 
CTX_3 5.063E-08 7.874E-18 4.820E-28 
CTX_4 4.557E-07 7.087E-17 4.338E-27 
CTX_5 9.489E-09 1.476E-18 9.034E-29 
CTX_6 8.540E-08 1.328E-17 8.130E-28 
CTX_7 9.394E-07 1.461E-16 8.943E-27 
CTX_8 8.454E-06 1.315E-15 8.049E-26 
WCons_TX 5.114E-10 7.954E-20 4.869E-30 
Domino probabilities 
DL0 5.114E-10 
DL1 7.954E-20 
DL2 4.869E-30 
As seen in previous case studies, one of the advantage of Bayesian Networks is the possibility 
to revise probabilities, due to new evidencies. Therefore, the application of a probability 
revising technique is carried out to the net obtained from modelling step 3), in purpose to 
identify weak links leading to a specific final accidental state, for instance WCons_T2. The 
evidence of WCons_T2 in accidental state is inserted in the net, and the sum propagation 
normal tool is applied to compile the net. The results, reported in Table 5. 51, show posterior 
probabilities for each tank of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,3}), in particular: 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Consequence node probabilities (Cons_TX), specifying the one possibly leading to further 
escalation (WCons_TX); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2).
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Table 5. 51 Results of Bayesian probability revision for domino accident analysis in a simplified tank 
farm with safety barriers included in the analysis. The evidence of WCons_T2 is inserted in the net, 
obtained according to modelling Step 3). All the results refer to accident/failure state. 
Symbol Tank X (X=1,2,3) 
X=1 X=2 X=3 
TX 1 1 1.197E-06 
Sprinkler_TX 1 1 6.122E-08 
PSV_TX 1 1 1.197E-08 
Em_team_TX 1 1 1.197E-07 
Cons_TX X=1 X=2 X=3 
CTX_1 1 1 6.122E-11 
CTX_2 0 0 5.510E-10 
CTX_3 0 0 6.060E-09 
CTX_4 0 0 5.454E-08 
CTX_5 0 0 1.136E-09 
CTX_6 0 0 1.022E-08 
CTX_7 0 0 1.124E-07 
CTX_8 0 0 1.012E-06 
WCons_TX 1 1 6.122E-11 
Domino probability 
DL0 1 
DL1 1 
DL2 6.122E-11 
However, it should be noted that the application of probability revising techniques, which are 
very useful with respect to major accident scenarios and generally rather simple case studies, 
might be not the most significant advantage of domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian 
Network, due to the scarcity of accidental data to be applied.  
On the other hand, it might be relevant to carry out a comparison of the results, obtained from 
modelling steps 1), 2) and 3), in purpose to evaluate the effect of safety barriers introduction 
within modelling phase. For each tank of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,3}), the results referred to 
tank accident probabilities (TX) according to the three different modelling steps have been 
reported in Figure 5. 54. For instance, the ratio between tank accident probability in modelling 
step 3) and 1) clearly shows a reduction up to 9 orders of magnitude. The gap tends to be very 
significant in the last unit affected by domino effect (i.e., T3). Therefore, modelling step 3), 
which includes a complete approach to safety barriers performance assessment, is able to 
represent the systems in detailed way, avoiding overestimation of accident probabilities. 
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Figure 5. 54 Comparison of tank probabilities (T1, T2 and T3) obtained from domino accident analysis 
by means of Bayesian Networks, following different modelling steps/approaches: 1) No safety barriers 
(i.e., SB); 2) safety barriers performance expressed by availability only; 3) safety barriers overall 
performance, expressed by specific gates accounting availability and effectiveness. 
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Figure 5. 55 Comparison of domino probabilities (DL0, DL1 and DL2) obtained from domino accident 
analysis by means of Bayesian Networks, following different modelling steps/approaches: 1) No safety 
barriers (i.e., SB); 2) safety barriers performance expressed by availability only; 3) safety barriers overall 
performance, expressed by specific gates accounting availability and effectiveness. 
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Domino probabilities at different levels (DLO, DL1, DL2) have been reported separately for the 
three modelling steps in Figure 5. 55: without Safety Barriers (step 1), with safety barriers (only 
availability considered, according to step 2) and with safety barriers overall performance (i.e., 
combination of availability and effectiveness, according to step 3). The ratio between modelling 
steps 3) and 1) shows a reduction from 5 to 13 order of magnitude in domino probabilities after 
the introduction of safety barriers, confirming that safety barriers introduction within domino 
accident modelling provides a more realistic framework for domino effects analysis. 
5.3.4.5 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The present application has been aimed at implementing safety barriers performance 
assessment, by means of Bayesian Networks, to domino accident analysis. The case study 
refers to the prevention of fire escalation into a cascading event (i.e., domino accident), 
considering a simplified tank farm of three tanks and one top event. The methodology for the 
definition of domino accident modelling by means of BNs has been recently defined, but none 
of existing applications accounted for safety barriers within the modelling phase. Therefore, 
the present original case study was aimed at filling this research gap, by introducing safety 
barriers in the modelling phase and comparing the so obtained results. 
Safety barriers of different typologies (i.e., active, passive and procedural ones) have been 
introduced in the modelling phase on each tank of the tank farm; their performances have been 
assessed both by standard approach and by means of specific gates (i.e., type A, B and C), 
depending on barriers states and classification, combining availability and effectiveness. The 
application of specific gates for the assessment of safety barriers performance proved 
definitively to be useful in purpose to avoid performance overestimation and to provide a more 
accurate risk picture within domino effect modelling and prevention.  
Indeed, the results of the case study demonstrated a decrease of several order of magnitude of 
domino probabilities at different levels after the introduction of safety barriers within the 
modelling phase. Therefore domino accident analysis, performed by means of an advanced 
technique as Bayesian Networks, joined with safety barriers performance assessment may be 
able to model realistically severe accidental scenarios and cascading events triggered by 
external hazard factors (i.e., domino effect triggered by fire). The information obtained by 
domino accident modelling may offer a more accurate risk picture, avoiding overestimation of 
accident probabilities, within the framework of QRA extension to external hazard factor, with 
specific reference to domino effect. 
However, the case study deals with a simplified tank farm, with few units and just one top 
event. Therefore, the inclusion of safety barriers performance assessment within domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks should be tested to complex systems, 
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considering for instance realistic tank farm, with multiple top events, synergistic effects and a 
congruous number of units and domino levels.  
5.3.5 Application of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis 
including safety measures performance for a realistic tank farm 
5.3.5.1 Definition of the case study 
The present case study applies domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks for a 
realistic tank farm. The original application is aimed at extending safety barriers performance 
assessment by means of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis, filling the research 
gap identified in Section 3.5.1.2. The case study has been developed in two sequential steps. 
The starting point for the case study (i.e., named step 1 thoughout Section 5.3.5) is an existing 
application of domino accident analysis by means of BNs (Khakzad et al., 2013d), which 
applied an innovative methodology for domino accident propagation (see Section 3.3.2.1.3.4), 
with no safety barriers included in the modelling phase. The existing application is reproduced 
as the starting point for further implementations. 
In the step 2, which is an original application, safety barriers are included in domino accident 
analysis by means of BNs. Domino accident analysis is performed according to the same 
methodology of step 1). The safety barriers to be accounted are pertinent for the reference 
installation and their performance is evaluated by applying specific gates accounting 
availability and effectiveness and depending on barriers classification (see Section 3.3.2.1.2 for 
further information on the logic gates applied in the case study). 
The inputs data applied for the case study are adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 
2013d), in purpose to provide a sound comparison between the original application (with 
safety barriers included) and the starting point (where safety barriers are neglected). The 
installation to be considered is a realistic tank farm, where the possible cascading event is a 
domino accident triggered by fire and overpressure as escalation vectors.  
The following inputs regarding the tank farm, shared among all modelling steps of the case 
study, are reported: 
 The tank farm includes 8 atmospheric storage tanks (TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,3… ,8}), 
represented by eight nodes; 
 T1 is selected as primary unit; 
 Two Top-Events are accounted: Pool Fire (PF) and Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) with 
probabilities of 1.00 ∙ 10−5 and 2.00 ∙ 10−6 respectively;  
 Heat radiation and overpressure should be considered as escalation vectors; 
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 Each unit impacted has the same likelihood to develop a PF or a VCE (i.e., 0.5); 
 DLO, DL1, DL2 and DL3 indicate respectively the probability of zero, first, second and 
third level domino obtained with AND gates, according to the procedure of Section 
3.3.2.1.3.4. They have 2 states: Accident and Safe;  
 L1, L2, L3 are auxiliary nodes obtained with OR gates, according to the procedure of 
Section 3.3.2.1.3.4, to connect all the tanks concurring to same domino level;  
 Escalation probabilities are embedded in the Conditional Probability Table of each tank 
(TX) node. Each tank can be in one of these three states: PF (i.e., pool fire), VCE, Safe. 
Further explanations on these assumptions are available below. The layout of the realistic tank 
farm is reported in Figure 5. 56; a description of tanks characteristics is available in Table 5. 
52. 
 
Figure 5. 56 Layout of the realistic tank farm (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Overpressure and heat radiation escalation vectors are available in the reference (Khakzad et 
al., 2013d); the threshold values of heat radiation and overpressure are selected respectively as 
15𝑘𝑊 𝑚2⁄  and 7 kPa for atmospheric storage tanks with fixed roofs. The accident propagation 
pattern is defined according to the methodology described in Section 3.3.2.1.3.4. 
Preliminary calculations aimed at defining escalation probabilities (𝑃𝑑), corresponding to each 
value of each escalation vector, according to the procedure reported in Section 3.3.2.1.3.4; the 
inputs are reported in Table 5. 52.  
Regarding heat radiation, the time to failure calculation is carried out according to equation 
(3.9); then, escalation Probit calculation for heat radiation is carried out according to equation 
(3.2) with the Probit coefficients presented in Table 5. 52; the calculation of associated 
escalation probability is obtained by the application of normal standard distribution (equation 
(3.4)).  
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Regarding overpressure escalation vector, escalation Probit calculation for overpressure is 
carried out according to equation (3.3) with the Probit coefficients presented in Table 5. 52; 
the calculation of associated escalation probability is obtained by the application of normal 
standard distribution (equation (3.4)).  
Because the likely accident scenarios for T1 are PF and VCE, T1 can impact nearby units by 
means of either heat radiation or overpressure. Based on a comparison among the threshold 
values and the escalation vectors, T1 can impact T2 and T4 by either heat radiation or 
overpressure, although it affects T5 only by overpressure. Thus, T2 and T4 are secondary units, 
which in turn can result in PF or VCE (with equal likelihood, as described before). Therefore, 
causal arcs are directed from T1 to T2 and T4. T3, T5, and T7 can be involved in the domino 
effect as tertiary units. Similarly, units T6 and T8 are impacted as quaternary units in the 
domino effect. Causal arcs are drawn from the parent units to the associated children units, to 
model accident propagation in the realistic tank farm. The propagation pattern has been 
maintened in the two modelling steps. 
To calculate the domino effect probabilities, auxiliary nodes L1, L2, L3, are added to the net, 
as well as DL0, DL1, DL2, and DL3. DL0 overlaps with the primary event. To account for the 
first level domino effect, DL1 is connected to the primary unit T1 and the auxiliary node L1 with 
an AND gate. L1 represents the output of an OR gate between T2 and T4. Then, L2 auxiliary 
node is obtained as an OR gate among T3, T5 and T7. DL2 is connected to the unit DL1 and the 
auxiliary node L2 with an AND gate. Similarly, L3 auxiliary node is obtained as an OR gate 
between T6 and T8. DL3 is connected to the unit DL2 and the auxiliary node L3 with an AND 
gate. 
Table 5. 52 Input data for escalation probabilities calculations for the realistic tank farm, adapted from 
Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d). 
Values for ttf calculation 
V (m3) 2770 
c -2.667·10-5 
d 1 
e -1.13 
f 9.877 
Probit coefficient for heat radiation 
a 12.54 
b -1.847 
Probit coefficient for overpressure 
a -18.96 
b 2.44 
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The calculated values of escalation probabilities corresponding to the specific values of heat 
radiation and overpressure considered in the case study are reported in Table 5. 53. 
Table 5. 53 Inputs for the calculation of escalation probabilities due to single escalation vectors (i.e., 
heat radiation and overpressure) for the case study. 
A) Calculation of escalation probabilities due to heat radiation 
Heat Load 
(kW/m2) 
ttf (s) Probit (Y) Escalation 
Probability (Pd) 
2.2 7.433E+03 -3.924E+00 2.255E-19 
3.6 4.265E+03 -2.898E+00 1.421E-15 
4.6 3.235E+03 -2.387E+00 7.511E-14 
9.3 1.462E+03 -9.203E-01 1.607E-09 
19.3 6.417E+02 6.008E-01 5.432E-06 
B) Calculation of escalation probabilities due to overpressure 
Peak overpressure (Pa) Probit (Y) Escalation 
Probability (Pd) 
2000 -0.41380 3.085E-08 
4000 1.2775 9.862E-05 
8000 2.9688 2.112 E-02 
10000 3.5132 6.854 E-02 
The escalation probabilities derived from the two effects (i.e., heat radiation and overpressure) 
have been calculated for each tank as reported in Table 5. 54, and then combined in purpose 
to account synergistic effects.  
The Conditional Probability Tables that considers escalation probabilities to be inserted in 
Bayesian Network modelling (in both steps) have been reported in Table 5. 55, Table 5. 56 and 
Table 5. 57, for each unit TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,3… ,8}. The values of escalation probabilities, have 
been calculated by noisy OR-gates, considering the synergistic effects of heat radiation and 
overpressure. The CPTs are the same ones in both modelling steps, as the accident propagation 
pattern does not vary. 
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Table 5. 54 Results of escalation probabilities calculation due to heat radiation and overpressure. 
Heat radiation - escalation probabilities 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
T1 0 5.4315E-06 7.5112E-14 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 1.4210E-15 7.5112E-14 1.4210E-15 
T2 5.4315E-06 0 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 1.4210E-15 7.5112E-14 
T3 7.5112E-14 5.4315E-06 0 1.4210E-15 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 2.2551E-19 1.4210E-15 
T4 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 1.4210E-15 0 5.4315E-06 7.5112E-14 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 
T5 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 0 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 
T6 1.4210E-15 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 7.5112E-14 5.4315E-06 0 1.4210E-15 1.6066E-09 
T7 7.5112E-14 1.4210E-15 2.2551E-19 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 1.4210E-15 0.0000E+00 5.4315E-06 
T8 1.4210E-15 7.5112E-14 1.4210E-15 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 1.6066E-09 5.4315E-06 0 
Overpressure – escalation probabilities 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
T1 0 6.8538E-02 9.8623E-05 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 
T2 6.8538E-02 0 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 
T3 9.8623E-05 6.8538E-02 0 9.8623E-05 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 3.0851E-08 9.8623E-05 
T4 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 9.8623E-05 0 6.8538E-02 9.8623E-05 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 
T5 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 0 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 
T6 9.8623E-05 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 9.8623E-05 6.8538E-02 0 9.8623E-05 2.1115E-02 
T7 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 3.0851E-08 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 9.8623E-05 0 6.8538E-02 
T8 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 9.8623E-05 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 2.1115E-02 6.8538E-02 0 
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Table 5. 55 CPTs for the case study (from T1 to T5). 
CPT T1 
PF 1.00E-05 
VCE 2.00E-06 
Safe  9.9999E-01 
CPT T2 
T1 PF VCE Safe 
PF 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
VCE 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.3146E-01 1 
CPT T3 
T2 PF VCE Safe 
PF 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
VCE 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.3146E-01 1 
CPT T4 
T1 PF VCE Safe 
PF 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
VCE 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.3146E-01 1 
CPT T5 
T4 PF 
T2 PF VCE Safe 
T1 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 5.4323E-06 1.0563E-02 0 3.4271E-02 4.4105E-02 0 2.7166E-06 1.0560E-02 0 
VCE 5.4323E-06 1.0563E-02 0 3.4271E-02 4.4105E-02 0 2.7166E-06 1.0560E-02 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.7887E-01 1 9.3146E-01 9.1179E-01 1 9.9999E-01 9.7888E-01 1 
T4 VCE 
T2 PF VCE Safe 
T1 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 3.4271E-02 4.4105E-02 0 6.6189E-02 7.5349E-02 0 3.4269E-02 4.4103E-02 0 
VCE 3.4271E-02 4.4105E-02 0 6.6189E-02 7.5349E-02 0 3.4269E-02 4.4103E-02 0 
Safe 9.3146E-01 9.1179E-01 1 8.6762E-01 8.4930E-01 1 9.3146E-01 9.1179E-01 1 
T4 Safe 
T2 PF VCE Safe 
T1 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 2.7166E-06 1.0560E-02 0 3.4269E-02 4.4103E-02 0 8.0328E-10 1.0558E-02 0 
VCE 2.7166E-06 1.0560E-02 0 3.4269E-02 4.4103E-02 0 8.0328E-10 1.0558E-02 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.7888E-01 1 9.3146E-01 9.1179E-01 1 1.0000E+00 9.7888E-01 1 
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Table 5. 56 CPTs for the case study (from T6 to T7). 
CPT T6 
T2 PF 
T5 PF VCE Safe 
T3 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 5.4323E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
8.0328E-
10 
VCE 5.4323E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
8.0328E-
10 
Safe 9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
8.6762E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
1 
T2 VCE 
T5 PF VCE Safe 
T3 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 1.0563E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
7.5349E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0558E-
02 
VCE 1.0563E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
7.5349E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0558E-
02 
Safe 9.7887E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
8.4930E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-
01 
T2 Safe 
T5 PF VCE Safe 
T3 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 5.4315E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
0 
VCE 5.4315E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
0 
Safe 9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
8.6762E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
1 
CPT T7 
T4 PF VCE Safe 
PF 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
VCE 2.71577E-06 0.034268925 0 
Safe 9.9999E-01 9.3146E-01 1 
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Table 5. 57 CPTs for the case study (T8). 
CPT T8 
T4 PF  
T7 PF VCE Safe 
T5 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 5.4323E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
8.0328E-10 
VCE 5.4323E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7166E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
8.0328E-10 
Safe 9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
8.6762E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
1.0000E+00 
T4 VCE 
T7 PF VCE Safe 
T5 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 1.0563E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
7.5349E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0558E-02 
VCE 1.0563E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4105E-
02 
7.5349E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0560E-
02 
4.4103E-
02 
1.0558E-02 
Safe 9.7887E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
8.4930E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-
01 
9.1179E-
01 
9.7888E-01 
T4 Safe 
T7 PF VCE Safe 
T5 PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe PF VCE Safe 
PF 5.4315E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
0 
VCE 5.4315E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4271E-
02 
6.6189E-
02 
3.4269E-
02 
2.7158E-
06 
3.4269E-
02 
0 
Safe 9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
8.6762E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
9.9999E-
01 
9.3146E-
01 
1 
5.3.5.2 Application of Bayesian Networks to domino accident analysis without 
safety measures 
In modelling step 1), which is adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013d), safety 
barriers are not included in domino accident analysis, which is performed according to the 
methodology of Section 3.3.2.1.3.4. Bayesian Network is constructed using Hugin Software 
version 8.1 (Hugin, 2016); a qualitative representation of the net is available in Figure 5.57, the 
inputs and reasoning that lead to the accident propagation modelling are listed in the previous 
subsection.  
The outputs of the net obtained from modelling step 1), which consists on tank accident 
probabilities TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,3… ,8}, auxiliary nodes probabilities (i.e., L1, L2 and L3) and 
domino level probabilities (i.e., DL0, DL1 and DL2) are available in Table 5. 58. It should be 
noted that modelling step 1) demonstrates the usefuleness and ease of application of Bayesian 
Network application to domino accident modelling, with reference to a realistic plant layout. 
Section 5 - Dynamic safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events: 
applications to case studies 
 
257 
 
Neverthless, step 1) provides only a baseline situation for further implementations, as 
cascading events realistic representation demands for introduction of safety barriers in the 
modelling phase. 
 
Figure 5. 57 Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a realistic tank farm with no safety 
barriers included in the analysis (modelling Step 1), adapted from Khakzad et al. (Khakzad et al., 2013b). 
As seen in previous case studies, one of the advantage of Bayesian Networks is the possibility 
to revise probabilities, due to new evidencies. Therefore, the application of a probability 
revising technique is carried out to net obtained from modelling step 1), in purpose to identify 
weak links leading to a specific final accidental state, for instance T6. The evidence of T6 in PF 
state is inserted in the net, and the sum propagation normal tool is applied to compile the net. 
The results, reported in Table 5. 58, show posterior probabilities for each tank of the tank farm 
(𝑋 = {1,2,… ,8}), in particular: 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Auxiliary nodes probabilities (L1, L2, L3); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2, DL3). 
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Table 5. 58 Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a realistic tank farm with no 
safety barriers included in the analysis (modelling Step 1). Column on the left refers to prior 
probabilities; column on the right reports posterior probabilities, after the introduction of T6 in Pool 
Fire state as evidence. 
 Modelling 
step 1 
No safety barriers 
Prior probabilities 
No safety barriers 
Posterior probabilities 
Tank probabilities 
Tank ID PF VCE PF VCE 
T1 1.000E-05 2.000E-06 2.300E-04 9.998E-01 
T2 6.857E-08 6.857E-08 1.630E-02 5.371E-01 
T3 2.350E-09 2.350E-09 1.681E-02 6.337E-02 
T4 6.857E-08 6.857E-08 3.240E-02 7.910E-02 
T5 2.590E-08 2.590E-08 2.152E-02 5.458E-01 
T6 1.688E-09 1.688E-09 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 
T7 2.350E-09 2.350E-09 2.710E-03 2.710E-03 
T8 1.688E-09 1.688E-09 1.958E-02 1.958E-02 
Auxiliary nodes probabilities 
L1 2.649E-07 6.241E-01 nd 
L2 6.033E-08 6.374E-01 nd 
L3 6.619E-09 1.000E+00 nd 
Domino probabilities 
DL0 1.200E-05 1.000E+00 nd  
DL1 2.649E-07 6.241E-01 nd  
DL2 2.331E-08 2.615E-01 nd  
DL3 1.721E-09 2.615E-01 nd  
 
5.3.5.3 Application of safety measures performance assessment to domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks 
According to modelling step 2, an extension of the previous case study with introduction of 
pertinent safety measures, named also safety barriers, on each tank is provided, obtaining 
therefore an original application of domino accident analysis with Bayesian Networks, filling 
the research gap identified in Section 5.1.1.2. The accident propagation and the input data are 
the same ones applied in the previous section. The results obtained in the two different 
modelling steps will be compared to assess the influence of safety barriers introduction on 
domino probabilities. BNs modelling has been performed with Hugin Expert Software version 
8.1 (Hugin, 2016). 
Safety barriers pertinent for the reference installation are defined, based on the approach 
presented in Section 3.3.2.1.2; they are the same ones of the tank farm case study with 3 tanks 
(Section 5.3.4). As the installation is considered RI Type 1, the presence of 3 safety barriers on 
each tank is accounted. They are respectively: sprinkler (Sprinkler_TX), PSV (PSV_TX) and 
emergency team intervention (Em_Team_TX), represented by three nodes in BNs modelling, 
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which are connected as child node of TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,… ,8}; each safety barrier has a binary 
behavior (i.e., OUT 1 – fail / OUT 2 – work).  
The performance of safety barriers has been accounted by means of the three typologies of 
specific gates described in Section 3.3.2.1.2, which combine availability and effectiveness. 
Therefore, the performance of safety barriers on each tank (i.e., Sprinkler_TX, PSV_TX, 
Em_Team_TX) is the output of a logic gate, whose inputs are the nodes regarding the 
availability of each barrier (Av_Spr_TX, Av_PSV_TX, Av_Emt_TX) and the respective 
effectiveness (Eff_Spr_TX, Eff_PSV_TX, Eff_Emt_TX). Input data for safety barriers 
performance assessment are reported in Table 5. 59. It should be noted that safety barriers 
behavior is independent from the typology of top event (i.e., PF or VCE). This approach, 
applied also in the previous case study (Section 5.3.4) allows avoiding over conservative 
assumptions regarding safety barriers performance, according to the concepts discussed in 
Section 3.3.2.1.2. It should be noted that, despite the increased complexity of the net (more 
units and variables, increased maximum domino level), the inclusion of safety barriers 
performance in domino accident modelling for the current case study (i.e., tank farm of 8 
tanks) has been carried out by applying the same typologies of  safety barriers, with the same 
inputs regarding availability and effectiveness, as for the case study with 3 tanks (i.e., described 
in Section 5.3.4). 
Table 5. 59 Input data for the inclusion of safety barriers performance assessment within domino 
accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks. Data retrieved from a data repository (Landucci et al., 
2015). 
Safety 
barrier ID 
Safety barrier 
description 
Input data for modelling step 2  
Sprinkler Foam water 
sprinkler system 
with electric 
actuation 
Gate Type B 
Availability 5.39E-03 
Effectiveness (η) 0.954 
PSV Pressure safety 
valve 
Gate Type A 
Availability 1.00E-02 
Effectiveness (η) 1 
Em.Team Emergency team 
intervention 
Gate Type C 
Availability 1.00E-01 
Effectiveness (η) 1 
Regarding the definition of tank probabilities for the eight tanks composing the tank farm, the 
values reported in Table 5. 55, Table 5. 56, Table 5. 57 have been inserted in CPTs; CPTs remain 
the same ones of the previous modelling step. A consequence node is defined for each tank 
(Cons_TX), according to an AND gate, as displayed in previous safety barriers performance 
assessment by means of BNs (e.g., see Section 5.3.2, Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4). According 
to the configuration of the case study (i.e., two top events, three safety barriers on each tank), 
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the consequence node on each tank accounts for 16 accidental states plus state Safe, as 
displayed in Table 5. 60. On each tank, 8 final accidental states are due to PF and 8 are due to 
VCE; in this way propagation due to VCE and PF can be considered correctly.   
The escalation occurs only when all the barriers on a tank are not working, according to the 
approximation taken from Landucci et al. (Landucci et al., 2015a). In this situation, the 
consequence node is in state CTX_1 with reference to PF and in state CTX_9 with reference to 
VCE (Table 5. 60)), for each tank TX with 𝑋 = {1,2,3… ,8}. This is represented in the net by an 
additional node (WCons_TX) on each tank, which is a child node of the respective consequence 
node. Therefore, WCons_TX node represents the “reduced” accident probability on each tank, 
due to the introduction of safety barriers. Indeed, WCons_TX should concour to the 
determination of domino level probabilities in modelling step 2). According to the 
methodology for domino accident modelling displayed in Section 3.3.2.1.3.4, and previously 
applied in modelling step 1), the introduction of safety barriers did not modified the accident 
propagation pattern. Therefore, WCons_TX is linked to the following tanks considering the 
same propagation pattern as in modelling step 1). 
Table 5. 60 Safety barriers states for each resulting final accidental state, for a generic tank X of the 
realistic tank farm, with 𝑋 = {1,2,3… ,8}. 
Top event Consequence ID - Tank X Sprinkler_TX PSV_TX Em_team_TX 
PF CTX_1 fail fail fail 
PF CTX_2 fail fail work 
PF CTX_3 fail work fail 
PF CTX_4 fail work work 
PF CTX_5 work fail fail 
PF CTX_6 work fail work 
PF CTX_7 work work fail 
PF CTX_8 work work work 
VCE CTX_9 fail fail fail 
VCE CTX_10 fail fail work 
VCE CTX_11 fail work fail 
VCE CTX_12 fail work work 
VCE CTX_13 work fail fail 
VCE CTX_14 work fail work 
VCE CTX_15 work work fail 
VCE CTX_16 work work work 
Auxiliary nodes L1, L2, L3, are added to the net, as well as DL0, DL1, DL2, and DL3. DL0 
overlaps with the primary event. With reference to the specific case plant layout, for example, 
to account for the first level domino effect, DL1 is connected to WCons_T1 and the auxiliary 
node L1 with an AND gate. L1 represents the output of an OR gate between WCons_T2 and 
WCons_T4. Then, L2 auxiliary node is obtained as an OR gate among WCons_T3, WCons_T5 
and WCons_T7. DL2 is connected to the unit DL1 and the auxiliary node L2 with an AND gate. 
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Similarly, L3 auxiliary node is obtained as an OR gate between WCons_T6 and WCons_T8. 
DL3 is connected to the unit DL2 and the auxiliary node L3 with an AND gate. 
5.3.5.4 Results of the case study 
The results obtained from modelling step 2) are reported below; the qualitative part of BN, 
obtained with Hugin software 8.1 (Hugin, 2016) is reported in Figure 5. 58; the outputs of the 
net, obtained from Bayesian Network analysis, are available in Table 5. 61 and Table 5. 62. 
According to modelling step 2), for each tank 𝑋 of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,3,… ,8});, the 
following results have been reported in Table 5. 61 and Table 5. 62: 
 Safety barriers performance probabilities, referred to failure state (i.e., Sprinkler_TX, 
PSV_TX, Em_Team_TX); 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Consequence node probabilities (Cons_TX), specifying the one possibly leading to further 
escalation (WCons_TX); 
 Auxiliary nodes probabilities (L1, L2, L3); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2, DL3). 
As seen in previous case studies, one of the advantages of Bayesian Networks is the possibility 
to revise probabilities, due to new evidencies. Therefore, the application of a probability 
revising technique is carried out to net obtained from modelling step 2), in purpose to identify 
weak links leading to a specific final accidental state, for instance WCons_T6 is in PF state. 
The evidence is inserted in the net, and the sum propagation normal tool is applied to compile 
the net. The results, reported in Table 5. 63, show posterior probabilities for each tank 𝑋 of the 
tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,… ,8}), in particular: 
 Tank node probabilities (TX); 
 Consequence node probabilities (Cons_TX), specifying the one possibly leading to further 
escalation (WCons_TX); 
 Auxiliary nodes probabilities (L1, L2, L3); 
 Domino probabilities (DLO, DL1, DL2, DL3). 
However, it should be noted that the application of probability revising techniques, which are 
very useful with respect to major accident scenarios and generally rather simple case studies, 
might be not the most significant advantage of domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian 
Network, due to the scarcity of accidental data to be applied.  
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Table 5. 61 Part 1 - Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in realistic tank farm of 8 tanks with safety barriers included in the analysis. 
Their performance is evaluated with specific gates, based on availability and effectiveness (modelling Step 2). All the results refer to accident/failure state. 
  Tank ID (X=1,2,...,8) 
  X=1 X=2 X=3 
  
 X=4 
 
X=5 
  
 X=6 X=7 X=8 
  
Top event PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE 
Tank probabilities 
TX 1.000E-
05 
2.000E-
06 
3.507E-
12 
3.507E-
12 
6.146E-
18 
6.146E-
18 
3.507E-
12 
3.507E-
12 
1.091E-
12 
1.091E-
12 
3.806E-
18 
3.806E-
18 
6.146E-
18 
6.146E-
18 
3.806E-
18 
3.806E-
18 
Safety barriers 
Sprinkler_TX 6.137E-07  3.587E-13 6.286E-19 3.587E-13 1.116E-13 3.893E-19 6.286E-19 3.893E-19 
PSV_TX 1.200E-07 7.013E-14 1.229E-19 7.013E-14  2.182E-14 7.612E-20  1.229E-19  7.612E-20  
Em_team_TX 1.200E-06 7.013E-13 1.229E-18 7.013E-13 2.182E-13 7.612E-19 1.229E-18 7.612E-19 
Cons_TX 
CTX_1 5.114E-
10 
 - 1.793E-
16 
 - 3.143E-
22 
 - 1.793E-
16 
 - 5.581E-
17 
 - 1.946E-
22 
 - 3.143E-
22 
 - 1.946E-
22 
 - 
CTX_2 4.603E-
09 
 - 1.614E-
15 
 - 2.829E-
21 
 - 1.614E-
15 
 - 5.022E-
16 
 - 1.752E-
21 
 - 2.829E-
21 
 - 1.752E-
21 
 - 
CTX_3 5.063E-
08 
 - 1.775E-
14 
 - 3.112E-
20 
 - 1.775E-
14 
 - 5.525E-
15 
 - 1.927E-
20 
 - 3.112E-
20 
 - 1.927E-
20 
 - 
CTX_4 4.557E-
07 
 - 1.598E-
13 
 - 2.801E-
19 
 - 1.598E-
13 
 - 4.972E-
14 
 - 1.734E-
19 
 - 2.801E-
19 
 - 1.734E-
19 
 - 
CTX_5 9.489E-
09 
 - 3.327E-
15 
 - 5.832E-
21 
 - 3.327E-
15 
 - 1.035E-
15 
 - 3.611E-
21 
 - 5.832E-
21 
 - 3.611E-
21 
 - 
CTX_6 8.540E-
08 
 -- 2.995E-
14 
 - 5.249E-
20 
 - 2.995E-
14 
 - 9.318E-
15 
 - 3.250E-
20 
 - 5.249E-
20 
 - 3.250E-
20 
 - 
CTX_7 9.394E-
07 
 - 3.294E-
13 
 - 5.773E-
19 
 - 3.294E-
13 
 - 1.025E-
13 
 - 3.575E-
19 
 - 5.773E-
19 
 - 3.575E-
19 
 - 
CTX_8 8.454E-
06 
 - 2.965E-
12 
 - 5.196E-
18 
 - 2.965E-
12 
 - 9.225E-
13 
 - 3.218E-
18 
 - 5.196E-
18 
 - 3.218E-
18 
 - 
CTX_9  - 1.023E-
10 
 - 1.793E-
16 
 - 3.143E-
22 
 - 1.793E-
16 
 - 5.581E-
17 
 - 1.946E-
22 
 - 3.143E-
22 
 - 1.946E-
22 
CTX_10  - 9.206E-
10 
 - 1.614E-
15 
 - 2.829E-
21 
 - 1.614E-
15 
 - 5.022E-
16 
 - 1.752E-
21 
 - 2.829E-
21 
 - 1.752E-
21 
CTX_11  - 1.013E-
08 
 - 1.775E-
14 
 - 3.112E-
20 
 - 1.775E-
14 
 - 5.525E-
15 
 - 1.927E-
20 
 - 3.112E-
20 
 - 1.927E-
20 
CTX_12  - 9.114E-
08 
 - 1.598E-
13 
 - 2.801E-
19 
 - 1.598E-
13 
 - 4.972E-
14 
 - 1.734E-
19 
 - 2.801E-
19 
 - 1.734E-
19 
CTX_13  - 1.898E-
09 
 - 3.327E-
15 
 - 5.832E-
21 
 - 3.327E-
15 
 - 1.035E-
15 
 - 3.611E-
21 
 - 5.832E-
21 
 - 3.611E-
21 
CTX_14  - 1.708E-
08 
 - 2.995E-
14 
 - 5.249E-
20 
 - 2.995E-
14 
 - 9.318E-
15 
 - 3.250E-
20 
 - 5.249E-
20 
 - 3.250E-
20 
CTX_15  - 1.879E-
07 
 - 3.294E-
13 
 - 5.773E-
19 
 - 3.294E-
13 
 - 1.025E-
13 
 - 3.575E-
19 
 - 5.773E-
19 
 - 3.575E-
19 
CTX_16  - 1.691E-
06 
 - 2.965E-
12 
 - 5.196E-
18 
 - 2.965E-
12 
 - 9.225E-
13 
 - 3.218E-
18 
 - 5.196E-
18 
 - 3.218E-
18 
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Table 5. 62 Part 2 - Results of Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in realistic tank farm of 8 tanks with safety barriers included in the analysis. 
Their performance is evaluated with specific gates, based on availability and effectiveness (modelling Step 2). All the results refer to accident/failure state. 
  Tank ID (X=1,2,...,8) 
  X=1 X=2 X=3 
  
 X=4 
 
X=5 
  
 X=6 X=7 X=8 
  
Top event PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE 
WCons_TX 5.114E-
10 
1.023E-
10 
1.793E-
16 
1.793E-
16 
3.143E-
22 
3.143E-
22 
1.793E-
16 
1.793E-
16 
5.581E-
17 
5.581E-
17 
1.946E-
22 
1.946E-
22 
3.143E-
22 
3.143E-
22 
1.946E-
22 
1.946E-
22 
Auxiliary nodes probabilities 
  
L1 7.173E-16 
 
L2 1.116E-16 
 
L3 7.786E-22 
 
Domino probabilities 
DL0 6.137E-10 
DL1 7.173E-16 
DL2 3.260E-21 
DL3 1.222E-26 
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Figure 5. 58 Bayesian Network for domino accident analysis in a realistic tank farm with safety barriers included in the analysis. Their performance is evaluated 
with specific gates, based on availability and effectiveness (modelling Step 2). 
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Table 5. 63 Comparison between posterior probabilities and priors for domino accident analysis in realistic tank farm of 8 tanks with safety barriers included 
in the analysis. The evidence of WCons_T6 in PF state is added to the net to obtain posterior probabilities. 
  
Posterior probabilities 
 
 
Prior probabilities 
 
Tank probability PF VCE Tank probability PF VCE 
T1 1.972E-05 9.998E-01 T1 1.000E-05 2.000E-06 
T2 1.722E-02 5.147E-01 T2 3.507E-12 3.507E-12 
T3 1.705E-02 1.705E-02 T3 6.146E-18 6.146E-18 
T4 3.426E-02 3.426E-02 T4 3.507E-12 3.507E-12 
T5 2.198E-02 5.244E-01 T5 1.091E-12 1.091E-12 
T6 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 T6 3.806E-18 3.806E-18 
T7 1.547E-07 1.547E-07 T7 6.146E-18 6.146E-18 
T8 1.722E-02 1.722E-02 T8 3.806E-18 3.806E-18 
Worst Consequences PF VCE Worst Consequences PF VCE 
Wcons_T1 1.972E-04 9.998E-01 Wcons_T1 5.114E-10 1.023E-10 
Wcons_T2 9.099E-07 4.975E-01 Wcons_T2 1.79E-16 1.79E-16 
Wcons_T3 8.721E-07 3.640E-06 Wcons_T3 3.143E-22 3.143E-22 
Wcons_T4 1.730E-06 4.510E-06 Wcons_T4 1.793E-16 1.793E-16 
Wcons_T5 4.094E-05 5.025E-01 Wcons_T5 5.580E-17 5.580E-17 
Wcons_T6 1.000E+00 0.000E+00 Wcons_T6 1.946E-22 1.946E-22 
Wcons_T7 7.911E-12 7.911E-12 Wcons_T7 3.143E-22 3.143E-22 
Wcons_T8 8.806E-07 8.806E-07 Wcons_T8 1.946E-22 1.946E-22 
Domino Level probability  Domino Level probability 
DL0 1.000E+00 DL0 6.137E-10 
DL1 4.975E-01 DL1 7.173E-16 
DL2 1.570E-05 DL2 3.260E-21 
DL3 1.570E-05 DL3 1.222E-26 
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On the other hand, it might be relevant to carry out a comparison of the results, obtained from 
modelling steps 1) and 2), in purpose to evaluate the effect of safety barriers introduction 
within modelling phase. For each tank of the tank farm (𝑋 = {1,2,… ,8}), the results referred to 
tank accident probabilities (TX), according to the two different modelling steps have been 
reported in Table 5. 64. For instance, the ratio between tank accident probability in modelling 
step 2) and 1) clearly shows a reduction up to 9 orders of magnitude. The gap tends to be 
particularly significant in the last units affected by domino effect (i.e., T6, T7, T8). Therefore, 
modelling step 3), which includes a complete approach to safety barriers performance 
assessment, is able to represent the systems in detailed way, avoiding overestimation of 
accident probabilities. 
Domino probabilities at different levels (DLO, DL1, DL2, DL3) have been reported separately 
for the two modelling steps in Table 5. 64: without safety barriers (modelling step 1) and with 
safety barriers overall performance, by a combination of availability and effectiveness 
(modelling step 2). The ratio between modelling steps 2) and 1) shows a reduction from 5 to 18 
order of magnitude in domino probabilities after the introduction of safety barriers, confirming 
that safety barriers introduction within domino accident modelling provides a more realistic 
framework for domino effects analysis. 
Table 5. 64 Comparison of results obtained from domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian 
Networks, before (i.e., modelling step 1) and after introduction of safety barriers (i.e., modelling step 2) 
in the modelling phase. 
  
Tank 
probability 
Modelling step 2 
 SB performance 
  
Modelling step 1 
No safety barriers 
  
Ratio  - modelling 
step 2 /modelling 
step 1 
PF VCE PF VCE PF VCE 
T1 1.00E-05 2.00E-06 1.000E-05 2.000E-06 1.000E+0
0 
1.000E+0
0 
T2 3.507E-12 3.507E-12 6.857E-08 6.857E-08 5.114E-05 5.114E-05 
T3 6.146E-18 6.146E-18 2.350E-09 2.350E-09 2.616E-09 2.616E-09 
T4 3.507E-12 3.507E-12 6.857E-08 6.857E-08 5.114E-05 5.114E-05 
T5 1.091E-12 1.091E-12 2.590E-08 2.590E-08 4.214E-05 4.214E-05 
T6 3.806E-18 3.806E-18 1.688E-09 1.688E-09 2.255E-09 2.255E-09 
T7 6.146E-18 6.146E-18 2.350E-09 2.350E-09 2.616E-09 2.616E-09 
T8 3.806E-18 3.806E-18 1.688E-09 1.688E-09 2.255E-09 2.255E-09 
Domino 
Level prob. 
 Modelling step 2 
 SB performance 
  
Modelling step 1 
No safety barriers 
  
Ratio  - modelling 
step 2 /modelling 
step 1 
 
DL0 6.137E-10 1.200E-05 5.114E-05 
DL1 7.173E-16 2.649E-07 2.708E-09 
DL2 3.260E-21 2.331E-08 1.399E-13 
DL3 1.222E-26 1.721E-09 7.104E-18 
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5.3.5.5 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The present application has been aimed at implementing safety barriers performance 
assessment, by means of Bayesian Networks, to domino accident analysis. The case study 
refers to the prevention of fire escalation into a cascading event (i.e., domino accident), 
considering a realistic tank farm of eight tanks, with multiple top events, three domino levels 
and synergistic included in the analysis.. The methodology for the definition of domino 
accident modelling by means of BNs has been recently, but only the simplified case study 
presented in the previous Section (Section 5.3.4) accounted for safety barriers within the 
modelling phase. Therefore, the present original case study is aimed at definitely proving the 
advantage of safety barriers performance assessment inclusion within domino accident 
analysis by means of Bayesian Networks.  
Safety barriers of different typologies (i.e., active, passive and procedural ones) have been 
introduced in the modelling phase on each tank of the tank farm; their performances have been 
assessed by means of specific gates (i.e., type A, B and C), depending on barriers states and 
classification, combining availability and effectiveness. Indeed, the application of specific gates 
for the assessment of safety barriers performance has proved in previous case studies (e.g., see 
Section 5.3.4) to be useful in purpose to avoid performance overestimation and to provide a 
more accurate risk picture within domino effect modelling and prevention.  
Despite the increasing complexity of the present case study with respect to the previous one 
(Section 5.3.4), the results were analogous. Indeed, the results of the current case study have 
revealed a decrease of several order of magnitude in the domino probabilities at all the levels 
(i.e., 3 levels of domino), as well as in the tanks accident probability, in comparison with the 
results obtained not including safety barriers in the modelling phase.  
Therefore, it is confirmed that the information obtained by domino accident modelling, with 
the inclusion of safety barriers, offers an accurate risk picture, avoiding overestimation of 
accident probabilities. 
Eventually domino accident analysis, performed by means of an advanced dynamic technique 
as Bayesian Networks, joined with safety barriers performance assessment is able to model 
realistically severe accidental scenarios and cascading events triggered by external hazard 
factors (i.e., domino effect). This typology of application has demonstrated its full potential 
and may become a fundamental tool to support QRA application (i.e., risk evaluation phase) 
to external hazard factor-driven accidents, with specific reference to domino effects. 
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The present section of the research project has been aimed at applying dynamic approaches to 
safety measures performance assessment in the prevention of major accidents and cascading 
events (i.e., domino accidents), by means of Bayesian analysis techniques, in particular 
Bayesian Networks. 
Initial tutorials and applications, the latter derived from existing works, were aimed at 
exploring the potentialities of the mentioned Bayesian techniques. Initial applications, which 
considered Bayesian failure assessment for a process tank equipped with safety system and 
Bayesian analysis to an oil spill accident, emphasized the necessity to perform dynamic risk 
assessment by means of specific software, in purpose to support calculations.  
Therefore, a specific software, named Hugin, was applied to construct Bayesian Networks: 
tutorials have been carried out to show tools and features of the software. Then, safety barriers 
performance assessment has been applied by means of Bayesian Networks: two case studies 
were aimed at converting conventional risk assessment techniques (i.e., Fault-Tree and Bow-
Tie) into Bayesian Networks. The possibility of Bayesian Network to account safety barriers 
performance, including also economic elements has been explored by an additional tutorial. 
The lesson learnt by existing case studies and tutorials made clear the advantages of Bayesian 
Networks in terms of flexibility, ability to consider multi state variables and ease to update 
probabilities over time, according to experience. However, few original applications of 
dynamic techniques, in particular Bayesian Networks, are focused on safety barriers 
performance and none of them included safety barriers in domino accident modelling. 
Then, original applications aimed at implementing a Bayesian Network approach to safety 
measures (or barriers) performance assessment with reference to major accidents and 
cascading events prevention, have been carried out.  
A preliminary application has been focused on the implementation of Bayesian Networks to 
safety measures performance assessment, starting from a conventional approach, and 
including only active measures. Safety barriers performance was accounted by means of 
specific gates, depending on barriers states and classification, accounting both availability and 
effectiveness. The case study demonstrate the feasibility of the approach.  
Then, the Bayesian Network application was extended to a realistic case study regarding the 
prevention of fire escalation, including active, passive and procedural safety measures 
performance. The case study proved the feasibility of Bayesian Networks application to safety 
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barriers performance assessment with respect to accident escalation into a cascading event. 
Indeed, both these applications highlighted the easiness to dynamically revise top event, 
intermediate event, safety measures performance and final events probabilities over time, in 
purpose to obtain an updated and more realistic risk picture, by means of Bayesian Networks. 
Therefore, Bayesian Networks have been applied to cascading events prevention, for instance 
to domino accident analysis, in purpose to assess the effect of safety measures inclusion in the 
modelling phase. Two case studies, the first regarding a simplified tank farm and the second 
regarding a realistic tank farm, have been carried out. Despite the increasing level of 
complexity of the realistic tank farm case study, which included multiple top events, three 
levels of domino and synergistic effects, the results of the two case study were analogous. They 
both showed a reduction of domino accident probabilities of several orders of magnitude 
demonstrating that domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks, joined with 
safety barriers performance assessment is able to model realistically cascading events.  
Eventually the case studies have demonstrated that the application of an advanced technique 
for safety barriers performance assessment, as Bayesian Networks, allows providing a very 
accurate identification of risk reducing measures within the risk evaluation phase of QRA, with 
reference to external hazard factors driven accidents (i.e., domino effects), offering a sound 
tool to support safety analysts.  
 
Extension of Quantitative Risk Assessment to the Analysis of External Hazard Factors 
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Section 6. 
Application of an economic model for 
the allocation of preventive security 
measures against terroristic attacks in 
chemical facilities 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present section includes the applications to case studies of the original economic model 
for the selection and allocation of preventive security measures in chemical facilities, presented 
in Section 4, according to its two versions, called EM-PICTURES (i.e., Economic Model for 
Process-Industry related Counter Terrorism measURES) and ECO-SECURE (i.e., ECOnomic 
model for the selection of SECurity measUREs). The mentioned applications provide a 
benchmark for the validation of the model. 
The section starts in Section 6.2 with tutorials on the application of existing methodologies for 
physical security measures performance assessment, which are required for the application of 
the economic model, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. In particular, the tutorial focuses on the 
application of Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (i.e., EASI) model, which is 
inserted in the economic model, presented in Section 4 (Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). 
Then, in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, two original applications to case studies of the economic model, 
in EM-PICTURES version (i.e., Economic Model for Process-Industry related Counter 
Terrorism measURES), are presented.  
The illustrative simplified case study, introduced in Section 6.3, deals with the prevention of a 
possible sabotage to a storage tank farm in a process facility, whose occurrence may lead to a 
major accident. The aim of the case study is to prove that the application of the model provides 
an economic aid or criterion for selecting additional security measures in a simplified chemical 
installation. Starting from a credible sequence of adversary actions regarding an illustrative 
plant layout, the uncertainties related to the threat probability have been accounted and 
possible security measures in place have been considered, determining the baseline physical 
security system performance. Therefore, three pertinent security upgrades have been 
proposed; for each of them the performances improvement and realistic total costs have been 
calculated; the losses derived from an expected accidental scenario have been estimated. Then, 
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economic analysis is applied to prove that model application may allow defining a rational 
selection of security measures for a simplified chemical installation.  
In Section 6.4, EM-PICTURES application is tested using an illustrative case study, based on 
a possible security-related event that took place in France, within a storage tank farm. EM-
PICTURES application starts with the definition of the adversary sequence of actions, which 
includes multiple targets, and the realistic site-specific analysis of the baseline physical 
security system performance. The application includes the comparison and evaluation of the 
costs and performance improvements of a wide range of security upgrades with the 
(hypothetical) benefits related to the avoided losses, derived from different scenarios, 
including a possible cascading event. The application of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analysis is provided, according to EM-PICTURES version of the model, to enable selecting 
economically feasible security measures, or a combination of such measures with a maximum 
net present value, within the budget constraints of a chemical plant. An uncertainty analysis 
regarding threat and vulnerabilities probabilities is carried out, in purpose to evaluate their 
effects on economic analyses results. The complexity of the case study and the use of realistic 
site-specific information for a chemical installation provide a sound benchmark for the 
application of EM-PICTURES version of the original economic model within a real industrial 
context. 
Section 6.5 presents an example of application to a relevant original case study of ECO-
SECURE version of the economic model, specifically aimed at the allocation of preventive 
security measures against environmental and ecological terroristic attacks within chemical 
installations. The application of ECO-SECURE to an illustrative case study, freely adapted 
from a possible security-related environmental disaster that took place in Italy, show the 
capabilities and specific features of this economic model version. Site-specific analysis of the 
baseline physical security system performance allows comparing the costs of different security 
upgrades with the benefits related to the actual losses, derived from an environmental 
accident. The application of both deterministic and break-even approaches, provided by ECO-
SECURE, allows considering directly the uncertainties regarding the threat probability within 
model application. Deterministic analysis allows upgrading the existing physical protection 
system, according to possible variations in the likelihood of the attack. Break-even analysis 
application provides the optimal allocation of the security budget, defined yearly by security 
management. Therefore, the selection of the most profitable security measures within budget 
constraints and definition of economic indicators are the main outputs of the case study. The 
complexity of the case study and the use of realistic site-specific information for a chemical 
installation provide a sound benchmark for the application of ECO-SECURE version of the 
original economic model within a real industrial context. 
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In Section 6.6, conclusions on the case studies are summarized to define the possible 
contribution of economic model application with respect to the reduction of chemical plants 
vulnerability toward security-based accidents, including terroristic attacks.  
6.2 TUTORIALS ON SECURITY MEASURES PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT 
6.2.1 Introduction to tutorials 
The present tutorials, adapted from Garcia (Garcia, 2007), are aimed at clarifying how to 
evaluate the performance of a physical security system, with reference to a site-specific 
adversary path of actions. 
The analysis of available methodologies for the evaluation of physical security measures 
performance, provided in Section 3.4.3, highlighted that the Estimate of Adversary Sequence 
Interruption (i.e., EASI) model, based on the simplified methodology of timely detection, is a 
complete analytical method to calculate the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼), referred to a 
sequence of adversary actions aimed at theft or sabotage. Indeed, according to the 
methodology developed in Section 4 (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3), the site-specific evaluation 
of physical security system performance is a fundamental step for the application of economic 
analysis aimed at the allocation of security resources and the EASI model is applied to that 
extent.  
The first tutorial applies the concept of timely detection; the second one provides an example 
of application of the EASI model. For both, the modelling environment is Excel® version 2013 
datasheet. 
6.2.2 Tutorial on timely detection model 
This tutorial considers a sabotage path to a critical pump (i.e., the sabotage target) in a process 
facility, with multiple layers of protection standing between the adversary and the target. The 
evaluation of baseline physical security system performance (i.e., effectiveness) and possible 
upgrades are provided, by means of timely detection model.  
In Figure 6. 1, information regarding adversary sequence of actions, detection and delay 
elements present along the path are reported. Details on the timely detection equations to be 
applied in the tutorial can be retrieved from Section 3.4.3. 
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The following assumptions are taken into account for model application: 
 Detection occurs before delay; 
 Non-detection probabilities (𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑖), assessed detection probabilities (𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖) and delay times 
(𝑡𝐷,𝑖) for each security element (𝑖 = 1,… ,5) present in the baseline system have been 
reported in Table 6. 1; 
 Response force time (𝑡𝐺) applied in the calculation is 90 𝑠. 
𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑖 indicates the non-detection probability provided by element i. In other words, 𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑖 
represent the probability that element i will not detect the defined adversary, and its value is 
the complement to one of 𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖 (i.e., probability of assessed detection). 
 
Figure 6. 1 Example of physical protection system (i.e., PPS) effectiveness calculation, for the sabotage 
of a critical pump in a process facility. From the top to the bottom: adversary path of actions, detection 
elements, delay elements. 
Table 6. 1 Data for the calculation of baseline effectiveness with timely detection methodology.  
Task description Task number Delay time 𝒕𝑫,𝒊 (𝒔) 𝑷𝑵𝑫,𝒊 𝑷𝑨𝑫,𝒊 
Penetrate Fence 1 6 1 0 
Penetrate Outer 
Door 
2 84 0.9 0.1 
Penetrate Wall 3 120 0.7 0.3 
Penetrate Inner 
Door 
4 84 0.1 0.9 
Destroy Pump 5 30 1 0 
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First, the analyst should define the Critical Detection Point (i.e., CDP), that is the first point in 
the adversary path in which the adversary is more than 90 𝑠 away from the target (i.e., the 
pump).  
The delay time remaining after the CDP in the baseline PPS can be calculated as follows: 
𝑡𝑅,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦 𝑝𝑢𝑚𝑝 + 𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 = (30 + 84) 𝑠 = 114 𝑠 > 𝑡𝐺 
The CDP is located at the wall and the time remaining on the path after it is 114 𝑠; this means 
that if the adversary is not detected at the wall, there won’t be enough time remaining for the 
guards to interrupt the adversary. The probability of interruption should be computed by 
considering only the detection elements before the CDP, which are fence sensors (not present 
in this case, as 𝑃𝑁𝐷,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1), outer door sensors and wall sensors. According to the concept of 
timely detection (see Section 3.4.3) the Probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼), which expresses the 
baseline PPS effectiveness for the specific adversary’s path of actions, is: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑃𝐼
∗ = 1 − (𝑃𝑁𝐷,1 ∙ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,2 ∙ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,3) = 1 − (1 ∙ 0.9 ∙ 0.7) = 1 − 0.63 =  0.37  
The same procedure should be repeated for all the other possible existing adversary paths 𝑝; 
the one with the minimum 𝑃𝐼 , indicated as critical path (𝑝
∗), represents PPS effectiveness. In 
this tutorial, it is assumed, for sake of simplicity, that the path considered is the critical one.  
𝑃𝐼 should be compared with acceptability criteria defined by the security analyst; if it does not 
fulfill it, the Physical Protection System must be improved, by proposing modifications to the 
existing protection elements and/or additional elements to be added. 
In the present example, it is clear that the PPS should be improved, as a possible adversary has 
63% chance of reaching the sabotage target. Therefore, a possible upgrading of the PPS has 
been proposed and the information regarding the upgraded PPS have been reported in Table 
6. 2. The possible modifications to the PPS include: 
 Reduction of response force time (𝑡𝐺)  to 40 𝑠, obtained by dispatching guards in a point 
closer to the high-value asset; 
 Additional delay to the pump, obtained by placing the pump inside a locked metal 
enclosure; 
 Improvement of detection sensors at outer and inner doors level, using sensors with higher 
𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖. 
The CDP of the upgraded system is now located at the pump, as shown by the calculation of 
the delay time remaining after the CDP: 
𝑡𝑅,𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦 𝑝𝑢𝑚𝑝 = 50 𝑠 > 𝑡𝐺 
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Table 6. 2 Example of calculation of upgraded system performance with timely detection method. The 
possible upgrades in comparison with baseline PPS have been indicated in bold printing. 
Task description Task number Delay time 𝒕𝑫,𝒊 (𝒔) 𝑷𝑵𝑫,𝒊 𝑷𝑨𝑫,𝒊 
Penetrate Fence 1 6 1 0 
Penetrate Outer 
Door 
2 84 0.2 0.8 
Penetrate Wall 3 120 0.7 0.3 
Penetrate Inner 
Door 
4 84 0.9 0.1 
Destroy Pump 5 50 0 1 
Apart from the benefits obtained by the upgrading of single security elements, it should be 
noted that it turns into the addition of a layer of protection into the system (i.e., the inner door), 
whose contribution can be added in the computation of upgraded system effectiveness 
(𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤), according to the following expression: 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑃𝐼
∗  = 1 − (𝑃𝑁𝐷,1 ∙ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,2 ∙ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,3 ∙ 𝑃𝑁𝐷,4) = 1 − (1 ∙ 0.2 ∙ 0.7 ∙ 0.9) = 1 − 0.13 =  0.87  
The comparison between the values of baseline and upgraded PPS effectiveness shows that the 
effectiveness improvement (∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ ) is significant: 
∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ = 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.87 − 0.37 = 0.50 
Indeed, also the reduction of delay time after the introduction of PPS upgrades is relevant: 
𝑡𝑅,𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 50 𝑠 < 𝑡𝑅,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 114 𝑠 
Therefore, this tutorial made clear how to assess the performance of an illustrative physical 
protection system, according to the methodology of timely detection, and how to account PPS 
upgrades in the calculations. 
6.2.3 Tutorial on Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption model 
This tutorial, adapted from Garcia (Garcia, 2007), explains how to implement the Estimate of 
Adversary Sequence Interruption (i.e., EASI) model for the calculation of baseline and 
upgraded physical protection system (i.e., PPS) effectiveness, referred to a sequence of 
adversary tasks, by using an Excel version 2013 datasheet. EASI model is applied within the 
original economic model presented in Section 4, in purpose to assess both the baseline and the 
upgraded physical protection system effectiveness. Further details on the equations composing 
the EASI model are available in Section 3.4.3; its insertion within the original economic model 
is presented in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.  
The current tutorial considers a possible sabotage to a target (i.e., a pump located in an internal 
area of a chemical installation). According to the EASI model, a possible critical site-specific 
adversary sequence path, connecting the adversary starting point with the target, in relation 
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with physical protection elements present on the reference site, is defined and reported in 
Table 6. 3, Part A. The adversary starting point is assumed outside the plant border, at the 
outer fence level. In this tutorial, the adversary is supposed to carry out the sabotage by foot, 
with no additional tools hindering his action. If a sabotage is considered, as in the present 
tutorial, the way back from the target up to the plant borders should not be accounted for in 
effectiveness calculations, because it is not relevant for the fulfillment of the malevolent action 
scope. 
The calculation of baseline system effectiveness is carried out, with the aim to determine the 
probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼
∗) of the critical adversary path. The calculation of the baseline 
system effectiveness requires the following inputs: 
1) Detection elements present along the path. The solely detection elements present are 
cameras on the wall delimiting the two storage areas, with 𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 𝑃𝐴𝐷,5 = 0.9. The 
probability of assessed detection (𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖) expresses the likelihood of detecting an 
adversary within the zone covered by cameras or intrusion detection sensors. In 
addition, the location of detection elements was included in the analysis, according to 
the EASI model, identifying all of them with a standard B location, indicating detection 
before delay. All the data inherent to the detection function for the path considered in 
the case study have been reported in Table 6. 3, Part A. 
2) Delay elements present along the path. For all delay elements with the exception of 
running times, specific data have been retrieved (Garcia, 2007) and reported in Table 
6. 3, Part A.  
3) Data for the calculation of running delay times. Distances among delay elements were 
retrieved from site layout and reported in Table 6. 3, Part B. For the calculation of 
running times, the standard adversary velocity of 10 𝑓𝑡/𝑠 = 3.048 𝑚/𝑠 has been 
assumed, considering a reduction factor due to additional weights carried by the 
adversary unitary (i.e., no additional weight carried by the adversary).  
4) Data for the calculation of response function. Inputs for the calculation of response 
element have been reported in Table 6. 3, Part C; for the probability of guard 
communication (𝑃𝐶) a conventional value for industrial facilities was assumed (Garcia, 
2007), with a response force time of 300 𝑠, considering that security guards are present 
on site. 
Standard deviation for the delay parameter of each security element and for the response force 
time parameter was assumed as 3 10⁄  of the mean value throughout the tutorial, according to 
the conservative assumption on data dispersion reported in the EASI model (Garcia, 2007). 
This assumption allows considering that guards will not always respond exactly after the same 
Section 6 – Application of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures 
against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities 
277 
 
time, and that adversaries may take more or less time to penetrate barriers with respect to 
average values.  
The critical probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼
∗) has been calculated according to equation (3.26) 
and its value is 0.4760; 𝑃𝐼
∗ represents the value of the baseline PPS effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑). 
The value was obtained by inserting in the EASI model datasheet (Garcia, 2007) the inputs 
listed in Table 6. 3, according to the approach described in Section 3.4.3 and in Section 4.2.2. 
Therefore, the calculation of baseline system effectiveness highlights moderate security 
weaknesses, which may be tackled by the introduction of pertinent security upgrades.  
Table 6. 3 Inputs for the calculation of baseline PPS effectiveness referred to the critical path. Part A) 
Adversary sequence and inputs for the calculation of detection and delay elements referred to the 
identified adversary path; Part B) Additional data for the calculation of running delay times; Part C) 
Inputs for the calculation of the response function. Standard deviation was assumed 3/10 of the mean 
value. Values retrieved from data repository (Garcia, 2007) and plant layout. 
Part A) Adversary Sequence Diagrams and Inputs for Detection and Delay elements 
ADVERSARY TASKS  DETECTION  DELAY 
Task 
number 
Task Description Detection elements and 
assessed detection 
probabilities  𝑷𝑨𝑫,𝒊 
Delay elements Mean delays 
𝒕𝑫,𝒊 (s)  
1 Cut fence None Fence fabric 10.0 
2 Run to building None Running time 12.0 
3 Open door Camera on the door  
(𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 0.9) 
Door hardness 90.0 
4 Run to vital area None Running time 10.0 
5 Open door Camera on the door  
(𝑃𝐴𝐷,5 = 0.9) 
Door hardness 90.0 
6 Sabotage target None Time required for sabotage 180 
Part B) Data for Calculation of running delay times 
Description of the action Symbol  Value  Unit 
Adversary velocity during running  𝑣 3.048 m/s 
Distance starting point/ building (Task 2) 𝑑2 36.6 m 
Distance building/ vital area (Task 4) 𝑑4 30.5 m 
Reduction factor due to additional weight 
carried by adversary 
𝜑 1 Adim. 
Part C) Data for the calculation of Response function 
Probability of guard communication 𝑷𝑪 0.95 Mean Response Force Time 𝒕𝑮  
(s) 
300 
Starting from the value of baseline PPS effectiveness (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.4760), six PPS upgrades 
have been proposed, according to technical references (Garcia, 2007): 
A) Adding  fence sensors as perimeter detection system; 
B) Adding fence sensors at perimeter level at fence and additional delay at target level 
(i.e., by enclosing the target in an hardened case); 
C) Adding detection elements (i.e., surveillance cameras) at sabotage target level; 
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D) Adding a delay element (i.e., a wall) at perimeter level; 
E) Reducing response force time by relocating the guard dispatch and additional fence 
sensors at perimeter level. 
It should be noted that upgrades A and C refer to the detection function, upgrades D refers to 
the delay function, upgrade B refers to the combination of detection and delay functions and 
upgrade E refers to the response function. Moreover, upgrades A and D refer to the external 
perimeter of the facility, upgrades B, C, E refer to the proximity of the sabotage target.  
Table 6. 4 Effectiveness results for five different possible PPS upgrades. From the left to the right, in 
column order: Upgrade identity, description of the upgrade, Physical protection function modification, 
reference number of adversary sequence diagram modified tasks, modified inputs for the effectiveness 
calculations, upgraded PPS effectiveness (𝜼𝑷𝑷𝑺,𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒊). (*) Reduction of response force time does not affect 
a single task. A data repository regarding modified inputs values for security upgrades is available in 
Garcia (Garcia, 2007). 
Upgrade 
ID 
Description PPS - function 
modification 
N° of 
modified 
tasks  
Modified inputs   ηPPS, new i 
A Addition of fence sensors at 
perimeter level 
Detection; fence 
sensors 
1 𝑃𝐴𝐷,1 = 0.9 0.5781 
 
B Addition of fence sensors at 
perimeter level and 
hardened case for target 
Detection; fence 
sensors. Delay; 
wall hardness 
1; 6 𝑃𝐴𝐷,1 = 0.9 
𝑡𝐷,6 = 240 𝑠 
0.8432 
C Addition of detection 
element at sabotage target 
(cameras) 
 
Detection; 
camera 
6  𝑃𝐴𝐷,6 = 0.9  
         
0.4763 
 
D Construction/ additional 
height to external concrete-
reinforced perimeter wall 
(3m high) 
Delay; wall 
hardness 
1  𝑡𝐷,1 =  30 𝑠 0.4760 
 
E Reduction of responsed 
force time and addition of 
fence sensors at perimeter 
level 
Detection; fence 
sensors.  
(*) 𝑃𝐴𝐷,1 = 0.9 
𝑡𝐺 = 200 𝑠 
0.8960 
The upgraded values of effectiveness, indicated as 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖, for each of the five options have 
been calculated by inserting the modified input items, listed in Table 6. 4 (i.e., third to last 
column), in the effectiveness model previously applied to calculate baseline PPS effectiveness 
(i.e., the EASI model), according to the approach presented in Section 3.4.3 and summarized 
in Section 4.2.2. The modified inputs regarding each security upgrade, with the exception of 
upgrade E, affect only specific tasks of the adversary sequence diagram; for all the remaining 
tasks, the values reported in Table 6. 3 have been applied.  
The results regarding upgraded effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖), corresponding to each of these 
upgrades, have also been reported in Table 6. 4.  
The results in Table 6. 4 clearly show that, from the effectiveness point of view, the best option 
is the reduction of response force time with an upgrade of detection at fence (upgrade E), 
followed by the combined application of detection elements at fence and delay elements at 
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target level (upgrade B). On the other hand, the presence of an additional delay element at 
perimeter level (upgrade D) and detection element at sabotage target (upgrade C), proved to 
be ineffective in increasing PPS effectiveness. The addition of detection elements (i.e, fence 
sensors) at perimeter level, represented respectively by upgrade A, shows an intermediate 
performance in terms of upgraded PPS effectiveness.  
The EASI model, here applied, can be performed analogously in other case studies and 
tutorials, according to the same approach; however, the results are site-specific as they require 
data regarding distances on site and security measures in place. Therefore, the specific values 
of baseline and upgraded effectiveness obtained in the present tutorial cannot be extended 
beyond the current PPS configuration and plant layout.  
6.3 SELECTION OF PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES 
AGAINST SABOTAGE IN A STORAGE TANK FARM (EM-
PICTURES APPLICATION) 
6.3.1 Definition of the case study 
The economic model was applied, in EM-PICTURES version, to an illustrative case study, 
freely inspired by a real incident that took place in summer 2015 in France, consisting in the 
sabotage of storage tanks in a process facility (Le Guernigou and Revilla, 2015). In the case 
study, the sabotage of one storage tank containing naphtha has been considered.  
The analysis carried out focuses on the selection and management of the security measures, 
given the likelihood of the attack (𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗, renamed 𝑃(𝑇) for a single scenario) with reference to 
a perspective security-based accident. A range of values regarding the likelihood of the attack 
has been accounted (i.e., 0.01; 0.20; 0.50; 0.75; 1), in purpose to derive a broad set of economic 
indicators. Vulnerabilities probabilities (i.e., 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻)) have been assumed equal 
to 1, following the conservative assumptions reported in Table 4. 5.  
The fictional simplified plant layout applied in the case study consists on a tank farm, to which 
the target belongs, including 8 atmospheric storage tanks containing naphtha, with a volume 
of 40000 𝑚3 each. The adversary was supposed to carry out the sabotage by foot, following a 
possible critical path that starts from the facility boundary.   
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Figure 6. 2 Site-specific adversary sequence of actions for the case study, regarding the sabotage to a 
single process storage tank. 
6.3.2 Development of adversary sequence diagrams and effectiveness 
calculation 
6.3.2.1 Definition of site-specific adversary sequence diagrams and calculation 
of the baseline system effectiveness 
The critical adversary site-specific sequence of actions is reported in Figure 6. 2. After cutting 
the perimeter fence, the adversary is supposed to run 200 𝑚 up to external tank protected area, 
open a security door with camera on it, run for 200 𝑚 up to the target and placing explosives 
and detonators on it, in purpose to trigger a major accident (i.e., fire). The identification of key 
protection elements and key distances, reported in Table 6. 5 (Part A) regarding the simplified 
plant layout is necessary to calculate the baseline physical protection system effectiveness. The 
calculation of baseline system effectiveness was carried out according to the approach 
described in Section 4.2.2, with the aim to determine the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼
∗) of 
the critical adversary path. The solely detection elements present are cameras on the wall 
delimiting external tank protected area, with a probability of assessed detection 𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 0.9. In 
addition, the location of detection elements was included in the analysis, according to the EASI 
model, considering a standard B location. For all delay elements with the exception of running 
times, specific data have been retrieved (Garcia, 2007) and reported in Table 6. 5, Part A, 
jointly with all the data inherent to the detection function for the path considered in the case 
study. For the calculation of running times, the standard adversary velocity of 10 𝑓𝑡/𝑠 =
3.048 𝑚/𝑠 has been assumed, considering a reduction factor due to additional weights carried 
by the adversary of 0.75 (i.e., additional weight due to explosives and detonators). Distances 
among delay elements for a typical plant layout were reported in Table 6. 5, Part B. Standard 
deviation for the delay parameter of each security element and for the response force time 
parameter was assumed as 3 10⁄  of the mean value throughout the case study, according to the 
conservative assumption on data dispersion reported in the EASI model (Garcia, 2007). Inputs 
for the calculation of response element have been reported in Table 6. 5, Part C; for the 
probability of guard communication (𝑃𝐶) a conventional value for industrial facilities was 
assumed (Garcia, 2007), with a response force time of 5 minutes, considering that security 
guards are present on site.  
Cut simple 
wired 
perimeter 
fence
Run 200 m 
up to 
external 
tank 
protected 
area
Open a 
security 
door with 
surveillance 
camera on 
it
Run 200 m 
up to the 
target 
(i.e., 
storage 
tank)
Sabotage the 
target by 
placing
explosives and 
detonators
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The critical probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼
∗)  has been calculated according to equation (4.1) 
and its value is 0.1759. 𝑃𝐼
∗will be considered in the development of the case study and 
represents the value of the baseline PPS effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑). The value was obtained by 
inserting in the EASI model datasheet (Garcia, 2007) the inputs listed in Table 6. 5, according 
to the approach described in Section 4.2.2. The baseline effectiveness calculations can be 
performed in other case studies, according to the same approach, described in Section 4.2.2; 
however, the results are site-specific as they require data regarding distances on site and 
security measures in place. Therefore, the value of baseline effectiveness obtained (i.e., 0.1759) 
cannot be extended beyond the current case study. 
Table 6. 5 Inputs for the calculation of baseline PPS effectiveness referred to the critical path. Part A) 
Adversary sequence and inputs for the calculation of detection and delay elements referred to the 
adversary path; Part B) Additional data for the calculation of running delay times; Part C) Inputs for the 
calculation of the response function. Standard deviation was assumed 3/10 of the mean value. Values 
retrieved from data repository (Garcia, 2007) and plant layout. 
Part A) Adversary Sequence Diagrams and Inputs for Detection and Delay elements 
ADVERSARY TASKS  DETECTION  DELAY 
Task 
number 
Task Description Detection elements and 
assessed detection 
probabilities  𝑷𝑨𝑫,𝒊 
Delay elements Mean delays 
𝒕𝑫,𝒊 (s)  
1 Cut simple wired external 
perimeter fence 
None Fence fabric 10.0 
2 Run to external tank 
protected area 
None Running time 87.5 
3 Open door Camera on the door (𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 0.9) Door hardness 10.0 
4 Run to the storage tank None Running time 87.5 
5 Sabotage target None Time required for sabotage 120.0 
Part B) Data for Calculation of running delay times 
Description of the action Symbol  Value  Unit 
Adversary velocity during running  𝑣 3.048 m/s 
Distance starting point/ wall of external tank 
protected area (Task 2) 
𝑑2 36.6 m 
Distance wall of external tank protected area/ 
target (Task 4) 
𝑑4 30.5 m 
Reduction factor due to additional weight 
carried by adversary 
𝜑 0.75 Adim. 
Part C) Data for the calculation of Response function 
Probability of guard communication 𝑷𝑪 0.95 Mean Response Force Time 𝒕𝑮  (s) 300 
6.3.2.2 Proposal of three security upgrades and calculation of upgraded system 
effectiveness 
The calculation of baseline system effectiveness highlights a rather low value of baseline PPS 
effectiveness (i.e., 0.1759), which may be increased by the introduction of pertinent security 
upgrades. Therefore, three security upgrades have been proposed, according to technical 
references (Garcia, 2007):  
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A) Adding fence sensors as perimeter detection system;  
B) Adding a delay element by building a concrete wall with security door at sabotage target 
level;  
C) Reducing response force time by building a closer guard dispatch.  
The upgraded value of PPS effectiveness (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆 𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑖), and therefore the effectiveness 
improvements (i.e., ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖 ) have been calculated for each of the proposed security measures 
(Table 6. 6). The upgraded values of effectiveness, indicated as 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖, for each of the three 
options have been calculated by inserting the modified input items, listed in Table 6. 6 (i.e., 
third to last column), in the effectiveness model previously applied to calculate baseline PPS 
effectiveness (i.e., the EASI model), according to the approach presented in Section 4.2.3. The 
modified inputs regarding each security upgrade, with the exception of upgrade C, affect only 
specific tasks of the adversary sequence diagram; for all the remaining tasks, the values 
reported in Table 6. 5 have been applied.  
The results regarding upgraded effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖) and effectiveness improvement 
index (i.e., ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖), corresponding to each of these upgrades, have also been reported in               
Table 6. 6. These values have been obtained for each security upgrade according to the 
equations of Section 4.2.3, using the baseline effectiveness value (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.1759) and 
the upgraded effectiveness value (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖). 
Table 6. 6 Effectiveness results for six different possible PPS upgrades. From the left to the right, in 
column order: Upgrade identity, description of the upgrade, Physical protection function modification, 
reference number of adversary sequence diagram modified tasks, modified inputs for the effectiveness 
calculations, upgraded PPS effectiveness (ηPPS,new i) and effectiveness improvement index (∆𝜼̅̅̅̅ 𝒊). (*) 
Reduction of response force time does not affect a single task. A data repository regarding modified 
inputs values for security upgrades is available in Garcia (Garcia, 2007). 
Upgrade 
ID 
Description PPS - function 
modification 
N° of 
modified 
tasks  
Modified 
inputs   
ηPPS, new i ∆𝜼̅̅̅̅ 𝒊 
A External fence sensors as 
perimeter detection 
system (at fence level) 
 
Detection; fence 
sensors 
1 𝑃𝐴𝐷,1 = 0.9 0.4941 
 
0.3182 
B Additional delay element 
by building a concrete 
wall with security door at 
sabotage target 
Delay; door 
hardness 
2 𝑡𝐷,5 = 150 𝑠 0.2624 0.0865 
C Reduction of response 
force time (by creating a 
closer guard dispatch)  
Response; 
relocation of 
guards closer to 
storage area 
- 
(*) 
𝑡𝐺 = 180 𝑠 
(*) 
0.6016 0.4257 
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The results in Table 6. 6 clearly show that, from the effectiveness point of view, the best option 
is the reduction of response force time (upgrade C), followed by the application of fence sensors 
(upgrade A). On the other hand, the presence of additional delay elements at sabotage target, 
represented by options B, proved to be almost ineffective in increasing PPS effectiveness. 
However, even if upgrade C is the best ones from the effectiveness intermediate calculation, it 
does not mean automatically that it will be the best options in the end of the application, due 
to additional terms that are still to be considered in the analysis (e.g., costs, benefits, budget 
threshold, etc.). The approach presented in Section 4.2.3, here applied, can be used 
analogously in other case studies. However, the results of effectiveness calculations are site-
specific and accident-specific; consequently they cannot be generalized beyond the current 
case study.  
6.3.3 Cost calculation for security upgrades 
Cost calculations have been realized for each of the three PPS upgrades proposed in the case 
study, according to the six main categories mentioned in Section 4.2.4, subcategories and 
formula, presented in EM-PICTURES version of the methodology (see Section 4.2.4), 
considering the time span of one year and the implementation of a single security upgrade. 
Further information on cost assessment is reported in Section 4.2.4. It should be noted that 
many subcategories consist of wages, so realistic annual salaries have been retrieved from a 
specific database (PayScale, 2016) and converted into hourly wages considering 1920 
hours/year. 
Indeed, several data regarding cost calculation have been retrieved in U.S.A. dollars of year 
2016; the conversion rate from U.S.A. dollars to € has been assumed 0.8683 € 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐴.  $⁄  (X-
Rates, 2016) throughout the case study. Moreover, a location factor of 1.20 (Richardson 
Products & Cost Data On Line Inc., 2008) was applied in order to adjust US prices and salaries 
to those of Italy (i.e., Milan industrial area). The use of location factor throughout the analysis 
allowed a site-specific cost calculation. In the estimation of wages, several professional profiles, 
which are typically involved in the selection, design, installation and maintenance of a security 
system in a process facility, have been considered. According to their different job tasks, the 
following security-related jobs have been accounted for the calculation of appropriate cost 
subcategories: purchasing office staff and manager, security manager, security engineer, 
security guards and officers, training expert (i.e., security consultant), masons, installation and 
maintenance technicians. 
In the calculation of Initial costs for each security upgrade, wages for the job profiles involved, 
costs of auxiliary materials have been considered. In the calculation of Installation costs, with 
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particular reference to Equipment costs, specific information of market prices has been 
retrieved from vendor websites for each security upgrade and reported in Table 6. 7. 
In the calculation of Operating costs, Utility costs consist of the costs of annual electric power 
consumption, which are significant only for upgrade A. For upgrade A the power has been 
calculated through the standard power law, retrieving data on intensity and voltage from 
products datasheet (Shenzhen P&H Electronic Co. Ltd, 2016) and accounting the number of 
devices in place, which have been assumed to be working continuously all the yearlong. The 
estimated annual electric power consumption has been 4.73 · 103𝑘𝑊ℎ for upgrade A. 
Considering an average industrial electric energy market price in Italy of 0.17 € 𝑘𝑊ℎ⁄  
(Eurostat, 2016), utilities costs have been finally calculated. Human resources operating costs 
have been calculated by considering the manpower, in terms of security officers and guards 
wages for each of the security countermeasures, which was not negligible for upgrade A. It 
should be noted that for security upgrades B, which consists on an additional wall with door 
close to the possible targets (i.e., all the tanks of the tank farm), this subcategory is equal to 
zero. For upgrade C, the security guards have been just relocated, so no additional human 
resources operating costs have been accounted in comparison with the baseline situation.  
Table 6. 7 Data for the calculation of Equipment costs for three different PPS upgrades. 
UPGRADE 
ID 
DATA FOR THE CALCULATION OF EQUIPMENT COSTS 
Description Unit Value Reference/ 
Notes 
A Cost of a couple of fence sensors (i.e., unit cost) € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  20 (Shenzhen P&H 
Electronic Co. 
Ltd, 2016) 
Total number of fence sensors in place  𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 330 8% of spare items 
not included 
Number of tanks 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 8 Layout of the 
facility 
Length and height of the concrete wall around unit 
type 1 (*) and unit type 2 (**) 
𝑚 650; 3 Layout of the 
facility 
Cost of the wall for each unit € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ⁄  1700 (Get A Quote, 
2016) 
Cost of security doors to be applied on each unit 
(both type 1 and type 2) 
€ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  1000 (Grainger, 2016) 
C Unit cost for the new building (standard 
warehouse with concrete floor and metal clad) 
€ 𝑚2⁄  548 (BMT, 2016) 
Area of the building 𝑚2 50 Layout of the 
facility 
In the calculation of Maintenance, inspection and sustainability costs the following 
assumptions have been applied for each security upgrade: material costs have been estimated 
by assuming an annual substitution rate for equipment and other materials in the range 
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between 3% and 5%, 2 scheduled maintenances, 1 unscheduled maintenances and 2 scheduled 
inspections per year have been accounted. License and renewal costs appeared to be negligible 
for all the three upgrades. Other running costs have been calculated for each security upgrade; 
only for upgrade C this cost category has a significant role, provided that the construction of a 
new building for security guards requires additional office furniture and utilities. In the 
calculation of Specific costs, the contribution offered by False-positive costs should be 
considered only for upgrade A (i.e., detection upgrade). For both these upgrades, despite a 
single false-alarm cost, according to expert judgement, is about 2.80 · 103 € and 
𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 ⃓ 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) = 0.143 (Garcia, 2007), assuming the probability of the attack unitary 
turns false-positive costs to zero. Site-specific costs, as revisions of safety measures and 
procedures, have been accounted in particular for upgrade B (i.e., additional delay element), 
whose implementation might require a revision of emergency routes, as well as entrance and 
exit doors. 
For each of the three security upgrades, the main results obtained from cost calculations, 
according to the six cost categories of EM-PICTURES, as well as the Overall costs (𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖) 
have been summarized in Figure 6. 3 and reported in detail in Table 6. 8 for upgrade A, Table 
6. 9 for upgrade B and Table 6. 10 for upgrade C respectively. 
 
Figure 6. 3 Percentage composition of Overall costs for each upgrade of the PPS, according to six main 
cost categories, for 𝑷(𝑻)𝒊𝒋. For each cost category, from the left to the right: A) Adding fence sensors as 
perimeter detection system; B) Adding a delay element by building a concrete wall with security door at 
sabotage target level; C) Reducing response force time by building a closer guard dispatch. 
The cost calculations results, reported in Figure 6. 3 showed that the order of magnitude of the 
Overall costs is the same one for all the security upgrades. Nevertheless, despite cost 
distributions are slightly different, according to the security function, installation costs are the 
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prevailing ones for all the three security upgrades, with a percentage of 41.9 % for upgrade A, 
81.5 % for upgrade B and 68.8 % for upgrade C respectively. 
Table 6. 8 Overall costs results for upgrade A (i.e., fence sensors as perimeter detection system).  
Calculation of Overall Costs for upgrade A 
Symbol Category/subcategory 
description 
Unit Value Assumption 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳,𝑶𝑽 1. Overall Initial costs € 6.98E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 Investigation costs € 6.46E+02 Purchasing officers, purchasing 
officer manager and security 
manager wages 
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 Selection and design costs € 5.51E+02 Security engineer, purchasing 
officer manager and security 
manager wages 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 Material costs € 3.50E+03 Cost of cables at perimeter level 
and monitoring software 
𝑪𝑻 
 
Training costs (start-up/in service) € 1.98E+03 Training expert (security 
consultant) and security 
guards/officers wages 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 Changing of guidelines and informing 
costs 
€ 3.00E+02 Cost of leaflets for internal use 
𝑪 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳,𝑶𝑽 2.  Overall Installation costs € 1.05E+04 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 Start-up costs € 1.21E+03 Maintenance technicians and 
security engineer wages 
𝑪𝑬 
 
Equipment costs (including P - 
purchase & R - rental costs, space 
requirement costs) 
€ 6.60E+03 Costs of fence sensors, no space 
requirement costs, no rented 
equipment costs 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 Installing costs € 2.70E+03 External personnel, maintenance 
technicians, IT engineer and 
security manager wages 
𝑪𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵,𝑶𝑽 3.  Overall Operating costs € 4.32E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 Utilities costs € 8.04E+02 Electric power consumption 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 Human resources operating costs € 3.52E+03 Security guards and officer wages 
for monitoring action 
𝑪𝑴𝑰𝑺,𝑶𝑽 4. Overall Maintenance, 
Inspection and Sustainability 
costs 
€ 2.70E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 Material costs € 3.00E+02 Cables and sensors components 
substitution 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 Maintenance team costs (A- scheduled 
m. /B- unscheduled m.) 
€ 1.72E+03 Maintenance technicians and 
security engineer wages 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 Inspection team costs € 
 
6.87E+02 Maintenance technicians and 
security engineer wages 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 License and rental renewal € 0 No license and rental renewal costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑹,𝑶𝑽 5. Other Running costs € 1.80E+02 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 Office furniture costs € 0 No additional office furniture 
required 
𝑪𝑻 Transport costs € 1.00E+02 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Additional communication costs € 6.00E+01 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑰 Insurance costs € 0 No additional insurance costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑼 Office utilities costs € 2.00E+01 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Office supplies costs € 0 No office supplies required 
𝑪𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽  6. Overall Specific costs € 4.00÷8.00 
E+02 
See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 False-positive case costs € 0 ÷ 4.00 E+02 False-positive costs equal to zero 
with 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1 
𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 Site-specific costs € 1.80E+02 Cleaning of plant perimeter to limit 
false-positive cases 
𝑪𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚,𝒊 Overall Costs € 2.51 ÷ 2.56 
E+04  
- 
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Table 6. 9 Overall costs results for upgrade B (i.e., additional delay element by building a concrete wall 
with security door at sabotage target level).  
Calculation of Overall Costs for upgrade B 
Symbol Category/subcategory 
description 
Unit Value Assumption 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳,𝑶𝑽 1. Overall Initial costs € 2.31E+03 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 Investigation costs € 6.46E+02 Purchasing officers, purchasing officer 
manager and security manager wages.  
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 Selection and design costs € 1.04E+03 Security engineer, purchasing officer 
manager and security manager wages. 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 Material costs € 0 Reinforced concrete wall considered as 
equipment, no additional materials 
considered to produce it 
𝑪𝑻 
 
Training costs (start-up/in service) € 3.30E+02 Training expert (security consultant) and 
security guards/officers wages 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 Changing of guidelines and 
informing costs 
€ 3.00E+02 Cost of leaflets for internal use 
𝑪 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳,𝑶𝑽 2.  Overall Installation costs € 2.51E+04 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 Start-up costs € 9.22E+02 Masons, security engineer for 
supervision 
𝑪𝑬 
 
Equipment costs (including P - 
purchase & R - rental costs, space 
requirement costs) 
€ 2.19E+04 Price of concrete wall installation around 
each tank, price of security doors, costs 
due to rented tools for construction 
works 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 Installing costs € 2.28E+03 Masons, maintenance technicians and 
security manager wages 
𝑪𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵,𝑶𝑽 3.  Overall Operating costs € 0 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 Utilities costs € 0 No utilities required 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 Human resources operating costs € 0 No human resources required 
𝑪𝑴𝑰𝑺,𝑶𝑽 4. Overall Maintenance, 
Inspection and Sustainability 
costs 
€ 2.09E+03 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 Material costs € 6.48E+02 Annual substitution costs 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 Maintenance team costs (A- 
scheduled m. /B- unscheduled m.) 
€ 1.10E+03 Maintenance technicians and security 
engineer wages 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 Inspection team costs € 
 
3.44E+02 Maintenance technicians and security 
engineer wages 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 License and rental renewal € 0 No license and rental renewal costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑹,𝑶𝑽 5. Other Running costs € 2.80E+02 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 Office furniture costs € 0 No additional office furniture required 
𝑪𝑻 Transport costs € 2.00E+02 Assumption based on expert judgement 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Additional communication costs € 6.00E+01 Assumption based on expert judgement 
𝑪𝑰 Insurance costs € 0 No additional insurance costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑼 Office utilities costs € 2.00E+01 Assumption based on expert judgement 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Office supplies costs € 0 No office supplies required 
𝑪𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽  6. Overall Specific costs € 1.00E+03 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 False-positive case costs € 0 No false-positive costs 
𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 Site-specific costs € 1.00E+03 Revision of safety systems (e.g. 
emergency door/entrance and exit doors) 
𝑪𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚,𝒊 Overall Costs € 3.08E+04 - 
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Table 6. 10 Overall costs results for upgrade C (reduction of response force time by guard relocation in 
a closer dispatch).  
Calculation of Overall Costs for upgrade C 
Symbol Category/subcategory description Unit Value Assumption 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳,𝑶𝑽 1. Overall Initial costs € 5.48E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 Investigation costs € 6.46E+02 Purchasing officers, purchasing 
officer manager and security 
manager wages.   
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 Selection and design costs € 5.51E+02 Security engineer, purchasing 
officer manager and security 
manager wages. 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 Material costs € 2.00E+03 Cost of cables and connections 
𝑪𝑻 
 
Training costs (start-up/in service) € 1.98E+03 Training expert (security 
consultant) and security 
guards/officers wages 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 Changing of guidelines and informing 
costs 
€ 3.00E+02 Cost of leaflets for internal use 
𝑪 𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳,𝑶𝑽 2.  Overall Installation costs € 3.94E+04 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 Start-up costs € 5.57E+02 Masons and security engineer 
wages 
𝑪𝑬 
 
Equipment costs (including P - purchase & 
R - rental costs, space requirement costs) 
€ 3.22E+04 Cost of building for hosting security 
guards, rented tools for 
construction works and space 
requirement costs 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 Installing costs € 6.67E+03 Masons, maintenance technicians, 
security engineer and security 
manager wages 
𝑪𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵,𝑶𝑽 3.  Overall Operating costs € 0 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 Utilities costs € 0 No utilities required 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 Human resources operating costs € 0 No additional human resources 
required in comparison with 
baseline 
𝑪𝑴𝑰𝑺,𝑶𝑽 4. Overall Maintenance, Inspection 
and Sustainability costs 
€ 2.67E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 Material costs € 9.22E+02 Equipment annual substitution 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 Maintenance team costs (A- scheduled m. 
/B- unscheduled m.) 
€ 1.06E+03 Maintenance technicians and 
security engineer wages 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 Inspection team costs € 
 
6.87E+02 Maintenance technicians and 
security engineer wages 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 License and rental renewal € 0 No license and rental renewal costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑹,𝑶𝑽 5. Other Running costs € 8.75E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 Office furniture costs € 6.09E+03 Additional office furniture 
required, based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑻 Transport costs € 1.00E+02 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Additional communication costs € 6.00E+01 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑰 Insurance costs € 0 No additional insurance costs 
𝑪𝑶𝑼 Office utilities costs € 2.50E+03 Assumption based on expert 
judgement 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Office supplies costs € 0 No office supplies required 
𝑪𝑺𝑷𝑬𝑪,𝑶𝑽  6. Overall Specific costs € 1.00E+03 See assumptions for 
subcategories 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 False-positive case costs € 0 No false-positive costs for this 
security upgrade 
𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 Site-specific costs € 1.00E+03 Revision of emergency routes/plan 
after guards relocation 
𝑪𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚,𝒊 Overall Costs € 5.73E+04 - 
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6.3.4 Benefit calculation for an expected scenario 
In the present study, an expected scenario has been considered, as a prospective analysis is 
carried out. Expected benefits are the losses derived from a hypothetical scenario, which 
considers the average benefits, weighted by probabilities of occurrence, of four possible 
outcomes (i.e., indicated with T1, T2, T3 and T4 in decreasing order of severity, and named 
catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible accident respectively), as described in Section 
4.2.5.  
Illustrative probabilities were defined for each category of scenario and listed in Table 6. 11, 
together with a description of the losses for each scenario. Benefit calculations have been 
carried out according to according to the nine categories and subcategories proposed in EM-
PICTURES version of the model, suitable for a generic security-based accident; the results of 
benefit calculations for the four scenarios are available in Figure 6. 4.  
In the calculation of Supply chain benefits, a realistic production rate for the facility has been 
estimated by assuming  a production rate of 2.66 ∙ 105 𝑘𝑔 ℎ⁄ ; for the conversion into mass flow 
rate a reference density for naphtha has been considered (Engineering ToolBox, 2017). The 
profit per unit sold that is the market price equal to 4.08 ∙ 10−4€ (Wang and Kim, 2015). For 
Schedule benefits, the fine for a cancelled contract has been assumed, based on expert 
judgment, 1.00 ∙ 105  € 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁄  and the fine for delay in deliveries per day, 1.00 ∙
104  € (𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∙ 𝑑𝑎𝑦)⁄ . 
In the calculation of Damage benefits, illustrative commercial equipment costs for storage 
tanks have retrieved from vendors (Shanghai Iven Pharmatech Engineering Co. Ltd, 2016): a 
commercial value of 8.00 ∙ 104 € for 40000 𝑚3 tank has been assumed throughout the case 
study. For the estimation of finished goods damages, the naptha market price has been applied. 
In the calculation of Legal benefits and after, it should be noted that, as for costs calculations, 
many benefits subcategories consist of wages; the expression for converting annual salaries 
into hourly wages applied has been the same one reported in Section 6.3.3. Moreover, also the 
same values regarding conversion rate from U.S.A. dollars to € and location factor have been 
applied (Section 6.3.3). In the case of Legal benefits, the job profiles involved are junior lawyers 
and seniors lawyers, specialized lawyers, security manager, security engineer, security analyst 
and security consultant. The total security budget prior to the accident has been assumed, 
based on expert judgment, 8.00 ∙ 104 €, but the percentage increase of the security budget is 
scenario dependent.  
In the calculation of Insurance benefits, the value of the current total premium cost of the 
facility has been considered, based on expert judgment, 5.00 ∙ 107€, while the percentage 
increase of the premium due to the accident is scenario dependent. In the calculation of Human 
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benefits, the value of a statistical life (VSL) has been retrieved from a previous study (Viscusi 
and Aldy, 2003) and converted from 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐴. $(2000) into €(2016) by the application of 
appropriate conversion rate (X-Rates, 2016) and inflation rate (Friedman, 2017); the final 𝑉𝑆𝐿 
is 7.07 ∙ 106€. Following the same reference and approach, the monetary values for a light and 
a serious injury are respectively 1.41 ∙ 104 € and 2.06 ∙ 105 €. 
In the calculation of Intervention benefits, a different flat rate has been assumed for the three 
scenarios. In the calculation of Reputation benefits, a current total market price for the 
company of 1.84 ∙ 108€ has been accounted, but the expected percentage drop is scenario 
dependent. In the calculation of Other benefits, wages for security manager and cleaning 
employees have been accounted, while in the estimation of Specific benefits, transportation 
delays costs and psychological counselling for accident witnesses have been considered. The 
data applied for the calculation of benefit categories and subcategories were retrieved from a 
collection of references and validated by a panel of security managers and academic security 
experts. 
The comparison among benefits percentage compositions obtained for each scenario by using 
the respective Overall benefits as reference and reported in Figure 6. 4, shows that benefits 
distributions depend on the scenario selection: for catastrophic (i.e., T1) and critical scenarios 
(i.e., T2), the costs due to casualties and injuries are prevailing, while for marginal (i.e., T3) 
and negligible (i.e., T4) accidents, the prevailing losses are related to legal issues and assets 
damages. Indeed, as stated in previous studies referred to benefit assessment for major 
accidents within the chemical industry domain (Gavious et al., 2009; Reniers and Brijs, 
2014b), the value of indirect losses, which include for instance reputational losses, human and 
environmental losses, legal and insurance losses, is generally superior to direct losses. The gap 
tends to increase with the increasing severity of the accident (Gavious et al., 2009), as 
confirmed also by Figure 6. 4. The Overall expected benefit value is 2.436·105 €; the expected 
benefits apportionment is reported in Figure 6. 5; it confirmes that human and environmental 
benefits are prevailing, followed by legal benefits and assets damages.  
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Table 6. 11 Description of the scenarios applied in the case study for expected benefit assessment. 
Expected benefits have been calculated as the average of four possible outcomes (i.e., T1, T2, T3 and T4), 
weighted by respective probabilities of occurrence. T1 benefits overlaps with worst-case scenario. 
Vulnerability probabilities are considered unitary within the present case study. 
    SCENARIO     
ID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BENEFITS 
EXPECTED 
T1 
Catastrophic accident 
T2 
Critical accident 
T3 
Marginal accident 
T4 
Negligible 
accident 
Probability of occurrence 
1.00E-05 2.00E-01 7.50E-01 5.00E-02 
Description 
1. Overall 
supply chain 
benefits 
Stop in production for 24 hours; 
0% production rate at reactivation; 
48 hours start-up; fines for delays 
in deliveries and 1 order cancelled 
Stop in production 
for 6 hours; delays in 
the supply chain 
Production slowed for 
few hours; delays in 
the supply chain, 
facility at 80% of its 
production rate at 
reactivation 
Negligible 
2. Overall 
damage 
benefits 
3 tanks destroyed with content; 
severe damage to piping; severe 
damages to other company’s and 
public properties; severe damage to 
surrounding living areas 
One tank completely 
destroyed and other 
assets damages (e.g., 
contiguous tanks). 
Two tanks damaged 
(20%); minor other 
assets damages 
Minor damages 
to 2 tanks (5%) 
3. Overall 
legal benefits 
Civil liability fine for pollution; 
lawyers’ wages; 80% increase of the 
Security budget; possible closing 
down (10%) 
Fines; salaries; 50% 
increase of Security 
budget 
Fines; salaries; 30% 
increase of Security 
budget 
Fines; salaries; 
8% increase of 
Security budget 
4. Overall 
insurance 
benefits 
1% premium increase 0.1% premium 
increase 
10−2%premium 
increase 
10−3% premium 
increase 
5. Overall 
human and 
environmental 
benefits 
2 casualties; 3 serious injuries and 
5 light injuries; several new 
recruitments; content of the three 
tanks burnt; severe environmental 
damages 
2 serious injuries; 4 
light injuries; 
environmental 
damages 
1 light injury; marginal 
environmental 
damages 
Negligible 
6. Overall 
intervention 
benefits 
Massive Emergency intervention, 
with special units 
Critical Marginal  Negligible 
7. Overall 
reputation 
benefits 
0.5% expected drop in the share-
price 
10−4% share price 
drop 
5 ∙ 10−5%share price 
drop 
10−5%         share 
price drop 
8. Other 
benefits 
Significant manager work-time 
benefits and cleaning benefits 
Critical Marginal Negligible 
9. Overall 
specific 
benefits 
Severe airport and traffic delays; 
relevant immaterial consequences 
Critical Marginal Negligible 
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Figure 6. 4 Percentage composition of Overall benefits for four different scenarios: (a) T1, (b) T2, (c) 
T3 and (d) T4, composing the expected scenario, calculated according to the categories of the model, in 
EM-PICTURES version. Overall benefits values are reported in the box on the left for each scenario. 
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Figure 6. 5 Percentage composition of Overall benefits for the expected scenario, according to nine 
benefits categories proposed in EM-PICTURES version of the model. 
6.3.5 Results of the case study 
The results of the assessment of the case study consist in cost-benefit analysis results, which 
are the values of actualized Net benefits, for three PPS upgrades with reference to the expected 
scenario, according to EM-PICTURES version of the economic model.  
Overall costs for each security measure and Overall expected benefits have been made 
comparable by applying appropriate discount rates (i.e., 3.5 % and 1.5 % respectively (HSE - 
Health and Safety Executive, 2016)) over a 10 year time-span. The latter is a conventional 
number of operational years for a security measure. Considering several values for the 
likelihood of the attack (𝑃(𝑇)), the values of Net Benefit, also named Net Present Value (NPV), 
have been calculated for each of the three PPS upgrades, according to the expected losses, by 
applying equation (4.20). The values have been compared with respect to the acceptability 
criteria, expressed by equation (4.21).  
The results of cost-benefit analysis, reported in Figure 6. 6, prove the coherency of the model, 
highlighting that the feasibility of all the security upgrades is dependent on the value assumed 
for the likelihood of the attack. Indeed, all the three upgrades are feasible under the 
assumption of likelihood of the attack unitary, even if the values of Net Benefit are higher for 
Upgrades A and C than for Upgrade B. Nevertheless, the results of cost-benefit analysis for 
different values of the likelihood of the attack show that Upgrade A is feasible even for low 
values of the likelihood of the attack (i.e., 0.2), while Upgrade C is not. Therefore, the possible 
suggestion derived from the economic indicators may be to adopt security upgrade A, due to 
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its feasibility even with low probabilities of the attack and to its high Net Benefit under 
deterministic assumption. 
 
Figure 6. 6 Results of cost-benefit analysis for three security upgrades, with reference to different 
values of the likelihood of the attack (𝑷(𝑻)) and to an expected scenario. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis has been applied in order to determine the most profitable 
combination of security upgrades within the security budget constraint for the expected 
scenario, according to the deterministic approach proposed in EM-PICTURES version of the 
model (Section 4.2.8.1). All the possible 7 combinations of PPS upgrades have been considered, 
starting from each single security measure, to couples and triplet. Actualized Overall costs have 
been calculated for each combination by applying a 3.5% discount rate to the pertinent cost 
categories of each option taken and by summing the actualized costs (HSE - Health and Safety 
Executive, 2016), then Overall costs have been compared with the actualized security budget. 
For each scenario, only the combinations respecting the budget criteria have been selected and 
their Net Benefits have been calculated and compared, according to equation (4.27). For 
instance, the triplet of security measures A+B+C is the only combination not respecting the 
security budget among all the possible ones.  
The results of cost-effectiveness analyses, reported in Figure 6. 7, show that the combination 
of security upgrades A and C (i.e., application of fence sensors at external fence level and 
relocation of security guards) is the one with the highest Net Benefit for all the values of the 
likelihood of the attack considered in the analysis, with the exception of 𝑃(𝑇) = 0.01. For the 
latter value of the threat probability, the application of upgrade A is the most profitable option. 
However, the second most profitable combination varies with the likelihood of the attack.   
Figure 6. 7 shows the complete ranking of all possible combinations of security measures, 
according to cost-effectiveness analysis, for the values of the likelihood of the attack considered 
in the analysis. The results show that several profitable combinations offer an integration of 
different security functions (i.e., detection and response), providing therefore a more complete 
security protection. 
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Figure 6. 7 Results of cost-effectiveness analysis, expressed as Net Benefit in €(2016), for the 
combinations of security upgrades respecting budget, with reference to different values of the 
likelihood of the attack (𝑃(𝑇)) and to an expected scenario. 
6.3.6 Discussion and conclusions on the case study 
The current section has been aimed at applying the EM-PICTURES version of the economic 
model to an original case study, regarding a sabotage to a storage tank farm. The case study 
dealt with a simplified plant layout and a sabotage action with one target, in purpose to test 
the model.  
The application demonstrated that the model provides site-specific answers to security 
analysts, because it allows evaluating the performance of physical security measures present 
on-site and proposing several pertinent security upgrades, in relation with the specific 
adversary action and according to the security functions of detection, delay and response. 
Therefore, effectiveness assessment is site-specific and accident-specific, as it depends on the 
possible adversary path of actions. Therefore, the results obtained from effectiveness 
assessment, which suggest guard relocation in a closer dispatch as possible security upgrade, 
cannot be generalized beyond this case study. The cost assessment allows defining the most 
relevant cost items due to the implementation of security measures, which are indirect costs 
for all the upgrades proposed; the analyst, according to the model structure, can add site-
specific information. Information regarding certain cost voices needs to be retrieved from 
vendors; as visible in Section 6.3.3 it is necessary to present cost calculations in a detailed 
manner and to discuss possible assumptions made and uncertainties arisen.  
The case study included benefit assessment, which was carried out considering an expected 
scenario, as proposed in the methodology section for prospective applications (see Section 
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4.2.5). The precise categories and subcategories elaborated for benefit calculations allows 
preventing omissions and inaccuracies; nevertheless, its inputs are validated for the case study 
by a panel of security experts, in purpose to avoid misleading conclusions. 
As discussed in Section 4.3, also the assumptions regarding discount rates for overall costs and 
benefits might be affected by subjectivity of the analyst, therefore specific guidance values have 
been considered in the case study. Indeed, simplifying assumptions have been assumed for 
threat and vulnerability probabilities. Different values of threat probabilities were considered 
to provide a broad spectrum of economic indicators. Vulnerabilities probabilities were 
assumed unitary throughout the case study. The deterministic approach provided by EM-
PICTURES here-in applied provide guidance for the choice of threat probabilities and it allows 
focusing on the role of security measures in the prevention of accidental scenarios.  
The results of the case study made clear that model application, even to a simplified extent, 
provides useful insights on the profitable security measures to be adopted in a process facility, 
by means of its outputs, which are a set of economic security-related indicators. Model outputs 
are a broad spectrum of economic analyses results, which can eventually support the security 
decision-making process. Indeed, the interpretation of the economic analyses results derived 
from the case study is particularly important, as demonstrated by the case study. Within this 
specific application, the results provided by cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses are 
coherent. For instance, cost-benefit analysis results suggest to apply either additional detection 
at perimeter level or to relocate guards; cost-effectiveness analysis results confirm that the 
combination of these two measures is generally the most profitable option, according to 
different values of the threat probability.  The results of cost-effectiveness analysis depend on 
the security budget threshold that is generally defined yearly by security management, which 
in the present case study is not particularly strict, as it excludes only one possible combination 
of security upgrades (i.e., a triplet of upgrades). Moreover, it should be noted that in the 
simplified case study here in considered, cost-effectiveness analysis results do not offer 
relevant additional guidance to decision-makers because the pool of possible security upgrades 
is very limited.  
Indeed, several aspects regarding the application of EM-PICTURES version of the model need 
to be tested to an additional case study, as they have not been investigated in the present case 
study, before proposing the use of EM-PICTURES within chemical and process industry and 
related regulatory bodies: 
 Benchmark application to a case study inspired by a real terroristic attack to a chemical 
plant, in purpose to apply realistic plant layout, site-specific and accident-specific 
information is required; 
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 Application of adversary sequence diagrams to multiple paths, considering a complex 
terroristic action with multiple targets should be carried out; 
 Proposal of more than one security upgrade belonging to each security function should 
be considered, with the aim to extend effectiveness and cost assessment and to offer a 
broader pool of protection alternatives within economic analyses; 
 Benefit assessment may be extended to multiple scenarios, in purpose to evaluate the 
role of scenario selection on security budget, model outputs and to apply multi-scenario 
economic criteria provided by the model; 
 Retrospective application of the model should be carried out to validate occurrence 
probabilities for accidental scenarios; 
 Specific information on the terroristic organization responsible for the accident should 
be applied, with the aim to evaluate threat and vulnerabilities probabilities realistically; 
 Sensitivity analysis on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness results may be performed, 
considering the effect of threat and vulnerabilities variations on model outputs. 
In conclusion, the application of EM-PICTURES to a simplified case study demonstrated that 
this model version might provide a sound support to managers and regulators within the 
decision-making process, suggesting possible solutions for the optimal selection of security 
prevention investments, but the full potential of EM-PICTURES still needs to be tested to a 
more extended case study. 
6.4 SELECTION OF PREVENTIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES IN CHEMICAL FACILITIES (EM-PICTURES 
APPLICATION) 
In this Section, the economic model for the selection and allocation of preventive physical 
security measures against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities, presented in Section 4, is 
tested to a realistic case study, according to EM-PICTURES version. The application is aimed 
at better understanding the full potential and possible outcomes of the approach developed, by 
means of an illustrative case study, freely inspired by a possible terrorism-related event that 
took place in a chemical facility in France. 
6.4.1 Definition of the case study 
The proposed EM-PICTURES version of the model was applied to an illustrative case study, 
inspired by a real incident that took place on July 14th, 2015 in Berre l’Étang, France, consisting 
in the sequential sabotage of two storage tanks in a chemical facility (Associated Press, 2015; 
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BBC News, 2015b; Le Guernigou and Revilla, 2015; Le Huffington Post, 2015; Pardini, 2016; 
RFI News, 2015).  
 
Figure 6. 8 A picture of the accident, happened on July 14th 2015 in a refinery in Berre l’Étang, France 
that freely inspired the case study. 
The analysis carried out focuses on the selection and management of the security measures, 
given the probability of the attack. Considering the analysis temporary posterior to the event 
and in purpose to maintain the focus on the role of security measures, the probability of the 
attack was assumed equal to one throughout the case study. Indeed, the assumption of 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1 was justified by guidance values reported in Section 4.2.6 (Table 4. 5). Due to the 
limited amount of information available, 𝑃(𝐻 ⎸𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿 ⎸𝐻) have been assumed equal to 1, 
following the conservative assumptions reported in Table 4. 5. The effect of these assumptions 
on the case study results has been evaluated by means of an uncertainty analysis. 
The tank farm considered in the case study includes 40 atmospheric storage tanks, but 6 of 
them are dismissed. The scope of introducing dismissed tanks in the illustrative case study is 
to give security analysts a practical answer on security strategies to be adopted on dismissed 
areas of the plant/dismissed equipment, located close to the possible targets, but not 
containing hazardous substances anymore. The tanks have two different sizes: 10 have a 
volume of 40000 𝑚3 and contain naphtha, while 30 have a volume of 10000 𝑚3 and contain 
gasoline. The accidental scenario considered consists of a sequential sabotage to two storage 
tanks (i.e., multiple targets), named after respectively “first sabotage target” and “second 
sabotage target” as shown in Figure 6. 9. “First target” is a 40000 𝑚3 naphtha tank, while 
“second target” is a gasoline tank. The distance between the two targets is 500 𝑚. The starting 
point for the adversary was chosen in correspondence of a pedestrian route just outside the 
border of the facility (i.e., 300 𝑚 from the first target). Indeed, investigations have shown holes 
in the perimeter of the fence close to one of the sabotage target (BBC News, 2015b).  The 
adversary was supposed to carry out the sabotage action by foot, placing improvised explosives 
on the targets, as confirmed by recent investigations (Pardini, 2016). Electronic devices, 
compatible with detonators, were found in proximity of the targets (BBC News, 2015b). The 
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realistic damages, derived from the actual event, consisted on fire, environmental damage, but 
no casualties. The two tanks involved in the accident were completely destroyed, as well as 
their content. It was assumed that during emergency intervention, which lasts 13 hours, 
refinery activities were not shut down, but production rates were decreased. Moreover, 
additional consequences on public transportation (i.e., temporary highway closing-down, 
delays in the local airport) were derived from the actual event. In conclusion, the media 
screening highlighted several key aspects of the accident, as size and content of tanks, probable 
accident dynamic, features of emergency team intervention, and main consequences of the 
accident, which allowed carrying out the EM-PICTURES application in a realistic manner. 
The determination of PPS in place was carried out comparing the description of PPS usually 
present in chemical facilities (Reniers et al., 2015) with photos and maps of the layout of a 
reference installation, reported in Figure 6. 9. The screening allowed the identification of key 
protection elements and key distances, which are data necessary to calculate the baseline 
physical protection system effectiveness. Further information on the PPS in place has been 
reported in Section 6.4.2.2. The application was carried out in Excel® modelling environment, 
using 7 different datasheets, corresponding to EM-PICTURES modules, as explained in 
Section 4.2.1. 
6.4.2 Development of adversary sequence diagrams and effectiveness 
calculation 
6.4.2.1 Definition of site-specific adversary sequence diagrams and calculation 
of the baseline system effectiveness 
A possible site-specific adversary sequence path, in relation with physical protection elements 
present on the site, has been found. Two segments related to the two sabotage targets have 
been identified: “Segment n°1” connects the starting point with the first target; “Segment n°2” 
connects the first target with the second one. The details have been reported in Table 6. 12, 
Part A and Figure 6. 9. The calculation of baseline system effectiveness was carried out 
accordingly to Section 4.2.2, following EM-PICTURES version of the model, suitable for multi-
target malevolent actions, with the aim to determine the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼), for 
the critical paths of the two segments. 
The detection elements present in both the segments are cameras on doors, at level of both the 
sabotage targets, whose 𝑃𝐴𝐷 = 0.9. In addition, the location of detection elements has been 
included in the analysis, according to EASI model. For all delay elements with the exception of 
running times, specific data have been retrieved (Garcia, 2007) and reported in Table 6. 12, 
Part A, joined with all the data inherent to the detection function, for both the paths considered 
in the case study. For the calculation of running times, the standard adversary velocity of 
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10 𝑓𝑡/𝑠 = 3.048 𝑚/𝑠 has been assumed, considering a reduction factor due to the weight of 
explosives and detonators. Distances among delay elements have been retrieved from the map 
and reported in Table 6. 12, Part B. Inputs for the calculation of response element have been 
reported in Table 6. 12, Part C. 
 
Figure 6. 9 Layout of a reference installation considered in the case study, with adversary starting 
point, sabotage targets and critical adversary paths, divided into two segments. Segment n°1 connects 
the starting point with the first target. Segment n°2 connects the first target with the second target. The 
ending point of adversary sequence of actions is the second target.  
The EASI model, applied for the calculation of the effectiveness, takes into account 
uncertainties regarding each task (e.g., presence of a lag time in the detection) by applying 
probability distribution. According to the conservative assumption on data dispersion of the 
model (Garcia, 2007), standard deviation for each security element has been assumed as 3 10⁄  
of the mean value throughout the case study. This assumption allows considering 
uncertainties, as guards that will not always respond exactly after the same time and adversary 
that may take more or less time to penetrate barriers with respect to average values.  
The critical probabilities of interruption (𝑃𝐼) are respectively 0.27 for segment n°1 and 0.16 for 
segment n°2; these values represent the baseline PPS effectiveness for the two segments (i.e., 
𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑘) that will be considered in the following developments of the case study. 
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Table 6. 12 Inputs for the calculation of baseline PPS effectiveness. From the top to the bottom: Part 
A) Adversary sequence and inputs for the calculation of detection and delay elements for critical segment 
n°1 and critical segment n°2; Part B) Additional data for the calculation of running delay times for both 
the segments; Part C) Inputs for the calculation of the response function, valid for both the segments. 
Part A) Adversary Sequence Diagrams and Inputs for Detection and Delay elements 
ADVERSARY TASKS – CRITICAL PATH -
SEGMENT N°1 
DETECTION  DELAY 
Task n° Task Description Detection elements Delay elements Mean 
delays 
(s) 
1 Cut simple wired perimeter 
fence 
none Fence fabric 10.0 
2 Run to first tank protected 
area 
none Running time 65.6 
3 Open door camera on the door; (𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 0.9) Height of the wall 30.0 
4 Run to first tank (target) none Running time 131.2 
5 Sabotage first target none Place explosives and detonators 120.0 
ADVERSARY TASKS – CRITICAL PATH -
SEGMENT N°2 
DETECTION DELAY 
Task n° Task Description Detection elements Delay elements Mean 
delays 
(s) 
6 Exit first target zone none Running time 21.9 
7 Run to second tank protected 
area 
none Running time 196.9 
8 Open door camera on the door (𝑃𝐴𝐷,8 = 0.9) Door hardness 30.0 
9 Reach second tank (target) none Running time 91.9 
10 Sabotage second target none Place explosives and detonators 120.0 
Part B) Data for Calculation of running delay times 
Description of the action Symbol  Value  Unit Description of the 
action 
Symbol  Value  Unit 
Adversary velocity during 
running  
𝑣 3.048 m/s Distance first wall/first 
target (Task 4 – segment 
n°1) 
𝑑2 200 m 
Reduction velocity factor due 
to additional weight - a 
(before first sabotage – 
segment n°1) 
𝜑1 0.5 adim. Distance first 
target/exit first target 
zone (Task 6 – segment 
n°2) 
𝑑3 50 m 
Reduction velocity factor due 
to additional weight - b (after 
first sabotage – segment n°2) 
𝜑2 0.75 adim. Distance exit first target 
zone/ second wall (Task 
7 – segment n°2) 
𝑑4 450 m 
Distance out/first wall (Task 
2 – segment n°1) 
𝑑1 100 m Distance second 
wall/second target 
(Task 9 – segment n°2) 
𝑑5 210 m 
Part C) Data for the calculation of Response function 
Probability of guard 
communication 
0.95 Mean Response Force Time (s) 300 
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6.4.2.2 Proposal of five security upgrades and calculation of upgraded system 
effectiveness 
Starting from the values of baseline PPS effectiveness for the two segments (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 1 =
0.27 and 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 2 = 0.16), five PPS upgrades have been proposed, according to technical 
references (Garcia, 2007; Reniers et al., 2015): 
A) Adding fence sensors as perimeter detection system; 
B) Adding a perimeter delay element by building a concrete-reinforced external wall; 
C) Adding detection elements (i.e., cameras) at sabotage targets level; 
D) Adding delay elements at sabotage targets level; 
E) Reducing response force time by building a closer guard dispatch. 
It should be noted that upgrades A and C refer to the detection function, upgrades B and D 
refer to the delay function and upgrade E refers to the response function. Moreover, upgrades 
A and B refer to external perimeter of the facility, and consequently only to segment n°1, while 
C, D and E refer to the proximity of the storage tank farm and consequently belong both to 
segment n°1 and segment n°2. 
The upgraded values of effectiveness, indicated as 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖 1 and 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖 2, for each of the 
five options have been calculated by inserting in the effectiveness model for the two segments 
(i.e., the same model previously applied to calculate baseline PPS effectiveness) the modified 
inputs listed in Table 6. 13. The results regarding upgraded effectiveness index (i.e., 𝛥𝜂𝑖,1 and 
𝛥𝜂𝑖,2) and overall effectiveness improvement for a sequential action (i.e., ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖, calculated 
according to equation (4.6)), correspondent to each of these upgrades have been reported 
indeed in the same table. 
The results, reported in Table 6. 13, clearly show that, from the effectiveness point of view, two 
options belonging to different security functions are the best ones: the addiction of detection 
elements at external fence level (upgrade A) and guard relocation (upgrade E). Neverthless, 
the presence of additional delay elements at fence level, represented by upgrade B, and the 
addition of detection elements at sabotage targets proved to be uneffective in increasing PPS 
effectiveness. Additional delay at targets level, indicated with upgrade D, appeared as an 
intermediate option in terms of effectiveness improvement. However, even if upgrades A and 
E are the best ones from the effectiveness intermediate calculation, it does not mean 
automatically that they are the best options in the end of the application, due to additional 
terms that are still to be considered in the analysis (e.g., costs, benefits, budget threshold, etc.). 
Furthermore, the results of effectiveness assessment are site-specific and accident-specific; 
consequently they cannot be generalized beyond the current case study. 
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Table 6. 13 Effectiveness results for five different possible PPS upgrades. From the left to the right, in 
column order: Upgrade identity, description of the upgrade, Physical protection function modification, 
reference number of modified tasks for segment n°1 and segment n°2, effectiveness improvement index 
for segment n°1 (𝛥𝜂𝑖,1)and segment n°2 (𝛥𝜂𝑖,2) and overall effectiveness improvement index (∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖). (*) 
Reduction of response force time does not affect a single task. 
Upgrade 
ID 
Description PPS function 
modification 
N° of 
modified 
tasks  
(segment 
n°1) 
N° of 
modified 
tasks  
(segment 
n°2) 
Modified 
inputs   
∆𝜼𝒊,𝟏  ∆𝜼𝒊,𝟐 ∆𝜼̅̅̅̅ 𝒊 
A External 
infrared fence 
sensors as 
perimeter 
detection 
system (at 
fence level) 
Detection; 
infrared fence 
sensors 
1 none 𝑃𝐷,1 = 0.9 0.3541 0 0.3541 
B Construction 
of an external 
reinforced 
concrete wall 
(instead of the 
fence) 
Delay; wall 
hardness 
1 none 𝑡𝐷,1
=  180 𝑠 
 
0 0 0 
C Addition of 
detection 
elements at 
sabotage 
targets 
Detection; 
exterior 
cameras 
5 10 𝑃𝐴𝐷,5
= 𝑃𝐴𝐷,10
= 0.9 
0.0027 0.0027 0.0054 
D Addition of 
delay 
elements at 
sabotage 
targets 
Delay; 
additional wall 
with doors 
5 10 𝑡𝐷,5 =
𝑡𝐷,10=
150 𝑠 
 
0.0945 0.0836 0.1781 
E Reduction of 
response 
force time (by 
creating a 
closer guard 
dispatch)  
Response; 
relocation of 
guards closer 
to storage area 
- 
(*) 
- 
(*) 
𝑡𝐺 = 180 𝑠 0.1961 0.1535 0.3496 
6.4.3 Cost calculation for security upgrades 
Cost calculations were carried out for each of the five PPS upgrades proposed in the case study, 
according to six main categories, 22 subcategories and formula presented in the methodology 
(i.e., Section 4), considering the time span of one year and the implementation of a single 
security upgrade. Further information on cost assessment is reported in Section 4.2.4. It 
should be noted that many subcategories consist of wages, so realistic annual salaries have 
been retrieved from a specific database (PayScale, 2016) and converted into hourly wages 
considering 1920 hours/year. 
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Indeed, several data regarding cost calculation have been retrieved in U.S.A. dollars of year 
2016; the conversion rate from U.S.A. dollars to € has been assumed 0.8683 € 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐴.  $⁄  (X-
Rates, 2016) throughout the case study. Moreover, a location factor of 1.13 (Richardson 
Products & Cost Data On Line Inc., 2008) was applied in order to adjust US prices and salaries 
to those of France.  
The use of location factor throughout the analysis allowed a site-specific cost calculation. In 
the estimation of wages, several professional profiles, which are typically involved in the 
selection, design, installation and maintenance of a security system in a process facility, have 
been considered. According to their different job tasks, the following security-related jobs have 
been accounted for the calculation of appropriate cost subcategories: purchasing office staff 
and manager, security manager, security engineer, security guards and officers, training expert 
(i.e., security consultant), masons, installation and maintenance technicians. 
In the calculation of Initial costs for each security upgrade, wages for the job profiles involved, 
costs of auxiliary materials and publications of leaflets for internal use have been considered. 
In the calculation of Installation costs, with particular reference to Equipment costs, specific 
information of market prices has been retrieved from vendor websites for each security 
upgrade and reported in Table 6. 14. 
In the calculation of Operating costs, Utility costs consist of the costs of annual electric power 
consumption, which are significant only for upgrades A and C. For both the upgrades the power 
has been calculated through the standard power law, retrieving data on intensity and voltage 
from products datasheets (Alibi, 2016; Shenzhen P&H Electronic Co. Ltd, 2016) and 
accounting the number of devices in place, which have been assumed to be working 
continuously all the yearlong.  
The estimated annual electric power consumption has been 9.07 · 103𝑘𝑊ℎ for upgrade A and 
3.89 · 103𝑘𝑊ℎ for upgrade C. Considering an average industrial electric energy market price 
in France of 0.095 € 𝑘𝑊ℎ⁄  (Eurostat, 2016), utilities costs have been finally calculated. Human 
resources operating costs have been calculated by considering the manpower, in terms of 
security officers and guards wages for each of the security countermeasures, which was not 
negligible for upgrade A and C.  
It should be noted that for security upgrades B and D, which are walls in different position, this 
subcategory is equal to zero. For upgrade E the guards have been just relocated, so no 
additional human resources operating costs have been accounted in comparison with the 
baseline situation.  
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Table 6. 14 Data for the calculation of Equipment costs for five different PPS upgrades. 
UPGRADE 
ID 
DATA FOR THE CALCULATION OF EQUIPMENT COSTS 
Description Unit Value Reference/ 
Notes 
Cost of a couple of fence sensors (i.e., unit cost) € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  20 (Shenzhen P&H 
Electronic Co. 
Ltd, 2016) 
Total number of fence sensors in place  𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 575 8% of spare items 
not included 
B Length and height of the concrete wall, with 
footings 
𝑚 5750; 3 Layout of the 
facility 
Cost of the wall (according to these specifications) € 13530 (Get A Quote, 
2016) 
C Number of cameras for each operative (*) and 
dismissed (**) tank 
𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑘⁄  2 (*);  
1 (*) 
- 
Cost of an outdoor camera € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  178 (Alibi, 2016) 
Total number of cameras in place 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 74 8% of spare items 
not included 
D Number of couples of small tanks 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 15 Layout of the 
facility 
Number of major tanks 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 10 Layout of the 
facility 
Length and height of the concrete wall around unit 
type 1 (*) and unit type 2 (**) 
𝑚 600 (*); 
650 (**); 
3 
Layout of the 
facility 
Cost of the wall for each unit (type 1 (*) and type 2 
(**)) 
€ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ⁄  1412 (*); 
1530 
(**) 
(Get A Quote, 
2016) 
Cost of security doors to be applied on each unit 
(both type 1 and type 2) 
€ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  1000 (Grainger, 2016) 
E Unit cost for the new building (standard 
warehouse with concrete floor and metal clad) 
€ 𝑚2⁄  548 (BMT, 2016) 
Area of the building 𝑚2 50 Layout of the 
facility 
In the calculation of Maintenance, inspection and sustainability costs the following 
assumptions have been applied for each security upgrade: material costs have been estimated 
by assuming an annual substitution rate for equipment and other materials in the range 
between 3% and 5%, 2 scheduled maintenances, 1 unscheduled maintenances and 2 scheduled 
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inspections per year have been accounted. License and renewal costs appeared to be negligible 
for all the five upgrades.  
Other running costs have been calculated for each security upgrade; only for upgrade E this 
cost category has a significant role, provided that the construction of a new building for security 
guards requires additional office furniture and utilities.  
In the calculation of Specific costs, the contribution offered by False-positive costs should be 
considered only for detection elements (i.e., upgrade A and C). For both these upgrades, 
despite a single false-alarm cost, according to expert judgement, is about 2.80 · 103 € and 
𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 ⃓ 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) = 0.143 (Garcia, 2007), assuming the probability of the attack unitary 
turn false-positive costs to zero. Nevertheless, site-specific costs, as revisions of safety 
measures and procedures, have been accounted in particular for delay elements, whose 
implementation might require a revision of emergency routes, as well as entrance and exit 
doors. 
For each of the five security upgrades, the main results obtained from cost calculations, 
according to the six cost categories of EM-PICTURES, as well as the Overall costs (𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖) 
have been illustrated in Figure 6. 10 and Table 6. 15. 
 
Figure 6. 10 Percentage composition of Overall costs for each upgrade of the PPS, according to six 
main cost categories. For each cost category, from the left to the right:  A) Adding fence sensors as 
perimeter detection system, B) Adding a perimeter delay element by building a concrete-reinforced 
external wall, C) Adding detection elements at sabotage targets level, D) Adding delay elements at 
sabotage targets level, E) Reducing response force time by relocating guards closer to the targets. Overall 
cost of each security upgrade is reported in the box on the right. 
Despite the values of Overall costs (𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖) belong to the same order of magnitude (i.e., 
104 €)  for all the security upgrades, the same consideration does not apply to the percentage 
composition of each cost category, as it is visible in Figure 6. 10. 
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Table 6. 15 Calculation of Overall annual costs for five security upgrades, as the sum of six main 
categories, for 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1: 1) Overall initial costs, 2) Overall installation costs, 3) Overall operating costs, 
4) Overall maintenance, inspection & sustainability costs, 5) Other running costs, 6) Overall specific 
costs. 
CALCULATION OF OVERALL COSTS  
(𝑪𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚,𝒊) 
UPGRADE 
A 
UPGRADE 
B 
UPGRADE 
C 
UPGRADE 
D 
UPGRADE 
E 
 Symbol Description Unit Value Value Value Value Value 
CINITIAL,OV 1. Overall initial 
costs 
€ 1.18E+04 2.20E+03 1.13E+04 2.20E+03 5.29E+03 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 Investigation costs € 6.08E+02 6.08E+02 6.08E+02 6.08E+02 6.08E+02 
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 Selection and design 
costs 
€ 5.19E+02 9.78E+02 5.19E+02 9.78E+02 5.19E+02 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 Material costs € 8.50E+03 0 8.00E+03 0 2.00E+03 
𝑪𝑻 
 
Training costs (start-
up/in service) 
€ 1.86E+03 3.11E+02 1.86E+03 3.11E+02 1.86E+03 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 Changing of 
guidelines and 
informing costs 
€ 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 
CINSTALL,OV 2. Overall 
installation costs 
€ 1.62E+04 1.77E+04 1.76E+04 6.48E+04 3.90E+04 
𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 Start-up costs € 1.14E+03 1.74E+03 6.73E+02 8.68E+02 5.24E+02 
𝑪𝑬 
 
Equipment costs 
(including P - 
purchase & R - rental 
costs, space 
requirement costs) 
€ 1.25E+04 1.38E+04 1.62E+04 6.18E+04 3.22E+04 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 Installing costs € 2.54E+03 2.15E+03 6.65E+02 2.15E+03 6.28E+03 
COPERATION,O
V 
3. Overall 
operating costs 
€ 4.17E+03 0 2.69E+04 0 0 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 Utilities costs € 8.61E+02 0 3.69E+02 0 0 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 Human resources 
operating costs 
 3.31E+03 0 2.65E+04 0 0 
CMIS,OV 4. Overall 
maintenance, 
inspection & 
sustainability 
costs 
€ 2.95E+03 1.54E+03 2.86E+03 2.98E+03 2.57E+03 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 Material costs € 6.88E+02 4.06E+02 6.00E+02 1.84E+03 9.22E+02 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 Maintenance team 
costs (A- scheduled 
m. /B- unscheduled 
m.) 
€ 1.62E+03 8.09E+02 1.62E+03 8.09E+02 9.96E+02 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 Inspection team 
costs 
€ 6.47E+02 3.24E+02 6.47E+02 3.24E+02 6.47E+02 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 License and rental 
renewal 
€ 0 0 0 0 0 
COR,OV 5. Other running 
costs 
€ 1.80E+02 2.80E+02 1.80E+02 2.80E+02 8.75E+03 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 Office furniture costs € 0 0 0 0 6.09E+03 
𝑪𝑻 Transport costs € 1.00E+02 2.00E+02 1.00E+02 2.00E+02 1.00E+02 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Additional 
communication 
costs 
€ 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 
𝑪𝑰 Insurance costs € 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑪𝑶𝑼 Office utilities costs € 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.50E+03 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Office supplies costs € 0 0 0 0 0 
CSPEC,OV 6. Overall specific 
costs 
€ 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 False-positive case 
costs 
€ 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 Site-specific costs € 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 
CSecurity, i Overall costs  € 3.57E+04 2.27E+04 5.91E+04 7.13E+04 5.66E+04 
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The comparison among percentage compositions (Figure 6. 10), obtained for each security 
measure by using the respective Overall cost as reference, shows that for detection elements 
(i.e., upgrades A and C) Installation costs are the prevailing ones, followed by relevant Initial 
costs and Operational costs. For delay elements (i.e., upgrades B and D) Installation costs are 
predominant, but Operating costs are negligible. For response element (i.e., upgrade E) 
Installation costs are the prevailing ones, followed by Other running costs; the latter ones are 
almost negligible for all the other security upgrades. Eventually, Maintenance, inspection and 
sustainability costs are around 5% of the Overall costs for all the five security upgrades 
considered in the case study. 
6.4.4 Benefit calculation for different scenarios 
The losses derived from a successful attack should include the fatalities and other damages, 
both direct and indirect, which will accrue because of a successful attack, taking into account 
the value and vulnerability of people and infrastructures, as described in Section 4.2.5. 
Consequently, benefits calculation is dependent on the choice of an appropriate accidental 
scenario.  
In the present case study, three possible scenarios have been analyzed for benefit calculation, 
with the purpose to illustrate the potentiality of EM-PICTURES: realistic scenario, worst-case 
scenario and expected scenario. Realistic benefits indicates the actual losses sustained in the 
attack. The realistic benefits considered may not exactly reflect the actual ones, due to the 
limited amount of technical information available. On the other hand, worst-case benefits are 
the consequences sustained in the worst-case scenario that is a domino accident in the tank 
farm, with several casualties and injuries and severe damage and production loss. Indeed, 
expected benefits are the benefits derived from a hypothetical scenario, which considers the 
average benefits, weighted by probabilities of occurrence, of four possible outcomes (i.e., 
indicated as T1, T2, T3 and T4), as described in Section 4.2.5. Illustrative probabilities were 
defined for each category of scenario, together with a detailed description of all the scenarios 
analyzed in the case study, and reported in Table 6. 16. It was assumed that, for each scenario 
considered, benefits are independent from the security countermeasure that can be 
implemented.  
The benefit categories, subcategories and formula to assess the overall annual benefits (i.e., 
avoided losses) derived from the occurrence of a generic accidental scenario j are calculated 
according to Module 3 of EM-PICTURES version of the economic model; further information 
on benefit assessment is reported in Section 4.2.5. 
In the calculation of Supply chain benefits, a realistic production rate for the facility has been 
estimated by assuming  1 10⁄   of the overall national French oil derivatives production in 2013 
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that is 1.26 · 106  𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑦⁄  (OPEC, 2014); for the conversion into mass flow rate a reference 
density for naphtha has been considered (Engineering ToolBox, 2017). The estimated 
production rate for the facility has been 4.17 · 105 𝑘𝑔 ℎ⁄ , with a profit per unit sold that is the 
market price equal to 4.08 ∙ 10−4€ (Wang and Kim, 2015). For Schedule benefits, the fine for a 
cancelled contract has been assumed, based on expert judgment, 1.00 ∙ 105  € 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁄  and 
the fine for delay in deliveries per day, 1.00 ∙ 104  € (𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∙ 𝑑𝑎𝑦)⁄ . 
In the calculation of Damage benefits, illustrative commercial equipment costs for storage 
tanks have retrieved from vendors (Shanghai Iven Pharmatech Engineering Co. Ltd, 2016): a 
commercial value of 8.00 ∙ 104 € for 40000 𝑚3 tank and of 3.0000 ∙ 104 € for 10000 𝑚3 tank 
has been assumed throughout the case study. For the estimation of finished goods damages, 
the same market price has been assumed for both the products (i.e., naphtha and petrol). 
In the calculation of Legal benefits and after, it should be noted that, as for costs calculations, 
many benefits subcategories consist of wages; the expression for converting annual salaries 
into hourly wages applied has been the same one reported in Section 6.4.3. Moreover, also the 
same values regarding conversion rate from U.S.A. dollars to € and location factor have been 
applied (Section 6.4.3). In the case of Legal benefits, the job profiles involved are junior lawyers 
and seniors lawyers, specialized lawyers, security manager, security engineer, security analyst 
and security consultant. The total security budget prior to the accident has been assumed, 
based on expert judgment, 8.00 ∙ 104 €, but the percentage increase of the security budget after 
the accident is different for the three scenarios considered, depending on consequences 
severity.  
In the calculation of Insurance benefits, the value of the current total premium cost of the 
facility has been considered, based on expert judgment, 5.00 ∙ 107€, while the percentage 
increase of the premium due to the accident is scenario dependent. In the calculation of Human 
benefits, the value of a statistical life (VSL) has been retrieved from a previous study (Viscusi 
and Aldy, 2003) and converted from 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐴. $(2000) into €(2016) by the application of 
appropriate conversion rate (X-Rates, 2016) and inflation rate (Friedman, 2017); the final 𝑉𝑆𝐿 
is 7.07 ∙ 106€. Following the same reference and approach, the monetary values for a light and 
a serious injury are respectively 1.41 ∙ 104 € and 2.06 ∙ 105 €. Hiring benefits are inserted in 
Human and environmental benefits category as they refer to the costs that should be sustained 
by the company when an employee is hospitalized or dead after the accident to hire additional 
personnel in substitution. Hiring and training costs have been assumed equivalent to a 
monthly salary each for the employee category, based on previous studies (Gavious et al., 2009; 
Reniers and Brijs, 2014b). 
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Table 6. 16 Description of the scenarios applied in the case study for benefit assessment: realistic 
scenario, worst-case scenario and expected scenario. Realistic benefits indicate the actual losses 
sustained in the terroristic attack. Expected benefits have been calculated as the average of four possible 
outcomes weighted by respective probabilities of occurrence. Worst-case and T1 benefits are coincident. 
Vulnerability probabilities are considered unitary. 
SCENARIO      
ID 
 
 
 
 
BENEFITS 
REALISTIC WORST-
CASE 
EXPECTED 
T1 
Catastrophi
c accident 
T2 
Critical 
accident 
T3 
Marginal 
accident 
T4 
Negligible 
accident 
Probability of occurrence 
5.00E-04 4.00E-01 5.55E-01 4.95E-02 
Description 
1. Overall 
supply chain 
benefits 
No stop in production; 
20% activity slowed for 13 
hours (emergency 
intervention time); fines 
for delays in deliveries 
Stop in production for 24 
hours; 0% production rate 
at reactivation; 48 hours 
start-up; fines for delays in 
deliveries and 2 orders 
cancelled 
Stop in 
production 
for few 
hours; 
delays in 
the supply 
chain 
Production 
slowed for few 
hours; delays in 
the supply 
chain 
Negligible 
2. Overall 
damage 
benefits 
Two tanks completely 
destroyed, damage to 
piping 
6 tanks destroyed with 
content; severe damage to 
piping; severe damages to 
other company’s and 
public properties; severe 
damage to surrounding 
living areas 
 Two tanks 
completely 
destroyed 
and other 
assets 
damages. 
Two tanks 
damaged 
(20%); minor 
other assets 
damages 
Minor 
damages to 
2 tanks 
(3%) 
3. Overall 
legal benefits 
Civil liability fine for 
pollution; lawyers’ wages; 
50% increase of the 
Security budget; very 
improbable closing down 
(10−5%) 
Civil liability fine for 
pollution; lawyers’ wages; 
80% increase of the 
Security budget; possible 
closing down (10%) 
Fines; 
salaries; 
50% 
increase of 
Security 
budget 
Fines; salaries; 
30% increase of 
Security budget 
Fines; 
salaries; 8% 
increase of 
Security 
budget 
4. Overall 
insurance 
benefits 
0.1% premium increase 10% premium increase 0.1% 
premium 
increase. 
10−2%premiu
m increase 
10−3% 
premium 
increase 
5. Overall 
human and 
environmental 
benefits 
No casualties and injuries; 
content of the two tanks 
burnt 
3 casualties; 4 serious 
injuries and 8 light 
injuries; several new 
recruitments; content of 
the six tanks burnt; severe 
environmental damages 
2 serious 
injuries; 4 
light 
injuries; 
environme
ntal 
damages 
1 light injury; 
marginal 
environmental 
damages 
Negligible 
6. Overall 
intervention 
benefits 
Significant emergency 
intervention 
Massive Emergency 
intervention, with special 
units 
Critical Marginal  Negligible 
7. Overall 
reputation 
benefits 
10−4% expected drop in 
the share-price 
1% expected drop in the 
share-price 
10−4% 
share price 
drop 
5 ∙ 10−5%share 
price drop 
10−5%         s
hare price 
drop 
8. Other 
benefits 
Manager work-time 
benefits and cleaning 
benefits 
Significant manager work-
time benefits and cleaning 
benefits 
Critical Marginal Negligible 
9. Overall 
specific 
benefits 
Airport and traffic delays; 
limited immaterial 
consequences 
Severe airport and traffic 
delays; relevant immaterial 
consequences 
Critical Marginal Negligible 
In the calculation of Intervention benefits, a different flat rate has been assumed for the three 
scenarios. In the calculation of Reputation benefits, a current total market price for the 
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company of 3.84 ∙ 1010€ has been accounted, but the expected percentage drop is scenario 
dependent. In the calculation of Other benefits, wages for security manager and cleaning 
employees have been accounted, while in the estimation of Specific benefits, transportation 
delays costs and psychological counselling for accident witnesses have been considered. 
Eventually, all the benefit numerical values have been determined accordingly to the pertinent 
9 categories of EM-PICTURES, up to Overall benefits (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗), for each of the three scenarios 
considered, which are respectively realistic scenario, worst-case scenario and expected 
scenario. The results of benefits calculations are summarized in Figure 6. 11, Figure 6. 12 and 
Table 6. 17.  
The comparison among benefits percentage compositions forming the expected scenario, 
reported in Figure 6. 11, highlights that benefits distributions depend on the scenario severity: 
for catastrophic (i.e., T1) and critical scenarios (i.e., T2), the costs due to casualties and injuries 
are prevailing, while for marginal (i.e., T3) and negligible (i.e., T4) accidents, the prevailing 
losses are related to legal issues and assets damages. Indeed, as stated in previous studies 
referred to benefit assessment for major accidents within the chemical industry domain 
(Gavious et al., 2009; Reniers and Brijs, 2014b), the value of indirect losses, which include for 
instance reputational losses, human and environmental losses, legal and insurance losses, is 
generally superior to direct losses. The gap between direct and indirect benefits tends to 
increase with the increasing severity of the accident (Gavious et al., 2009). The Overall 
expected benefit value is 6.459·105 €; the expected benefits apportionment is reported in Figure 
6. 11 and shows that human and environmental benefits are prevailing, followed by 
reputational benefits and assets damages.  
The comparison among percentage compositions, obtained for the three scenarios by using the 
respective Overall benefits as reference and reported in Figure 6. 12, shows that, from a general 
point of view, Human and environmental benefits, Overall reputational benefits, Overall 
damage benefits, Overall insurance benefits are the most relevant categories. Both for worst-
case scenario and for expected scenario Human and environmental benefits are relevant, due 
to the high monetary value attributed to injuries and casualties, in comparison with damages 
to assets; however, especially in worst-case scenario, the reputation loss is prevailing. On the 
other hand, for realistic scenario, benefits distribution among categories is the most uniform 
one, but Overall damage benefits are slightly prevailing, due to the relevant damages to 
company assets and to the absence of human losses. As visible from Figure 6. 12, the values of 
Overall benefits belong to the same order of magnitude (i.e., 105 €) for realistic scenario and 
expected scenario, while the Overall benefits referred to worst-case scenario are three orders 
of magnitude higher; details on benefit calculations for the three scenarios are available in 
Table 6. 17. 
Section 6 – Application of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures 
against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities 
312 
 
 
Figure 6. 11 Percentage composition of Overall benefits for four different scenarios: (a) T1, (b) T2, (c) 
T3 and (d) T4, composing the expected scenario (e), calculated according to the categories of the model. 
Overall benefits values are reported for each scenario. 
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Figure 6. 12 Percentage composition of Overall benefits for three different scenarios. For each benefit 
category, from the left to the right: realistic scenario, worst-case scenario and expected scenario. Overall 
benefits are reported in the box on the right for each scenario. 
Table 6. 17 Overall annual benefits results for different scenarios: realistic benefits, worst-case benefits 
and expected benefits. The calculation of Overall benefits has been carried out as the sum of nine main 
categories: (1) Overall supply chain benefits, (2) Overall damage benefits, (3) Overall legal benefits, (4) 
Overall insurance benefits, (5) Overall human and environmental benefits, (6) Overall intervention 
benefits, (7) Overall reputation benefits, (8) Other benefits, (9) Overall specific benefits. 
CALCULATION OF OVERALL BENEFITS (𝑪𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔,𝒋) REALISTIC 
SCENARIO 
WORST - CASE 
SCENARIO 
EXPECTED 
SCENARIO 
Symbol Description Unit Value Value Value 
BSUPC,OV 1 . Overall supply chain 
benefits 
€ 2.04E+04 3.87E+05 2.07E+04 
BDAMAGE,OV 2. Overall damage 
benefits 
€ 1.29E+05 5.23E+05 6.61E+04 
BLEGAL,OV 3. Overall legal benefits € 8.56E+04 1.18E+06 5.69E+04 
BINS,OV 4. Overall insurance 
benefits 
€ 5.00E+04 5.00E+06 2.53E+04 
BH&E,OV 5. Overall human and 
environmental benefits 
€ 7.50E+04 2.24E+07 2.47E+05 
BINTV,OV 6. Overall intervention 
benefits 
€ 5.00E+03 3.00E+04 3.99E+03 
BREPT,OV 7. Overall reputation 
benefits 
€ 3.84E+04 3.84E+08 2.18E+05 
BOTH,OV 8. Other benefits € 1.06E+03 9.94E+03 8.12E+02 
BSPEC,OV 9. Overall specific 
benefits 
€ 1.30E+04 5.50E+04 6.64E+03 
CLoss, j Overall benefits  € 4.17E+05 4.14E+08 6.46E+05 
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6.4.5 Results and discussion 
6.4.5.1 Results of the case study 
The results of the assessment of the case study consist in cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analyses results, obtained according to the deterministic approach presented in EM-
PICTURES version of the model. The first are the values of actualized Net benefits, for five PPS 
upgrades and for three scenarios. The latter are the most profitable combinations of security 
upgrades for each scenario, within the constraint of the security budget. Further information 
on the equations to be applied is available in Sections 4.2.7.1 and 4.2.8.1. 
Overall costs for each security measure and Overall benefits for each scenario have been made 
comparable by applying appropriate discount rates (i.e., 3.5% and 1.5% respectively (HSE - 
Health and Safety Executive, 2016)) over a 10 year time-span, according to equation (4.19). 
The latter is a conventional number of operational years for a security measure.  
Certain costs (e.g., initial and installation costs) occurs only in the present and thus do not have 
to be actualized, whereas other costs (e.g., operating costs, maintenance, inspection and 
sustainability costs, other running costs) refer to the whole remaining lifetime of the facility 
and  therefore they should be discounted to the present. The benefit categories should be all 
actualized, as they represent positive cash flows, occurring throughout the remaining lifetime 
of the facility. The actualized values of Overall Benefits are respectively 2.70 · 105 € for realistic 
scenario, 2.76 · 108 € for worst-case scenario and 4.31 · 105 € for expected scenario. 
Table 6. 18 Cost-benefit analysis results, in term of Net Benefits, for five different PPS upgrades and 
three possible scenarios. 
 
SECURITY UPGRADES 
 
NET BENEFITS 
REALISTIC 
SCENARIO 
WORST - CASE 
SCENARIO 
EXPECTED 
SCENARIO 
Upgrade 
ID 
DESCRIPTION/UNIT € € € 
A External infrared fence sensors as 
perimeter detection system (at fence level) 
6.80E+04 9.76E+07 1.22E+05 
B Construction of an external reinforced 
concrete wall (instead. of the fence) 
-2.21E+04 -2.21E+04 -2.21E+04 
C Addition of detection elements (i.e., 
cameras) at sabotage targets 
-4.69E+04 1.44E+06 -4.60E+04 
D Addition of delay elements at sabotage 
targets 
-2.06E+04 4.90E+07 6.59E+03 
E Reduction of response force time (by 
creating a closer guard dispatch)  
4.86E+04 9.63E+07 1.02E+05 
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Considering the threat and vulnerability probabilities unitary, the value of Net Benefit, also 
named Net Present Value (𝑁𝑃𝑉), has been calculated for each of the five PPS upgrades, 
according to the three scenarios, by applying equation (4.20). The final results of cost-benefit 
analyses, reported in Table 6. 18, prove the coherency of the model, highlighting that security 
upgrades A and E are economically feasible for all the scenarios considered. Upgrade D is 
acceptable only with reference to expected scenario and worst-case scenario; upgrade C is 
acceptable only with reference to worst-case scenario. Therefore, according to the multi-
scenario acceptability criteria expressed by equation (4.21), upgrades B, C and D are not 
economically profitable. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis has been applied in order to determine the most profitable 
combination of security upgrades within the security budget constraint for each scenario, 
according to the deterministic approach. For each scenario, all the possible 30 combinations 
of PPS upgrades have been considered, starting from each single security measure, to couples, 
triplets, quartets and eventually group of five. Actualized Overall costs have been calculated for 
each combination by applying a 3.5% discount rate to the pertinent cost categories of each 
option taken and by summing the actualized costs (HSE - Health and Safety Executive, 2016), 
then Overall costs have been compared with the actualized security budget. It should be noted 
that the security budget is different among the three scenarios, due to different percentage 
increases of security budget after the accident, depending on consequence severity. For each 
scenario, only the combinations respecting the budget criteria have been selected and their Net 
Benefits have been calculated and compared, according to equation (4.27), proposed in EM-
PICTURES version of the model. The actualized values of Overall benefits applied in the 
calculation have been the ones reported in this section.  
Table 6. 19 Cost-effectiveness analysis results, regarding all possible combinations of security 
measures, for each of the three scenario. From the left to the right: first-most profitable combination, 
second-most profitable combination and security budget. 
 
SCENARIO 
REFERENCE 
 
FIRST COST-EFFECTIVE COMBINATION 
 
SECOND COST-EFFECTIVE COMBINATION 
Security 
Budget 
Combination 
ID 
Net Benefit 
(€) 
Total Cost of 
Combination 
(€) 
Combination 
ID 
Net Benefit 
(€) 
Total Cost of 
Combination 
(€) 
Value  (€) 
REALISTIC A+E 1.17E+05 7.90E+04 A+B+E 9.46E+04 1.01E+05 1.20E+05 
WORST -
CASE  
A+C+E 1.95E+08 1.27E+05 A+E 1.94E+08 7.90E+04 1.44E+05 
EXPECTED  A+E 2.24E+05 7.90E+04 A+B+E 1.01E+05 2.02E+05 1.10E+05 
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The results of cost-effectiveness analyses, reported in Table 6. 19, show that the combination 
of security measures A and E (i.e., application of detection system at external fence level and 
relocation of security guards) is the one with the maximum Net Benefit for realistic and 
expected scenario. Nevertheless, the most profitable combination for worst-case scenario 
includes, besides upgrades A and E, also upgrade C, which refers to additional detection system 
at sabotage targets. The second most profitable combination includes upgrades A and E for the 
three scenarios; indeed, for realistic and expected scenarios also the application of upgrade B 
(i.e., additional delay element at external level) is suggested.  
Figure 6. 13 shows the complete ranking of all possible combinations of security measures, 
according to cost-effectiveness analysis, for each of the three scenarios. The results confirm 
that several profitable combinations offer an integration of different security functions (i.e., 
detection, delay and response), providing therefore a more complete security protection. 
Nevertheless, none of the combinations respecting the budget constraints includes more than 
three security upgrades. Moreover, in the top ten most profitable combinations for the three 
scenarios are often present security measures whose single performance increases are very 
limited, due to the relatively low costs of implementation (e.g., upgrade B). 
Therefore, the consistent results of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses highlight that 
upgrade A and upgrade E are the suggested security measures to be implemented together. 
This option offers improved detection at perimeter level and improved response of security 
guards. However, the implementation of a triplet of security upgrades (e.g., upgrades A+B+E), 
might be convenient with reference to a worst-case scenario. According to all these options, an 
integration of different security functions is carried out, providing therefore a more complete 
security protection, according to the Organizational-Physical-Electronics-Reporting principle 
(OPER) principle (Reniers et al., 2015).  
These results may offer sound indications for the stakeholders to rationally select and allocate 
security measures, providing a range of economically profitable options, which should be 
eventually compared with company-specific acceptance criteria and information.  
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Figure 6. 13 Cost-effectiveness analysis results, showing the ranking in terms of Net Benefit 
respecting budget (expressed in €(2016)) for all possible combinations of security measures, with 
reference to the three scenarios: A) realistic scenario and expected scenario; B) worst-case scenario. 
Section 6 – Application of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures 
against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities 
318 
 
6.4.5.2 Uncertainty analysis 
As discussed in the methodology section (see Section 4.3), the application of EM-PICTURES 
version of the model requires to perform an uncertainty analysis on threat and vulnerability 
probabilities, in purpose to evaluate the effect of their variations on economic analyses results.  
According to the equations and concepts expounded in Section 4.2.6, the uncertainty analysis 
regarding case study results focuses on: 
1) The effect of threat probability (𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗), here named also 𝑃(𝑇), as it assumes an 
uniform value for all security measures and scenarios, and conditional loss probability 
(𝑃(𝐿|𝐻)) variations on cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis results. The 
two terms, which are related, depend on the typologies of adversaries and malicious 
acts. The values considered in the uncertainty analysis are reported in Table 6. 20. 
2) The effect of conditional hazard probability (𝑃(𝐻|𝑇)) variations on economic analysis 
results. This term depends on the complexity of the explosive device applied in the 
terroristic attack. The values considered in the uncertainty analysis are reported in 
Table 6. 20. 
Table 6. 20 Values applied for uncertainty analysis on the threat and vulnerabilities values of the case 
study. 
Threat 
severity 
Example of adversaries and malicious act 𝑷(𝑻) 𝑷(𝑳 ⎸𝑯) 
Medium Organized criminals/ terrorists stealing assets/ weak sabotage action 0.3 0.80 
High Terrorists aimed at causing a major accident  0.1 1 
Conditional 
threat 
Terrorists aimed at causing cascading effects  1 1 
𝑷(𝑯 ⎸𝑻) 
 Reliability of Improvised Explosives 
Devices 
Global Performance 
Shaping Factors 
𝑷(𝑯 ⎸𝑻) 
 Device 
complexity 
Representative IED design 𝑹𝑰𝑬𝑫 𝑷𝑺𝑭  for a terroristic 
organization 
Simple Pipe bomb 0.931 0.981 0.913 
Medium Mobile phone initiated VBIED 
(Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Device) 
0.920 0.980 0.902 
Complex Improvised mortar 0.910 0.905 0.824 
Conservative 
assumption 
No information available 1 1 1 
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According to point 1), the value of conditional hazard probability was kept unitary and 
unchanged; the uncertainty analysis dealt on only with the variation of 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻). 
The value of Net Benefit, also named Net Present Value (𝑁𝑃𝑉), has been recalculated for each 
of the five PPS upgrades, according to the three scenarios, by applying equation (4.20), with 
the mentioned different values of 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻); the recalculated cost-benefit analysis 
results are reported in Figure 6. 14. For instance, according to realistic scenario, the only 
upgrades profitable with 𝑃(𝑇) = 1 and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) = 1 that are security measures A and E, become 
not profitable with lower values of the threat probability and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻). According to worst-case 
scenario, all the single security measures are still profitable, after the decrease of 𝑃(𝑇) and 
𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) values, with the exception of upgrade B. According to the expected scenario, security 
measures A, D and E are profitable with 𝑃(𝑇) = 1 and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) = 1; only security measure A is 
profitable with 𝑃(𝑇) = 0.3 and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) = 0.8 and none of the security measures is still 
profitable with 𝑃(𝑇) = 0.1. 
Figure 6. 14 Results of cost-benefit analysis as a function of threat probability 𝑃(𝑇) and conditional 
loss probability (𝑃(𝐿|𝐻)) values, for the five PPS upgrades and three scenarios: A) realistic scenario; B) 
worst-case scenario; C) expected scenario. Monetary values are expressed in (€, 2016). 
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Figure 6. 15 Results of cost-effectiveness analysis as a function of threat probability (𝑃(𝑇)) and 
conditional loss probability (𝑃(𝐿|𝐻)) values, for the five PPS upgrades and three scenarios: A) realistic 
scenario; B) worst-case scenario; C) expected scenario. Monetary values are expressed in (€, 2016). 
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Indeed, the effects of uncertainties regarding 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) values on cost-effectiveness 
analysis results were evaluated by inserting the modified inputs in equation (4.27); the results 
are available in Figure 6. 15. Values not respecting the security budget threshold have not been 
reported in Figure 6. 15. According to realistic and expected scenario, none of security 
measures combination is profitable with lower values of the threat probability and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻). 
According to worst-case scenario, the reduction of 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) values turn into a 
reduction of 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑗, but the number of combinations respecting the threshold criteria 
is unchanged, as well as the most profitable combination, which remains A+C+E.  
In conclusion, Figure 6. 14 and Figure 6. 15 show that the modified values of 𝑃(𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) 
have a linear effect on cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis results. In a general 
perspective, removing the over-conservative assumptions of 𝑃(𝑇) = 1 and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻) = 1 lead to 
a significant reduction of the profitability, both for a single security upgrade and for a 
combination of them, with an analogous trend for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. 
This difference is scenario-dependent, and becomes even more remarkable with decreasing 
scenario severity (i.e., lower 𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗) , as arguable from the equations applied (see Sections 
4.2.7.1 and 4.2.8.1).  
According to point 2), the values of conditional loss probability and 𝑃(𝑇) were kept unitary and 
unchanged; the uncertainty analysis dealt only with the variation of the conditional hazard 
probability (i.e., 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇)), proportionally increasing with the decreasing explosive device 
complexity, according to the values reported in Table 6. 20. The effects of uncertainties 
regarding 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) values on cost-benefit analysis results were evaluated by inserting the 
modified inputs in equation (4.20); the results are available in Figure 6. 16, for the five PPS 
upgrades and the three scenarios considered in the case study. According to realistic scenario, 
the only upgrades profitable with 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) = 1 are security measures A and E, and they are still 
profitable, with lower values of Net Benefits, with lower values of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇). Also according to 
worst-case scenario, the reduction of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) lead only to a reduction of Net Benefits for all the 
security upgrades, but all of them, with the exception of upgrades B, remain feasible. According 
to the expected scenario, the upgrades profitable with 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) = 1 are A, D and E; upgrade D 
becomes not feasible removing the conservative assumption of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) = 1, regardless the 
complexity of the explosive device.  
Indeed, the effects of uncertainties regarding 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) values on cost-effectiveness analysis 
results were evaluated by inserting the modified inputs in equation (4.27); the results are 
available in Figure 6. 17. Values not respecting the security budget threshold have not been 
reported in Figure 6. 17. According to realistic, worst-case and expected scenario, the reduction 
of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) lead to a limited reduction of the Net Benefit for a generic combination of security 
measures; the most profitable combination for each scenario is unchanged.  
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Figure 6. 16 Results of cost-benefit analysis as a function of conditional hazard probability values 
(𝑃(𝐻|𝑇)), which express device complexity, for the five PPS upgrades and three scenarios: A) realistic 
scenario; B) worst-case scenario; C) expected scenario. Monetary values are expressed in (€, 2016). 
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Figure 6. 17 Results of cost-effectiveness analysis as a function of conditional hazard probability 
(𝑃(𝐻|𝑇)) values, for the five PPS upgrades and three scenarios: A) realistic scenario; B) worst-case 
scenario; C) expected scenario. Monetary values are expressed in (€, 2016). 
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In conclusion, Figure 6. 16 and Figure 6. 17 show that the modified values of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) have a 
linear effect on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses results. In a general perspective, 
removing the conservative assumptions of 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) = 1 and decreasing 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇)  lead to a limited 
reduction of the profitability, both for a single security upgrade and for a combination of them, 
with similar trend for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. Indeed, this difference is 
not particularly significant, as arguable from the values applied and reported in Table 6. 20, 
which are all close to 1; in particular, the results obtained for a medium complexity and a low 
complexity device almost overlap.  
Therefore, the results of uncertainty analysis highlighted that it is important to consider 
adequate values of the threat probability within EM-PICTURES application, because they 
deeply affect economic analyses results. On the other hand, the effect of explosive device 
complexity on economic analyses results is generally limited and therefore may be neglected, 
especially in case of limited information available.  
6.4.5.3 Scenario analysis validation 
The application of EM-PICTURES highlighted a significant similarity, in terms of benefit 
category results between realistic scenario and expected scenario (see Figure 6. 12).  
As explained in Section 6.4.4, the initial probabilities of occurrence for four different outcomes 
that compose expected benefits have been chosen arbitrarily, for illustrative purposes (Table 
6. 16). Indeed, a validation of scenario analysis through the re-calculation of probabilities for 
four different outcomes has been carried out, imposing for each category, as well as for Overall 
values, the equality of expected benefits with realistic benefits, by means of Excel Solver® 
(version 2013).   
The comparison has been made among non-actualized benefit values, but it should be 
remarked that this element does not affect the comparison results, as long as the discount rate 
applied is the same. The results of probability revision, reported in Table 6. 21, show that the 
severity of consequences in the real accident is between category T2 (critical accident) and 
category T3 (marginal accident), accordingly to the severity ranking considered in the case 
study.  
Therefore, EM-PICTURES may be effectively applied also retrospectively, in purpose to 
validate the probability of occurrence for security-based accidental scenarios.  
The present application might be useful in the security domain, due to the lack of quantitative 
information regarding accidents occurrence in this domain. 
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Table 6. 21 Scenario validation (i.e., sv) results. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
RECALCULATION RESULTS 
EXPECTED 
SCENARIO 
 RATIO 
(𝑪𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔,𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 − 𝑪𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔,𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄) 𝑪𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔,𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄⁄  
After scenario 
validation 
Before scenario 
validation 
After scenario 
validation 
Symbol Description Unit Value Value (%) Value (%) 
BSUPC,OV 1 . Overall supply chain benefits € 2.04E+04 1.39% 0 
BDAMAGE,OV 2 . Overall damage benefits € 6.59E+04 -48.55% -48.74% 
BLEGAL,OV 3. Overall legal benefits € 5.75E+04 -33.55% -32.91% 
BINS,OV 4. Overall insurance benefits € 2.27E+04 -49.45% -54.54% 
BH&E,OV 5. Overall human and 
environmental benefits 
€ 2.33E+05 229.67% 210.93% 
BINTV,OV 6. Overall intervention benefits € 4.09E+03 -20.21% -18.27% 
BREPT,OV 7. Overall reputation benefits € 3.84E+04 468.00% 0 
BOTH,OV 8. Other benefits € 8.22E+02 -23.24% -22.32% 
BSPEC,OV 9. Overall specific benefits € 6.60E+03 -48.91% -49.21% 
CLoss Overall benefits  € 4.50E+05 54.85% 7.80% 
PROBABILITY OF OCCURENCE 
RECALCULATION RESULTS  
EXPECTED 
SCENARIO 
RATIO 
(𝑷𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒗 − 𝑷𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒗) 𝑷𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒗⁄  
After scenario 
validation 
Category Descriptive word Value  Value (%) 
T1 Catastrophic accident 3.05E-05 -93.91% 
T2 Critical accident 3.91E-01 -2.35% 
T3 Marginal accident 6.09E-01 10.79% 
T4 Negligible accident 0 -100.00% 
 
6.4.5.4 Discussion 
The current Section has been aimed at applying the EM-PICTURES version of the economic 
model to an original case study, regarding a terroristic attack to a storage tank farm. The case 
study, freely adapted from a real event, considered a multi-targets terroristic attack on a 
realistic chemical installation, including site-specific and accident-specific information in the 
calculations. The application of EM-PICTURES version of the economic model to the present 
case study definitely demonstrate that this version of the model provides a useful insight on 
the profitable security measures to be adopted in a chemical and process facility and therefore 
it validates the EM-PICTURES version of the methodology, described in Section 4. 
The application highlighted that the model provides site-specific answers to security analysts, 
because it allows evaluating the performance of physical security measures present on a real 
chemical installation, composing the physical protection system, in relation with the specific 
adversary sequence of actions. The case study proved the ability of the model to represent a 
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complex multi-targets terroristic attack and to include adversary mode of action in the 
effectiveness assessment, which is site-specific and accident-specific, as it depends on the 
possible adversary path of actions. Indeed, several possible security upgrades were proposed, 
according to the security functions of detection, delay and response; the pool of security 
options has been enlarged in comparison with the previous simplified case study (see Section 
6.3), in purpose to include more than one detection and delay upgrades, considering 
improvements at perimeter and at sabotage targets level. The use of a large pool of security 
options offer a broader pool of alternatives to be considered in the economic analyses, making 
their results more realistic, even if they add complexity to the calculations. The additional 
security measures have been compared in terms of overall effectiveness improvement, showing 
that, with reference to the realistic plant layout and the specific adversary action, it is suggested 
either to apply fence sensors at external level or to relocate guards in a closer dispatch. 
However, three options over five show relevant effectiveness improvement indexes results, 
making the final results of economic analyses application not obvious from the outset. Indeed, 
it should be noted that the effectiveness analysis results are site-specific and accident-specific 
and cannot be generalized beyond the current case study. Moreover, although the model is able 
to take into account possible additional terms that may affect the overall performance of the 
physical protection system (e.g., lag-time in detection by the security guards), it should be 
considered as a simplified representation of reality. 
The cost assessment allows a precise definition of the most relevant cost terms due to the 
implementation of the five possible security upgrades, leaving at the same time enough space 
for the analyst to add site-specific costs. Cost calculations confirmed that the overall cost due 
to the implementation of a single security upgrade generally belongs to the same order of 
magnitude (i.e., 104€) and  installation costs are generally prevailing; for detection upgrades 
operating costs are significant. Information regarding certain cost voices needs to be retrieved 
from vendors, other information are related to the plant layout (e.g., the number of detection 
devices in place); as visible in Section 6.4.3, it is necessary to present cost calculations clearly, 
as well as to discuss assumptions made and uncertainties arisen.  
The potentiality of EM-PICTURES both in predictive and in posterior analysis has been 
evaluated by its application to several possible accidental scenarios, including a worst-case 
scenario, a realistic scenario and an expected scenario. The use of multiple scenarios allows 
providing a broader number of economic indicators and to apply multi-scenario economic 
criteria provided by the model. The precise categories and subcategories elaborated for benefit 
calculations allows preventing omissions and inaccuracies; nevertheless, its inputs are 
validated for the case study by a panel of security experts, in purpose to avoid misleading 
conclusions. Indeed, the case study proved that benefit assessment allows a detailed 
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description of the losses derived from either perspective or retrospective accidental scenarios. 
In particular, the retrospective application of EM-PICTURES (Section 6.4.5.3) may offer an 
additional tool to retrieve and validate quantitative information on security-based scenarios. 
Nevertheless, as all economic analyses, EM-PICTURES requires the monetization of all the 
losses derived from a major accident, which is not always free from complication. For instance, 
assigning monetary values to mortality and morbidity is a common practice in economic 
analyses, but it is still defined “a complicated situation” (Tappura et al., 2014), which might 
arise ethical concerns (Ale et al., 2015). Due to the high monetary value assigned to casualties, 
human losses are the prevailing category in case of a catastrophic accident (i.e., worst-case 
scenario). Therefore, the variation of this term affects significantly final economic analyses 
results, at least for a catastrophic scenario.  
Moreover, also the assumptions regarding discount rates for overall costs and benefits might 
be affected by subjectivity of the analyst; within the case study, standard assumptions referred 
to cost-benefit analysis for industrial facilities have been considered. Indeed, also the 
definition of adequate threat and vulnerability probabilities requires carefulness of the security 
analyst, as they depend on many variables (e.g., typology of terroristic organization and device 
used in the attack). The deterministic approach provided by EM-PICTURES version of the 
model is applied here by assuming conservatively unitary values for threat and vulnerabilities. 
This assumption is justified for the case study, as it refers to a terroristic attack, which may 
possibly cause a cascading event; it allows focusing on the role of security measures in the 
prevention of accidental scenarios. Therefore, whenever EM-PICTURES is applied, it is 
important to present the analysis in a fully transparent manner, specifying the assumptions 
made and discussing the uncertainties arisen, for example regarding threat and vulnerabilities, 
in purpose to avoid misleading conclusions. 
The application of EM-PICTURES to an illustrative case study, based on a real accident, made 
clear that a distinctive feature of model application is the flexibility, given by its capability to 
perform both cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, offering as outputs a broad 
spectrum of economic analyses results, which can support the security decision-making 
process. Indeed, the interpretation of the economic analyses results derived from EM-
PICTURES application to the case study is a crucial point. Within this specific application, the 
results provided by cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses are generally coherent; 
however, they show a strong dependency on the selection of pertinent security-based 
scenarios. For instance, cost-benefit analysis results suggest to apply either additional 
detection at perimeter level or to relocate guard; all the other security upgrades are feasible 
only with reference to certain scenarios and therefore they do not respect the multi-scenario 
acceptability criteria of the model. Indeed, the case study highlighted that security measures 
that are not feasible with reference to a marginal scenario might be appropriate with reference 
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to a catastrophic scenario. This issue makes the selection of an appropriate pool of credible 
scenarios even more important.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis results confirm that the combination of improved detection at fence 
is the most profitable option for realistic and expected scenario; according to worst-case 
scenario it is suggested to adopt a triplet a measures, including, besides the mentioned 
upgrades, also detection measures at targets level. Nevertheless, the second most profitable 
combination of security measures diverge with the indications previously provided by cost-
benefit analysis, for two scenarios over three, as it includes a measure (i.e., additional delay at 
perimeter level) singularly not feasible. Indeed, the final results may suggest adopting 
combinations of security measures that include also one or more security measures singularly 
not profitable. Indeed, a profitable combination of security measures may include one or more 
measures whose performances are not excellent, due to several factors standing between 
effectiveness assessment and final results (e.g., costs, budget threshold, selection of scenarios, 
etc.). In these situations, it is a management decision whether to revise the security 
expenditure, as well as to give priority either to cost-benefit or to cost-effectiveness analyses 
results. Moreover, the results of cost-effectiveness analysis depend on the security budget 
threshold, which is generally defined yearly by security management; the increase of security 
budget after the accident is in turn scenario dependent. In comparison with the simplified case 
study presented in Section 6.3, for the current case study cost-effectiveness analyses results 
are more significant than cost-benefit ones, due to the extended pool of possible combinations 
(i.e., 30), to the use of multiple scenarios and to the strict security budget threshold, which 
excludes several possible combinations of security upgrades. From a general perspective, 
within the case study, it might be profitable to apply a combination of security measures, which 
includes upgrades belonging to all the security functions (e.g., additional detection and delay 
at fence, joined with relocation of security guards), as it provide a more complete security 
protection.  
The uncertainty analysis performed on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses highlighted 
that the variation of threat and vulnerability probabilities values has a linear effect on model 
results, tending to reduce the Net Benefits for all security upgrades and scenarios. The effect 
of removing the conservative assumptions regarding threat and vulnerabilities is relevant for 
what concerns the threat and conditional loss probability, but it is limited regarding the 
conditional hazard probability. The most profitable combination of security measures for all 
the scenarios is unchanged; therefore, within the present case study, the uncertainty analysis 
do not offer significantly different results in comparison with the ones previously obtained. 
In conclusion, the application of EM-PICTURES version of the economic model to the present 
case study demonstrated definitely that model outputs may be applied in risk-informed 
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security decision-making both at company and at regulatory level, to increase the awareness 
of management or regulators toward security issues by means rather user-friendly outputs, 
given by cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses results. Moreover, the case study proved 
that model application gives accurate results, due to its precise checklists and classifications, 
but it is not over-complicated, even with reference to a complex terroristic attack for a realistic 
chemical installation.  
Therefore, the present case study proved the applicability of EM-PICTURES version of the 
model in industrial practice, within chemical facilities or related regulatory bodies. However, 
it is necessary to validate also the other version of the economic model (i.e., ECO-SECURE), 
specifically referred to environmental security-based accidents, by means of a benchmark case 
study, referred to a realistic accident.  
6.4.6 Conclusions on the case study 
EM-PICTURES version of novel economic model for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analyses of process-industry related counter-terrorism measures was applied to an illustrative 
case study, based on a real accident.  
Model application started from baseline physical protection system effectiveness assessment 
for a specific process facility, then it included the evaluation and comparison of the costs 
derived from the introduction of a security upgrade with the losses derived from either 
perspective or retrospective accidental events, named benefits, accounting also effectiveness 
improvement. The application of cost-benefit analysis allows defining single profitable security 
measures. Cost-effectiveness analysis output is the ranking of security measures combinations, 
in order of decreasing profitability, for each scenario and according to budget threshold. The 
uncertainties related to threat and vulnerabilities probabilities are considered, within case 
study application.  
Therefore, the case study definitely demonstrated that EM-PICTURES model version enables 
to define a more rational selection and allocation of process industry related physical security 
measures, by means of its outputs, which are a set of economic security-related indicators. EM-
PICTURES outputs provide a sound support to managers and regulators involved in the 
security decision-making process, and its application in industrial practice may eventually 
contribute to the reduction of chemical plants vulnerability towards intentional malevolent 
acts.  
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6.5 ALLOCATION OF PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES 
AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL 
TERRORISM IN CHEMICAL FACILITIES (ECO-SECURE 
APPLICATION) 
In this Section, the economic model for the selection and allocation of preventive physical 
security measures against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities, presented in Section 4, is 
tested to an original case study, according to ECO-SECURE version, specifically referred to 
environmental security-related accidents. This benchmark application is aimed at 
understanding the full potential and possible outcomes of the approach developed, by means 
of an illustrative case study, freely inspired by a possible security-related event that took place 
in a chemical facility in Italy. 
6.5.1 Definition of the case study 
The ECO-SECURE model was applied to an illustrative case study, consisting in the terroristic 
sabotage of four storage tanks in a fuel storage facility, aimed at causing environmental 
damages by releasing water pollutants.  
The oil depot considered in the case study includes 37 storage tanks containing various liquid 
hydrocarbons, as diesel and heating oil. The accident scenario consisted of a sequential 
sabotage of four storage tanks, named after respectively Target 1, Target 2, Target 3 and Target 
4, as shown in Figure 6. 18. Target 1 and Target 2 are two heating oil tanks, containing in total 
800,000 kg of product; while Target 3 and Target 4 are two diesel tanks, containing in total 
1,800,000 kg of product. The distances among the targets have been reported in Table 6. 22, 
Part B.  The damages, as well as the plant layout, are freely adapted from a real security-based 
accident that took place during the night between 22nd and 23rd February 2010 in Villasanta, 
Monza-Brianza province, Italy (Alpas et al., 2011; Associated Press in Rome, 2010; EMARS - 
Major accidents reporting system, 2010; Winfield, 2010a). However, the case study is fictional 
and its aim is the validation and the further implementation of ECO-SECURE version of the 
model, addressing the selection and allocation of physical security measures against 
environmental and eco-terroristic attacks in a chemical facility. Therefore, the causes of the 
security-based accident here-in considered (i.e., an external environmental terroristic attack) 
are not related to the causes of the real accident (Berni, 2016; La Repubblica, 2016). 
The starting point for the adversary was chosen in correspondence of a railway route just 
outside the border of the facility, at about 50 m distance from the first target. The adversary 
was supposed to carry out the sabotage action by foot. The sabotage sequence of actions 
consisted in opening a valve and switching on a pump in correspondence of each target, leading 
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to the spill of the entire contents of the four tanks, for a total amount of 2,600,000 kg of 
hydrocarbon liquid products (ARPA - Agenzia Regionale Prevenzione Ambiente dell’Emilia-
Romagna, 2010). The spill substance, from the pipes of the loading docks and the repayment 
of the product, overfilled the tanks of the oil-water separator tank coming indirectly from the 
sewage system inside the plant and directly passed to curb protection, likely due to saturation 
of the sewer system itself; part of the spill was also poured into the containment basins. Then, 
the spill was drained from the oil-water tank through the main valve, always kept open to allow 
the discharge of wastewater from a hydraulic barrier aimed at remediation, to the sewer 
outside the plant, which flows into the main collector. Indeed, the spill reached the treatment 
plant of the nearby city through the main sewer. Consequently, the spill has been poured into 
the nearby river and caused a significant pollution of river water and rive sides downstream of 
the filter for about 100 km, with involvement of a second river in the stretch downstream from 
the mouth of the first river. Contaminated waters of the second river affected the second river 
delta and the coastal area of the sea.  
In the actual event, the Lambro river (i.e., first river in the case study) and the Po river (i.e., 
second river in the case study) were polluted for about 350 km. The realistic damages, derived 
from the actual event, consisted in severe environmental losses to the ecosystem, requiring 
therefore emergency actions to contain pollution that lasted several days after the accident. 
Furthermore, intense monitoring and in-site and off-site remediation actions were required 
during the subsequent months. The company had to sustain legal costs due to prosecution, as 
well as the payment of fines. The accident resulted in no human losses but in severe damages 
to the environment, in economic damages to the company, and in collateral damages to 
surrounding activities and public infrastructures (e.g., the treatment plant was off for about 
one month) in the nearby densely populated area (EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 
2010). 
The determination of PPS in place was carried out using available information and comparing 
the description of PPS usually present in chemical facilities (Reniers et al., 2015) with photos 
and maps of the layout of the reference installation, reported in Figure 6. 18. The screening 
allowed the identification of key protection elements and key distances, which are data 
necessary to calculate the baseline physical protection system effectiveness. Further 
information on the PPS in place is reported in Section 6.5.2.  
The application was carried out in Excel® modelling environment, using 7 different datasheets, 
corresponding to ECO-SECURE modules, as explained in Section 4.2.1. 
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Figure 6. 18 Layout of the reference installation considered in the case study, with adversary starting 
point and path of actions, the latter indicated by the numbers. The ending point is target 4. Further 
information on adversary tasks is available in Table 6. 22. The layout has been retrieved from Google 
Earth®. 
6.5.2 Development of adversary sequence diagram and effectiveness 
calculation 
6.5.2.1 Definition of site-specific adversary sequence diagrams and calculation 
of the baseline system effectiveness 
A possible critical site-specific adversary sequence path, in relation with physical protection 
elements present on the reference site, was defined and is described in Table 6. 22, Part A and 
shown in Figure 6. 18. The calculation of baseline system effectiveness was carried out 
according to the approach described in Section 4.2.2 for ECO-SECURE version of the model, 
with the aim to determine the probability of interruption (i.e., 𝑃𝐼,𝑝∗ indicated also as 𝑃𝐼
∗) of the 
critical adversary path. 
The solely detection elements present are cameras on the wall delimiting the two storage areas, 
with 𝑃𝐴𝐷,9 = 0.9. The probability of assessed detection (𝑃𝐴𝐷,𝑖) expresses the likelihood of 
detecting an adversary within the zone covered by cameras or intrusion detection sensors. In 
addition, the location of detection elements was included in the analysis, according to the EASI 
model, considering a standard B location, indicating detection before delay. For all delay 
elements with the exception of running times, specific data have been retrieved (Garcia, 2007) 
and reported in Table 6. 22, Part A, jointly with all the data inherent to the detection function 
for the path considered in the case study. For the calculation of running times, the standard 
adversary velocity of 10 𝑓𝑡/𝑠 = 3.048 𝑚/𝑠 has been assumed, considering a reduction factor 
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due to additional weights carried by the adversary unitary (i.e., no additional weight carried by 
the adversary).  
Table 6. 22 Input for the calculation of baseline PPS effectiveness referred to the critical path. Part A) 
Adversary sequence and inputs for the calculation of detection and delay elements referred to the 
identified adversary path; Part B) Additional data for the calculation of running delay times; Part C) 
Inputs for the calculation of the response function. Standard deviation was assumed 3/10 of the mean 
value. Values retrieved from data repository (Garcia, 2007) and site-specific plant layout. 
Part A) Adversary Sequence Diagrams and Inputs for Detection and Delay elements 
ADVERSARY TASKS  DETECTION  DELAY 
Task 
number 
Task Description Detection elements and 
assessed detection 
probabilities  𝑷𝑨𝑫,𝒊 
Delay elements Mean 
delays 
𝒕𝑫,𝒊 (s)  
1 Starting point - - - 
2 Climb external wall None Height of the wall 10.0 
3 Run to first tank (Target 
1) 
None Running time 14.8 
4 Open first valve None Time required to open first valve 30.0 
5 Activate first pump None Time required to activate first pump 60.0 
6 Run to second tank 
(Target 2) 
None Running time 16.4 
7 Open second valve None Time required to open second valve 30.0 
8 Activate second pump None Time required to activate second 
pump 
60.0 
9 Run to third tank 
(Target 3) 
Camera on wall delimiting two 
areas (𝑃𝐴𝐷,9 = 0.9) 
Running time 26.9 
 
10 Open third valve None Time required to open third valve 30.0 
11 Activate third pump None Time required to activate third pump 60.0 
12 Run to fourth tank 
(Target 4) 
None Running time 43.6 
13 Open fourth valve None Time required to open fourth valve 30.0 
14 Activate fourth pump None Time required to activate fourth 
pump 
60.0 
15 Ending point - - - 
Part B) Data for Calculation of running delay times 
Description of the 
action 
Symbol  Value  Unit Description of the 
action 
Symbol  Value  Unit 
Adversary velocity 
during running  
𝑣 3.048 m/s Distance external 
wall/ target 1 (Task 3) 
𝑑3 45 m 
Distance target 1/ target 
2 (Task 6) 
𝑑6 50 m Distance target 2/ 
target 3 (Task 9) 
𝑑9 82 m 
Distance target 3/ target 
4 (Task 12) 
𝑑12 133 m Reduction factor due 
to additional weight 
carried by adversary 
𝜑 1 Adim. 
Part C) Data for the calculation of Response function 
Probability of guard 
communication 𝑷𝑪 
0.95 Mean Response Force Time 𝒕𝑮  (s) 480 
Distances among delay elements were retrieved from the reference map and reported in Table 
6. 22, Part B. Standard deviation for the delay parameter of each security element and for the 
response force time parameter was assumed as 3 10⁄  of the mean value throughout the case 
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study, according to the conservative assumption on data dispersion reported in the EASI model 
(Garcia, 2007). This assumption allows considering that guards will not always respond exactly 
after the same time, and that adversaries may take more or less time to penetrate barriers with 
respect to average values. Inputs for the calculation of response element have been reported in 
Table 6. 22, Part C; for the probability of guard communication (𝑃𝐶) a conventional value for 
industrial facilities was assumed (Garcia, 2007), with a response force time (𝑡𝐺) of 8 minutes, 
considering that security guards are not present on site during the night shift, with the 
exception of the facility caretaker.  
The critical probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼
∗)  has been calculated according to equation (4.1) 
and its value is 0.0425. 𝑃𝐼
∗will be considered in the development of the case study and 
represents the value of the baseline PPS effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑). The value was obtained by 
inserting in the EASI model datasheet (Garcia, 2007) the inputs listed in Table 6. 22, according 
to the approach described in Section 4.2.2 for ECO-SECURE version of the model. Therefore, 
the calculation of baseline system effectiveness highlights security weaknesses, which may be 
tackled by the introduction of pertinent security upgrades.  
The baseline effectiveness calculations can be performed in other case studies, according to the 
same approach proposed in ECO-SECURE version of the model; however, the results are site-
specific as they require data regarding distances on site and security measures in place. 
Therefore the value of baseline effectiveness obtained (i.e., 0.0425) cannot be extended beyond 
the current case study. 
6.5.2.2 Security upgrades identification and calculation of upgraded system 
effectiveness 
Starting from the value of baseline PPS effectiveness (𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.0425), six PPS upgrades 
have been proposed, according to technical references (Garcia, 2007; Reniers et al., 2015): 
A) Adding surveillance cameras as perimeter detection system; 
B) Construction or additional height to concrete-reinforced external perimeter wall as 
perimeter delay element; 
C) Adding detection elements (i.e., surveillance cameras) at sabotage targets level; 
D) Adding delay elements at sabotage targets level; 
E) Adding alarm for unauthorized manual valve opening and cages to hinder unplanned 
switching on/off pumps at sabotage targets level; 
F) Reducing response force time by building a closer and 24h active guard dispatch. 
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It should be noted that upgrades A and C refer to the detection function, upgrades B and D 
refer to the delay function, upgrade E refers to the combination of detection and delay 
functions and upgrade F refers to the response function. Moreover, upgrades A and B refer to 
the external perimeter of the facility, while upgrades C, D, E and F refer to the proximity to the 
sabotage targets. All the tanks of the storage facility have been considered possible targets. 
Table 6. 23 Effectiveness results for six different possible PPS upgrades. From the left to the right, in 
column order: Upgrade identity, description of the upgrade, Physical protection function modification, 
reference number of adversary sequence diagram modified tasks, modified inputs for the effectiveness 
calculations, upgraded PPS effectiveness (ηPPS,new i) and effectiveness improvement index (∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖). (*) 
Reduction of response force time does not affect a single task. A data repository regarding modified 
inputs values for security upgrades is available in Garcia (Garcia, 2007). 
Upgrade 
ID 
Description PPS - function 
modification 
N° of 
modified 
tasks  
Modified inputs   ηPPS, new i ∆𝜼̅̅̅̅ 𝒊 
A Addition of cameras 
at external perimeter 
wall level 
Detection; 
exterior cameras 
2 𝑃𝐴𝐷,2 = 0.9 0.3904 
 
0.3479 
B Construction/ 
additional height to 
external concrete-
reinforced perimeter 
wall (3m high) 
Delay; wall 
hardness 
2 𝑡𝐷,2 = 180 𝑠 0.0425 0 
C Addition of detection 
elements at sabotage 
targets (cameras on 
each tank) 
 
Detection; 
exterior cameras 
3; 6; 9; 12  𝑃𝐴𝐷,3 = 𝑃𝐴𝐷,6 = 𝑃𝐴𝐷,12
= 0.9  
 𝑃𝐴𝐷,9 = 0.99 for 
existing cameras 
0.3685 
 
0.3260 
D Addition of delay 
elements at sabotage 
targets 
Delay; additional 
wall with doors 
3; 6; 9; 12  𝑡𝐷,3 = 𝑡𝐷,6 = 𝑡𝐷,9
= 𝑡𝐷,12 =  30 𝑠 
additional delay with 
running time 
0.0783 
 
0.0358 
 
E Addition of alarms 
for unauthorized 
manual valves 
opening and cages for 
pumps at sabotage 
targets 
Detection 
(alarms);  
Delay (cages) 
4; 7; 10; 13 
5; 8; 11; 14 
𝑃𝐴𝐷,4 = 𝑃𝐴𝐷,7 =
𝑃𝐴𝐷,10 = 𝑃𝐴𝐷,13 = 0.9           
for alarms 
𝑡𝐷,5 = 𝑡𝐷,8 = 𝑡𝐷,11
= 𝑡𝐷,14 =  30 𝑠 
for pumps cages 
0.5215 
 
0.4790 
 
F Reduction of 
response force time 
(by creating a closer 
and 24h active guard 
dispatch)  
Response; 
relocation of 
guards closer to 
storage area 
- 
(*) 
𝑡𝐺 = 240 𝑠 0.5771 
 
0.5346 
 
The upgraded values of effectiveness, indicated as 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖, for each of the six options have 
been calculated by inserting the modified input items, listed in Table 6. 23 (i.e., third to last 
column), in the effectiveness model previously applied to calculate baseline PPS effectiveness 
(i.e., the EASI model), according to the approach presented in Section 4.2.3 for ECO-SECURE 
version of the model. The modified inputs regarding each security upgrade, with the exception 
of upgrade F, affect only specific tasks of the adversary sequence diagram; for all the remaining 
tasks, the values reported in Table 6. 22 have been applied.  
The results regarding upgraded effectiveness (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖) and effectiveness improvement 
index (i.e., ∆𝜂̅̅̅̅ 𝑖, named sometimes also risk reduction, as discussed in Section 4.2.7.1), 
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corresponding to each of these upgrades, have also been reported in Table 6. 23. Effectiveness 
improvement values have been obtained for each security upgrade according to equation (4.8), 
using the baseline effectiveness value (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.0425) and the upgraded effectiveness 
value (i.e., 𝜂𝑃𝑃𝑆,𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑖). 
The results in Table 6. 23 clearly show that, from the effectiveness point of view, the best option 
is the reduction of response force time (upgrade F), followed by the application of alarms for 
valves and cages for pumps at sabotage targets level (upgrade E). On the other hand, the 
presence of additional delay elements, represented by options B and D, proved to be ineffective 
in increasing PPS effectiveness. The addition of detection elements (i.e, cameras), both at 
external and sabotage targets level, represented respectively by upgrade A and C, shows an 
intermediate performance in terms of risk reduction. However, even if upgrades F and E are 
the best ones from the effectiveness intermediate calculation, it does not mean automatically 
that they are the best options in the end of the application, due to additional terms that are still 
to be considered in the analysis (e.g., costs, benefits, budget threshold, etc.). The approach 
presented in Section 4.2.3, here applied, can be used analogously in other case studies. 
However, the results of effectiveness calculations are site-specific and accident-specific; 
consequently they cannot be generalized beyond the current case study.  
6.5.3 Cost calculation for security upgrades 
Cost calculations were carried out for each of the six PPS upgrades proposed in the case study, 
according to the six main categories, 22 subcategories and formula presented in the model 
(Section 4.2.4), considering the time span of one year and the implementation of a single 
security upgrade. It should be noted that many subcategories consist of wages, so realistic 
annual salaries have been retrieved from a specific database (PayScale, 2016) and converted 
into hourly wages considering 1920 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟⁄ . 
Several data regarding cost calculation have been retrieved in US dollars of year 2016. A 
conversion rate from US dollars to Euro of 0.9019 € 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐴.  $⁄  was assumed (X-Rates, 2016). 
Moreover, a location factor of 1.20 (Richardson Products & Cost Data On Line Inc., 2008) was 
applied in order to adjust US prices and salaries to those of Italy, the location of the case study. 
The use of location factor throughout the analysis allowed a site-specific cost calculation. In 
the estimation of wages, several professional profiles, which are typically involved in the 
selection, design, installation and maintenance of a security system in a chemical facility, were 
considered. According to their different job tasks, the following security-related jobs have been 
accounted for the calculation of appropriate cost subcategories: purchasing office staff and 
manager, security manager, security engineer, security guards and officers, training expert 
(i.e., security consultant), masons, installation and maintenance technicians. 
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In the calculation of initial costs for each security upgrade, wages for the job profiles involved, 
costs of auxiliary materials and publications of leaflets for internal use have been considered. 
In the calculation of Installation costs, with particular reference to equipment costs, specific 
information of market prices for each security upgrade have been retrieved from vendor 
websites and reported in Table 6. 24. 
In the calculation of operating costs, utility costs consist of the costs of annual electric power 
consumption, which are significant only for upgrades A, C and E. For the three mentioned 
upgrades the power has been calculated through the standard power law, retrieving data on 
intensity and voltage from products datasheets (Alibi, 2016; Shenzhen An Ying Technology Co. 
Ltd., 2016) and accounting the number of devices in place, which have been assumed to be 
working continuously all year long. The estimated annual electric power consumption has been 
5.78·102 kWh for upgrade A, 3.89·103 kWh for upgrade C and 7.78·103 kWh for upgrade E. 
Considering an average industrial electric energy market price in Italy of 0.175 €/kWh 
(Eurostat, 2016), utilities costs have been finally calculated. Human resources operating costs 
have been calculated by considering the manpower, in terms of security officers and guards 
wages for each security upgrade, which is not negligible for upgrade A, C and E. It should be 
noted that for security upgrades B and D, which are walls in different positions, this 
subcategory is equal to zero. For upgrade F, the hiring of four additional security guards, 
aiming to extend the security surveillance during the night shift, has been accounted. 
Therefore, operating costs, prevailing over other cost categories for upgrade F, consist of 
security guards annual wages, hiring and training costs.  
In the calculation of Maintenance, inspection and sustainability costs, the following 
assumptions have been made for each security upgrade: material costs were estimated 
assuming an annual substitution rate for equipment and other materials in the range between 
3% and 5%, 2 scheduled maintenances, 1 unscheduled maintenance and 2 scheduled 
inspections per year have been accounted. License and renewal costs appeared to be negligible 
for all the six upgrades. 
Other running costs have been calculated for each security upgrade; only for upgrade F this 
cost category has a significant role, provided that the construction of a new building for security 
guards requires additional office furniture and utilities. 
In the calculation of Specific costs, the contribution offered by false-positive costs should be 
considered only for detection elements (i.e., upgrade A, C and E). For these upgrades, a single 
false-alarm cost has been assumed, based on expert judgement, 2.80.103 € (Toronto 
Municipality, 2016) and 𝑃(𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) = 0.143 (Garcia, 2007). According to the 
considerations expressed in Section 4.2.4, false-positive costs depend on the assumption 
regarding the probability of the attack. Assuming the probability of the attack equal to one 
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turns false-positive costs to zero, leading to the minimum value of specific costs value. 
Consequently, assuming the probability of the attack equal to zero, leads to the maximum value 
of specific costs. Site-specific costs, as revisions of safety measures and procedures, have been 
accounted in particular for delay elements, whose implementation might require a revision of 
emergency routes, as well as entrance doors and exit doors. Therefore, specific costs are 
represented by a range of values only for detection elements (i.e., upgrades A, C and E), in turn 
determining a range of values for Overall costs. Nevertheless, in case of a narrow range of 
values for overall costs, as in the case study, this dependence might be neglected. 
Table 6. 24 Data for the calculation of Equipment costs for six different PPS upgrades. 
UPGRADE 
ID 
DATA FOR THE CALCULATION OF EQUIPMENT COSTS 
Description Unit Value Reference/Notes 
A Number of surveillance cameras at perimeter 
level 
𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 11 8% of spare items not 
included 
Cost of an outdoor surveillance camera € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  195.9 Vendor website (Alibi, 
2016) 
B Length and height of the concrete wall, with 
footings 
𝑚 1382; 3 Layout of the facility 
Cost of the wall (according to these 
specifications) 
€ 3251.76 Vendor website (Get A 
Quote, 2016) 
C Number of cameras for each tank 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑘⁄  2 - 
Cost of an outdoor camera € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  195.9 Vendor website (Alibi, 
2016) 
Total number of cameras in place 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 74 8% of spare items not 
included 
D Number of tanks group 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 9 Layout of the facility 
Average length and height of the concrete wall 
around each unit  
𝑚 800; 3 Layout of the facility 
Cost of the wall for each unit (according to 
these specifications) 
€ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ⁄  1900 Vendor website (Get A 
Quote, 2016) 
Cost of security doors to be applied on each unit  € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  1082 Vendor website (Grainger, 
2016) 
E Number of alarm per valve 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒⁄  1 - 
Cost of an industrial alarm € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  117.4 Vendor website (Shenzhen 
An Ying Technology Co. 
Ltd., 2016) 
Number of alarms 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 37 8% of spare items not 
included 
Number of cages per pump 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑢𝑚𝑝⁄  1 - 
Cost of a metallic cage for pump with lock € 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄  18.4 - 
Number of pumps 𝑛°𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 37 - 
F Unit cost for the new building (standard 
warehouse with concrete floor and metal clad) 
€ 𝑚2⁄  582.3 Vendor website (BMT, 
2016) 
Area of the building 𝑚2 70 Layout of the facility 
For each of the six security upgrades, the main results obtained from cost calculations, 
according to the six cost categories of the model, as well as the Overall costs (𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑖) have 
been illustrated in Table 6. 25.
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Table 6. 25 Calculation of Overall costs for six security upgrades, as the sum of six main categories: 1) Overall initial costs, 2) Overall installation costs, 3) 
Overall operating costs, 4) Overall maintenance, inspection & sustainability costs, 5) Other running costs, 6) Overall specific cost. For detection upgrades (i.e., 
upgrades A, C, E) Overall specific costs, and consequently Overall costs, depend on the assumption regarding the probability of the attack. Setting 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1 
leads to the minimum value of specific costs and consequently to the minimum value of Overall costs for a generic security measure. Setting 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 0 leads to 
the maximum value of specific costs and consequently to the maximum value of Overall costs for a generic security measure. 
CALCULATION OF OVERALL COSTS  (𝑪𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚,𝒊) UPGRADE A UPGRADE B UPGRADE C UPGRADE D UPGRADE E UPGRADE F 
 Symbol Description Unit Value Value Value Value Value Value 
CINITIAL,OV 1. Overall initial costs € 3.53E+03 1.57E+03 3.53E+03 1.57E+03 4.41E+03 4.49E+03 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑽 Investigation costs € 4.75E+02 4.75E+02 4.75E+02 4.75E+02 4.75E+02 4.75E+02 
𝑪𝑺&𝑫 Selection and design costs € 5.73E+02 6.79E+02 5.73E+02 6.79E+02 6.79E+02 5.73E+02 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑰 Material costs € 1.50E+03 0 1.50E+03 0 1.50E+03 2.00E+03 
𝑪𝑻 
 
Training costs (start-up/in service) € 6.87E+02 1.14E+02 6.87E+02 1.14E+02 1.45E+03 1.14E+03 
𝑪𝑮&𝑰 Changing of guidelines and informing costs € 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 3.00E+02 
CINSTALL,OV 2. Overall installation costs € 4.17E+03 7.10E+03 1.92E+04 3.11E+04 7.87E+03 5.71E+04 
𝑪𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑻 Start-up costs € 7.42E+02 1.16E+03 7.42E+02 9.57E+02 9.13E+02 9.57E+02 
𝑪𝑬 
 
Equipment costs  € 2.95E+03 3.95E+03 1.77E+04 2.78E+04 5.89E+03 4.57E+04 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑳 Installing costs € 4.77E+02 1.99E+03 7.34E+02 2.37E+03 1.06E+03 1.04E+04 
COPERATION,OV 3. Overall operating costs € 1.01E+03 0 7.99E+03 0 5.01E+03 1.70E+05 
𝑪𝑼,𝑶𝑷 Utilities costs € 1.01E+02 0 6.81E+02 0 1.36E+03 0 
𝑪𝑯𝑹𝑶 Human resources operating costs  9.13E+02 0 7.30E+03 0 3.65E+03 1.70E+05 
CMIS,OV 4. Overall maintenance, inspection & 
sustainability costs 
€ 1.98E+03 1.05E+03 2.69E+03 2.18E+03 2.62E+03 2.79E+03 
𝑪𝑴𝑨𝑻,𝑴 Material costs € 8.05E+01 9.76E+01 2.75E+02 8.05E+02 4.10E+02 1.32E+03 
𝑪𝑴𝑵𝑻 Maintenance team costs  € 1.36E+03 6.78E+02 1.87E+03 1.11E+03 1.67E+03 9.27E+02 
𝑪𝑰𝑵𝑺𝑷 Inspection team costs € 5.42E+02 2.71E+02 5.42E+02 2.71E+02 5.42E+02 5.42E+02 
𝑪𝑳𝑰𝑪 License and rental renewal € 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COR,OV 5. Other running costs € 1.80E+02 2.80E+02 1.80E+02 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 2.43E+04 
𝑪𝑶𝑭 Office furniture costs € 0 0 0 0 0 1.81E+04 
𝑪𝑻 Transport costs € 1.00E+02 2.00E+02 1.00E+02 2.00E+02 2.00E+02 3.00E+02 
𝑪𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑴 Additional communication costs € 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 6.00E+01 
𝑪𝑰 Insurance costs € 0 0 0 0 0 0 
𝑪𝑶𝑼 Office utilities costs € 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 5.60E+03 
𝑪𝑶𝑺 Office supplies costs € 0 0 0 0 0 2.00E+02 
CSPEC,OV 6. Overall specific costs € 3.00÷ E+02   
7.00 E+02 
1.00E+03 4.00E+02 ÷8.00 
E+02 
8.00E+02 
 
8.00E+02 ÷ 
1.20 E+03 
1.00E+03 
𝑪𝑭𝑷 False-positive case costs € 0÷4.00E+02 0 0÷4.00E+02 0 0÷4.00E+02 0 
𝑪𝑺𝑰𝑻𝑬_𝑺𝑷 Site-specific costs € 3.00E+02 1.00E+03 4.00E+02 8.00E+02 8.00E+02 1.00E+03 
CSecurity, i Overall costs € 1.12E+04 
÷1.16E+04 
1.10E+04 3.39E+04 
÷3.43E+04 
3.60E+04 
 
2.10E+04 
÷2.14E+04 
2.60E+05 
Section 6 – Application of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures 
against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities 
340 
 
Figure 6. 19 summarizes the results obtained from cost calculations. The values of Overall costs 
belong to the same order of magnitude (i.e., 104 €) for all the security upgrades, with the 
exception of upgrade F that is one order of magnitude higher. The comparison among 
percentage compositions, also reported in Figure 4, shows that for detection and delay 
elements (i.e., upgrades A, B, C, D and E) installation costs are the prevailing ones. For 
upgrades regarding the detection function (i.e., upgrades A, C and E), initial costs and 
operational costs are also relevant items.  
 
Figure 6. 19   Percentage composition of Overall costs for each upgrade of the PPS, according to the 
six cost categories considered, under the assumption of 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1. On x-axis, from the left to the right, 
the six PPS upgrades are represented:  A) Adding surveillance cameras as perimeter detection system; 
B) Construction or additional height to concrete-reinforced external perimeter wall as perimeter delay 
element; C) Adding detection elements (i.e., surveillance cameras) at sabotage targets level; D) Adding 
delay elements at sabotage targets level; E) Adding alarms for unauthorized manual valves opening and 
cages to hinder unplanned switching on/off of pumps at sabotage targets level; F) Reducing response 
force time by building a closer and 24h active guard dispatch. Overall cost of each security upgrade is 
reported on the top of the corresponding column. 
6.5.4 Benefit calculation for the actual scenario 
The losses derived from a successful attack should include the environmental damages and 
other damages, both direct and indirect, which will accrue because of a successful attack, taking 
into account the value and vulnerability of environment, people and infrastructures, as 
described in Section 4.2.5 for ECO-SECURE version of the model. Consequently, benefits 
calculations are dependent on the choice of an appropriate accidental scenario. In case of 
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economic analyses based on a real event it is common practice to account the retrospective 
losses, named also realistic benefits, which indicate the actual losses sustained in the accident. 
Therefore, the realistic benefits were considered in the case study. These may not exactly reflect 
the actual ones, due to the limited amount of technical and site-specific information available. 
It was assumed that benefits are independent from the security measure that can be 
implemented. 
Benefit calculations have been carried with respect to the actual scenario considered in the case 
study, according to the categories, subcategories and formula proposed in Section 4.2.5 for 
ECO-SECURE version of the model, which specifically refers to environmental consequences. 
In the calculation of Supply chain benefits, production losses and start-up losses have been 
neglected because the facility is an oil depot, not a production facility (e.g., a refinery). A flat 
rate for Schedule benefits has been retrieved (Galvani, 2015); details are available in Table 6. 
27. 
In the calculation of Damage benefits, illustrative commercial equipment costs for the pumps 
damaged have been retrieved from vendors; details on the calculations are reported in Table 
6. 26. The values of damages to company infrastructures, surrounding living area (e.g., canals, 
private properties) have been reported in Table 6. 27. The estimation of damages to public 
infrastructures, as the water treatment system of the nearby city is presented in the same table. 
Regarding the evaluation of finished goods damages, average market prices have been assumed 
for both the products (i.e., diesel and heating oil); details on calculations are reported in Table 
6. 26. 
In the calculation of Legal & insurance benefits and after, it should be noted that, as for costs 
calculations, many benefits subcategories consist of wages. The same data displayed in Section 
6.5.3, regarding the conversion rate from US dollars to € and the location factor have been 
applied. In the case of Legal & insurance benefits, the job profiles involved are junior lawyers 
and seniors lawyers, specialized lawyers, security manager, security engineer, security analyst 
and security consultant. Details on the data applied for the calculation of Legal & insurance 
benefit subcategories are available in Table 6. 26.  
No human losses and injuries have been sustained in the actual accident; however, data 
regarding the calculation of Human benefits, as the value of a statistical life (VSL) and 
compensation costs for injuries might have been retrieved from previous studies (Nicola 
Paltrinieri et al., 2012; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). 
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Table 6. 26 Data for the calculation of benefit subcategories with respect to the actual scenario. 
BENEFIT 
CATEGORY 
BENEFIT 
SUBCATEGORY 
SYMBOL 
DATA FOR THE CALCULATION OF BENEFIT SUBCATEGORIES 
Symbol Description Unit Value Reference/Notes 
DAMAGE 
BENEFITS 
𝐵𝐷,𝑂𝑀&𝑃 𝐴 Damage to the company equipment 
and machines  
€ 1.19E+04 Damage to 4 pumps; average unit cost for a pump assumed 
2.98E+03 € from vendors and validated by expert judgement 
𝐵 Damage to the company buildings 
and other infrastructures 
€ 5.00E+03 
 
Limited damages to piping/surrounding infrastructures 
(EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 2010) – 
quantification based on expert judgement 
𝐶 Damage to the company raw 
materials and finished goods 
€ 6.52E+05 
 
Spill of diesel and heavy oil. Inventories of spilled diesel and 
heavy oil available in Section 6.5.1. Average market prices 
assumed for diesel and heavy oil (i.e., respectively 280 € 𝑚3⁄  
and 95 € 𝑚3⁄ ) 
LEGAL & 
INSURANCE 
BENEFITS 
 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑊 
𝐾 Civil liability fines € 6.89E+06 Civil liability fines as expressed by prosecutors (Totaro, 2014) 
𝑀 Administrative liability fines € 8.90E+05 Taxation on spilled products (Galvani, 2015) 
𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐺  𝑆𝐵 Total security budget of the facility € 1.00E+04 Severe security deficiencies highlighted by accident report 
(EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 2010) – 
quantification based on expert judgement  
𝐼𝑆𝐵 Increase of the security budget for 
the facility after accident occurrence  
% 17.00 Scenario dependent value, based on expert judgement, to 
reach usual budget values reported by (Reniers and Van Erp, 
2016) 
𝐵𝑃&𝐿𝐼𝐶  𝐶𝐶𝐷 Cost due to facility close-down € 1.20E+08 Data retrieved from (Berni and Rosa, 2015) 
𝐿𝑃 Likelihood of losing operating 
permit (%) 
% 10.00 Likely closing-down of the facility after the accident (Berni and 
Rosa, 2015) – quantification based on expert judgement 
𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆 𝑃𝐹 Current total premium cost of the 
facility  
€ 5.00E+07 Premium based on possible value of the facility after partial 
sale, as declared by company owner (Pecorella, 2011) 
𝐼𝑃𝐹 Expected increase of the premium % 1.00 Expert judgement 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
BENEFITS 
𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑀 𝑚𝑆𝑃,𝑖 Amount of product spilled (𝑘𝑔) or 
(𝑚3) 
𝑘𝑔 2.60E+06 Inventory of spilled hydrocarbons products available in 
Section 6.5.1 
𝐶𝑆𝑃,𝑖 Cost per unit of product i spilled (
€
𝑘𝑔
) 
or (
€
𝑚3
) 
€ 1.44 Unit remediation cost for liquid hydrocarbon spills retrieved 
from a previous study (Etkin, 1999), converted and actualized 
to (€(2016)) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝐿𝑇 Long-term remediation costs € 2.00E+07 Long-term remediation costs for the site retrieved from (Berni 
and Rosa, 2015) 
REPUTATION 
BENEFITS 
𝐵𝑆𝑃 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃 Current total market value of the 
company  
€ 6.00E+07 Current total market price for the company based on 
(Pecorella, 2011) 
𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑃 Expected drop in the share price  % 31 Expected long-time percentage drop of market price regarding 
a major oil spill (Goossens, 2012) 
 
Section 6 – Application of an economic model for the allocation of preventive security measures 
against terroristic attacks in chemical facilities 
343 
 
Hiring benefits are inserted in Human benefits category as they refer to the costs that should 
be sustained by the company when an employee is hospitalized or dead after the accident to 
hire additional personnel in substitution. Therefore, no hiring benefits have been sustained in 
the actual accident. Data regarding their calculation may be retrieved from previous studies 
(Gavious et al., 2009; Reniers and Brijs, 2014b); it is suggested to consider hiring and training 
costs equivalent to a monthly salary each for the employee category. 
In the calculation of Environmental benefits, flat rates for external and internal intervention 
costs have been reported in Table 6. 27. Environmental remediation costs have been estimated 
according to the data reported in Table 6. 26. A flat rate for other environmental damages to 
the surrounding ecosystem (i.e., plants and animals) is available Table 6. 27.  
The data for the calculation of Reputation benefits are available in Table 6. 26. The expected 
percentage drop of market price regarding a major oil spill has been assumed, with a value of 
31% (Goossens, 2012). This data was confirmed in a long-term time perspective, which is the 
time span required for benefit calculations, by a recent study (Neilan, 2016). In the calculation 
of Specific benefits, collateral damages, due to voluntary spills in the river from nearby facilities 
subsequent to the major accident (Querzé, 2010), have been reported in Table 6. 27. 
The data reported in Table 6. 26 and Table 6. 27, applied for the calculation of benefit 
categories and subcategories, were retrieved from a collection of references and validated by a 
panel of security managers and academic security experts. Eventually, all the benefit numerical 
values have been determined accordingly to the pertinent categories and subcategories of ECO-
SECURE version of the model, allowing the calculation of the Overall benefits (𝐶𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑗), for the 
actual scenario (Table 6. 27).  
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Table 6. 27 Overall benefits results for realistic scenario. The calculation of Overall benefits ha been carried out as the sum of seven main categories: (1) Overall 
supply chain benefits, (2) Overall damage benefits, (3) Overall legal & insurance benefits, (4) Overall human benefits, (5) Overall environmental benefits, (6) 
Overall reputation benefits, (7) Overall specific benefits. Intermediate calculations regarding benefit subcategories are reported, with assumptions made. 
CALCULATION OF OVERALL BENEFITS (𝑪𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔,𝒋) 
Symbol Category/ subcategory description Unit Value Assumptions  
BSUPC,OV 1. Overall supply chain benefits € 1.70E+06 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝐵𝑃𝐿 Production loss benefits € 0 No stop in production, it is an oil depot 
𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑇 Start-up benefits € 0 No start-up benefits, it is not a production facility 
𝐵𝑆𝐶𝐻  Schedule benefits € 1.70E+06 Costumers refunding – flat rate retrieved from reference (Galvani, 2015) 
BDMG,OV 2. Overall damage benefits € 2.29E+06 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝐵𝐷,𝑂𝑀&𝑃 Damage to own material/property € 6.69E+05 Limited damages to equipment and machines – calculated according to data in Table 6. 26; limited damages to 
piping/surrounding infrastructures – calculated according to data in Table 6. 26; damage to finished goods (e.g., diesel and 
heavy oil) - calculated according to data in Table 6. 26 
𝐵𝐷,𝑂𝐶𝑀&𝑃 Damage to other companies  material/property € 2.00E+04 Very limited damages to other companies materials/properties (EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 2010) – 
quantification based on expert judgement, assuming 1.00E+04 € of damages each for 2 boundary facilities 
𝐵𝐷,𝑆𝐴 Damage to surrounding living area € 1.00E+05 Damage to private properties/canals (ARPA - Agenzia Regionale Prevenzione Ambiente dell’Emilia-Romagna, 2010; 
EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 2010) – quantification based on expert judgement, assuming 5.00E+03 € of 
damages for 20 householders in the surrounding densely inhabited area 
𝐵𝐷,𝑃𝑀&𝑃 Damage to public material/property € 1.50E+06 Damages to the water treatment system of the nearby city (Pecorella, 2011) 
BLGL&INS,OV 3. Overall legal & insurance benefits € 2.05E+07 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆 Fines-related benefits € 7.78E+06 Civil liability fines and taxation of spilled products – calculated according to data in Table 6. 26; no criminal liability fines 
– based on expert judgement 
𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑊 Interim lawyers benefits € 1.31E+04 Senior and junior lawyers’ wages – calculated according to (PayScale, 2016) 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑊 Specialized lawyer benefits € 6.28E+02 Specialized lawyers’ wages – calculated according to (PayScale, 2016) 
𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 Internal research team benefits € 2.91E+03 Security manager, security engineer and security analysts’ wages – calculated according to (PayScale, 2016) 
𝐵𝐸𝐻 Expert at hearings benefits € 6.14E+02 Security consultant’s wage – calculated according to (PayScale, 2016) 
𝐵𝐿𝐸𝐺  Legislation benefits € 1.70E+05 Increase of security budget after the accident – calculated according to data in Table 6. 26 
𝐵𝑃&𝐿𝐼𝐶  Permit and license benefits € 1.20E+07 Calculated according to data in Table 6. 26 
𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆 Insurance premium benefits € 5.00E+05 Calculated according to data in Table 6. 26 
BH,OV 4. Overall human benefits € 0 No human losses and injuries (EMARS - Major accidents reporting system, 2010), no recruit benefits  
BENV,OV 5. Overall environmental benefits € 3.80E+07 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝐵𝐸,𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑉 External intervention benefits (salaries related to 
emergency interventions / materials / post-accident 
monitoring / others) 
€ 1.20E+07 
 
Overall external intervention benefits – flat rate retrieved from bulletin released by Italian environmental protection 
agency (ARPA - Agenzia Regionale Prevenzione Ambiente dell’Emilia-Romagna, 2010) 
𝐵𝐼,𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑉 Internal intervention benefits (manager work-time 
benefits/ cleaning benefits) 
€ 1.55E+06 
 
Overall internal intervention benefits – flat rate based on an interview to the company owner (Galvani, 2015) 
𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑀 Environmental remediation benefits (short-term / long-
term) 
€ 2.37E+07 
 
Environmental remediation for hydrocarbons spill and cost of requalification project for the site – calculated according to 
data in Table 6. 26 
𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻,𝐸𝑁𝑉 Other environmental benefits € 7.00E+05 Damages to the ecosystem close to the river (Franceschi, 2010)  
BREPT,OV 6. Overall reputation benefits € 1.86E+07 Expected long-term drop in market price - calculated according to data in Table 6. 26 
BSPEC,OV 7. Overall specific benefits € 5.01E+05 See assumptions for subcategories 
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑆𝑃 Site-specific benefits € 5.00E+05 
 
Collateral damages, due to voluntary spills in the river from nearby facilities subsequent to the major accident (Querzé, 
2010) – quantification based on expert judgement, considering 1% of overall environmental benefits 
𝐵𝐼𝑀𝑀 Immaterial benefits € 5.00E+02 Post-accident psychological meeting for employees (12 hours) – Salary of psychologist retrieved from (PayScale, 2016). 
CLoss,j Overall benefits  € 8.16E+07 - 
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The results of benefit calculations are summarized in Figure 6. 20, expressing losses 
apportionment. The overall benefits were estimated of 8.16·107 €, justifying therefore the 
definition of the accident as an “ecological disaster” (Winfield, 2010b). As shown in Figure 6. 
20, environmental benefits are strongly prevailing (i.e., about 47% of Overall benefits), with a 
particular relevance of the environmental remediation benefits subcategory. Moreover, 
reputational benefits and legal and insurance benefits are relevant (i.e., about 23% and 25% of 
Overall benefits respectively), due to the high media coverage give to the accident and to the 
legal procedures. The calculated benefit apportionment is typical of a major accident. Indeed, 
as stated in previous studies referred to the chemical industry domain (Gavious et al., 2009; 
Reniers and Brijs, 2014b), the value of indirect losses, which include for instance reputational 
losses, human and environmental losses, legal and insurance losses, is generally superior to 
direct losses. The gap tends to increase with the increasing severity of the accident (Gavious et 
al., 2009). Moreover, the comparison with a previous work, regarding the estimation of 
reputational losses derived from notorious accidents within the same domain (Kyaw and 
Paltrinieri, 2015), confirmed the gravity of reputational losses with respect to Overall benefits. 
In the present case study, damage benefits represent only 2% of Overall benefits derived from 
an environmental disaster. This low percentage value is confirmed by a previous application 
referred to a less severe accident scenario (Gavious et al., 2009) that estimated damage 
benefits around 10% of Overall benefits (i.e., 3.56·105 €). 
The application of a possible global approach toward benefit calculations, including human 
and assets damages, has no relevance on the present case study, as human benefits value is 
zero, due to the absence of casualties and morbidities. 
 
Figure 6. 20 Percentage composition of Overall benefits for the actual scenario, according to seven 
benefits categories. 
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6.5.5 Results 
The results of the assessment of the case study consist in cost-benefit analysis results, cost-
effectiveness analysis results and final results based on the application of an original scoring 
system to cost-effectiveness analysis, according to ECO-SECURE version of the model, which 
couples deterministic and break-even approaches toward threat probability estimation and 
economic analyses. Cost-benefit analysis results are the values of actualized Net benefits, 
according to deterministic approach and the values of break-even probabilities for six 
upgrades, with reference to the actual scenario. Cost-benefit analysis results have been 
calculated according to the equations presented in Section 4.2.7, for ECO-SECURE version of 
the model. Cost-effectiveness analysis results are the most profitable combinations of security 
upgrades for the actual scenario, within the constraint of the security budget, for both 
deterministic and break-even approaches. Further information on the equations to be applied 
within ECO-SECURE version of the model is available in Sections 4.2.7 and 4.2.8. The specific 
scoring system that allow the integration of results is presented in Section 4.2.8.3. 
Overall costs for each security measure and Overall benefits for each scenario have been made 
comparable by applying appropriate discount rates (i.e., 3.5% and 1.5% respectively (HSE - 
Health and Safety Executive, 2016)) over a 10 year time-span, according to equation (4.19). 
The latter is a conventional number of operational years for a security measure. With regards 
to the deterministic approach, the conservative conditional threat probability assumption of 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗 = 1 has been taken (Garcia, 2007), because the scenario analysis is retrospective and 
refers to an environmental disaster. Regarding the break-even approach, the threat probability 
is the output of the economic analysis. Vulnerability probabilities (i.e., 𝑃(𝐻|𝑇) and 𝑃(𝐿|𝐻)) 
have been assumed unitary throughout the case study, due to the lack of information on these 
terms. 
Cost-benefit analysis results, reported in Table 6. 28, for both the deterministic and break-even 
approaches, are coherent. Indeed, the security measures A, C, D, E and F may be applied 
according to the actual scenario. Therefore, the simple application of a conventional cost-
benefit analysis does not offer precise indication on which single measure is the most useful 
with respect to the case study.  
Cost-effectiveness analysis was thus applied to determine the most profitable combination of 
security upgrades within the security budget constraint, according to a deterministic approach 
and a break-even approach. All the possible 63 combinations of PPS upgrades have been 
considered. Actualized Overall costs were calculated for each combination summing the 
Overall costs of each option and applying a 3.5% discount rate (HSE - Health and Safety 
Executive, 2016). Overall costs were then compared with the actualized security budget. 
Actualized security budget value considered is of 51.4 k€. The results, reported in Table 6. 29, 
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show that the most profitable combinations of security measures are different between 
deterministic and break-even approaches. Nevertheless, upgrades A (i.e., addition of cameras 
at external perimeter wall level) and/or upgrade E (i.e., installing alarms for unauthorized 
manual valves opening and cages for pumps at sabotage targets) are present within all the most 
profitable combinations, regardless the approach. 
Table 6. 28 Cost-benefit analysis results according to a deterministic and a break-even approach, in 
term of Net Benefits and 𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗
∗
 respectively, for six different PPS upgrades with respect to the actual 
scenario. 
  
PPS UPGRADE 
DETERMINISTIC 
APPROACH 
BREAK-EVEN 
APPROACH 
Net Benefit Upgrade 
economic 
feasibility 
𝑷(𝑻)𝒊𝒋
∗
 Upgrade 
economic 
feasibility 
Upgrade 
ID 
 DESCRIPTION/UNIT €  - adim.  - 
A Addition of cameras at external perimeter 
wall level 
1.89E+07 
 
accept 1.75E-04 accept 
B Additional height to external perimeter 
wall (3m instead of 1.5m) 
-3.14E+03 refuse 1.00E+00 refuse 
C Addition of a detection element at the 
sabotage targets (cameras on each tank) 
1.77E+07 accept 5.53E-04 accept 
D Addition of a delay element at the 
sabotage targets (concrete wall + security 
door) 
1.94E+06 accept 3.95E-04 accept 
E Putting alarms for unauthorized manual 
valves opening and cages for pumps at 
sabotage targets 
2.60E+07 accept 2.35E-04 accept 
F Reduction of response force time (by 
creating a closer and 24h active guard 
dispatch)  
2.90E+07 accept 2.56E-03 accept 
The complete rankings of security measures combinations, obtained according to deterministic 
and break-even approaches to cost-effectiveness analysis, are available in Figure 6. 21. 
Combinations not respecting the security budget have not been reported.  
Table 6. 29 Cost-effectiveness analysis results according to deterministic and break-even approaches. 
From the top to the bottom: first-most profitable combination, second-most profitable combination and 
third-most profitable combination. Combinations of security measures are indicated by the acronym 
Comb. ID. 
 
COST-
EFFECTIVENESS 
RANKING 
DETERMINISTIC APPROACH BREAK-EVEN APPROACH 
Comb. 
ID 
Net 
Benefit (€) 
Total Cost  
of 
Combination
(€) 
𝑲𝑷𝑰𝟏 
 
Comb. 
ID 
𝑷(𝑻)𝒗𝒋
∗
  
(adim) 
Total Cost  
of Combination 
(€) 
𝑲𝑷𝑰𝟐 
 
FIRST  A+C+
D+E 
6.46E+07 2.91E+04  10 A 1.75E-04 3.31E+03 10 
SECOND A+B+
C+D+
E 
6.46E+07 3.23E+04  9.9995 A+E 2.09E-04 9.42E+03 9.9997 
THIRD A+C+
E 
6.27E+07 1.89E+04 9.7003 E 2.35E-04 6.11E+03 9.9994 
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In order to allow a comparison of the results obtained from the two approaches, indicators 
𝐾𝑃𝐼1 and 𝐾𝑃𝐼2, expressing deterministic and break-even cost-effectiveness analysis results, 
were calculated, according to the scoring system developed within ECO-SECURE version of 
the model, applying equation (4.29) and equation (4.30), respectively. The results for the most 
profitable combinations are reported in Table 6. 29. 
 
Figure 6. 21 Cost-effectiveness analysis results, showing the ranking of security measures 
combinations respecting budget, for the actual scenario, according to: A) deterministic approach; B) 
break-even approach. 
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Figure 6. 22 shows the values calculated for the overall cost-effectiveness indicator, 𝐸𝐶𝑆, 
obtained combining 𝐾𝑃𝐼1 and 𝐾𝑃𝐼2, according to equation (4.31) and setting both the threshold 
values in the equation, α and β, equal to 3, according to the guideline provided in Table 4. 6. 
All the combinations not complying with threshold values were not reported in Figure 6. 22. 
 
Figure 6. 22 Values calculated for the deterministic performance indicators (KPI1), break-even 
performance indicator (KPI2) and overall cost-effectiveness indicator (ECS). Only combinations with 
threshold values α and β higher than 3 are reported.  
As shown in the figure, the combinations with the highest values of ECS always include at least 
three measures. All the ten top combinations offer an integration of different security functions 
(i.e., detection, delay and response), providing therefore a more complete security protection. 
It should be noted that none of the combinations reported in Figure 6. 22 include the security 
upgrade F, because its overall cost does not respect the security budget, even if its effectiveness 
improvement is the highest one. 
6.5.6 Discussion 
The current Section has been aimed at applying the ECO-SECURE version of the economic 
model to an original case study, regarding a terroristic attack an oil depot. The case study, 
which is illustrative but freely adapted from a possible security-related event, considered a 
terroristic attack on a chemical installation, aimed at causing environmental damages.  
The application of ECO-SECURE version of the economic model to the present case study 
demonstrate that this version of the model suggests some answers to practical challenges that 
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a security manager may face within a chemical facility, and therefore it validates the ECO-
SECURE methodology, described in Section 4. 
For instance, the application demonstrates that ECO-SECURE offers a complete framework 
for economic analysis, aimed at the selection and allocation of security measures w.r.t. 
environmental accidents, within the specific chemical industry context. Model application 
starts from the site-specific evaluation of physical security measures performance present on 
a real chemical installation, which in the case study highlighted security weaknesses. ECO-
SECURE effectiveness assessment provides site-specific answers to the security analyst, as it 
represents a complex terroristic attack, including site-specific and accident-specific adversary 
sequence of actions, but with fewer inputs required in comparison with EM-PICTURES version 
of the model (for application of the latter, see for example Section 6. 4). Therefore, the global 
approach to effectiveness assessment provided by ECO-SECURE is suggested to be applied 
whenever the information regarding adversary mode of action in case of multiple targets are 
scarce.  
Six possible security upgrades were proposed in the case study, according to the security 
functions of detection, delay and response. The choice of an appropriate pool of security 
upgrades is particularly important, as it influences all the following results; in the current case 
study, the pool of security options has been enlarged in comparison with the previous 
application (see Section 6. 4), in purpose to obtain a broader set of economic indicators. The 
additional security measures have been compared in terms of overall effectiveness 
improvement, showing that, with reference to the realistic plant layout and the specific 
adversary action, four options over six show relevant and comparable effectiveness 
improvement indexes results, making the final results of economic analyses application not 
obvious from the outset. Indeed, the effectiveness analysis results are site-specific and 
accident-specific and cannot be generalized beyond the current case study. Moreover, although 
the model is able to take into account uncertainties that may decrease the overall performance 
of the PPS (e.g., possible lag-time in detection by security guards), it offers just a simplified 
description of a possible real accident. 
The main advantage that emerged from ECO-SECURE application to the current case study is 
its completeness with respect to cost and performance of security measures, as well as to losses, 
and the consequent accuracy of results. The cost assessment allows a precise definition of the 
most relevant cost terms due to the implementation of the six possible security upgrades, 
including also information from vendors and site-specific data. The overall costs due to the 
implementation of a single security upgrade belong to the same order of magnitude (i.e., 104€), 
for five over six upgrades; however, cost distributions are different and related to the security 
function (i.e., detection, delay and response).  
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Within the case study, the original losses classification developed for environmental accidents 
was applied to the actual scenario, due to the retrospective analysis carried out. The 
classification allows focusing on environmental damages, providing a detailed description of 
losses sustained in the accident. The precise categories and subcategories elaborated for 
benefit calculations allows preventing omissions and inaccuracies; nevertheless, its inputs are 
validated for the case study by a panel of security experts, in purpose to avoid misleading 
conclusions. ECO-SECURE version of the model may be applied also in predictive analysis, as 
well as to different accident scenarios, in order to obtain scenario-specific economic indicators 
to be compared. 
However, as all economic analyses, the results may reflect the subjectivity of the analyst, 
concerning the monetization of intangible costs and damages (e.g., assigning monetary values 
to casualties and morbidities) and the choice of discount rates, whose inaccuracies may lead to 
misleading results. For this reason, whenever ECO-SECURE is applied, it is important to 
present the analysis in a fully transparent manner, specifying the assumptions made and 
discussing the uncertainties arisen, as in the current application. 
A distinctive feature of the ECO-SECURE application, in comparison with the other version of 
the model (i.e., EM-PICTURES), is the presence of two complementary approaches to the 
likelihood of the attack (i.e., threat probability), named deterministic and break-even, leading 
to two different economic analysis approaches. For instance, the results of the case study are a 
broad spectrum of outputs, including cost-benefit results, cost-effectiveness results and final 
results obtained from the application of a specific scoring system, which can eventually support 
the security decision-making process. As visible from Section 6.5.5, the application of solely 
cost-benefit analysis might not provide significant screening criteria, in particular with 
reference to very severe environmental accidents. Costs of security measures are several orders 
of magnitude inferior to overall losses, as in the case study, resulting therefore in the feasibility 
of almost all the single security measures.  
Instead, with reference to the case study, cost-effectiveness analysis may offer sound 
indications for the stakeholders to rationally select and allocate security measures, providing 
a range of economically profitable options that consider also security measures combinations 
within the budget constraints, among 63 possible ones. The deterministic approach offers to 
the security manager insight on the optimal revision of the physical protection system, within 
the constraint of the annual security budget, after a variation regarding the likelihood of the 
attack. The deterministic results proposes the integration of several security measures, from 
triplets to groups of five. 
The break-even approach, starting from a range of security options, allows defining the 
minimum likelihood of the attack that makes each option economically profitable, within the 
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constraint of the annual security budget. The combinations proposed by the break-even 
approach are different ones; nevertheless, additional detection measures at perimeter and 
additional detection and delay elements at sabotage targets level are shared between the two 
approaches. It should be noted that cost-effectiveness analyses results obtained from the case 
study may vary depending on the threshold of the security budget, which is generally defined 
yearly by security management. 
The combined application of deterministic and break-even approaches to cost-benefit and 
cost-effectiveness analysis allows inserting directly the uncertainties related to the estimation 
of the likelihood of the attack in the application, avoiding the necessity to perform an additional 
sensitivity analysis on the results, which instead was required in EM-PICTURES application, 
as visible in Section 6.4.5.2.  
Another original feature of ECO-SECURE is the use of a specific scoring system, made 
necessary to compare the cost-effectiveness results obtained from the two approaches and to 
eventually combine them into an overall cost-effectiveness indicator (i.e., 𝐸𝐶𝑆). Eventual 
company-specific criteria and additional information should be considered, in particular to 
define the additional acceptability thresholds for scoring system application (i.e., 𝛼 and 𝛽). The 
results of scoring system application, available in Section 6.5.5, provide a complete ranking of 
security measures combinations; the combinations with the highest values for the specific case 
study offer an integration of different security functions (i.e., detection, delay and response), 
providing therefore a more complete security protection, by means of at least three additional 
security measures. For instance, the final output of ECO-SECURE is constituted by solely one 
typology of indicator (i.e., 𝐸𝐶𝑆), which can be easily understood also by decision-makers and 
stakeholders with non-technical background, increasing the possibility of ECO-SECURE to be 
applied in industrial practice. Therefore, the case study demonstrated that application of an 
original scoring system allows comparing a limited pool of final combinations, and 
consequently to allocate the dedicated budget on security upgrades according to a rational 
criteria. 
In conclusion, the case study demonstrated that the outputs of ECO-SECURE might be applied 
in risk-informed security decision-making at company level with different purposes: to 
increase the awareness of management towards environmental security issues by means of 
non-technical and rather user-friendly outputs, to tackle security vulnerabilities in chemical 
facilities and to allocate the budget on profitable physical protection alternatives w.r.t. 
environmental accidents. Eventually, ECO-SECURE version of the model, as demonstrated by 
the case study, may be a systematic useful tool to cope with environmental-security based 
incidents in chemical facilities.  
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6.5.7 Conclusions on the case study 
ECO-SECURE version of novel model for the selection and allocation of process-industry 
related security measures against environmental accidents was applied to an illustrative case 
study, based on a real accident, to show the model capabilities.  
Model application highlighted that ECO-SECURE provides to security managers indications 
on the most profitable single security upgrades and combinations of them needed to prevent 
security-based accident scenarios, with a specific focus on environmental losses. Starting from 
the site-specific analysis of the baseline physical security system performance, the comparison 
of costs for different security upgrades with the benefits related to the actual losses was carried 
out. The uncertainties regarding the threat probability are included in model application by 
means of two complementary approaches (i.e., deterministic and break-even). Results of 
deterministic analysis allow upgrading the physical protection system, according to possible 
variations in the likelihood of the attack. Break-even analysis provides the optimal allocation 
of the security budget, defined yearly by security management. The application of a specific 
scoring system allows comparing the two set of results, obtaining overall indicators.  
Thus, the case study definitely demonstrated that ECO-SECURE model version enables to 
define rational criteria for the selection and allocation of physical security measures and its 
outputs provide a sound support to managers within security risk assessment and related 
decision-making process. Its application may eventually contribute to the reduction of 
chemical plants vulnerability toward environmental and ecological terroristic attacks. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this section, applications of an original economic model for the selection and allocation of 
preventive physical security measures against security-based accidents, with particular 
reference to terroristic attacks, within the chemical industry domain are presented. The two 
versions of the model, which are named EM-PICTURES and ECO-SECURE, are definitely 
validated by means of two illustrative case studies based on real accidents, presented in Section 
6.4 and Section 6.5 respectively, which demonstrated model capabilities.  
Model applications start from site-specific analysis of the baseline security system; then, they 
allow proposing security upgrades and accounting both the performance improvement and the 
costs of their implementation. The differences that emerged from applications of the two 
versions of the model mainly refer to the benefit assessment and to different approaches 
toward the definition of the threat probability, affecting economic analyses results. These 
differences make the model suitable to cope with a wide range of security-based accidents, 
from rather simple sabotage to complex and realistic terroristic attacks, from perspective to 
retrospective analysis of losses. In particular, EM-PICTURES application is a useful and 
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straightforward tool, generically applicable to all typologies of terroristic attacks within 
chemical facilities to upgrade the security system after a variation of the likelihood of the 
attack, but it requires to perform additional sensitivity analysis on threat probability. On the 
other hand, ECO-SECURE application is relatively more elaborated and focused on a specific 
typology of security-based accident (i.e., environmental accidents), but it couples with the 
deterministic analysis provided by EM-PICTURES, a break-even analysis that provides the 
optimal allocation of the security budget, avoiding the necessity to perform an additional 
sensitivity analysis on results. Moreover, ECO-SECURE application demonstrated the easiness 
to use of a specific scoring system for the presentation of results. 
Therefore, model applications demonstrate that it enables including security hazards within 
risk assessment and related decision-making process. Indeed, it allows defining rational 
criteria for the selection and allocation of physical security measures and its outputs provide a 
sound support to managers and regulators involved in the security decision-making process. 
The case studies confirm that model application in industrial practice contributes to the 
reduction of chemical plants vulnerability towards intentional malevolent acts.  
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Section 7. 
Conclusions 
External hazard factors are capable to trigger cascading events, which have a catastrophic 
disruptive potential toward workers and population in the nearby of a chemical process facility, 
as well as assets and environment. The concepts and issues regarding the inclusion of external 
hazard factors within quantitative risk assessment, aimed at the prevention of major accidents 
and cascading events, have been deeply discussed in the current PhD research thesis, with a 
specific focus on the topics of domino effects accidents and security-based accidents.  
State of the art approaches to Risk Assessment for chemical and process facilities have been 
analysed and classified, following novel criteria. The classification highlighted how the 
application of Risk Assessment have usefully supported the process industry business by 
enabling risk management. Despite the obvious fact that it is not an exact description of reality, 
QRA proved to be the best available, analytic, predictive tool to assess the risks of complex 
chemical process installations. However, the overview pointed out that better refinement of 
Risk Assessment tools is required to achieve its full potential of applicability. The main 
development pathway is given by the application of dynamic approaches, in particular 
Bayesian analysis and Bayesian Networks, which are capable to integrate emerging risk notions 
and potentially disregarded information. Indeed, risk assessment techniques should be 
constantly improved and evolve in parallel with the increasing complexity of the systems where 
they are applied. 
State of the art regarding approaches and techniques aimed at including external hazard 
factors within Risk Assessment and related decision-making have been presented, considering 
both safety-based accidents (i.e., domino accidents) and security-based accidents (i.e., 
terroristick attacks and sabotage). The research field proved to be very active, due to the 
increasing concern toward the possible occurrence of these catastrophic events in chemical 
facilities, fostering the necessity to implement a unified framework for safety and security Risk 
Assessment, including external hazard factors.  
The overview made clear that the risk evaluation step, including identification and evaluation 
of possible risk reducing measures (or barriers) is the most critical phase, to whom research 
efforts should be posed. Indeed, it emerged that the effectiveness of safety and security risk 
management mainly relies on an accurate technical and economic performance assessment of 
risk reducing measures. Then, the analysis of Risk Assessment techniques made clear the 
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paramount important role of safety and security measures (or barriers) within cascading 
events prevention, control and mitigation. For instance, safety measures are applied with 
respect to unintentional accidents (i.e., domino effects), while security measures refer to 
intentional accidents (i.e., security-based accidents). 
Different typologies of risk reducing measures applied within chemical and process 
installations were described, together with methodologies to evaluate their performances, from 
economic and technical point of views. A parallelism among the three existing classes of safety 
and security measures (i.e., active-detection measures; passive-delay measures; procedural-
response measures) has been highlighted, but methodologies needed to address performance 
assessment have demonstrated to be very different between safety and security measures. 
About the inclusion of safety and security measures performance within Risk Assessment of 
external hazard factors, two main research gaps have been found. 
Concerning measures technical performance, the overview made clear the superiority of 
dynamic techinques for safety barriers performance assessment, by means of Bayesian 
Networks, within major accident prevention, with respect to the conventional Event-Tree 
based technique, and the usefuleness to apply tailored safety performance gates, depending on 
barriers states and classification. On other hand, a significant research gap was pointed out: 
few applications of safety measures performance assessment, by means of Bayesian Networks 
exist, with regards to major accidents prevention in the chemical and process industry domain. 
Moreover, none of existing applications of domino accident analysis, by means of dynamic 
techniques (e.g., Bayesian Networks), included safety measures performance assessment in the 
modelling phase.  
Concerning measures economic performance, the overview pointed out that, despite the 
existence of economic models for supporting decision-making processes in general, for 
instance cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, and ongoing research regarding 
economic models to support operational safety, no specific economic models are available in 
the domain of operational security (including counter-terrorism decision-making) to be 
applied within the chemical and process industry context.  
Therefore, the research activities were aimed at filling these two gaps, by means of original 
methodologies and applications. 
Concerning barriers technical performance, the research activity was devoted to the 
application of dynamic risk assessent techniques, to safety barriers performance assessment 
in the prevention of major accidents and cascading events (i.e., domino accidents), by means 
of Bayesian techniques and Bayesian Networks.  
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Preliminary applications and tutorials have been carried out to illustrate the potentialities of 
dynamic approaches. An original application has been focused on the implementation of 
Bayesian Networks to safety measures performance assessment, starting from a conventional 
approach, in the prevention of a major accident. Then, the Bayesian approach is extended to 
an original case study regarding the prevention of fire escalation. The case study proved the 
feasibility of Bayesian Networks application to safety barriers performance assessment with 
respect to accident escalation into a cascading event, as it is able to dynamically revise 
occurrence probabilities over time. Therefore, Bayesian Networks have been applied to 
cascading events prevention, for instance to domino accident analysis, in purpose to assess the 
effect of safety measures inclusion in the modelling phase. Two original case studies, the first 
regarding a simplified tank farm and the second regarding a realistic tank farm, have been 
carried out. Despite the increasing level of complexity of the realistic tank farm case study, the 
results of the two case studies were analogous: they showed a reduction of domino escalation 
probabilities of several orders of magnitude, due to safety barriers introduction within 
modelling phase.  
Eventually domino accident analysis by means of Bayesian Networks, joined with safety 
barriers performance assessment, has proved to be an effective approach to represent severe 
accidental scenarios, and its application may offer a realistic risk picture of cascading events. 
Therefore, the case studies have demonstrated that the application of an advanced technique 
for safety barriers performance assessment, as Bayesian Networks, allows providing a very 
accurate identification of risk reducing measures within the risk evaluation phase of QRA, with 
reference to external hazard factors driven accidents (i.e., domino effects), offering a sound 
tool to support safety analysts.  
Concerning measures economic performance, the research activity was devoted to the 
development and application of an original economic model for the prevention of security-
based cascading events and for related decision-making support.  
Starting from the baseline performance of the physical security system, the model allows 
proposing site-specific security upgrades and accounting both the performance improvement 
and the costs of their implementation. The model includes also the evaluation of benefits, 
considering avoided losses for several pertinent hypothetical scenarios. Moreover, it allows 
defining threat and vulnerability probabilities for a chemical installation, in relation with 
possible typologies of malicious acts. The application of economic techniques, by means of 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses, enables the comparison among different security 
upgrades and the choice of economically feasible ones, as well as the determination of the 
combination with the maximum profit, with budgets constraints. The model is developed in 
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two-fold versions, which allows a realistic representation of different typologies and 
specificities of security-based accidents within chemical and process installations. EM-
PICTURES (i.e., Economic Model for the selection of Process-Industry related Counter-
Terrorism MeasURES) refers to the prevention of possible terroristic attacks in chemical 
facilities selection, by means of a rational selection and allocation of security measures; the 
approach toward economic analyses is solely deterministic and model application requires 
sensitivity analysis on the most variable parameters (e.g., threat and vulnerabilities 
probabilities). ECO-SECURE (ECOnomic model for the selection of SECurity measUREs) is 
specifically aimed at preventing potential environmental security-based accidents in chemical 
facilities by means of a rational allocation of security resources. Indeed, a specific classification 
for environmental losses is developed. A coupled approach toward the estimation of the threat 
probability and to economic analyses (i.e., deterministic and break-even) allows defining a 
broad set of economic indicators. Results of deterministic analysis allow upgrading the 
physical protection system, according to possible variations in the likelihood of the attack. 
Break-even analysis provides the optimal allocation of the security budget, defined yearly by 
security management. The application of a specific scoring system allows comparing the two 
set of results, obtaining overall indicators.  
Model capabilities have been demonstrated by application to relevant case studies. For 
instance, EM-PICTURES version of the model was tested to an illustrative case study, dealing 
with the prevention of a possible sabotage to a storage tank farm in a process facility, whose 
occurrence may lead to a major accident, proving that model application provides an economic 
aid or criterion for selecting additional security measures in a simplified chemical installation. 
Then, EM-PICTURES was definitely validated by the application to a illustrative case study, 
based on a possible security-related event that took place in France, within a storage tank farm. 
ECO-SECURE version of the economic model, specifically aimed at the allocation of preventive 
security measures against environmental and ecological terroristic attacks within chemical 
installations, was validated by the application to an illustrative case study, freely adapted from 
a possible security-related environmental disaster that took place in Italy, which showed the 
capabilities and specific features of this economic model version. The complexity of the case 
studies and the use of realistic site-specific information for chemical installations provided a 
sound benchmark for the application of both versions of the original economic model within a 
real industrial context. 
Indeed, applications to case studies confirmed that the original economic model developed in 
the PhD research project enables defining rational criteria for the selection and allocation of 
physical security measures (or barriers) and its outputs provide a sound support to managers 
within the security decision-making process. Therefore, the model may support the inclusion 
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of security hazards within quantitative risk assessment, and related delated decision-making, 
with particular mention to the risk evaluation phase, and its application may eventually 
contribute to the reduction of chemical and process plants vulnerability towards intentional 
malevolent acts.  
The research work carried out provided a framework to approach for the inclusion of external 
hazard factors, being either domino or security hazards, within Risk Assessment for the 
chemical and process industry domain. Neverthless, the research work carried out still needs 
to be further refined and widened, with the aim to assist the progress toward a universal 
methodology for the prevention and assessment of cascading events triggered by external 
hazard factors, whose application may enhance safety, security and sustainability in the 
chemical and process industry. 
 
Extension of Quantitative Risk Assessment to the Analysis of External Hazard Factors 
in the Chemical and Process Industry 
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